International Litigation Partners Pte Ltd v Chameleon Mining NL (Receivers and Managers Appointed)

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

FRENCH CJ,
GUMMOW, HEYDON, CRENNAN AND BELL JJ

INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION PARTNERS PTE
LTD  APPELLANT

AND

CHAMELEON MINING NL (RECEIVERS AND
MANAGERS APPOINTED) & ORS  RESPONDENTS

International Litigation Partners Pte Ltd v Chameleon Mining NL (Receivers and Managers Appointed)

[2012] HCA 45

5 October 2012

S362/2011

ORDER

1.Appeal allowed.

2.Set aside orders 2, 3, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of the orders of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales made on 3 June 2011, save for so much of order 9 as relates to the costs of the appeal to that Court, and, in their place, order that:

(a)judgment in the sum of $8,381,144.30 be entered for the appellant against the first respondent;

(b)the first respondent pay interest on the judgment sum of $8,381,144.30 to the appellant as follows:

(i)pursuant to s 100 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), the first respondent pay interest on the judgment sum from 10 August 2010, being the date on which the Early Termination Fee became payable, up to the date of entry of judgment; and

(ii)pursuant to s 101 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), the first respondent pay interest on the judgment sum from the date of entry of judgment up to the date of payment.

3.The first respondent pay the appellant's costs of the appeal to this Court and of the cross-appeal to the Court of Appeal.

4.The security provided by the appellant, as a condition of the grant of special leave to appeal given by this Court on 28 October 2011, be released.

On appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales

Representation

B W Walker SC with R C A Higgins for the appellant (instructed by Ashurst Australia)

J T Gleeson SC with M A Jones SC and M L Bennett for the first respondent (instructed by Swaab Attorneys)

C R C Newlinds SC with J C Giles for the second respondent (instructed by Lavan Legal)

Submitting appearance for the third and fourth respondents

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. FRENCH CJ, GUMMOW, CRENNAN AND BELL JJ.   This appeal from the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Giles and Young JJA; Hodgson JA dissenting)[1] turns upon the construction of provisions in Ch 7 in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ("the Act") and regulations made thereunder[2]. 

    [2]References in these reasons to the Act are to the form taken at the critical date, which, as will appear, was 10 August 2010.

    Chapter 7 of the Act

  2. Chapter 7 is headed "Financial services and markets". The "main object" of Ch 7 is stated in s 760A as the promotion of:

    "(a)confident and informed decision making by consumers of financial products and services while facilitating efficiency, flexibility and…

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Details
Case
[2012] HCA 45
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia heard an appeal concerning a litigation funding agreement between International Litigation Partners Pte Ltd (the appellant) and Chameleon Mining NL (the first respondent). The dispute arose when Chameleon Mining sought to rescind the agreement, arguing that International Litigation Partners had conducted a financial services business without the requisite licence. This contention was based on the assertion that the litigation funding agreement constituted a "financial product" or a "credit facility" under the relevant legislation.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the litigation funding agreement entered into by the parties constituted a "financial product" or a "credit facility" for the purposes of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and its associated regulations. Specifically, the court had to determine if the appellant's provision of funding for legal costs, paid directly to the respondent's lawyers, fell within the statutory definitions of these terms, thereby requiring a financial services licence.

The High Court reasoned that the Funding Deed provided financial accommodation to Chameleon Mining. The appellant agreed to pay the legal costs associated with the litigation, satisfying a need of the respondent for funds to pay its lawyers. This accommodation was provided for a period, either until the litigation reached resolution or until a change in control of the respondent occurred. The court found that this arrangement constituted a "credit facility" as it involved the provision of financial accommodation for a period, and therefore fell within the scope of the legislation. The exclusion for credit facilities from the definition of financial products under s 765A(1)(h)(i) of the Act meant that the appellant was not dealing in a financial product.

Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The court ordered that judgment be entered for the appellant against the first respondent in the sum of $8,381,144.30, with interest, and that the first respondent pay the appellant's costs of the appeal. The security provided by the appellant for the grant of special leave to appeal was also ordered to be released.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal allowed.

2. Set aside orders 2, 3, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of the orders of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales made on 3 June 2011, save for so much of order 9 as relates to the costs of the appeal to that Court, and, in their place, order that:

(a) judgment in the sum of $8,381,144.30 be entered for the appellant against the first respondent;

(b) the first respondent pay interest on the judgment sum of $8,381,144.30 to the appellant as follows:

(i) pursuant to s 100 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), the first respondent pay interest on the judgment sum from 10 August 2010, being the date on which the Early Termination Fee became payable, up to the date of entry of judgment; and

(ii) pursuant to s 101 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), the first respondent pay interest on the judgment sum from the date of entry of judgment up to the date of payment.

3. The first respondent pay the appellant's costs of the appeal to this Court and of the cross-appeal to the Court of Appeal.

4. The security provided by the appellant, as a condition of the grant of special leave to appeal given by this Court on 28 October 2011, be released.

