Farrell v Super Retail Group Limited (Application for Leave to Appeal Suppression Orders)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Farrell v Super Retail Group Limited (Application for Leave to Appeal Suppression Orders) [2025] FCA 170

Appeal from: Rebecca Farrell v Super Retail Group Limited & Ors (NSD100/2025, Orders dated 23 December 2024)
File number(s): NSD 100 of 2025
Judgment of: SHARIFF J
Date of judgment: 11 March 2025
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to appeal – where primary judge made suppressions orders “until further order” – no substantial injustice established –leave refused
Legislation:

Corporations Act 2000 (Cth)

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 570

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 37AF, 37AG(1)(a), 37AH(2)(d), 37AI, 37AJ(3), 37M

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 39.05

Cases cited:

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Air New Zealand Limited (No 3) [2012] FCA 1430

Booth v Victoria (No 3) [2020] FCA 1143

Clime Capital Ltd v UGL Pty Ltd (No 2) [2020] FCA 257

Country Care Group Pty Ltd v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (No 2) [2020] FCAFC 44; (2020) 275 FCR 377

Darwalla Milling Co Pty Ltd v F Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd [2006] FCA 915

Décor Corporation Proprietary Limited v Dart IndustriesInc [1991] FCA 844; 33 FCR 397

Energy Beverages LLC v Cantarella Bros Pty Ltd (No 2) [2022] FCA 394

Equity Financial Planners Pty Ltd v AMP Financial Planning Pty Ltd [2024] FCA 1036

Farrell v Super Retail Group Limited (Confidentiality Applications) [2024] FCA 954

Farrell v Super Retail Group Limited (Specific Performance Claim) [2024] FCA 1515

GLJ v The Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Lismore [2023] HCA 32; (2023) 414 ALR 635

Hogan v Australian Crime Commission [2010] HCA 21; (2010) 240 CLR 651

Hopkins v AECOM Australia Pty Ltd (No 8) [2016] FCA 1096

House v The King [1936] HCA 32; (1936) 55 CLR 499

Melbourne City Investments Pty Ltd v Treasury Wine Estates Ltd [2017] FCAFC 98; (2017) 252 FCR 1

MZABP v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391; (2015) 242 FCR 585

Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Rush [2018] FCAFC 70

Naude v DRA Global Limited [2023] FCA 493

Oreb v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2016] FCA 321

Patterson v Westpac Banking Corporation [2024] FCA 629

Patterson v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 2) [2024] FCA 818

Pigozzo v Mineral Resources Ltd [2022] FCA 1166

Porter v Dyer [2022] FCAFC 116; (2022) 402 ALR 659

Rawson Finances Pty Ltd v Deputy Cmr of Taxation [2010] FCAFC 139; (2010) 81 ATR 36

Reynoldsv JP Morgan Administrative Services Australia Limited (No 2) [2011] FCA 489

Re City Steel Pty Ltd (in liq) [2024] FCA 481

Rogan v White [2024] FCA 1163

Saw v Seven Network (Operations) Ltd [2024] FCA 1210

Saw v Seven Network (Operations) Ltd (Post-Settlement Suppression Orders) [2025] FCA 30

Super Retail Group Limited v Farrell [2024] FCA 1214

Trilogy Funds Management Ltd v KPMG [2017] FCA 432

Valentine v Freemantlemedia Australia Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 1293

Warren…

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Details
Case
[2025] FCA 170
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Farrell v Super Retail Group Limited (Application for Leave to Appeal Suppression Orders) involved Ms. Farrell as the applicant seeking leave to appeal the suppression orders made by the primary judge. The suppression orders were made in the context of a larger dispute concerning specific performance claims, which were dismissed by the primary judge in a prior decision. Super Retail Group Limited (SRG) was the respondent in the case. The primary judge had made suppression orders to protect confidential information related to the dispute, and Ms. Farrell contested these orders. The Federal Court was tasked with deciding whether Ms. Farrell should be granted leave to appeal the suppression orders made by the primary judge.

The central legal issue in the case was whether the suppression orders made by the primary judge should be appealed. The primary judge had concluded that the suppression orders were necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice, given that the information in question remained confidential and without prejudice. Ms. Farrell argued that the orders were already covered by interim orders made in an earlier appeal and that broader confidentiality orders should not be granted. The court needed to determine whether the suppression orders constituted a substantial injustice to Ms. Farrell, warranting an appeal.

The court found that the suppression orders did not amount to a substantial injustice. The primary judge had carefully considered the need to balance the public interest in open justice with the protection of confidential information. The court held that the suppression orders were necessary to protect the confidential communications that were part of the dispute resolution process. The court also noted that the broader confidentiality orders sought by SRG were not warranted by the circumstances. The application for leave to appeal was dismissed as there was no sufficient doubt in the primary judge's decision, and no substantial injustice would result if the appeal was not granted.

The Federal Court made it clear that the application for leave to appeal the suppression orders was dismissed. No orders were made as to the costs of the application. This decision confirmed the primary judge's authority to make suppression orders to protect confidential information in the context of ongoing legal disputes.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to appeal dated 28 January 2025 be dismissed.

