Ellis v Wadjemup Trading Pty Ltd ATF Wadjemup Unit Trust T/A Rottnest Express & Ors
[2017] FCCA 88
•24 January 2017
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| ELLIS v WADJEMUP TRADING PTY LTD ATF WADJEMUP UNIT TRUST T/A ROTTNEST EXPRESS & ORS | [2017] FCCA 88 |
| Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Disability discrimination claim – alleged non-compliance with earlier orders – test for dismissal for non-compliance – application in a case for default judgment. |
| Legislation: Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth), ss.46PH, 46PO |
| Cases cited: ACOHS Pty Ltd v Ucorp Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 577 |
| Applicant: | TROY ELLIS |
| First Respondent: | WADJEMUP TRADING PTY LTD ATF WADJEMUP UNIT TRUST T/A ROTTNEST EXPRESS |
| Second Respondent: | FREMANTLE PORT AUTHORITY |
| Third Respondent: | ROTTNEST ISLAND AUTHORITY |
| File Number: | PEG 81 of 2016 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Lucev |
| Hearing date: | 30 September 2016 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 30 September 2016 |
| Delivered at: | Perth |
| Delivered on: | 24 January 2017 |
REPRESENTATION
| For the Applicant: | In person (by telephone) |
| Counsel for the Second Respondent: | Ms S Maddern |
| Solicitors for the Second Respondent: | Norton Rose Fulbright |
For the Third Respondent: | No appearance |
ORDERS
By reason of the Applicant’s non-compliance with orders 3 and 4 of the Court’s orders of 16 June 2016, and order 2 of the Court’s orders of 26 August 2016, the proceeding as against the Second Respondent be dismissed pursuant to r.13.03B(1)(a) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth).
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT PERTH |
PEG 81 of 2016
| TROY ELLIS |
Applicant
And
| WADJEMUP TRADING PTY LTD ATF WADJEMUP UNIT TRUST T/A ROTTNEST EXPRESS |
First Respondent
| FREMANTLE PORT AUTHORITY |
Second Respondent
| ROTTNEST ISLAND AUTHORITY |
Third Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
Troy Ellis (“Mr Ellis”) electronically lodged an application with the Court on 24 February 2016 alleging that he was unlawfully discriminated against because of a disability (“Originating Application”). The second respondent, the Fremantle Port Authority (“FPA”) filed an application in a case on 26 July 2016 to dismiss the Originating Application as against the FPA because of alleged non-compliance with Court orders (“Application in a Case”).
Application in a Case
The Application in a Case seeks the following orders:
1. By reason of the Applicant’s non-compliance with order 3 and 4 of the Court’s orders of 16 June 2016, the proceeding as against the Second Respondent be dismissed pursuant to r.13.03B(1)(a) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth).
2. Costs be awarded in favour of the Second Respondent.
An affidavit in support of the Application in a Case was filed by Katherine Clare Werren (affirmed 26 July 2016), a lawyer with the lawyers for the FPA (“Ms Werren’s Affidavit”). Ms Werren’s Affidavit sets out the history of the proceedings relevant to the Application in a Case.
At the hearing of the Application in a Case the FPA also sought to rely upon Mr Ellis’ failure to comply with an order made in the Court’s orders of 26 August 2016 (“August 2016 Orders”).
Disability discrimination complaint
On 1 December 2015, a delegate of the President of the Australian Human Rights Commission (“AHRC”) terminated a disability discrimination complaint made to the AHRC by Mr Ellis against, amongst others, the FPA. The termination of Mr Ellis’ complaint by the delegate was pursuant to s.46PH(1)(i) of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) (“AHRC Act”) on the basis that there was no reasonable prospect of the complaint being settled by the AHRC by conciliation. The delegate issued a notice of termination in accordance with s.46PH(2) of the AHRC Act (“Notice”).
Originating Application
Pursuant to s.46PO(2) of the AHRC Act, Mr Ellis was required to file the Originating Application with this Court or the Federal Court of Australia within 60 days of the date the Notice was issued, or within such further time as either of the courts concerned allow.
On 24 February 2016, Mr Ellis electronically lodged the Originating Application with this Court, seemingly out of time, and emailed the FPA at “[email protected]” attaching a Court-stamped copy of the Originating Application.
