Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Davidof

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Davidof [2017] FCA 658

Appeal from: Davidof and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2017] AATA 37
File number: NSD 200 of 2017
Judge: LEE J
Date of judgment: 9 June 2017
Catchwords: CORPORATIONS – appeal from decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal – whether a MINI warrant constitutes a “derivative” and hence a “financial product” in accordance with the definitions in Chapter 7 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) – appeal upheld
Legislation:

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), Div 3 of Part 7.1, ss 761A, 764A(1)(c), 920A(1), 1041A

Corporations Regulations 2001 (Cth), reg 7.1.04

Cases cited:

International Litigation Partners Pte Ltd v Chameleon Mining NL (Receivers and Managers Appointed) [2012] HCA 45; (2012) 246 CLR 455

International Litigation Partners Pte Ltd v Chameleon Mining NL [2011] NSWCA 50; (2011) 248 FLR 149

May v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation & Anor [2015] FCAFC 93; (2015) 233 FCR 397

Wingecarribee Shire Council v Lehman Bros Australia Ltd (In Liq) [2012] FCA 1028; (2012) 301 ALR 1

Date of hearing: 9 June 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Corporations and Corporate Insolvency
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 30
Counsel for the Applicant: Dr JG Renwick SC with Ms AM Mitchelmore
Solicitor for the Applicant: Australian Securities and Investments Commission
Counsel for the Respondent: The respondent appeared in person
Table of Corrections
31 August 2017 In the first sentence of paragraph 30, “dismissing” has been replaced with “allowing”.

ORDERS

NSD 200 of 2017
BETWEEN:

AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS COMMISSION

Applicant

AND:

TONY DAVIDOF

Respondent

JUDGE:

LEE J

DATE OF ORDER:

9 JUNE 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be allowed.

2.The decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal made on 20 January 2017 be set aside.

3.The matter be remitted to the Tribunal for redetermination according to law.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Revised from the transcript)

LEE J:

A        INTRODUCTION

  1. This is an appeal from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) to set aside a determination of the applicant (ASIC) to ban the respondent, Mr Davidof, from providing any financial services for a period of three years.

  2. The appeal arises this way: s 920A(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Act) provides that ASIC may, by written notice, make a banning order against a person in a number of circumstances including if the person the subject of the banning order “has not complied with a financial services law”. In relation to Mr Davidof, the relevant financial services law was the norm prohibiting market manipulation contained in s 1041A of the Act. The market manipulation with which the section deals is contravening conduct in relation to “financial products”. By reason of s 761A, which provides definitions of terms used in Chapter 7, a “financial product” has…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 658
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Davidof, the dispute arose concerning the classification of MINI warrants under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Specifically, the case addressed whether MINI warrants should be considered "derivatives" and thus "financial products" as defined in Chapter 7 of the Act. This classification was crucial for regulatory oversight and compliance purposes.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether MINI warrants satisfied the definition of a "derivative" under section 761D(1) of the Corporations Act. The court needed to determine if the MINI warrants met the three conditions outlined in the definition: whether they required the provision of consideration at a future time, whether that future time was not less than one business day after the arrangement, and whether the consideration was derived from the value of something else. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal had previously ruled that MINI warrants did not meet the definition due to the absence of a set expiry date.

The court found that the MINI warrants did indeed satisfy the conditions for being classified as derivatives. Firstly, they involved the provision of consideration at a future time, as they obligated CSISAL to pay a Termination Amount to the holder under certain conditions. Secondly, the future time for the provision of consideration did not need to be precisely one business day, as the Settlement Date was defined as 10 business days after a specified event. Lastly, the value of the MINI warrants was ultimately derived from the value of shares in Atlas Iron Limited or the ASX SPI 200 Index Futures contracts. The court held that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal had erred in its interpretation of the regulations and statutory provisions.

Consequently, the court allowed the appeal, set aside the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, and remitted the matter back to the Tribunal for redetermination in accordance with the law. The orders stipulated that the matter should be reconsidered with the correct interpretation of the statutory and regulatory definitions applied.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal made on 20 January 2017 be set aside.

3. The matter be remitted to the Tribunal for redetermination according to law.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case involves an appeal by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) against a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). The central issue is whether a MINI warrant issued by Corporate Services International Pty Ltd (CSISAL) constitutes a "derivative" and therefore a "financial product" as defined in Chapter 7 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The MINI warrants in question were issued to investors who purchased them under a Product Disclosure Statement (PDS). The warrants gave the holders the right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell shares in Atlas Iron Limited at a specified price on a specified date, known as the Settlement Date. The Settlement Date was contingent on certain market conditions, specifically the price of Atlas Iron Limited shares and the ASX SPI 200 Index Futures contracts.

