Merck Sharpe & Dohme (Australia) Pty Ltd v Genentech Inc

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Merck Sharpe & Dohme (Australia) Pty Ltd v Genentech Inc

[2016] FCA 324

Appeal from: Merck Sharpe & Dohme (Aust) Pty Ltd v Genentech Inc [2015] APO 19
File number: NSD 639 of 2015
Judge: RARES J
Date of judgment: 1 April 2016
Catchwords:

PATENTS – Patents Act 1990 (Cth) – competency of appeal from decision of Commissioner under s 60(4) of Patents Act 1990 (Cth) – opposition proceedings – first decision of Commissioner under s 60(1) upholding opposition that some claims lacked novelty but granting applicant leave to amend the claims to cure deficiencies – applicant conceded before Commissioner that if independent claims not novel dependant claims also failed – opponent did not appeal first decision under s 60(4) – after amendments allowed under s 104(2) – opponent sought to argue new claims lacked novelty – Commissioner refused to allow opponent to argue lack of novelty as first decision was a final decision on all issues of lack of novelty – opponent appealed second decision under s 60(4) – Commissioner contended appeal incompetent as first decision finally determined all questions of lack of novelty

Held:  appeal dismissed as incompetent

Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)

Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Raising the Bar) Act 2012 (Cth)

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)

Patents Act 1952 (Cth)

Patents Act 1990 (Cth)

Patents Regulations 1991 (Cth)

The Constitution

Cases cited:

Iluka Midwest Ltd (formerly RGC Mineral Sands Ltd) v Technological Resources Pty Ltd (2002) 58 IPR 467

Iluka Midwest Ltd v Technological Resources Pty Ltd (2002) 116 FCR 218

New England Biolabs Inc v F Hoffman–La Roche AG  (2004) 141 FCR 1

R v Smith (Commissioner of Patents);  Ex parte Mole Engineering Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 340

Date of hearing: 27 November 2015
Date of last submissions: 3 December 2015
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Intellectual Property
Sub-area: Patents and associated Statutes
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 71
Counsel for the Applicant: M Darke SC with C Burgess
Solicitor for the Applicant: Spruson & Ferguson Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent: A Fox
Solicitor for the Respondent: Griffith Hack
Counsel for the Commissioner of Patents: C Dimitriadis SC
Solicitor for the Commissioner of Patents: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

NSD 639 of 2015
BETWEEN:

MERCK SHARPE & DOHME (AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD

Applicant

AND:

GENENTECH INC

Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE OF ORDER:

1 APRIL 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed as incompetent.

2.The applicant pay the costs of the Commissioner of Patents.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

RARES J:

  1. Merck, Sharpe & Dohme (Australia) Pty Ltd commenced these proceedings by filing a notice of appeal (intellectual property) on 2 June 2015 against the decision of the delegate of the Commissioner of Patents given on 12 May 2015 (Merck, Sharpe & Dohme (Aust) Pty LTd v Genentech Inc (2015) 113…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 324
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Merck Sharpe & Dohme (Australia) Pty Ltd v Genentech Inc, the Court was called upon to decide whether an appeal from a second decision of the Commissioner of Patents was competent. The dispute arose from opposition proceedings regarding the patentability of certain claims in a patent application. The Commissioner initially ruled that some claims lacked novelty but allowed the applicant, Genentech, to amend the claims. Genentech conceded that if the independent claims were not novel, the dependent claims would also fail. The opponent did not appeal the first decision but, after Genentech amended the claims, sought to argue that the new claims also lacked novelty. The Commissioner refused to hear this argument, holding that the first decision was final on all issues of lack of novelty. The opponent then appealed the second decision, contending that the appeal was competent as it related to the amended claims. The Commissioner argued that the appeal was incompetent because the first decision had finally determined all questions of lack of novelty.

The legal issues before the Court were whether the Commissioner's second decision was appealable and whether the first decision conclusively determined all issues of novelty, thus barring the opponent from raising further objections in a subsequent appeal. The Court considered the statutory framework provided by the Patents Act 1990 (Cth), particularly sections 60 and 104, and the Patents Regulations 1991 (Cth). The Court also referenced the High Court's decision in Mole Engineering Pty Ltd v Kane [1981] HCA 63, which held that once the Commissioner had made a final decision under a similar provision, the decision could not be revisited. The Court had to determine whether the legislative intent in the current Act mirrored that of the previous Act, such that the first decision was conclusive on the issues of novelty and inventive step.

The Court found that the appeal was incompetent. It held that the first decision, which allowed amendments to the claims, was a final determination of all issues of lack of novelty. The Court reasoned that the statutory language and legislative history indicated that once the Commissioner made a decision under section 60(1), that decision was final and could not be revisited in a subsequent appeal. The Court emphasised that the statutory right to appeal under section 60(4) was confined to decisions made under section 60(1), and once such a decision was made, it concluded all matters arising from the opposition. Therefore, the second decision, which refused to consider the opponent's new arguments about the amended claims, did not introduce new matters but merely enforced the finality of the first decision. Consequently, the opponent's appeal was dismissed as it sought to relitigate issues already decided.

The Court ordered that the appeal be dismissed as incompetent and that the applicant, Merck, pay the costs of the Commissioner of Patents. This outcome underscored the importance of the finality of decisions made under the statutory scheme and reinforced the principle that once a decision has been made, it cannot be reopened on appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed as incompetent.

