FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Commissioner of Taxation v Bendel [2025] FCAFC 15
ORDERS
VID 903 of 2023 BETWEEN: COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
Applicant
AND: STEVEN BENDEL
First Respondent
GLEEWIN INVESTMENTS PTY LTD (ACN 131 785 576)
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
LOGAN, HESPE AND NESKOVCIN JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
19 FEBRUARY 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal is dismissed.
2.There be no order as to costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules
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- Case
- [2025] FCAFC 15
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue was the interpretation of section 109D(3) of the 1936 Act. The Commissioner argued that the non-exercise by the beneficiary of its right to demand payment of its present entitlement amounted to the provision of financial accommodation, which would constitute a loan. However, the court found that section 109D(3) required more than just the existence of a debtor-creditor relationship; it needed an obligation to repay, not merely an obligation to pay. The Tribunal's failure to engage with the specific text of section 109D(3) and its reliance on other statutory contexts was deemed insufficient. The court held that the correct construction of section 109D resulted in the conclusion that no loan was created as there was no obligation to repay.
The court concluded that the Tribunal did not complete its statutory task by failing to properly engage with the text of section 109D(3). The Commissioner's interpretation was not accepted, and the appeal was dismissed. There was no order as to costs. The decision underscored the importance of statutory interpretation in tax law and highlighted the necessity for tribunals to thoroughly engage with the statutory text and context.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. There be no order as to costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
At the commencement of the hearing the respondents withdrew their notice of objection to competency. CONSIDERATION Construction of s 109D(3) of the 1936 Act The essential issue on appeal concerns the construction of s 109D(3). As explained below, s 109D(3) cannot be construed in isolation and, in particular, not in isolation from the use of the term loan, as defined in s 109D(3) in s 109D(1)(a) or from s 109D(1)(b). The principles of statutory construction are well established. They are encapsulated in summary form in SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34; 262 CLR 362 at [14] (Kiefel CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ) as follows (footnotes omitted):The starting point for the ascertainment of the meaning of a statutory provision is the text of the statute whilst, at the same time, regard is had to its context and purpose. Context should be regarded at this first stage and not at some later stage and it should be regarded in its widest sense. This is not to deny the importance of the natural and ordinary meaning of a word, namely how it is ordinarily understood in discourse, to the process of construction. Considerations of context and purpose simply recognise that, understood in its statutory, historical or other context, some other meaning of a word may be suggested, and so too, if its ordinary meaning is not consistent with the statutory purpose, that meaning must be rejected. The task of statutory construction is to ascertain the meaning of a statutory provision by reference to its text, context and purpose. In the present case, it is the meaning of “a provision of credit or any other form of financial accommodation” (s 109D(3)(b)) and “a transaction (whatever its terms or form) which in substance effects a loan of money” (s 109D(3)(d)) that is required to be ascertained. The Tribunal considered the text of the statute only in general terms. The Tribunal regarded (at TR [82]) the “language” used in s 109D(3) as “very wide” and considered that “similar language has been used in other statutory settings” and that “those settings give a generous and wide construction to that term” but did not identify precisely to which part of the definition in s 109D(3) it was referring. The Tribunal cited three authorities which it considered concerned other statutory settings that gave such a generous and wide construction: Montgomery Wools; Radilo; and International Litigation Partners. The first is not a judicial authority but a decision of the Tribunal concerning s 10 of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) which provided that a “loan includes the provision of credit or any other form of financial accommodation, whether or not enforceable, or intended to be enforceable, by legal proceedings”. Radilo is a decision of the Full Court of this Court that concerned the former s 46D of the 1936 Act and in particular whether a dividend paid on certain performance shares was equivalent to the payment of interest on a loan. “Loan” was defined to include the provision of credit or any other form of financial accommodation. The extended definition of “loan” in this context was construed in light of the concept of interest. Cardinal to the concept of interest is that interest is referable to a principal in money or an obligation to pay money. Section 46D(2)(c) was found to direct attention to the relationship between the company and the shareholder pursuant to which the dividend is paid to determine whether there was a consensual arrangement between them. In respect of the term “provision of credit or any other form of financial accommodation” in this context, the Court at 312E (Sackville and Lehane JJ) concluded that:Under a consensual arrangement for the provision of credit or financial accommodation a principal sum, or its substantial equivalent (by way of indemnity against a liability on maturing bills for example, in the case of accommodation provided in the form of a bill acceptance facility), will ultimately be payable.