Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Thomas

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

KIEFEL CJ,
BELL, GAGELER, KEANE, NETTLE, GORDON AND EDELMAN JJ

Matter No B60/2017

THE COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA  APPELLANT

AND

MARTIN ANDREW THOMAS  RESPONDENT

Matter No B61/2017

THE COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA  APPELLANT

AND

MARTIN ANDREW PTY LTD  RESPONDENT

Matter No B62/2017

THE COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA  APPELLANT

AND

THOMAS NOMINEES PTY LTD  RESPONDENT

Matter No B63/2017

THE COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA  APPELLANT

AND

MARTIN ANDREW THOMAS  RESPONDENT

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Thomas
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Martin Andrew Pty Ltd
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Thomas Nominees Pty Ltd
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Thomas

[2018] HCA 31

8 August 2018
B60/2017, B61/2017, B62/2017 & B63/2017

ORDER

Matter No B60/2017

1. The appeal be allowed in respect of the income years ending 30 June 2006, 30 June 2007 and 30 June 2008.

2. The cross-appeal be dismissed.

3. Set aside order 1 of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia made on 12 April 2017 in Matter No QUD72/2016 and orders 1, 2, 3 and 4 of that Court made on 3 August 2017 in Matter No QUD72/2016, and in their place make the following orders:

(a)the appeal be allowed in part;

(b)the cross-appeal be allowed;

(c)the objection decisions in respect of the income years ending 30 June 2006, 30 June 2007 and 30 June 2008 be remitted to the Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia for determination in accordance with the reasons of this Court;

(d)the objection decision in respect of the income year ending 30 June 2009 be remitted to the Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia for determination in accordance with the orders of Greenwood J made on 26 November 2015 in Matter No QUD274/2012 and otherwise in accordance with the law.

4. The respondent pay the appellant's costs of the appeal except for those costs that relate to the determination of the matters concerning the income year ending 30 June 2009.

5. The appellant pay the respondent's costs of the appeal insofar as those costs relate to the determination of the matters concerning the income year ending 30 June 2009.

Matter No B61/2017

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. Set aside order 1 of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia made on 12 April 2017 in Matter No QUD78/2016 and orders 1, 2, 3 and 4 of that Court made on 3 August 2017 in Matter No QUD78/2016, and in their place make the following orders:

(a)the appeal be dismissed;

(b)the cross-appeal be allowed;

(c)the objection decision in respect of the income year ending 30 June 2008 be remitted to the Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia for determination in accordance with the reasons of this Court.

3. The respondent pay the appellant's costs of the appeal.

Matter No B62/2017

1. The appeal be dismissed.

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Details
Case
[2018] HCA 31
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered appeals from the Full Court of the Federal Court concerning the application of Division 207 of the *Income Tax Assessment Act 1997* (Cth) to a trust. The dispute arose from resolutions passed by the trustee of a trust, which purported to distribute franking credits to beneficiaries separately from and in different proportions to the income comprising franked distributions. The trustee had also obtained directions from the Supreme Court of Queensland under section 96 of the *Trusts Act 1973* (Qld) concerning these resolutions. The Commissioner of Taxation contended that these directions did not conclusively determine the application of Division 207.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the directions obtained by the trustee from the Supreme Court of Queensland, in conjunction with the trustee's resolutions, were effective to determine the application of Division 207 of the *Income Tax Assessment Act 1997* (Cth) in a manner that was binding on the Commissioner. This involved considering the nature of judicial advice in the context of trust distributions and its interaction with the imputation system, particularly the concept of "streaming" franked distributions. The Court also had to determine whether the trustee's actions, as sanctioned by the Supreme Court, validly allocated franking credits to beneficiaries independently of the underlying franked income.

