Repipe Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Patents (No 3)

Link copied
Case Copied 57 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Repipe Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Patents (No 3) [2021] FCA 31  

File number: WAD 323 of 2018
Judgment of: MCKERRACHER J
Date of judgment: 29 January 2021
Catchwords: PATENTS – validity – manner of manufacture – where appellant’s claims held to be mere scheme or business method – where appellant given limited opportunity to amend claims after delivery of judgment – where appellant proceeded to engage in iterative process with the Commissioner of Patents and filed two amendment applications – whether any amendment could cure the defects in the claims without offending s 102 of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) – whether the principle of finality should prevent the appellant from relying on the second application
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 37M, 37N

Patents Act 1990 (Cth) ss 101F(4), 102, 102(1), 105, 105(1A)

Cases cited:

Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v IGT (Australia) Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1529

Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Limited v Commissioner of Patents [2020] FCA 778

Autodesk Inc v Dyason (No 2) (1993) 176 CLR 300; [1993] HCA 6

CCOM Pty Ltd v Jiejing Pty Ltd (1994) 51 FCR 260; [1994] FCA 396

Commissioner of Patents v Rokt Pte Ltd [2020] FCAFC 86

Commissioner of Patents v RPL Central Pty Ltd (2015) 238 FCR 27; [2015] FCAFC 177

Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation v BASF Plant Science GmbH [2020] FCA 328

Encompass Corporation Pty Ltd v InfoTrack Pty Ltd [2019] FCAFC 161

Meat & Livestock Australia Ltd v Cargill, Inc (2018) 129 IPR 278; [2018] FCA 51

Merial Inc v Intervet International BV (No 4) (2017) 124 IPR 1; [2017] FCA 223

Nutrasweet Australia Pty Ltd v Ajinomoto Co Inc (No 3) (2007) 73 IPR 282; [2007] FCA 966

Repipe Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Patents [2019] FCA 1956

Repipe Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Patents (No 2) [2019] FCA 2125

Research Affıliates LLC v Commissioner of Patents (2014) 227 FCR 378; [2014] FCAFC 150

Wentworth v Woollahra Municipal Council (No 2) (1982) 149 CLR 672; [1982] HCA 41

Wimmera Industrial Minerals Pty Ltd v RGC Mineral Sands Ltd (No 3) [1997] FCA 1063; (1997) AIPC 91-366

Division: General Division
Registry: Western Australia
National Practice Area: Intellectual Property
Sub-area: Patents and associated Statutes
Number of paragraphs: 74
Date of hearing: 17 June 2020 and 1 September 2020
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr A Lang SC
Solicitor for the Appellant: Provan legal Pty Ltd
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr C Dimitriadis SC with Mr C Burgess
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

WAD 323 of 2018
BETWEEN:

REPIPE PTY LTD

Appellant

AND:

COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

MCKERRACHER J

DATE OF ORDER:

29 JANUARY 2021

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Leave to file the appellant’s amended interlocutory application dated 17 June 2020 be refused.

2.The interlocutory application filed on 14 January 2020 be dismissed.

3.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the applications, to be…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Repipe Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Patents (No 3) and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2021] FCA 31
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Repipe Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Patents (No 3), the court addressed the validity of patent claims filed by Repipe Pty Ltd regarding a business method implemented using computers. The dispute centred around whether the claimed inventions were merely business methods or schemes, which are not patentable, or if they contained a technological innovation that made them patentable. The case also considered whether the principle of finality in litigation should prevent the appellant from relying on its second application to amend the claims.

The key legal issues before the court were whether the appellant's patent claims were patentable subject matter under the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) and whether the principle of finality should preclude the appellant from relying on its second amendment application. The court examined whether the claims described a technological innovation or merely a business method, and if the amendments could cure the defects in the claims without contravening section 102 of the Patents Act. Additionally, the court assessed whether the Commissioner of Patents' refusal to allow the second amendment application was appropriate under the principle of finality.

The court found that the appellant's claims were not patentable as they related to a business method or scheme rather than a technological innovation. The court rejected the amendments proposed by the appellant, holding that they did not address the fundamental issue that the claims lacked meaningful technical content. The court concluded that the principle of finality did not preclude the appellant from relying on its second amendment application, but that the amendments did not cure the defects in the claims. Therefore, the court refused leave to file the second amendment application and dismissed the first one.

In summary, the court held that the appellant's patent claims did not meet the criteria for patentability as they were not a manner of manufacture but rather a business method. The amendments proposed did not sufficiently alter the substance of the claims to render them patentable. The court also determined that the Commissioner's refusal to allow the second amendment application was not contrary to the principle of finality. Consequently, the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the applications.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave to file the appellant’s amended interlocutory application dated 17 June 2020 be refused.