2. The applicant pay the costs of the Commissioner of Patents.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Minister or any other person had a right, under s 59 of the Act, to oppose the grant of a standard patent, in accordance with the Patents Regulations 1991 (Cth), only on one or more of the grounds specified in s 59, including that “the invention is not a patentable invention” (s 59(b)). Critically, s 60 provided:60 Hearing and decision by Commissioner(1)Where the grant of a standard patent is opposed, the Commissioner must decide the case in accordance with the regulations.(2)The Commissioner must give the applicant and the opponent a reasonable opportunity to be heard before deciding a case.(3)The Commissioner may, in deciding a case, take into account any ground on which the grant of a standard patent may be opposed, whether relied upon by the opponent or not.(4)The applicant, and any opponent, may appeal to the Federal Court against a decision of the Commissioner under this section. (emphasis added) Chapter 10 of the Act dealt with amendments. Where the Commissioner granted an applicant leave to amend a patent request, s 104 relevantly provided:104 Amendments by applicants and patentees(1)An applicant for a patent or a patentee, may, subject to this Act, and subject to and in accordance with the regulations, ask the Commissioner for leave to amend the relevant patent request or complete specification, or any other filed document, for any purpose including either or both of the following:(a)removing a lawful ground of objection to the request or specification, whether that objection is raised in the course of an examination or re-examination or otherwise;(b) correcting a clerical error or an obvious mistake.(2)Where an applicant or patentee asks for leave to amend a patent request or complete specification, or any other filed document, the Commissioner must consider and deal with the request in accordance with the regulations.(4)The Minister or any other person may, subject to and in accordance with the regulations, oppose allowing an amendment.(5)The Commissioner must not allow an amendment that is not allowable under section 102.(6)On the allowance of an amendment, the amendment is to be taken to have been made.(7)An appeal lies to the Federal Court, against a decision of the Commissioner allowing, or refusing to allow, a requested amendment, other than a prescribed decision. (emphasis added) Chapter 5 of the Regulations dealt with opposition for the purposes of the Act, including under ss 59 and 104(4) (reg 5.1(a)(i) and (iv)). The only ground on which reg 5.3(4) permitted a person to oppose the allowance of a proposed amendment was that it was not allowable under s 102. It was common ground that all of the amendments made by Genentech after the first decision were allowable and that none was prohibited by s 102 (or s 104(5)). Neither Merck nor the Commissioner raised any issue as to whether the power to make regulations as to the grounds for opposing an amendment under s 104(4) can be limited to only what ss 102 and 104(5) prohibit in any event: cf New England Biolabs Inc v F Hoffman–La Roche AG (2004) 141 FCR 1 at 16 [52] and Mole Engineering 147 CLR at 348.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Merck’s application for summary judgment was based on its assertion that a necessary corollary of the rejection of the Commissioner’s argument that the appeal was incompetent, was that the delegate erred in the second decision by not hearing its argument on whether amended claims 1, 2 and 14 lacked novelty. Merck also argued that because amended dependent claims 3 to 13 covered the subject matter of the original dependent claims 21 to 32, the alleged concession meant that the former also lacked novelty. If there were a material difference in the scope of the original and amended claims then, Merck submitted, it should be entitled to have its appeal heard and determined on the merits.The objection as to competency – consideration The Commissioner’s objection as to competency raised a question as to the jurisdiction of the Court to hear Merck’s appeal. The question arose because Merck sought to invoke a right to appeal under s 60(4) of the Act in respect of the second decision. The Commissioner contended that the relief that Merck sought could not be given in this appeal because the first decision had been a final determination of the subject matter (i.e. the lack of novelty and an inventive step) on which the notice of appeal was based. The legislative scheme governing opposition to the grant of a standard patent reflected the principal features of the similar scheme in the Patents Act 1952 (Cth) that the High Court considered in Mole Engineering 147 CLR 340. There, a delegate gave an “interim” decision that determined that a patent application did not comply with the analogue of s 40 of the Act. The delegate gave the applicant 60 days to lodge a request to amend the patent. The applicant then lodged amendments designed to eliminate the aspects of a claim the subject of the adverse findings in the interim decision. After the original decision-maker had retired, a second decision-maker decided that the amendments were allowable but, he stated that he and the Commissioner had agreed that the applicant should withdraw its amendments and the Commissioner would direct that the whole application be re-heard, since the original decision-maker was no longer available to finalise the opposition. The opponent sought, and the High Court granted, a writ of prohibition against the proposed re-hearing. Gibbs CJ, Murphy and Aickin JJ agreed with the separate, but similar, reasons of Mason J and Wilson J. They held that there was no power for the Commissioner or a delegate to re‑hear an opposition proceeding under the analogue of s 60 (147 CLR at 348, 358). Mason J explained that when a provision in similar terms to s 60(1) of the Act required the Commissioner to “decide the case”, any such decision was final. He held that the analogue of s 60(4) gave the applicant and opponent the right to “appeal” against “a decision of the Commissioner under this section”. He reasoned that the Commissioner had no power to re-hear the case, because the previous Act did not contemplate that there could be two decisions under the relevant section of the Act. He said that an impossible situation would arise were this not so. That was because no statutory provision indicated which of any conflicting decisions under the section would prevail (147 CLR at 348; see too at 358 per Wilson J).