The AAT had previously determined that the MINI warrants did not qualify as financial products because they did not have a set expiry date. ASIC appealed this decision, arguing that the MINI warrants did indeed meet the criteria for being classified as derivatives and hence financial products. ASIC's appeal hinged on the interpretation of the conditions set out in s 761D(1) of the Corporations Act and the corresponding regulations, particularly reg 7.1.04.

The matter originated in the AAT, where the Tribunal initially ruled that the MINI warrants did not constitute financial products because they lacked a set expiry date. ASIC appealed this decision to the Federal Court of Australia. The appeal was heard by the Court, which was required to determine whether the AAT's decision was correct and in accordance with the law. The Court reviewed the arguments presented by both ASIC and CSISAL, focusing on the interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions and regulations. The Court's decision was to allow the appeal, set aside the AAT's decision, and remit the matter back to the AAT for redetermination according to law.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether a MINI warrant constitutes a "derivative" and hence a "financial product" under Chapter 7 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).
2. Whether the conditions set out in s 761D(1) of the Corporations Act are satisfied by the MINI warrants.
3. Whether the future time for the provision of consideration under the MINI warrants is less than the number of days prescribed by the regulations.

Held
1. The court concluded that a MINI warrant constitutes a "derivative" and hence a "financial product" under Chapter 7 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).
2. The court found that the conditions set out in s 761D(1) of the Corporations Act were satisfied by the MINI warrants.
3. The court determined that the future time for the provision of consideration under the MINI warrants was not less than the number of days prescribed by the regulations.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

What can immediately be seen is that apart from the italicised part of reg 7.1.04(2)(b), which allows that the “future time” may be “less than 1 day after the arrangement is entered into”, reg 7.1.04(2) is drafted in substantially similar terms to s 761D(1). It follows, as ASIC submits, that if an arrangement otherwise satisfies s 761D(1) but involves, or may require, the provision of consideration of a particular kind or kinds to someone at a time that is less than one business day, it can still meet the definition of “derivative”.F CONSIDERATION Returning to s 761D, the focus becomes whether the “arrangement” (to use the statutory word) is one that satisfies the conditions set out. Although the Tribunal found the only condition to be wanting was that in s 761D(1)(b) or reg 7.1.04(1) (by reason of the fact that the MINI warrants did not have a set expiry date), it is well to go through each of the three conditions specified. In the circumstances of this case, ASIC submits, and it may be accepted, that this task can be assayed by directing oneself to asking three questions: (a)Does the arrangement make provision whereby a party to the arrangement must, or may be required to, provide consideration of a particular kind or kinds to someone at some future time (s 761D(1)(a))? One should pause here to note that the use of the words “must, or may be required to” (and, in particular, the disjunctive) accepts that the arrangement is not necessarily required to lead to the provision of consideration of a particular kind or kinds, although the possibility must exist.(b)Pursuant to the arrangement, is the “future time” to which question (a) refers not less than the number of days prescribed by the regulations (s 761D(1)(b))?(c)Is the amount of the consideration, or the value of the arrangement, ultimately determined or derived from, or does it vary by reference to (wholly or in part), the value or amount of something else, such as an asset or index (s 761D(1)(c))? Returning to the characteristics of the MINI warrants identified above and taking the questions out of order: (a)As to question (c): the amount of the consideration, or the value of the arrangement, is plainly ultimately determined or derived from the value or amount of something else, being shares in Atlas Iron Limited or the ASX SPI 200 Index Futures contracts;(b)As to question (a): the arrangement does make provision whereby a party to the arrangement may be required to provide consideration of a particular kind or kinds to someone at some future time because each MINI warrant imposed on CSISAL an obligation to pay to the holder the Termination Amount in certain circumstances (see [12] above) calculated in accordance with section 8 of the PDS, depending on the MINI type (Long or Short) and notwithstanding that the definition expressly contemplates that the result of the calculation may be that no payment is required to be made. This leaves question (b). ASIC initially submitted that the “future time” is not less than one business day (reg 7.1.04(1)(b)) after the day on which the arrangement is entered into. This condition was satisfied, it was said, because the future time at which the obligation on the part of CSISAL to provide consideration may arise is satisfied by reason of the reference, in the definition of Settlement Date, to “10 business days” after the happening of specified event: see [11] above.