The grounds of the Originating Application and the orders sought therein are, in part, illegible. The final orders sought in Part A of the Originating Application appear to be as follows:
1. Final orders sought by the applicant
(a) Apology in writing.
(b) $1 million compensation from all entities in total.
(c) All access at Fremantle, on Rottnest Ferries, Rottnest Island+
Rottnest Lodge to be made 100% safe, no [not legible] risks + disabled easy transport to accommodation.
(d) All amenities + attractions to be made 100% accessible.
Part B – Grounds of Application in the Originating Application asked the question “What discrimination are you complaining of?” in response to which Mr Ellis has indicated “Disability Discrimination”. No further particulars are provided.
Power to dismiss for non-compliance with the Court’s orders
Rule 13.03A(1) of the FCC Rules provides as follows:
(1) For rule 13.03B, an applicant is in default if the applicant fails to:
(a) comply with an order of the Court in the proceeding; or
(b) file and serve a document required under these Rules; or
(c) produce a document as required by Part 14; or
(d) do any act required to be done by these Rules; or
(e) prosecute the proceeding with due diligence.
Rule 13.03B(1) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) (“FCC Rules”) provides as follows:
(1) If an applicant is in default the Court may order that:
(a) the proceeding be stayed or dismissed as to the whole or any part of the relief claimed by the applicant; or
(b) a step in the proceeding be taken within the time limited in the order; or
(c) if the applicant does not take a step in the time mentioned in paragraph (b) -the proceeding be stayed or dismissed, as to the whole or any part of the relief claimed by the applicant.
The Court can only exercise power under r.13.03B(1) of the FCC Rules if an applicant is in default. To determine whether an applicant is in default regard must be had to r.13.03A(1) of the FCC Rules.
Factual matrix of alleged non-compliance
On 9 March 2016, this Court made orders (“March 2016 Orders”). Relevantly, orders 1 and 2 provided as follows:
1. The Applicant file and serve the First and Third Respondents with the originating application with (sic) in accordance with the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) by 23 March 2016.
2. The applicant file an affidavit of service on the First and Third Respondents by 30 March 2016.
Mr Ellis failed to comply with the March 2016 Orders in that he did not serve the Originating Application on the first respondent, Wadjemup Trading Pty Ltd As Trustee For the Wadjemup Unit Trust trading as Rottnest Express (“Wadjemup Trading”), or file an affidavit of service on Wadjemup Trading: Ms Werren’s Affidavit at [7].
On 11 April 2016, the Court made orders (“April 2016 Orders”). Relevantly, order 1 provided as follows:
1. Time for compliance with order 2 of the Court orders of 9 March 2016 be extended to 30 Apri1 2016.
Mr Ellis failed to comply with the April 2016 Orders by reason of his failure to serve the Originating Application on Wadjemup Trading, or to file an affidavit of service on Wadjemup Trading: Ms Werren’s Affidavit at [9].
On 16 June 2016, the Court made orders (“June 2016 Orders”). Relevantly, the June 2016 Orders provided as follows:
1. By reason of the applicant’s non-compliance with order 1 of the Court’s orders of 11 April 2016 the application as against the first respondent be dismissed pursuant to r.13.03B(1)(a) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth).
2. The applicant’s application for an extension of time be listed for hearing on a date to be fixed by the Court
3. Within 14 days of this Order, the applicant file and serve a Factual Summary which:
a. Articulates the acts or omissions of the second respondent that the applicant alleges amount to a breach of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth); and
b. Provides further facts and particulars in relation to those alleged acts or omissions,
4. Within 14 days of this Order, the Applicant file and serve submissions and evidence in support of his application for an extension of time.
5. Within 28 Days of this Order, the Second Respondent file and serve submissions and evidence in reply.
Mr Ellis failed to comply with the June 2016 Orders: Ms Werren’s Affidavit at [12].
The August 2016 Orders were relevantly as follows:
1. The second respondent file and serve an outline of submissions in support of its application in a case by 2 September 2016.
2. The applicant file and serve an outline of submissions in opposition to the second respondent’s application in a case by 16 September 2016.
3. The second respondent’s application in a case be listed for hearing at 4pm on 30 September 2016, with leave to the applicant to appear by phone.
