Commissioner of Taxation v Bendel

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Commissioner of Taxation v Bendel [2025] FCAFC 15

Appeal from: Bendel & Anor v Commissioner of Taxation [2023] AATA 3074
File number(s): VID 903 of 2023
Judgment of: LOGAN, HESPE AND NESKOVCIN JJ
Date of judgment: 19 February 2025 
Catchwords: TAXATION – appeal by Commissioner from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – where corporate beneficiary had a present entitlement which was unpaid – whether present entitlement remaining unpaid was a loan for the purposes of s 109D of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) – whether Tribunal failed to carry out its task
Legislation:

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 44

Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) Divs 6, 7A, Subdiv EA, ss 44, 109B, 109C, 109D, 109E, 109F, 109G, 109RB, 109XA, 109XB, 109Z

Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 6-25

Cases cited:

Bendel & Anor v Commissioner of Taxation [2023] AATA 3074

Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters Subscribing to Contract No IH00AAQS v Cross [2012] HCA 56; 248 CLR 378

Chianti Pty Ltd v Leume Pty Ltd [2007] WASCA 270; 35 WAR 488

Commissioner of Taxation v Radilo Enterprises Pty Ltd (1997) 72 FCR 300

Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [1981] HCA 26; 147 CLR 297

Corporate Initiatives Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2005] FCAC 62; 142 FCR 279

Di Lorenzo Ceramics Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2017] FCA 1006; 161 FCR 198

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Carter [2022] HCA 10; 274 CLR 304

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd [2012] HCA 55; 250 CLR 503

Fischer v Nemeske Pty Ltd [2016] HCA 11; 257 CLR 615

International Litigation Partners Pte Ltd v Chameleon Mining NL (Receivers and Managers Appointed) [2012] HCA 45; 246 CLR 455

Peter Greensill Family Co Pty Ltd (trustee) v Commissioner of Taxation [2020] FCA 559

Prime Wheat Association Ltd v Chief Commissioner of Stamp Duties (1997) 42 NSWLR 505

Re Montgomery Wools Pty Ltd (As Trustee for Montgomery Wools Pty Ltd Super Fund) v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2012] AATA 61; 87 ATR 282

SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34; 262 CLR 362

Division: General Division
Registry: Victoria
National Practice Area: Taxation
Number of paragraphs: 97
Date of hearing: 22–23 August 2024
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr G Davies KC and Mr J Phillips
Solicitor for the Applicant: Australian Taxation Office (in-house)
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr A De Wijn SC and Mr P Jeffreys
Solicitor for the Respondents: Arnold Bloch Leibler

ORDERS

VID 903 of 2023
BETWEEN:

COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION

Applicant

AND:

STEVEN BENDEL

First Respondent

GLEEWIN INVESTMENTS PTY LTD (ACN 131 785 576)

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

LOGAN, HESPE AND NESKOVCIN JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

19 FEBRUARY 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is dismissed.

2.There be no order as to costs.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules

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Details
Case
[2025] FCAFC 15
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Commissioner of Taxation v Bendel involved an appeal by the Commissioner against a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. The central issue was whether a present entitlement that remained unpaid constituted a loan under section 109D of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth). The Tribunal's task was to determine whether it had properly interpreted the relevant statutory provisions.

The primary legal issue was the interpretation of section 109D(3) of the 1936 Act. The Commissioner argued that the non-exercise by the beneficiary of its right to demand payment of its present entitlement amounted to the provision of financial accommodation, which would constitute a loan. However, the court found that section 109D(3) required more than just the existence of a debtor-creditor relationship; it needed an obligation to repay, not merely an obligation to pay. The Tribunal's failure to engage with the specific text of section 109D(3) and its reliance on other statutory contexts was deemed insufficient. The court held that the correct construction of section 109D resulted in the conclusion that no loan was created as there was no obligation to repay.

The court concluded that the Tribunal did not complete its statutory task by failing to properly engage with the text of section 109D(3). The Commissioner's interpretation was not accepted, and the appeal was dismissed. There was no order as to costs. The decision underscored the importance of statutory interpretation in tax law and highlighted the necessity for tribunals to thoroughly engage with the statutory text and context.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. There be no order as to costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

