FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Repipe Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Patents (No 2) [2019] FCA 2125
File number: WAD 323 of 2018 Judge: MCKERRACHER J Date of judgment: 19 December 2019 Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 43
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 39.05
Patents Act 1990 (Cth) ss 104, 105, 106
Cases cited:
Bayer Pharma Aktiengesellschaft v Generic Health Pty Ltd (2012) 99 IPR 1510
Cameron v Cole (1944) 68 CLR 571
Commissioner of Patents v RPL Central Pty Limited (2015) 238 FCR 27
Les Laboratoires Servier v Apotex (2016) 247 FCR 61
Encompass Corporation Pty Ltd v InfoTrack Pty Ltd (2019) 145 IPR 1
Meat and Livestock Australia Ltd v Cargill, Inc (No 2) (2019) 139 IPR 47
Date of hearing: Determined on the papers Date of last submissions: 17 December 2019 Registry: Western Australia Division: General Division National Practice Area: Intellectual Property Sub-area: Patents and associated Statutes Category: No Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 27 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr N Murray SC Solicitor for the Appellant: Mallon & Co Lawyers Counsel for the Respondent: Mr C Dimitriadis SC with Mr C Burgess Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor ORDERS
WAD 323 of 2018 BETWEEN: REPIPE PTY LTD
Appellant
AND: COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS
Respondent
JUDGE:
MCKERRACHER J
DATE OF ORDER:
19 DECEMBER 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.By 15 January 2020, the appellant file any application to amend Australian innovation patents numbers 2017100560 and 2017100943.
2.Unless by 15 January 2020 the appellant makes the application in order 1, the appeal is dismissed.
3.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal, to be assessed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MCKERRACHER J:
INTRODUCTION
On 22 November 2019, I delivered reasons in Repipe Pty Ltd v Commissioner for Patents [2019] FCA 1956, published 22 November 2019 (Reasons), in which I concluded that the two Patents the subject of the appeal were not a manner of manufacture and were not patentable subject matters. At the hearing of the appeal I was asked to refrain from making final orders pending publication to allow the parties an opportunity to consider the Reasons. The parties were unable to agree to final orders and, by consent, I programmed the filing of short written submissions to accompany their respective minutes of proposed final orders.
Repipe’s proposed orders are:
(1)By 15 January 2020, the appellant file any application to amend Australian innovation patents numbers 2017100560 and 2017100943.
(2)Unless by 15 January 2020 the appellant makes the application in order 1, the appeal is dismissed.
(3)The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal to date, other than the costs of and incidental to the evidence of Andrea Jane Shaw, to be taxed if not agreed.
The Commissioner’s proposed orders are:
(1)The appeal be dismissed.
(2)The appellant pay the respondent’s costs to…
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 2125
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to determine whether the Commissioner was entitled to her costs for the preparation of evidence that was not used during the trial, specifically the evidence of Ms Andrea Jane Shaw. Repipe argued that the Commissioner should not be awarded costs for this evidence, as it was not read or used in the trial. The Commissioner countered that the evidence was appropriately sought and that there was no basis to deny her costs for obtaining it. The court also had to decide whether the deficiencies in the patents could be overcome by amendment, a matter central to the appeal's outcome.
The court held that the Commissioner was entitled to her costs for preparing the evidence of Ms Shaw, as it was appropriately sought in response to Repipe's contentions and was part of the overall evidence package. The court found that the Commissioner’s decision to seek this evidence was justified, and there was no basis to depart from the general rule that costs follow the event. Regarding the patentability of the inventions, the court concluded that the deficiencies in the patents, particularly the lack of disclosure of a manner of manufacture, were not curable by amendment and thus the appeal was dismissed.
The court ordered that Repipe could file an application to amend the patents by 15 January 2020. If no such application was made by that date, the appeal would be dismissed, and Repipe was ordered to pay the Commissioner’s costs of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. By 15 January 2020, the appellant file any application to amend Australian innovation patents numbers 2017100560 and 2017100943.
2. Unless by 15 January 2020 the appellant makes the application in order 1, the appeal is dismissed.
3. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal, to be assessed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The chief dispute between the parties on this issue is whether the deficiencies identified in the Patents as revealed in the Reasons are capable of being overcome by an appropriate amendment. Repipe contends that the deficiencies are curable by amendment, but wishes to have a period of time to consider its position in this respect and, if it decides to apply, to formulate the proposed amendments. The Commissioner contends that any application to amend the Patents would be futile as the deficiencies identified in the Reasons, being the absence of any disclosure of any manner of manufacture in the specifications as a whole, are not possible to amend to introduce such subject matter.Consideration In the Reasons, I observed (at [93]-[94] and [101]):93I am not persuaded the Patents in this case are readily distinguishable. No specific application software has been claimed or even identified in any claim of the Patents. No computing programming logic or code is disclosed anywhere in the Patents. The substance of both inventions is a mere scheme that can be implemented using some unidentified software application to cause a server computer and smartphone to perform the steps identified in the claim. To implement the scheme, a reader must use his/her own skill and knowledge to write an appropriate software application. No such application is disclosed in the Patents.94It is not sufficient to rely on the form of the claims rather than their substance. This is clear from the authorities. It is not appropriate for Repipe to simply rely upon the field on which ingenuity is claimed to exist, being the field of computer technology. The language used by patent attorneys when drafting and amending claims cannot convert what is, in substance, an unpatentable business method or scheme into a patentable invention by merely asserting that the invention is in the field of computer technology or by using words in the claim or specification that refer to computer technology: Myriad (at [144]). The issue must be addressed as a matter of substance. As a matter of substance, there is no meaningful technical content in the description in the body of the claims or specification. There is only a scheme. The fact that the scheme may be quicker using a computer than using a paper system is a function of computers not the Patents: see, for example, RPL (at [85] and [104]).…101The claimed inventions are as to a business method. Even if construction of the specifications alone were to produce a different characterisation, that would be to elevate form over substance. The Patents may well contain a good idea, but they are not a manner of manufacture and are not patentable subject matters.(See also [93]-[94] of the Reasons.) As the Commissioner identifies, these findings concerning the absence of any disclosure of patentable subject matter in the specification are at the core of this Court’s reasoning. Although the Full Court’s decision in Encompass Corporation Pty Ltd v InfoTrack Pty Ltd (2019) 145 IPR 1 was not delivered until after the hearing in the present case (which did inform the Reasons), the principle of finality of litigation is important. The parties filed supplementary submissions on Encompass and so were heard on the decision.