Mr Ellis also failed to comply with order 2 of the August 2016 Orders, in that he failed to file and serve an outline of submissions in opposition to the Application in a Case.
In this case, there is no question that Mr Ellis is in default, by reason of his failure to comply with orders 3 and 4 of the June 2016 Orders, and order 2 of the August 2016 Orders.
There has been no attempt by Mr Ellis to comply with orders 3 and 4 of the June 2016 Orders or order 2 of the August 2016 Orders. As at the date of the hearing of the Application in a Case, Mr Ellis’ failure to comply with orders 3 and 4 of the June 2016 Orders and order 2 of the August 2016 Orders was ongoing.
Mr Ellis’ failure to comply with orders 3 and 4 of the June 2016 Orders and order 2 of the August 2016 Orders are not the first occasions upon which Mr Ellis has not complied with the orders of the Court in these proceedings.
Mr Ellis has failed to comply with orders of the Court on four separate occasions as follows:
a)orders 1 and 2 of the March 2016 Orders;
b)order 1 of the April 2016 Orders;
c)orders 3 and 4 of the June 2016 Orders; and
d)order 2 of the August 2016 Orders.
It was the failure to comply with the April 2016 Orders (which followed on from the failure to comply with the March 2016 Orders) which led the Court to dismiss the Originating Application as against Wadjemup Trading on 16 June 2016: see [12]-[16] above.
It is therefore the case that Mr Ellis has failed to comply, either in whole or part, with every order that the Court has thus far made in these proceedings. At no stage has Mr Ellis sought any extension of time to comply with any of the orders with which he has not complied.
The test for dismissal for non-compliance
Rule 13.03B(1)(a) of the FCC Rules requires the Court to objectively assess all of the circumstances and to determine if the non-compliance is sufficiently serious, at this stage, to warrant dismissal of the application for default in failing to comply with orders of the Court: Wintle v RUC Cementation Mining Contractors Pty Ltd [2012] FMCA 140 at [21] per Lucev FM (“Wintle”). In Wintle at [21] per Lucev FM the then Federal Magistrates Court (“FM Court”) took into account in objectively assessing all of the circumstances (and in determining to give Mr Wintle a further opportunity to put his claim in proper order):
a)that it was the first occasion on which Mr Wintle had not complied with orders of the FM Court;
b)that Mr Wintle was self-represented;
c)a submission (to which “some regard” was had) that Mr Wintle did not understand what was required of him by the relevant orders; and
d)the “exceptional caution” exercised when determining whether to dismiss claims containing allegations of unlawful discrimination (and citing in that regard Oorloff & Anor v Lee & Ors [2004] FMCA 893 at [49] per Walters FM and Portuguese Cultural and Welfare Centre Inc v Australian Media and Communications Authority [2011] FMCA 144; (2011) EOC 93-600 at [116] per Lucev FM).
This Court has more recently observed that the exercise of the discretion to dismiss for non-compliance with a Court’s orders is not commonplace, and further, that orders under r.13.03B(1) of the FCC Rules ought to be exceptional: Rothnie v St John of God Hospital (Subiaco) [2014] FCCA 159 at [20] and [28] per Judge Lucev.
In Lenijamar Pty Ltd v AGC (Advances) Ltd (1990) 27 FCR 388; (1990) 98 ALR 200; [1991] ATPR 41-082 (“Lenijamar”) the Full Court of the Federal Court established principles concerning applications to dismiss a proceeding based on non-compliance with court orders.
In Lenijamar the Full Court of the Federal Court considered the discretionary power to make orders under then O.10 r.7 of the then Federal Court Rules 1976 (Cth) (“1976 FC Rules”). That order was in substantially the same terms as r.13.03B(1) of the FCC Rules. After making some general observations about the scope of O.10 r.7 of the 1976 FC Rules, the majority of the Full Court of the Federal Court in Lenijamar FCR at 396 per Wilcox and Gummow JJ cautioned that:
We would not wish our observations to cause respondents to apply for dismissal of proceedings simply because there has been a non-compliance with a direction by the applicant, even though it does not cause or indicate a continuing problem in preparing the matter for an early trial.