In conclusion, whilst we are satisfied that the Tribunal did not complete its statutory task because it did not engage with the text of s 109D(3), we do not accept the Commissioner’s construction. Application to the facts Ordinarily the relationship between beneficiary and trustee is distinguishable from the legal relationship between debtor and creditor. However, the equitable relationship of trustee and beneficiary can be overlayed with the legal relationship of debtor and creditor. As Gageler J (as his Honour then was) said in Fischer v Nemeske Pty Ltd [2016] HCA 11; 257 CLR 615 at [105]:a trustee who admits to having an unconditional obligation to pay a specified amount of money to a beneficiary can thereby become liable to an action at law for the recovery of that amount as money had and received to the benefit of the beneficiary, so as to overlay the equitable relationship of trustee and beneficiary with the legal relationship of debtor and creditor. That has been settled since at least the middle of the nineteenth century [footnotes omitted]. The taxpayer respondents accepted here that there existed a debtor‑creditor relationship between the trustee and Gleewin Investments, based on the decision in Chianti Pty Ltd v Leume Pty Ltd [2007] WASCA 270; 35 WAR 488 at [63]–[77] (Buss JA) and of the High Court in Fischer at [26], [32] (French CJ and Bell J), [108] and [110]–[111] (Gordon J). The respondents conceded that the trustee had admitted the existence of a debt owing to Gleewin Investments on account of the amounts of net income distributed. The admission was accepted to arise from the terms of the trustee resolution and the manner in which the amounts so distributed appeared in the financial statements of the trust as part of the total liabilities owed by the trust disclosed in the balance sheet. It was also conceded that because Gleewin Investments was presently entitled to those distributed amounts, its interest in those amounts was not subject to any contingency or condition which might defeat its entitlement. Its interest was vested in interest and vested in possession and there remained nothing for the trustee to execute except payment to Gleewin Investments. However, s 109D(3) requires more than the existence of a debtor-creditor relationship. It requires an obligation to repay and not merely an obligation to pay. The Commissioner contended before the Tribunal that the non-exercise by Gleewin Investments of its right to call for payment of its present entitlement amounted to the provision of financial accommodation. The Commissioner contended that Gleewin Investments had consented or acquiesced to Gleewin not paying the present entitlement by making a decision to refrain from calling for payment. However, the consensual arrangement relied upon by the Commissioner did not involve the payment of a sum by or at the direction of Gleewin Investments that was required to be repaid. In those circumstances, applying the correct construction of s 109D results in only one conclusion being open. Section 109D is not satisfied. Although – based on the concessions made by the taxpayer – a debtor‑creditor relationship was created by the trustee resolution and the entry in the trust accounts, there was no loan or creation of an obligation to repay an amount as opposed to an obligation to pay.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

At the commencement of the hearing the respondents withdrew their notice of objection to competency. CONSIDERATION Construction of s 109D(3) of the 1936 Act The essential issue on appeal concerns the construction of s 109D(3). As explained below, s 109D(3) cannot be construed in isolation and, in particular, not in isolation from the use of the term loan, as defined in s 109D(3) in s 109D(1)(a) or from s 109D(1)(b). The principles of statutory construction are well established. They are encapsulated in summary form in SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34; 262 CLR 362 at [14] (Kiefel CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ) as follows (footnotes omitted):The starting point for the ascertainment of the meaning of a statutory provision is the text of the statute whilst, at the same time, regard is had to its context and purpose. Context should be regarded at this first stage and not at some later stage and it should be regarded in its widest sense. This is not to deny the importance of the natural and ordinary meaning of a word, namely how it is ordinarily understood in discourse, to the process of construction. Considerations of context and purpose simply recognise that, understood in its statutory, historical or other context, some other meaning of a word may be suggested, and so too, if its ordinary meaning is not consistent with the statutory purpose, that meaning must be rejected. The task of statutory construction is to ascertain the meaning of a statutory provision by reference to its text, context and purpose. In the present case, it is the meaning of “a provision of credit or any other form of financial accommodation” (s 109D(3)(b)) and “a transaction (whatever its terms or form) which in substance effects a loan of money” (s 109D(3)(d)) that is required to be ascertained. The Tribunal considered the text of the statute only in general terms. The Tribunal regarded (at TR [82]) the “language” used in s 109D(3) as “very wide” and considered that “similar language has been used in other statutory settings” and that “those settings give a generous and wide construction to that term” but did not identify precisely to which part of the definition in s 109D(3) it was referring. The Tribunal cited three authorities which it considered concerned other statutory settings that gave such a generous and wide construction: Montgomery Wools; Radilo; and International Litigation Partners. The first is not a judicial authority but a decision of the Tribunal concerning s 10 of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) which provided that a “loan includes the provision of credit or any other form of financial accommodation, whether or not enforceable, or intended to be enforceable, by legal proceedings”. Radilo is a decision of the Full Court of this Court that concerned the former s 46D of the 1936 Act and in particular whether a dividend paid on certain performance shares was equivalent to the payment of interest on a loan. “Loan” was defined to include the provision of credit or any other form of financial accommodation. The extended definition of “loan” in this context was construed in light of the concept of interest. Cardinal to the concept of interest is that interest is referable to a principal in money or an obligation to pay money. Section 46D(2)(c) was found to direct attention to the relationship between the company and the shareholder pursuant to which the dividend is paid to determine whether there was a consensual arrangement between them. In respect of the term “provision of credit or any other form of financial accommodation” in this context, the Court at 312E (Sackville and Lehane JJ) concluded that:Under a consensual arrangement for the provision of credit or financial accommodation a principal sum, or its substantial equivalent (by way of indemnity against a liability on maturing bills for example, in the case of accommodation provided in the form of a bill acceptance facility), will ultimately be payable.