Background

Background to the litigation

The background and the relevant legislation are set out in the joint judgment. I adopt the abbreviations for the legislation and the agreement between the parties there employed.The facts The appellant, alas, is a litigation funder. It entered a Funding Deed with the first respondent by which it agreed to fund the first respondent's conduct of certain litigation in which the first respondent's solicitors had changed. The appellant agreed in the Funding Deed to pay the "Legal Costs" within 28 days of receiving a written notification demanding payment and substantiating documentation if required (cl 2.1). The "Legal Costs" were costs associated with procuring legal files from the first respondent's previous solicitor as well as certain future agreed legal costs and disbursements (cl 1). Thus the appellant did not supply the first respondent with money for it to pay the "Legal Costs" incurred by the first respondent's lawyers. Instead it paid the money directly to the lawyers. It would not be reimbursed until either the proceedings reached "Resolution" (cl 3.1) or there was a Change in Control of the first respondent (cl 4.1). In the latter event, the appellant was entitled to immediate payment by the first respondent of the Early Termination Fee as defined in cl 1 (cl 4.2). By reason of dealings between the first respondent and the second respondent, there was a Change in Control of the first respondent. The first respondent disputed the appellant's entitlement to the Early Termination Fee, and purported to rescind the Funding Agreement under s 925A of the Act, on the ground that the appellant entered into the Funding Deed in the course of the appellant's "financial services business", which it carried on without a licence (s 911A of the Act). The statutory structure A "financial services business" is a business which provides "financial services" (s 761A of the Act). The expression "financial service" includes dealing in a "financial product" (s 766A(1)(b) of the Act). The appellant denies that it has dealt in a "financial product". A "credit facility" within the meaning of the Regulations is not a "financial product" (s 765A(1)(h)(i) of the Act). Pursuant to reg 7.1.06(1)(a), a "credit facility" includes "the provision of credit" for any period. Regulation 7.1.06(3)(b)(i) provides that "credit" includes "any form of financial accommodation". In ordinary usage, "accommodation" means anything which supplies a want.Conclusion The crucial issue is thus whether the appellant provided the first respondent with any form of financial accommodation. The first respondent needed lawyers to conduct its litigation. Lawyers would not do so unless paid. The first respondent had a want of money to pay them. The appellant supplied that want by paying the first respondent's lawyers directly. The accommodation so supplied extended for the period marked by cl 3.1, unless cl 4.1 came into operation earlier. The second respondent submitted that the definition of "credit facility" in the Act and the Regulations required identification of a period of time when there was money owing but not payable. Clauses 3.1 and 4.2 identified times when the money would be both owing and payable. That is sufficient to satisfy the words "the provision of credit … for any period" (reg 7.1.06(1)(a)(i)). What was given was financial accommodation for the periods defined in cll 3.1 and 4.2. The first respondent submitted that "credit" required an "element of a definite unavoidable obligation but with a concept of deferral". This construction imposes restrictions on the definition of credit considered in the context of a facility for providing credit in the form of "financial accommodation" which are not present in the statutory language. "Accommodation" is a wide expression. As the appellant submitted, the words "any" and "form" in the expression "any form of financial accommodation" indicate that it is an expression to be construed amply. Orders

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

FRENCH CJ, GUMMOW, CRENNAN AND BELL JJ (dissent) HEYDON J
Clause 2.1 of the Funding Deed contained a present promise by ILP to pay the Legal Costs within 28 days of receipt of written notification. The temporal limitation upon the performance of that promise was that the notification relate to costs in relation to the Federal Court proceedings or any appeal from a judgment or order therein. For its part, Chameleon undertook to make the payments identified in cl 3.1 if the Federal Court proceedings yielded a receipt whether by way of settlement or judgment.Conclusion The Funding Deed was a "credit facility", being for the provision for a period of a form of financial accommodation of Chameleon by ILP. The exclusion provision in s 765A(1)(h)(i) of the Act was satisfied. This makes it unnecessary to consider the alternative submissions by ILP. These are predicated upon the Funding Deed not being a "credit facility".Orders The appeal should be allowed. The first respondent should pay the appellant's costs of the appeal to this Court and of the cross‑appeal to the Court of Appeal. Orders 2, 3, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of the orders of the Court of Appeal made on 3 June 2011 should be set aside (save for so much of order 9 as relates to the costs of the appeal to the Court of Appeal) and in place thereof it should be ordered that:a.judgment in the sum of $8,381,144.30 be entered for the appellant against the first respondent;b.the first respondent pay interest on the judgment sum of $8,381,144.30 to the appellant as follows:(i)the first respondent pay interest on the judgment sum, pursuant to s 100 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), from 10 August 2010, being the date on which the Early Termination Fee became payable, up to the date of entry of judgment; and(ii)the first respondent pay interest on the judgment sum, pursuant to s 101 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), from the date of entry of judgment up to the date of payment. These orders reflect the short minutes filed by ILP on 25 June 2012, by leave, after the conclusion of the hearing of the appeal. An order also should be made for the release of the security that ILP provided in compliance with the condition attached to the grant by this Court of special leave. The background and the relevant legislation are set out in the joint judgment. I adopt the abbreviations for the legislation and the agreement between the parties there employed.The facts The appellant, alas, is a litigation funder. It entered a Funding Deed with the first respondent by which it agreed to fund the first respondent's conduct of certain litigation in which the first respondent's solicitors had changed. The appellant agreed in the Funding Deed to pay the "Legal Costs" within 28 days of receiving a written notification demanding payment and substantiating documentation if required (cl 2.1). The "Legal Costs" were costs associated with procuring legal files from the first respondent's previous solicitor as well as certain future agreed legal costs and disbursements (cl 1). Thus the appellant did not supply the first respondent with money for it to pay the "Legal Costs" incurred by the first respondent's lawyers. Instead it paid the money directly to the lawyers. It would not be reimbursed until either the proceedings reached "Resolution" (cl 3.1) or there was a Change in Control of the first respondent (cl 4.1). In the latter event, the appellant was entitled to immediate payment by the first respondent of the Early Termination Fee as defined in cl 1 (cl 4.2).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: HEYDON J