The High Court allowed the appeals in part and dismissed the cross-appeals for certain income years. The Court reasoned that while the trustee had broad discretion under the trust deed to apply income and to record categories of income separately, and that the deed contemplated differential distribution of franked distributions, the directions obtained from the Supreme Court did not conclusively determine the application of Division 207 in the manner contended by the taxpayers. The Court emphasised that the imputation system operates by attaching franking credits to franked distributions, and that the legislative framework for streaming under section 207-35 of the *Income Tax Assessment Act 1997* (Cth) requires that franked distributions be streamed in the same proportions as other income. The Court found that the resolutions and directions did not achieve this, and therefore the objection decisions for the relevant income years were remitted to the Commissioner for determination in accordance with the Court's reasons. The Court also made specific orders regarding costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Matter No B60/2017

1. The appeal be allowed in respect of the income years ending 30 June 2006, 30 June 2007 and 30 June 2008.

2. The cross-appeal be dismissed.

3. Set aside order 1 of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia made on 12 April 2017 in Matter No QUD72/2016 and orders 1, 2, 3 and 4 of that Court made on 3 August 2017 in Matter No QUD72/2016, and in their place make the following orders:

(a) the appeal be allowed in part;

(b) the cross-appeal be allowed;

(c) the objection decisions in respect of the income years ending 30 June 2006, 30 June 2007 and 30 June 2008 be remitted to the Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia for determination in accordance with the reasons of this Court;

(d) the objection decision in respect of the income year ending 30 June 2009 be remitted to the Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia for determination in accordance with the orders of Greenwood J made on 26 November 2015 in Matter No QUD274/2012 and otherwise in accordance with the law.

4. The respondent pay the appellant's costs of the appeal except for those costs that relate to the determination of the matters concerning the income year ending 30 June 2009.

5. The appellant pay the respondent's costs of the appeal insofar as those costs relate to the determination of the matters concerning the income year ending 30 June 2009.

Matter No B61/2017

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. Set aside order 1 of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia made on 12 April 2017 in Matter No QUD78/2016 and orders 1, 2, 3 and 4 of that Court made on 3 August 2017 in Matter No QUD78/2016, and in their place make the following orders:

(a) the appeal be dismissed;

(b) the cross-appeal be allowed;

(c) the objection decision in respect of the income year ending 30 June 2008 be remitted to the Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia for determination in accordance with the reasons of this Court.

3. The respondent pay the appellant's costs of the appeal.

Matter No B62/2017

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondent's costs.

Matter No B63/2017

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondent's costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

It is against that statutory framework that the terms of the Deed, and the actions of the Trustee, are to be considered.FactsThe Trust The Trust was established by a Deed, subsequently amended by a number of deeds poll. Mr Thomas was the sole shareholder and director of MAPL. Mr Thomas and his mother were directors and equal shareholders of the Trustee. Clause 4(1) of the Deed (as amended) gave the Trustee an "absolute and uncontrolled discretion" to apply the income of the Trust property. Under cl 4(2), the Trustee was permitted to record identified categories of income separately in the Trust's books of account. The identified categories included dividends which were fully franked, which were unfranked, to which a foreign tax credit attached, or to which "any other separately identifiable taxation consequence or benefit" attached. Clause 4(3) went on to provide that the Trustee could identify, separately record and maintain, in the books of account and records of the Trust, income having, or in respect of which there was attached, individual or unique characteristics other than as referred to in cl 4(2), as the Trustee by resolution determined. Next, consistent with s 207-35 in Div 207 of the 1997 Act, cl 4(4)(a) permitted differential distribution of the whole or any part of the income between beneficiaries – commonly referred to as "streaming". The Deed did not, because it could not, treat franking credits as income. However, the Deed did, as s 207‑35 provides, contemplate that franked distributions could be streamed between beneficiaries in different proportions to the other income of the Trust. Finally, cl 4(5) provided that expenses and outgoings of the Trust, at the discretion of the Trustee, could be differentially allocated against, and deducted from, categories of income. The Trustee did not purport to act under cl 4(5).Franked distributions and resolutions As noted earlier, in each of the 2006 to 2008 income years, the Trustee passed the resolutions, under cl 4 of the Deed, which were described by the taxpayers as "dual net income distribution resolutions". Each resolution purported to apply the net income of the Trust for the benefit of Mr Thomas and MAPL but in a different way. Apart from the year and the proportions, the resolutions for the 2006 year set out below were typical of the resolutions passed in each of the income years in dispute. The Net Income Resolution was in these terms: The Franking Credit Resolution was in these terms: The Trust's income tax returns, prepared and lodged on the basis that the Bifurcation Assumption was effective, disclosed the following distributions: The result sought to be achieved each year by the resolutions, and reflected in the tax returns, was not in dispute. As the taxpayers submitted to the primary judge in the Pt IVC proceedings, by the passing of the "dual net income distribution resolutions", the Trustee endeavoured to ensure that all trust income was distributed to avoid the operation of s 99A of the 1936 Act and to ensure that the distribution occurred in a way that maximised the refundable tax offsets available only to Mr Thomas.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

