Revie v Druitt

[2005] NSWSC 902

CITATION:	Revie v Druitt [2005] NSWSC 902
HEARING DATE(S):	26, 27 and 28 July 2005
JUDGMENT DATE :	8 September 2005
JURISDICTION:	2236 of 2002 Equity Division 104156 of 2004 Equity Division, Probate List
JUDGMENT OF:	Windeyer J at 1
DECISION:	Order for revocation of grant of probate of 2001 will.; Order for probate of 1999 will in common form.; Equity claims dismissed, apart from Family Provision Act claim.; Family Provision Act application stayed

CATCHWORDS:	SUCCESSION - probate - application for revocation of grant of probate - undue influence - evidence that defendant prepared documents later signed by testator, including last 2 wills - defendant able to exercise control over testator - whether such control sufficient to constitute "coercion". - SUCCESSION - probate - application for revocation of grant of probate - issue that of testamentary capacity - testator aged 94 at date of will and suffering from progressive dementia - evidence that testator had signed documents containing false statements - requirement for testator to bring a reasoning mind to competing claims on his estate. - EQUITY - equitable remedies - charges - improvements made to deceased's estate by plaintiff - benefit obtained by plaintiff - where no evidence of added value. - EQUITY - breach of contract - claim for contract based on promise by deceased to leave land to plaintiff in a will - contract not in writing - effect of s54A Conveyancing Act.
LEGISLATION CITED:	Conveyancing Act 1919, s54A, s163F(2) Family Provision Act 1982, s7.
CASES CITED:	Banks v Goodfellow [1870] LR 5 QB 549 Boyse v Rossborough (1857) 6 HL Cas 1 Horton v Jones (1935) 53 CLR 475 Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 Kerr v Badran [2004] NSWSC 735 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Fairlie-Cunninghame (1993) 32 NSWLR 377 Re Estate of Bellew (McLelland J, 13 August 1992, unreported) Re Estate Griffith (deceased) Easter v Griffith (1995) 217 ALR 284 Wingrove v Wingrove (1885) LR 11 PD 81 Winter v Crichton (1991) 23 NSWLR 116 Worth v Clasohm (1952) 86 CLR 439
PARTIES:	Sandra Joan Revie (Plaintiff) Roy Henry Macquarie Druitt (Defendant)
FILE NUMBER(S):	SC 2236 of 2002 ; 104156 of 2004
COUNSEL:	Ms J Needham SC (Plaintiff) Mr D M Flaherty (Defendant)
SOLICITORS:	Levitt Robinson (Plaintiff) Duncan & MacKenzie (Defendant)

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION:

- 35 -

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
EQUITY DIVISION

WINDEYER J

THURSDAY 8 SEPTEMBER 2005

2236/02 SANDRA JOAN REVIE & ANOR V ROY HENRY MACQUARIE DRUITT

104156/04 SANDRA JOAN REVIE V ROY HENRY MACQUARIE DRUITT IN THE ESTATE OF LEONARD WILLIAM LESLIE REVELLE DECEASED

JUDGMENT

Outline

1 Leonard William Leslie Revelle died on 21 October 2001. Probate in common form of a will dated 4 October 2001 was granted to his brother, Roy Henry Macquarie Druitt, the defendant, on 7 December 2001. He had signed earlier wills of 24 November 2000 and 30 August 1999. The plaintiff, who is a niece of the testator, seeks an order for revocation of the grant of probate on grounds (1) that the deceased lacked testamentary capacity when the will was executed, and (2) that the execution of the will was procured by the undue influence of the defendant. She seeks a grant of administration with the will dated 30 August 1999 annexed. Mr Druitt is the executor of that will. He seeks a grant of probate in solemn form of the will of 4 October 2001. These are the Probate proceedings.

2 In separate Equity proceedings heard at the same time, the plaintiff seeks damages for breach of contract claimed to be made originally between the deceased and herself under which, in consideration of her moving into his home and caring for him, the deceased promised to leave his home at 9 Short Street, Wentworthville (Short Street) to her. It is claimed that after the plaintiff became bankrupt the contract was either brought to an end by agreement and a new contract entered into, or that the contract was varied so as to leave the property to the plaintiff’s mother, Jean Revie, who was the deceased’s sister. Mrs Revie survived her brother, but she has since died, the plaintiff suing not only in her own right but now as administrator with the will annexed of her mother’s estate. That will left the whole of the estate of Mrs Revie to the plaintiff. The breach of contract is claimed to have arisen by the deceased executing the will dated 24 November 2000 and later the will dated 4 October 2001 and leaving the latter unrevoked. As an alternative to the breach of contract claim the plaintiff also claims an order for a charge over Short Street to the extent of the cost of improvements she said that she made to it and finally she claims an order for provision out the estate pursuant to s7 of the Family Provision Act 1982.

