FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Farrell v Super Retail Group Limited (Application for Leave to Appeal Suppression Orders) [2025] FCA 170
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- Case
- [2025] FCA 170
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue in the case was whether the suppression orders made by the primary judge should be appealed. The primary judge had concluded that the suppression orders were necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice, given that the information in question remained confidential and without prejudice. Ms. Farrell argued that the orders were already covered by interim orders made in an earlier appeal and that broader confidentiality orders should not be granted. The court needed to determine whether the suppression orders constituted a substantial injustice to Ms. Farrell, warranting an appeal.
The court found that the suppression orders did not amount to a substantial injustice. The primary judge had carefully considered the need to balance the public interest in open justice with the protection of confidential information. The court held that the suppression orders were necessary to protect the confidential communications that were part of the dispute resolution process. The court also noted that the broader confidentiality orders sought by SRG were not warranted by the circumstances. The application for leave to appeal was dismissed as there was no sufficient doubt in the primary judge's decision, and no substantial injustice would result if the appeal was not granted.
The Federal Court made it clear that the application for leave to appeal the suppression orders was dismissed. No orders were made as to the costs of the application. This decision confirmed the primary judge's authority to make suppression orders to protect confidential information in the context of ongoing legal disputes.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for leave to appeal dated 28 January 2025 be dismissed.
2. There be no orders as to costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
As to substantial injustice, the Media Interveners were not in a position to advance any submission as to the injustice arising to Ms Farrell but submitted that there would be substantial injustice arising to the public at large. It was submitted that there was a very real prospect that they would not have an occasion to be heard as to whether the Suppression Orders should be set aside at some future point in time, for example, if the proceedings were settled on a confidential basis. 4. CONSIDERATION 4.1 Principles As mentioned at the outset, the principles applicable to the grant of leave to appeal are well settled. The decision to grant leave to appeal involves an exercise of discretion that takes into account the need to promote the overarching purpose of the Court of seeking to ensure the just resolution of disputes according to law and as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible: s 37M of the FCA Act. In Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Rush [2018] FCAFC 70, the Full Court (constituted by Allsop CJ, Rares and Lee JJ and where Lee J gave ex tempore reasons for the Court) stated at [2]-[4]: The principles informing the determination of whether to grant leave to appeal from a decision of a single judge of this Court are not novel. The starting point is that in exercising the power to grant leave, regard must be had to the statutory charge in s 37M(3) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (Act) that the power must be exercised or carried out in the way that best promotes the overarching purpose, being the just resolution of disputes according to law and as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible.Consistently with the facilitation of a just resolution, an applicant must usually show that: (a) in all the circumstances, the decision to be appealed is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant its reconsideration on appeal; and (b) supposing the decision to be wrong, substantial injustice would result if leave were refused: Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 398 –399 (Sheppard, Burchett and Heerey JJ). The sufficiency of the doubt in respect of the decision to be appealed and the question of substantial injustice bear upon each other so that the degree of doubt which is sufficient in one case may be different from that required in another. It has also been said that the considerations are cumulative such that leave ought not be granted unless each limb is made out: Rawson Finances Pty Ltd v Deputy Cmr of Taxation [2010] FCAFC 139; (2010) 81 ATR 36 at 38 [5] (Ryan, Stone and Jagot JJ); Melbourne City Investments Pty Ltd v Treasury Wine Estates Ltd [2017] FCAFC 98; (2017) 252 FCR 1 at 4 [3] (Jagot, Yates and Murphy JJ).Additionally, consistent with the facilitation of a quick, inexpensive and efficient resolution is the principle which emerges from the oft-cited warning of Jordan CJ in In re the Will of F. B. Gilbert (Deceased) (1946) 46 SR (NSW) 318 at 323, that if a tight rein is not kept upon the interference with orders of judges at first instance in the exercise of discretion on a point of practice and procedure, the result will be “disastrous to the proper administration of justice”.