2. There be no orders as to costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 23 December 2024, the primary judge made orders dismissing Ms Farrell’s specific performance claims for the reasons set out in Farrell v Super Retail Group Limited (Specific Performance Claim) [2024] FCA 1515 (the Specific Performance Judgment). Upon delivery of those reasons, the SRG Parties pressed the Second Suppression Application. The primary judge gave short ex tempore reasons for making the Suppression Orders. It is convenient to set out those ex tempore reasons:Today, I have delivered judgment in Farrell v Super Retail Group Limited (Specific Performance Claim) [2024] FCA 1515…That judgment is being published [in a form] which contains some redactions. Those redactions are made following an [application] made by SRG, which was conditional upon it successfully defending a specific performance claim. That is the application that now falls for determination. In Farrell Super Retail Group Limited (Confidentiality Applications) [2024] FCA 954, I gave reasons why I was not persuaded to make orders then sought by SRG, and made a set of – and made alternative orders of 22 August 2024. Those orders [led] to an application for leave to appeal, and leave being granted for further interim orders made by a judge of the court pending an appeal against my refusal to make more extensive confidentiality orders.The current application comes against the background of two material changes of circumstance. The first is, I have now heard the specific performance suit. This hearing, including a portion which occurred in closed court[], was conducted in conformity with orders made by another judge of the court, which suppressed certain confidential information, which I will describe as the suppressed information. That hearing has now concluded without disclosure of the suppressed information. The second changed circumstance is that I have found that there was no contract between the parties. It follows that the communications which constitute the suppressed information were, and remain, without prejudice communications conducted on a confidential basis, in respect of which the privilege attaching to those communications, either at common law or pursuant to the provisions of the Evidence Act, have not been waived or lost by the respondent. This is an unusual set of circumstances because of the chronology, and the fact that I have heard and delivered judgment in respect of the specific performance suit before an interlocutory appeal from earlier orders has been made, when there has been a change of circumstances. The applicant resists the making of the confidential orders proposed by SRG. The primary point that has been made is that the orders are “covered” by the orders made in the appeal proceedings. That is not a reason for me denying the current application. I’m required to have regard to the circumstances that exist now. And although there are interim orders in place by another judge of the court, that is not an answer as to whether I am satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of justice for me to make the order now sought. While firmly having regard to the heavy – sorry, having regard to the need to take into account that a primary objective of the administration of justice is to safeguard the public interest in open justice, and the fact that the power to make the court is conditioned upon me being satisfied, it is, “necessary” to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice. This seems to me to be – sorry, given that these were, and remain, confidential without prejudice communications, it is necessary in my view that confidentiality orders be made. This is merely a reflection of the longstanding caution – sorry, the long-standing protection the court is prepared to give to confidential settlement negotiations pending the resolution of a dispute. The only other point I would make is that SRG has sought broader confidentiality orders that went beyond the suppressed information either sought originally by SRG, or was the subject of the orders made by another judge of the court.The hearing was conducted without any suppression of that information, and I do not think there is any reason why such an order should be made. It simply does not seem to me to reach the high bar of being necessary in the interests of justice that the orders go beyond what was suppressed by an earlier order of the court. Accordingly, I have raised various mechanical matters concerning the orders, and I direct that a copy of that those orders be brought in as quickly as possible, so orders can be made and the court’s judgment can be published before 4 pm. So I presently stand the matter down the list, to allow for a copy of a Word version in conformity with my reasons to be provided to my associate, so orders can be made and my other – and the judgment be published.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As to substantial injustice, the Media Interveners were not in a position to advance any submission as to the injustice arising to Ms Farrell but submitted that there would be substantial injustice arising to the public at large. It was submitted that there was a very real prospect that they would not have an occasion to be heard as to whether the Suppression Orders should be set aside at some future point in time, for example, if the proceedings were settled on a confidential basis. 4. CONSIDERATION 4.1 Principles As mentioned at the outset, the principles applicable to the grant of leave to appeal are well settled. The decision to grant leave to appeal involves an exercise of discretion that takes into account the need to promote the overarching purpose of the Court of seeking to ensure the just resolution of disputes according to law and as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible: s 37M of the FCA Act. In Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Rush [2018] FCAFC 70, the Full Court (constituted by Allsop CJ, Rares and Lee JJ and where Lee J gave ex tempore reasons for the Court) stated at [2]-[4]: The principles informing the determination of whether to grant leave to appeal from a decision of a single judge of this Court are not novel. The starting point is that in exercising the power to grant leave, regard must be had to the statutory charge in s 37M(3) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (Act) that the power must be exercised or carried out in the way that best promotes the overarching purpose, being the just resolution of disputes according to law and as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible.Consistently with the facilitation of a just resolution, an applicant must usually show that: (a) in all the circumstances, the decision to be appealed is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant its reconsideration on appeal; and (b) supposing the decision to be wrong, substantial injustice would result if leave were refused: Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 398 –399 (Sheppard, Burchett and Heerey JJ). The sufficiency of the doubt in respect of the decision to be appealed and the question of substantial injustice bear upon each other so that the degree of doubt which is sufficient in one case may be different from that required in another. It has also been said that the considerations are cumulative such that leave ought not be granted unless each limb is made out: Rawson Finances Pty Ltd v Deputy Cmr of Taxation [2010] FCAFC 139; (2010) 81 ATR 36 at 38 [5] (Ryan, Stone and Jagot JJ); Melbourne City Investments Pty Ltd v Treasury Wine Estates Ltd [2017] FCAFC 98; (2017) 252 FCR 1 at 4 [3] (Jagot, Yates and Murphy JJ).Additionally, consistent with the facilitation of a quick, inexpensive and efficient resolution is the principle which emerges from the oft-cited warning of Jordan CJ in In re the Will of F. B. Gilbert (Deceased) (1946) 46 SR (NSW) 318 at 323, that if a tight rein is not kept upon the interference with orders of judges at first instance in the exercise of discretion on a point of practice and procedure, the result will be “disastrous to the proper administration of justice”.