KIEFEL CJ, BELL, KEANE, NETTLE, GORDON AND EDELMAN JJ GAGELER J
By the parties' respective appeals to the Full Court of the Federal Court, that legal question was before that Court. Any denial of procedural fairness was therefore addressed by those appeals and is no longer operative. To the extent that the taxpayers sought to have the proceedings remitted to the primary judge to adduce further evidence in relation to the actual distributions of income that were made in the 2006 to 2008 income years, that application should be rejected. An application by the taxpayers to the primary judge for leave to reopen to adduce that evidence was refused. If the taxpayers wished to raise that issue in this Court, they should have sought leave to file a cross-appeal. No such cross‑appeal was filed. Conclusion and orders For those reasons, the following orders should be made:Matter No B60/20171.The appeal be allowed in respect of the income years ending 30 June 2006, 30 June 2007 and 30 June 2008. 2.The cross-appeal be dismissed. 3.Set aside order 1 of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia made on 12 April 2017 in Matter No QUD72/2016 and orders 1, 2, 3 and 4 of that Court made on 3 August 2017 in Matter No QUD72/2016, and in their place make the following orders:(a)the appeal be allowed in part;(b)the cross-appeal be allowed;(c)the objection decisions in respect of the income years ending 30 June 2006, 30 June 2007 and 30 June 2008 be remitted to the Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia for determination in accordance with the reasons of this Court;(d)the objection decision in respect of the income year ending 30 June 2009 be remitted to the Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia for determination in accordance with the orders of Greenwood J made on 26 November 2015 in Matter No QUD274/2012 and otherwise in accordance with the law.4.The respondent pay the appellant's costs of the appeal except for those costs that relate to the determination of the matters concerning the income year ending 30 June 2009.5.The appellant pay the respondent's costs of the appeal insofar as those costs relate to the determination of the matters concerning the income year ending 30 June 2009.Matter No B61/20171.The appeal be allowed.2.Set aside order 1 of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia made on 12 April 2017 in Matter No QUD78/2016 and orders 1, 2, 3 and 4 of that Court made on 3 August 2017 in Matter No QUD78/2016, and in their place make the following orders:(a)the appeal be dismissed;(b)the cross-appeal be allowed;(c)the objection decision in respect of the income year ending 30 June 2008 be remitted to the Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia for determination in accordance with the reasons of this Court.3.The respondent pay the appellant's costs of the appeal.Matter No B62/2017 1. The appeal be dismissed.2. The appellant pay the respondent's costs.Matter No B63/20171. The appeal be dismissed.2. The appellant pay the respondent's costs. Tax lawyers often speak of "taxable facts"[60]. They mean by that expression to refer to more than just facts. They mean by it to refer to the combination of events that have occurred and legal consequences of events that have occurred on which a taxing statute fixes to impose a taxation liability or to confer a taxation benefit. [60]Eg Bailey v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1977) 136 CLR 214 at 217; [1977] HCA 11.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: KIEFEL CJ, BELL, KEANE, NETTLE, GORDON AND EDELMAN JJ, GAGELER J