FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Reynolds v JP Morgan Administrative Services Australia Limited (No 2)
[2011] FCA 489
Citation: Reynolds v JP Morgan Administrative Services Australia Limited (No 2) [2011] FCA 489 Parties: KYLIE REYNOLDS v JP MORGAN ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES AUSTRALIA LIMITED and BRIAN JOHNSON File number: NSD 1325 of 2010 Judge: RARES J Date of judgment: 13 May 2011 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application by non-party to inspect Form 167 and Form 168 filed pursuant to O 81 rr 5(2) and 7(1) of the Federal Court Rules – whether Form 167 is part of an originating process within O 46 r 6(2)(a) – whether Form 167 or Form 168 is a pleading or particulars of a pleading within O 46 r 6(2)(c)
Held: neither Form 167 nor Form 168 was an originating process, pleading or particulars of a pleading within the meaning of O 46 r 6(2)(a) or (c) – non-party has no right to inspect
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - whether leave should be granted to non-party to inspect a Form 167 or Form 168 pursuant to O 46 r 6(4) – no evidence led to support application to inspect – Form 167 and Form 168 filed under compulsion in accordance with O 81 rr 5(2) and 7(1) – implied undertaking as to confidentiality of documents produced by compulsion of Court orders or requirements – settlement agreement between parties to keep the terms of the complaint and attachments to the Form 167 confidential – Form 167 and Form 168 not deployed nor played any part in conduct of the proceedings in open court – principle of open justice not engaged – public interest in settlement of litigation
Held: application to inspect each Form 167 and Form 168 refused
Legislation: Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) ss 46P, 46PD, 46PF(1), 46PH, 46PO
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 131
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 17(1)
Federal Court Rules O 1 r 4 , O 4 rr 1, 6, O 46 r 6, O 81 rr 4, 5, 7Cases cited: Dickason v Dickason (1913) 17 CLR 50 followed
Dye v Commonwealth Securities Ltd (No 2) [2010] FCAFC 118 followed
Harrington v Lowe (1996) 190 CLR 311 considered
Hearne v Street (2008) 235 CLR 125 followed
Hogan v Australian Crime Commission (2010) 240 CLR 651 followedMacquarie Radio Network Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Authority [2002] FCA 1408 considered
P v Australian Crime Commission (2008) 250 ALR 66 followed
Reading v Partnership of Western Diagnostic Pathology [2008] FCA 1381 followed
Reynolds v JP Morgan Administrative Services Australia Ltd [2010] FCA 1243 referred to
Thomson v Orica Australia Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 939 followed
White v Overland (2001) 67 ALD 731 consideredDate of hearing: 2 February 2011 Date of last submissions: 3 February 2011 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 32 Solicitor for the Applicant: Kit Yap, Harmers Workplace Lawyers Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr P Wood Solicitor for the First Respondent: Allens…
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- Case
- [2011] FCA 489
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court first considered whether the forms were protected from inspection under the Federal Court Rules. It held that neither Form 167 nor Form 168 qualified as an originating process, a pleading, or particulars of a pleading under the relevant rule. As a result, the court found that Fairfax had no right to inspect these forms under the rules. The court then turned to the discretionary basis for granting inspection under the rules, noting that there was no evidence to support Fairfax's application. The court also highlighted that the forms were filed under compulsion and were subject to an implied undertaking of confidentiality, further supported by a settlement agreement between JP Morgan and Mr Johnson. The court concluded that the principle of open justice was not engaged, and the public interest in the settlement of litigation favoured denying the inspection request.
Accordingly, the court refused Fairfax’s application to inspect the forms. The decision was based on the lack of statutory or rule-based entitlement to inspect the forms, the absence of any evidence supporting the application, and the public interest in maintaining the confidentiality of the settlement agreement. The court also ordered that the costs of the application be borne by Fairfax and apportioned between JP Morgan and Mr Johnson. This decision underscores the court's role in balancing the public interest in the confidentiality of settlement agreements with the principle of open justice, ultimately finding in favour of maintaining confidentiality in this instance.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The applications of Ms Hannah Low, Ms Vanda Carson and Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd to inspect the Forms 167 and 168 filed in these proceedings be refused.
2. Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd pay the costs of the parties of the applications to inspect, as agreed, or taxed, such costs to be limited to the costs of the applicant and one of the respondents to consider and enter a submitting appearance and of the other respondents to oppose the application at the hearing and that those costs then be apportioned equally between the respondents or as they may otherwise agree.
Note:
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Fairfax argued that the collocation of the application and Form 167 was intended to characterise the nature of the controversy that the applicant sought to have quelled by the Court. It contended that the Form 167 was unlike either an affidavit that had not been read or deployed in open court or a discovered or like document that had been produced under compulsion that had not been tendered. Fairfax submitted that there was no reason to treat a Form 167 as if it were a confidential document or subject to the implied undertaking given to the Court by a party or other person who obtains access to a document by use of the compulsory processes of the Court: cf Hearne v Street (2008) 235 CLR 125 at 160-162 [109]-[111] per Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ. Rather, so Fairfax argued, items 11-14 and 16 in a Form 167 required an applicant to identify and define factual matters amounting to the unlawful discrimination complained of that were put in issue by the application. It contended that the Form 167 accompanied the application at the time both were filed in accordance with O 81 r 5(2)(a) and, thus, was part of an originating process or pleading. CONSIDERATION – IS FAIRFAX ENTITLED TO INSPECT THE FORMS 167 AND 168 OF RIGHT PURSUANT TO O 46 R 6(2)? Form 167 requires an applicant to identify the unlawful discrimination complained of, to specify the remedy or remedies sought and to annex copies of the complaint to the Commission and the notice of termination. However, Form 168 does not provide anywhere for a response to those matters. Therefore, it is apparent that neither Form 167 nor Form 168 is intended to operate as a pleading or in a manner analogous to a pleading. There is no certainty that any document annexed to a Form 167 will be deployed or tendered in proceedings commenced pursuant to O 81. No such document was deployed or tendered in these proceedings. Additionally, the documents that item 16 requires to be annexed to a Form 167 are the initiating complaint to the Commission and the President’s notice of termination. Despite its misleading title as a “defence”, Form 168 does nothing to identify any issue. Rather, Form 168 contains some material that would be in a notice of appearance by a respondent together with further material that would not ordinarily be disclosed in court documents, for example, whether the respondent had special requirements such as a need for wheelchair access, a hearing loop or the presence of a carer (item 6) or whether the respondent had applied for legal aid (item 8). The scheme of Div 2 of Pt IIB of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act envisages that once a complaint alleging unlawful discrimination is lodged under s 46P it will be referred to the President (or her delegate) who must inquire into and attempt to conciliate the complaint (ss 46PD, 46PF(1)). The President (or her delegate) may terminate the complaint on a number of grounds including that she is satisfied that there is no reasonable prospect of it being settled by conciliation (s 46PH(1)(i)). The process contemplated by Div 2 of Pt IIB is that the President and the parties to a complaint will engage, in private, in an attempted conciliation. If that process results in the termination of a complaint, then s 46PO(1) and (3) confer a right in a complainant to commence proceedings in the Court based on the same, or substantially the same, unlawful discrimination alleged in the complaint or arising out of the same, or substantially the same, acts, omissions or practices that were the subject of the terminated complaint.