Donohue and Comcare (Compensation) [2019] AATA 101 (7 February 2019)
Division:GENERAL DIVISION
File Number 2017/1417
Re:Paul Donohue
APPLICANT
ComcareAnd
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal:Senior Member Linda Kirk
Date:7 February 2019
Place:Canberra
The reviewable decision dated 21 December 2016 is affirmed.
……………………………………….
Senior Member Linda Kirk
Catchwords
WORKER’S COMPENSATION – whether the Applicant’s claimed condition is an injury or disease – distinction between ‘injury simpliciter’ and disease – whether claimed condition is a ‘sudden and ascertainable or dramatic physiological change or disturbance of the normal physiological state’ – whether the Applicant’s employment contributed to the disease to a significant degree – contribution of other factors to the claimed condition – decision under review affirmed
Legislation
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) ss 4, 5A, 5B, 14
Cases
Australian Postal Corporation v Burch (1998) 156 ALR 483
Comcare v Mooi (1996) 69 FCR 439
Comcare v Power (2015) 238 FCR 187
Comcare v Reardon [2015] FCA 1166
Comcare v Sahu-Kahn (2007) 156 FCR 536
Kennedy Cleaning Services Pty Ltd v Petkoska (2000) 200 CLR 286
Re May and Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission [2011] AATA 886
Reardon and Comcare [2015] AATA 360
May v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission(2015) 233 FCR 397
Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission v May (2016) 257 CLR 468
Prain v Comcare [2016] AATA 459
Su v Comcare [2011] AATA 934REASONS FOR DECISION
Senior Member Linda Kirk
7 February 2019
INTRODUCTION
Mr Paul Donohue (‘the Applicant’) was born in 1951. He commenced employment with ACT Government Transport Canberra and City Services (‘the Agency’) in 1977. At all material times and until his retirement on 30 June 2017 he was employed as a GSO5/6 Ganger in the Road Patrol (Cold Mix).
On 5 July 2016, the Applicant lodged a workers’ compensation claim in respect of ‘stress fracture right distal tibia’ affecting his right foot (‘the Claimed Injury’).[1] The date of injury was claimed to be 12 November 2015. The Applicant claimed that his condition arose as a result of ‘excessive use of [his] right foot’ when ‘pressing road mix onto pavement’.[2]
[1] T20.
[2] T20.
On 21 October 2016, Comcare (‘the Respondent’) denied liability for the Claimed Injury under s 14 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) (‘SRC Act’) on the basis that the Applicant’s employment did not significantly contribute to the Claimed Injury.[3]
[3] T37.
In a decision dated 21 December 2016 the Respondent affirmed the determination denying liability (‘the Reviewable Decision’).[4]
[4] T41.
On 22 March 2017, the Applicant applied to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’) for a review of the Reviewable Decision.[5]
[5] T1.
The review application was heard by the Tribunal at a hearing in Canberra on 5 and 6 September 2018. The following witnesses gave oral evidence at the hearing:
·the Applicant;
·Mr Shane Holden;
·Dr Kylie Scott;
·Dr Anthony Menz; and
·Dr Sean Low.
The following documents were before the Tribunal:
·Applicant’s Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions dated…
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- Donohue and Comcare (Compensation) [2019] AATA 101
- Case
- [2019] AATA 101
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Tribunal was required to determine two primary legal issues. Firstly, whether the applicant's claimed condition was an "injury" (other than a disease) or a "disease" for the purposes of the SRC Act. If it was an "injury simpliciter," the Tribunal had to ascertain if it arose out of or in the course of his employment. If it was a "disease," the Tribunal needed to determine if his employment contributed to it to a significant degree, considering the contribution of other factors.
The Tribunal reasoned that the distinction between an "injury simpliciter" and a "disease" is critical, as different tests apply to establish compensability. An "injury simpliciter" requires a causal or temporal connection to employment, while a "disease" requires significant contribution from employment. The Tribunal noted that an "injury simpliciter" is generally characterised as a sudden and ascertainable or dramatic physiological change or disturbance of the normal physiological state. After considering the evidence, including the applicant's work duties involving tasks such as using a sledgehammer, shovelling concrete, and tamping cold mix, and the supervisor's evidence regarding accepted work practices, the Tribunal was not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the applicant had suffered an injury within the meaning of section 14 of the SRC Act.
Consequently, the Tribunal found that the respondent, Comcare, was not liable to pay compensation to the applicant for the claimed injury. The reviewable decision was affirmed.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Tribunal could not be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the reported stomping activity in fact occurred. This leaves only a finding on the medical evidence that significant contribution from work was not present.[113][113] Respondent’s Submissions dated 18 September 2018, para 5.CONSIDERATION AND REASONS The Tribunal has considered the parties’ submissions, the evidence of the witnesses at the hearing, and all the documentary material before it. The Tribunal is satisfied that the parties had an adequate opportunity to be heard by the Tribunal. (1) Was the Claimed Injury ‘an injury (other than a disease)’? - s5A(1)(b) SRC Act The first issue for the Tribunal’s consideration is whether the Claimed Injury for which the Applicant seeks compensation can be considered a ‘disease’ or an ‘injury other than a disease’ for the purposes of the SRC Act.Distinction between an ‘injury simpliciter’ and a ‘disease’ The distinction between s 5A(1)(a) and s 5A(1)(b) of the SRC Act is an important one for an applicant because, for an injury that is not a disease (often referred to as an ‘injury simpliciter’ – see Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission v May (2016) 257 CLR 468 (‘May’), French CJ, Kiefel, Nettle and Gordon JJ at [42]), the injury must arise out of, or in the course of, the employment (s 5A(1)(b) of the SRC Act). That is, ‘… the physical or mental injury has to have a causal or temporal connection with the employee’s employment’: May per French CJ, Kiefel, Nettle and Gordon JJ at [44]. An injury simpliciter is contrasted with a disease, which must be contributed to, to a significant degree, by the employee’s employment (s 5B(1) of the SRC Act). The latter requires a stronger causal connection between the employment and the ailment: Australian Postal Corporation v Burch (1998) 156 ALR 483 at 486 (‘Burch’); Prain v Comcare [2016] AATA 459 at [7]-[8]. Whether a claimed condition is an injury simplicter or a disease must be determined on a case-by-case basis. As Gleeson CJ and Kirby J observed in Kennedy Cleaning Services Pty Ltd v Petkoska (2000) 200 CLR 286 (‘Kennedy Cleaning’), ‘Generalities are dangerous. The duty of the decision-maker is to apply the language of the relevant legislation to the facts as found in the particular case’ at [22]. Therefore, the question of whether an applicant has a disease or injury must be determined with reference to ‘… precise evidence … concerning the nature and incidents of the physiological change…’: Kennedy Cleaning per Gleeson CJ and Kirby J at [39].What is an ‘injury simplicter’? In May French CJ, Kiefel, Nettle and Gordon JJ observed that whether there is an ‘injury’ in the primary sense ‘will be determined by asking whether the employee has suffered something that can be described as a sudden and ascertainable or dramatic physiological change or disturbance of the normal physiological state’ at [52]. Similarly, in Kennedy Cleaning, Gleeson CJ and Kirby J stated that ‘… a sudden and ascertainable or dramatic physiological change or disturbance of the normal physiological state … may qualify for characterisation as an ‘injury’…’ at [39]. In Burch, the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia found a stroke to be an injury because, in the circumstances, it was ‘…a disturbance of the normal physiological state … or an ascertainable lesion or dramatic physiological change’ at 488.