The majority of the Full Court of the Federal Court in Lenijamar observed that whilst it was undesirable to exhaustively outline the circumstances in which the power under O 10 r.7 of the 1976 FC Rules would be appropriately exercised, two situations were obvious candidates for the exercise of the power: Lenijamar FCR at 396 per Wilcox and Gummow JJ.
The first situation outlined in Lenijamar arises where there has been a history of non-compliance by an applicant to indicate an inability or unwillingness to cooperate with the Court and the other party or parties in bringing the matter to a hearing within an acceptable period: Lenijamar FCR at 396 per Wilcox and Gummow JJ. Importantly, there is:
no requirement of intentional default or contumelious conduct, although the attitude of the applicant to the default and the Court’s judgement as to whether or not the applicant genuinely wishes the matter to go to trial within a reasonable period will usually be important factors in weighing the proper exercise of the discretion conferred by the rule.
Lenijamar FCR at 396 per Wilcox and Gummow JJ.
The second situation outlined in Lenijamar arises where, whatever an applicant’s state of mind or resources, the non-compliance is continuing and occasioning unnecessary delay, expense or other prejudice to the respondent: Lenijamar FCR at 396 per Wilcox and Gummow JJ.
Consideration
At the hearing of the Application in a Case Mr Ellis made a number of oral submissions concerning his failure to comply with the June 2016 Orders and August 2016 Orders.
Mr Ellis firstly submitted that he had been ill and that his health was “shocking”: Transcript, pages 4 and 9, and that he has a variety of health problems: Transcript, page 9. There is however no evidence before the Court of what the illnesses are, what the extent of those illnesses is, and how it is that they might have prevented Mr Ellis from complying with orders 3 and 4 of the June 2016 Orders or order 2 of the 26 August 2016 Orders. The Court further notes that at no time was there any application directed to the Court to extend time for compliance with the June 2016 Orders or the August 2016 Orders on the basis of any illness suffered by Mr Ellis, or any other basis. In the circumstances, there is simply no evidence upon which the Court could base a finding that Mr Ellis’ health precluded him from complying with either the June 2016 Orders or the August 2016 Orders.
Mr Ellis also submitted that because the FPA, as a Western Australian Government entity, was represented by lawyers, the Western Australian Government should also give him a lawyer “as a disabled member of the public”: Transcript, page [5]. It suffices to observe that there is no obligation on the FPA (or more broadly, the Western Australian Government) to do so.
Mr Ellis submitted that he should not have to prepare the Factual Summary because the FPA “know exactly what the problems are there”: Transcript, page 5, and further, that the State Government was aware of the problem because it was proposing to sell and re-develop the Fremantle Port: Transcript, pages 5-7. Setting aside the vagueness and generality of those assertions, Mr Ellis’s submission ignores, as was pointed out to him at hearing, that he bears the onus of proof generally: Ferrus v Qantas Airways Ltd [2006] FCA 812; (2006) 155 IR 88 at [48] per Collier J; Vassollo v Jetswan Pty Ltd [2010] FMCA 708 at [20] per Lloyd-Jones FM (“Jetswan”) (and cases there cited), save where a person against whom indirect discrimination is alleged has to prove that a requirement or condition imposed which must be complied with by the person alleging discrimination is reasonable: DD Act, s.6; Jetswan at [20] per Lloyd-Jones FM (and cases there cited). But without the Factual Summary ordered to be filed by order 3 of the June 2016 Orders, or submissions and evidence in support of his application for an extension of time (which must ordinarily address the merit of the application for which an extension of time is sought): Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344; (1984) 58 ALR 305; (1984) 7 ALD 315; FCR at 349 per Wilcox J; Gordon v Greenup & Ors [2012] FMCA 1042 at [18] per Lucev FM, there is no indication in the materials before the Court as to the conduct alleged to constitute discrimination, or whether the discrimination is direct or indirect. Importantly in a disability discrimination case, there is no indication as to what disability Mr Ellis suffers from, or when and where and in respect of what matters the conduct alleged to constitute discrimination occurred. Nor is there any setting out of the less favourable treatment alleged or any alleged comparators (for the purposes of direct discrimination under s.5 of the DD Act), or the facts which constitute a requirement or condition which is not reasonable in the circumstances of the case and which is likely to have the effect of disadvantaging a person with the relevant disability (for the purposes of indirect discrimination under s.6 of the DD Act).