2. The interlocutory application filed on 14 January 2020 be dismissed.

3. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the applications, to be assessed if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Finally my remarks on the s 102 point can be brief as it is clear that the other reasons I have relied upon require rejection of the amendments in any form proffered. Generally I agree with the submissions for the Commissioner on this issue and in light of my other expressed reasons for rejecting the Amendment Applications, it is unnecessary to overly complicate and further delay production of these reasons by dealing with each of the arguments point by point. CONCLUSION Leave to amend the Second Amendment Application will be refused and the First Amendment Application will be dismissed. Repipe is to pay the costs of both applications.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Repipe argues that it is not contrary to the principle of finality of litigation to permit a party to adjust its position so as to seek to remove issues in dispute. Rather, it says, it is incumbent upon a party under s 37M of the FCA to do so; it is consistent with good practice in many contexts, and it is particularly important in this context, where a party’s substantive right to obtain a granted and certified patent is at stake. It is the Commissioner’s stance in making belated contentions and refusing Repipe an opportunity to respond to them which is said to be both contrary to the obligation in s 37M and contrary to the obligation not to treat an amendment application in a ‘hostile’ fashion: Wimmera (No 3).CONSIDERATION The following passages from Repipe (No 1) are particularly pertinent to the present analysis: 31The Court in National Research also cautioned that any attempt to state the ambit of s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies by precisely defining ‘manufacture’ is likely to fail and, further, ‘to attempt to place upon the idea the fetters of an exact verbal formula…would be unsound to the point of folly’ (at 277). 32Fifty-five years later, in D’Arcy v Myriad Genetics Inc (2015) 258 CLR 334, Gageler and Nettle JJ emphasised that the way in which a claim is drafted cannot transcend the reality of what is in suit. Monopolies are granted for inventions, not for the inventiveness of the drafting with which patent applicants choose to describe them. The matter must be looked at as a question of substance. Effect must be given to the true nature of the claim: Myriad per Gageler and Nettle JJ (at [144]); see also French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ (at [6], [87]-[88] and [94]) and Gordon J (at [255], in passing). An invention is to be understood as a matter of substance and not merely as a matter of form.…36In Rokt Pte Ltd v Commissioner of Patents [2018] FCA 1988 (presently under appeal), Robertson J said (at [201]):For example, both sides agreed that the matter had to be addressed as a matter of substance. I agree. I also accept that there is no formula to be mechanically applied, and that it is necessary to understand where the inventiveness or ingenuity is said to lie. A mere business innovation is insufficient and a business method or scheme is not, per se, a proper subject for letters patent. Nor are abstract ideas. The issue is whether there is a technological innovation. Where, as here, the claimed invention is to a computerised business method, the invention must lie in the computerisation and it is not enough simply to put a business method into a computer. The search is for an improvement in computer technology ...…51Repipe argues that both Patents are not merely business methods or schemes implemented using a computer. The computer is not merely an intermediary or a tool. Rather, the Patents claim technological inventions where the computer technology is integral to, and is the most significant feature of, the claims. …66The description is in broad and general terms, describing the performance of various methods of sharing and completing documents using computers. Nowhere is there any disclosure of the technical means that the computers must use to perform the ordinary identified processes of document or information storage, selecting documents, downloading information, displaying the downloaded information, receiving input and uploading the input. …93I am not persuaded the Patents in this case are readily distinguishable. No specific application software has been claimed or even identified in any claim of the Patents. No computing programming logic or code is disclosed anywhere in the Patents. The substance of both inventions is a mere scheme that can be implemented using some unidentified software application to cause a server computer and smartphone to perform the steps identified in the claim. To implement the scheme, a reader must use his/her own skill and knowledge to write an appropriate software application. No such application is disclosed in the Patents. 94It is not sufficient to rely on the form of the claims rather than their substance. This is clear from the authorities. It is not appropriate for Repipe to simply rely upon the field on which ingenuity is claimed to exist, being the field of computer technology. The language used by patent attorneys when drafting and amending claims cannot convert what is, in substance, an unpatentable business method or scheme into a patentable invention by merely asserting that the invention is in the field of computer technology or by using words in the claim or specification that refer to computer technology: Myriad (at [144]). The issue must be addressed as a matter of substance. As a matter of substance, there is no meaningful technical content in the description in the body of the claims or specification. There is only a scheme. The fact that the scheme may be quicker using a computer than using a paper system is a function of computers not the Patents: see, for example, RPL (at [85] and [104]). …99The claimed inventions do not rise above a scheme simply because, as Assoc Prof Hussain described, they are ‘a technology driven solution to be able to – for any organisation to be able to comply with work health and safety procedures’. The sense in which the inventions are ‘technology driven’ is that the schemes use computers to implement a solution to a business problem. The claims use the ‘standard’ computing functions to provide a non-standard solution. The ‘architecture’ shown in the figures is nothing more than a standard (generic) server, network and a smartphone or similar, for example, a tablet.100It may well be that specific software needs to be designed to achieve the ‘invention’, but even so, that is not the substance of the claimed inventions. As to the ‘specific application software’:(a)No software application or program code for carrying out the identified steps in the computer is defined by the claims or made the subject of the claims. (b)No software application or program code for carrying out the identified steps in the computer is disclosed anywhere in the complete specifications. (c)The specifications admit that the claimed inventions may be implemented using any software application, that uses any technical means, that causes a generic server and smartphone to perform the claimed steps. (d)The ‘specific application software’ referred to by Dr Aitken is something that must be developed and written by a programmer in order to implement the claimed inventions.CONCLUSION101The claimed inventions are as to a business method. Even if construction of the specifications alone were to produce a different characterisation, that would be to elevate form over substance. The Patents may well contain a good idea, but they are not a manner of manufacture and are not patentable subject matters.