3 It is convenient to set out the facts relevant to the Probate claim first. If the plaintiff succeeds there the Equity action becomes irrelevant. However, I can state at the outset that in my view the claim for breach of testamentary promise must fail. The claimed contract was one for disposition of an interest in land. That contract, if made, was not in writing. The contract was to make the writing, namely the will, and leave it unrevoked, and in those circumstances the will could not be the contract. There is no claim for part performance. The defence under s54A of the Conveyancing Act 1919 was clearly raised. It operates to defeat this part of the Equity action: Horton v Jones (1935) 53 CLR 475. No issue of fraud was raised.

4 In this judgment I will refer to the testator Mr Revelle as the deceased and the defendant as Mr Druitt. To distinguish between the plaintiff and her mother and not through any disrespect I will refer to them as Sandra and Jean respectively.

Facts

5 At the time of his death on 21 October 2001 the deceased was aged 94. Jean was born in 1913 and died on 30 April 2003, aged 89. Mr Druitt was born in 1917 and is now 88 years of age. The deceased lived in his home at 9 Short Street Wentworthville which he had owned since 1954. By 1994 he was becoming frail and had had some falls.

6 According to Sandra she had a conversation with the deceased in January 1995 when he said that if she would move into Short Street and cook, clean, wash and care for him until his death, then he would leave the Short Street property to her in his will. Sandra said that she agreed to this. She was at the time in rented accommodation and conducting a sewing business from that accommodation. At this time another brother of the deceased, Henry, was living at Short Street, but he was admitted to a nursing home in March 1995. Jean moved into Short Street in February 1995 and at that time Sandra arranged for a workshop to be built at the rear of the property for her sewing business. She moved in around March 1995.

7 There is evidence from Mrs Dodds, a next-door neighbour, and from a Mr Carmichael, who lived across the road in Short Street, that early in 1995 they witnessed a will of the deceased. Mrs Dodds says that the will was read out by Mr Druitt. She said that under this will Sandra was to get the house. She said Mr Druitt had told her that this was to happen some time earlier when he said, “The niece is moving in and she is going to get the home for looking after Len and Harry”. Mr Carmichael did not remember Mr Druitt being present at the time he said the 1995 document was signed. Mr Druitt denied being there. He said he had not seen any will made at that time. No will executed at about that time has been produced. I find that a will was made by the deceased early in 1995. I accept the evidence of Mrs Dodds whom I consider to be a completely honest witness. I find that Short Street was left by that will to Sandra. Mr Carmichael was quite clear that he had witnessed two wills and he certainly was a witness to the 1999 will. I will return to that second will in due course. I do not accept the evidence of Mr Druitt on this. He was not a reliable witness. By the time these proceedings came on he had come to the view which he may have come to earlier that the move of Sandra into Short Street was part of a plan to get the house. It is not necessary to decide, although it was put that Mr Druitt destroyed the 1995 will. I find that he knew there was such a document and that he was aware of its contents. It is clear that Sandra went to live at Short Street as a result of an arrangement with the deceased that in return for looking after him and his brother the house would be left to her. Mr Druitt knew of this. As this is not the contract ultimately sued upon I need take that matter no further.

8 Harry Revelle was admitted to a nursing home in March 1995 and died in June that year. He takes no further part in the story. Sandra moved to Short Street in late March or April 1995. The workshop was completed some short time after that. Sandra cared for the deceased which was not an easy task.

9 In May 1999, Sandra became bankrupt. She told the deceased of this. She said in one of her affidavits that in a conversation after this the deceased had said to her, “If you get the house and you are bankrupt the government will take it off you. I’ll get Roy to write another will to leave the house to your mother, so that the place will stay in the family.” To which she said, “That’s OK by me. I’m the only child and I am the sole beneficiary under my mother’s will”. She said that not long after that conversation Mr Druitt came to Short Street, she heard them discussing the new will and that later that day Mr Druitt went into the kitchen at Short Street where she was and said, “There’s no doubt about him. He’s leaving Harry’s share to Katrina and Adrian and he’s leaving the house to your mother because of your bankruptcy.” I accept this.