Although this is a claim which does not have to be “pleaded” in the traditional sense, it remains the case that there must be a sufficient degree of specificity of the material facts so as to define the issues and inform the FPA in advance of the case that they have to meet: Chang v CST Minerals Lady Annie Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 620 at [19]-[21] per Mortimer J (albeit a case in the context of pleadings in a sex discrimination case). The filing of the Factual Summary, or the filing of submissions and evidence in relation to the extension of time application, might have sufficed in this regard, but by reason of Mr Ellis’ non-compliance with the relevant orders, there is no sufficient degree of specificity of the material facts so as to define the issues and inform the FPA in advance of the case that they have to meet. Mr Ellis’ response to this is that the FPA “had enough evidence in my Human Rights Commission reports”, by which the Court assumes he means his complaint to the AHRC. The answer to Mr Ellis’ suggestion that the FPA ought to look at the AHRC complaint is that the AHRC complaint does not form part of the Originating Application (even when attached to the Originating Application), and generally forms no part of the proceeding in this Court at all, but is rather a pre-condition to, and a constraint upon, the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction under the AHRC Act, that jurisdiction being limited to the nature of the AHRC complaint as it was at the time of the termination of the AHRC complaint by the AHRC: Charles v Fuji Xerox Australia Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1531; (2000) 105 FCR 573; (2000) 105 IR 153; Reynolds v JP Morgan Administrative Services Australia Ltd (No. 2) [2011] FCA 489; (2011) 193 FCR 507; (2011) 280 ALR 612 at [20]-[24] per Rares J; Oldham v Capgemini Australia Pty Ltd & Anor [2015] FCA 1149; (2015) 241 FCR 397 at [28] per Mortimer J; Oldham v Capgemini Australia Pty Ltd & Anor(No. 2) [2016] FCA 1101 at [14] and [27]-28] per Mortimer J. Resort cannot therefore be had to the AHRC complaint to determine what the material facts of the disability discrimination alleged in these proceedings might be.
The Court has considered Mr Ellis’ status as a self-represented litigant, and one, who (as the Court indicated in the course of oral submissions) although he has many applications alleging disability discrimination in this Court, had not at the time of the hearing of the Application in a Case, proceeded beyond an interlocutory stage in any of them, and, whether in the circumstances, the Court might allow a further period of time for compliance with the June 2016 Orders, before making a self-executing order: FCC Rules, r.13.03B(1)(c). The fact that Mr Ellis is a self-represented litigant does not, of itself, explain or excuse his failure to comply with the June 2016 Orders or the August 2016 Orders (and the other orders with which he has failed to comply).
At the hearing of the Application in a Case Mr Ellis indicated that he recognised, in relation to the June 2016 Orders and the August 2016 Orders, that “it’s a court procedure. I’m not dumb”: Transcript, page 8; however, went on to indicate what he would be likely to file by way of a factual summary, if required to do so, in the following terms:
I don’t even know what factual summary – I mean, I will probably put a one-liner to them that says, “Well….rust bucket thing and I’ve got to walk 100 miles to it.” That’s the factual summary – one line. That should be enough to indicate what I’ve talked about in my last disabled issues and what my health consists of. And with my health failures that should be enough to me to go, “Well, that would be very hard for many disabled people – my elderly mother who lives with me.” They know that. But one sentence would sum it up for them….summary of 100 different things.
Transcript, page 9.
The obvious inadequacy of a statement of material facts to the effect that the conduct alleged to constitute the discrimination was the “rust bucket thing and I’ve got to walk 100 miles to it” in relation to alleged disability discrimination at a major metropolitan port facility, requires no further comment from the Court.
There was also nothing else in the hearing of the Application in a Case which indicated to the Court that if it allowed a further opportunity for compliance, in relation to the June 2016 Orders and the August 2016 Orders, any Factual Summary or further submissions or evidence would deal with relevant facts and issues, and not other irrelevant facts and issues with which Mr Ellis seems preoccupied, such as alleged corruption in the Western Australian Government and its authorities, and the conduct of lawyers acting for the Western Australian Government, or the conduct of lawyers generally: Transcript, pages 5-11.
