Musgrave v Martin

Case [2003] FCA 920

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Musgrave v Martin [2003] FCA 920

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – appeal on question of law – Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 44 – whether Tribunal misconstrued definition of “eligible dairy sharefarming arrangement’ in s 4(1) of Structural Adjustment Program Scheme 2000 (Cth) – whether Tribunal misconstrued term ‘false’ in s 35(5) of Scheme (and cl 50 of Schedule 2 to Dairy Produce Act 1986 (Cth)) – whether ‘false’ means purposely untrue, or objectively incorrect – whether statement in application form provided to Dairy Adjustment Authority made to a ‘person’ referred to in cl 50

WORDS AND PHRASES – “false statement”

Dairy Structural Adjustment Program Scheme 2000 (Cth) ss 3, 4, 9, 31, 35, Div 5.2
Dairy Produce Act 1986 (Cth) Schedule 2, cl 5, 6, 7, 50, 55-59, 134
Dairy Industry Adjustment Act 2000 (Cth)
Dairy Produce Legislation Amendment (Supplementary Assistance) Act 2001 (Cth)
Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) ss 22, 46

Re Rogers and Dairy Adjustment Authority and the Van Diemen’s Land Company – Dairies Ltd (VDLD) Pinegrove [2001] AATA 937 referred to
Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd (1993) 43 FCR 280 at 287 referred to
Proudman v Dayman (1941) 67 CLR 536 referred to
R v Bonollo [1981] VR 633 referred to
Collector of Customs v Agfa-Gevaert Limited (1997) 186 CLR 389 at 396 referred to
Brutus v Cozens [1973] AC 854 referred to
Sternberg v The Queen (1953) 88 CLR 646 applied
Cameron v Holt (1980) 142 CLR 342 referred to
Murphy v Farmer (1988) 165 CLR 19 applied
Toy Centre Agencies Pty Ltd v Spencer (1983) 46 ALR 351 referred to
Director of Public Prosecutions v Logon Park Investments Pty Ltd (1995) 37 NSWLR 118 referred to
Dawson v Jack (1902) 28 VLR 634 referred to
Davidson v Watson (1953) 28 ALJ 63 referred to
Ex parte Falstein; Re Maher (1948) 49 SR (NSW) 133 referred to
He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523 referred to
Secretary, Department of Social Security v Salvona (1989) 18 ALD 289 referred to
Commonwealth v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1997) 76 FCR 513 at 519 referred to
Morales v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1995) 60 FCR 550 referred to

PATRICK MUSGRAVE (in his capacity as Chairman of the Dairy Adjustment Authority), JOHN PATRICK DRINAN (in his capacity as Independent Member of the Dairy Adjustment Authority), TERRENCE WILLIAM O’CALLAGHAN (in his capacity as Industry Member of the Dairy Adjustment Authority), JAMES RICHMOND FORSYTH (in his capacity as Industry Member of the Dairy Adjustment Authority) and MERRILYN JANE MCPHERSON (in her capacity as Government Member of the Dairy Adjustment Authority) v GREGORY MARTIN

V622 of 2002

WEINBERG J
2 SEPTEMBER 2003
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V622 OF 2002

BETWEEN:

PATRICK MUSGRAVE
(in his capacity as Chairman of the Dairy Adjustment Authority)
FIRST APPLICANT

JOHN PATRICK DRINAN
(in his capacity as Independent Member of the Dairy Adjustment Authority)
SECOND…

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Details
AGLC
Musgrave v Martin [2003] FCA 920
Case
[2003] FCA 920
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Musgrave v Martin, the primary issue before the court was the interpretation of the term "eligible sharefarming arrangement" as it appears in section 4(1) of the Scheme, and whether a statement made by Mr Martin regarding his involvement in such an arrangement was false. The respondents, Musgrave and another, sought to challenge the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal which had found that Mr Martin's statement was not false. The case was heard in the Federal Court of Australia.

The central legal issues that the court had to address involved the interpretation of the term "eligible sharefarming arrangement" and whether Mr Martin's statement, made in response to a question in section 7 of a form, was false. The applicants argued that the Tribunal had not definitively resolved the meaning of the term and that it should be interpreted in a way that would exclude the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) from being an eligible sharefarming arrangement. Additionally, the applicants contended that Mr Martin's statement was indeed false. The respondents, on the other hand, argued that the Tribunal's interpretation was correct and that the statement was an honest expression of opinion.

The court found that the Tribunal had not conclusively determined the meaning of "eligible sharefarming arrangement" and had instead focused on whether Mr Martin's statement was false. The court held that it was inappropriate for it to resolve the issue of construction as it was not an error of law that affected the Tribunal's decision. Furthermore, the court found that the Tribunal's determination that Mr Martin's statement was not false was correct, as it was an honest expression of opinion based on reasonable grounds. The court therefore concluded that the Tribunal's decision should be set aside and the matter should be remitted to the Tribunal for further consideration in accordance with the law.

In conclusion, the court set aside the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal and remitted the matter back to the Tribunal for further hearing and determination according to law. This decision highlights the importance of clear and definitive interpretations of legal terms in administrative proceedings and the court's limited role in reviewing such interpretations unless they constitute errors of law.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal made on 26 August 2002 be set aside.

2. The matter be remitted to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for hearing and determination according to law.

3.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

WEINBERG J
At the same time, the respondent submitted, the Authority was not a body corporate. It followed that it could not be a “person” within the meaning of cl 50, by virtue of the operation of the provisions of the Acts Interpretation Act. Conclusions(a) Eligible dairy sharefarming arrangement As noted above, elaborate submissions were made by the parties regarding what they considered to be the proper meaning of the expression “eligible sharefarming arrangement” in s 4(1) of the Scheme. Although the Tribunal set out, in some detail, its analysis of the meaning of the expression, and went some way towards accepting the construction favoured by the respondent in this proceeding, it is by no means clear that it finally determined that issue. On more than one occasion the Tribunal observed that there was ambiguity or uncertainty about the meaning of the term. It said that it would adopt a “purposive” approach to the construction of the section, consistent with the decision in Re Rogers, and remarked that if the definition of eligible sharefarming arrangement was intended to embrace those entities whose milk revenue was affected by falling milk prices, then the MOU could not be characterised as such an arrangement. That is as close as the Tribunal came to resolving this issue. In reality, however, the Tribunal seems to have left the issue unresolved, and turned instead to consider whether the statement made by Mr Martin was false. It determined that the statement was not relevantly false because it amounted to an expression of opinion in relation to a complex legal question, and because the opinion was genuinely held, on reasonable grounds. The applicants urged me to resolve the question of construction which was not, in my view, determined below. They submitted that it would be convenient if I did so, having regard to the fact that the matter has been fully argued before me. I consider that it is inappropriate that I do so. The power of this Court, under s 44, is limited to correcting errors of law which were operative upon the decision below, and does not extend to answering hypothetical questions. I am not persuaded that the Tribunal came to a final conclusion as to whether the MOU created an eligible dairy sharefarming arrangement. It follows that I need not decide that question. Whatever views the Tribunal may provisionally have expressed regarding that question, those views did not play any operative role in its ultimate decision. In those circumstances, it is inappropriate to say anything further regarding the meaning of this expression. It also follows that it is unnecessary to determine whether, as the respondent contends, the correct interpretation of the expression raises nothing more than a question of fact, and is not amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court under s 44. (b) False statement At the outset, it is important to note that the applicants did not challenge the Tribunal’s finding that Mr Martin acted honestly and reasonably when he stated, in his answer to the question posed in s 7 of the form, that he was not party to any eligible sharefarming arrangement.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: WEINBERG J

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