Mr Ellis’ continuing non-compliance distinguishes this case from a line of cases where at the time of the relevant hearing, the defaulting party had complied with relevant orders of the court: for example, ACOHS Pty Ltd v Ucorp Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 577, or where there is a single or first instance of non-compliance: Wintle at [21] per Lucev FM.
Mr Ellis’ non-compliance with orders 3 and 4 of the June 2016 Orders must be considered in the context of Mr Ellis’ conduct of the proceedings generally, and in particular that:
a)Mr Ellis “commenced” these proceedings on 24 February 2016 by electronically lodging the Originating Application out of time;
b)Mr Ellis failed to comply with the FCC Rules, together with the Court’s March 2016 Orders and April 2016 Orders, concerning the service of the Originating Application on other parties to the proceedings; and
c)Mr Ellis failed to comply with the requirement under the August 2016 Orders to file submissions in relation to the hearing of the Application in a Case.
Mr Ellis’ failure to comply with the Court’s orders to date has to be considered in the context of s.42 of the Federal Circuit Court Act 1999 (Cth), which requires the Court to “endeavour to ensure that the proceedings are not protracted”: Wang v Botany View Hotel [2014] FCCA 850 at [23] per Judge Emmett (“Wang”), and the general requirement to endeavour to act expeditiously: Wang at [23] per Judge Emmett. The proceedings have already become unnecessarily protracted by reason of Mr Ellis’ failure to comply with the Court’s orders to date, and would be further protracted, at least in relation to the FPA, if the proceedings were to continue against the FPA. It would, for example, be necessary to make further orders with respect to the filing of a Factual Summary and the filing and service of submissions and evidence, and evidence in reply, in relation to the extension of time application listed for 17 March 2017, and there would be a serious question as to whether that interlocutory hearing could proceed. The delays which have already occurred, and any further delays, are serious issues for consideration in a Registry where there is a single Judge sitting and in which in 2016 650 applications were lodged.
The failure by Mr Ellis to comply with order 3 of the June 2016 Orders in particular, is of concern: Wintle at [21] per Lucev FM. That order required Mr Ellis to file and serve a Factual Summary and was directed to requiring Mr Ellis to state his case with sufficient factual and legal particularity. The Factual Summary was intended to enable the Court and the FPA to assess the merits of Mr Ellis’ claims and the future conduct of the proceedings: see [36]-[37] above. In particular, the Factual Summary would enable the FPA to consider whether Mr Ellis has an arguable case, which is a factor that the Court would ordinarily consider in assessing whether to grant Mr Ellis an extension of time to file the Originating Application, which is the subject of a hearing listed for 17 March 2017: see [36] above. As such the delay by Mr Ellis in complying with order 3 of the June 2016 Orders imposes an unnecessary and unacceptable burden on the FPA, and denies it the opportunity to deal with the case in a timely manner: Lenijamar at 397 per Wilcox and Gummow JJ.
The four separate occasions of default set out above: see [24] above, both collectively and individually, show a course of conduct, and an approach to the conduct of the proceedings generally, which is inconsistent with Mr Ellis’ obligation to avoid undue delay and expense: FCC Rules, r.1.03(4).
Considering the history of Mr Ellis’ non-compliance with orders of the Court, together with the delay occasioned by such non-compliance and the indications at hearing that Mr Ellis either cannot, or is not prepared to, prepare a Factual Summary which would have any utility, the order for dismissal for non-compliance sought by the FPA, and outlined at [2] and [4] above, is warranted. Whilst the effect of the order sought by the FPA would be to dispose of the proceedings against them, and notwithstanding the necessary caution which the Court exercises on applications for dismissal of disability discrimination cases, and generally because of non-compliance, an order for dismissal of the proceedings as against the FPA is necessary and appropriate, given Mr Ellis’ non-compliance with relevant Court orders to date.
Conclusion and orders
For the reasons set out above, the Court has concluded that these proceedings as against the FPA ought to be dismissed pursuant to r.13.03B(1)(a) of the FCC Rules by reason of Mr Ellis’ non-compliance with orders 3 and 4 of the June 2016 Orders and order 2 of the August 2016 Orders. There will be an order accordingly.
The Court will hear the parties as to costs.
I certify that the preceding forty-nine (49) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Lucev
Date: 24 January 2017
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