10 Mr Adrian Stott, who is a son of Sandra, moved into Short Street for about three months at the end of June 1996. He said that he recalled the deceased saying on numerous occasions that “It’s your mother’s house”. He said he had a further conversation with the deceased in 1999 after Sandra became bankrupt as follows:

Adrian: “If Mum inherits this house while she is still in bankruptcy, the bankruptcy people from the government would be able to sell the house so they can pay back the companies who are owed money by my mother”.
Uncle Les: “I don’t want your mother to have this house sold up on her. I’ll get Roy to write a new will as soon as he comes up to visit next time so that this place and everything in it is left to Jean, so that when Jean dies your mother won’t be bankrupt any longer so she can inherit the house from Jean.”

11 Katrina Stott, who is the daughter of Sandra, gave similar evidence. She remembered a number of discussions at Short Street during which the deceased said that Sandra was to live with him and look after him and she would have the house. Her evidence as to a will being made in 1995 is somewhat different from that of the other witnesses. She says that it took place after Sandra had moved in. She said that it was she who went to get Mrs Dodds to witness the will and when she returned she saw Mr Carmichael was there. She said that after the bankruptcy she heard the deceased say to Sandra, “I’ll change my will and leave the house to Jean and you will still get it. I don’t want the government to get it.” She lived in the house for about two months at the end of 1995, but not at any other time.

12 In fact the deceased did make a will on 30 August 1999. The attesting witnesses to it were Mr Carmichael and a Mrs Karmadonoff, who lived at 13 Short Street. By that will the deceased appointed the defendant as executor and if he predeceased him then the defendant’s son Gregory as executor. By clause 3 of that will he gave Short Street to Jean and declared, “that this property is not to be sold or disposed of in her lifetime”. He gave the proceeds of a savings bank account in equal shares to Katrina Stott and Adrian Stott. He gave the residue of his estate to Mr Druitt. This will was typed by Mr Druitt. Mr Carmichael has given evidence of execution. Sandra asked for and was given a copy of this will. This is the will which the plaintiff seeks to prove. There is no defence to that claim other than that it is not the last will of the deceased.

13 Paragraphs 8 and 9 of the further amended statement of claim in the Equity proceedings are as follows:

8. On 25 May 1999, the first named Plaintiff became a bankrupt.
9. Shortly after 25 May 1999, the first named Plaintiff and the Deceased agreed that in consideration of the first named Plaintiff continuing to perform the duties in paragraph 2, instead of the Deceased leaving the property to the first named Plaintiff in his Will, because of the first named Plaintiff’s bankruptcy, the Deceased would leave the property to the first named Plaintiff’s mother, Jean Mary Revie in his Will, the first named Plaintiff being the sole beneficiary of the said Jean Mary Revie.

There is no evidence of such an agreement with the plaintiff. In any event it was not in writing.

14 The deceased had various admissions to hospital after 1997. Some simple tests of mental state were carried out; his visual memory seemed reasonable but verbal memory was poor. He had various visits to the Geriatric Day Centre at Westmead Hospital from then on. On 18 October 1999 Dr Castaldi signed a note saying that the deceased is “cognitively intact but might require nursing home placement”. The deceased was admitted to Kaloola Nursing Home for respite care on 7 August 2000 and he scored 19 out of 27 on a Mini Mental State test on admission. His sister was admitted to respite care at the same time. At this time Sandra was having some difficulties with her son and caring for the deceased at the same time, which is why some respite care was required. The deceased had become hostile to female community nurses by this time. They had been calling at Short Street to assist with showering and other activities, as by this time the deceased was spending most of his time in bed. Sandra says, and I accept, that by 12 October, after discussions with doctors and the community aid assessment team, it was decided that the deceased should remain in the nursing home. Mr Druitt said that he was not happy with this at the time and neither was the deceased, although ultimately it seems the deceased became accepting of the position and Mr Druitt agreed that the nursing home was the proper place for him. Dr Singh, in a report dated 9 October 2000, which was probably prepared partly for the purposes of an application to the Guardianship Tribunal, reported:

The above patient is a patient of this practice. He currently resides at Kaloola Nursing Home. He is 93 years old and is unable to self-care. He has extremely poor mobility; and requires 2 people to transfer.
His mentation is also deteriorating with short term memory loss coupled with this he’s quite abusive to carers. I recommend him to continue at the nursing home as a permanent patient.

And a community nurse said in a note of 12 October 2000:

The Parramatta Nursing Service has been visiting Mr Revelle since May 1998, to assist with his personal care, bowel management and pressure care.
Since January this year Mr Revelle’s condition has progressively deteriorated. In the past he had demonstrated an hostility to the female nurses; this has progressed to a defiance to allow nurses to assist with showering him on many occasions. His poor mobility leading up to client’s hospitalisation had been considered unsafe for one nurse and it was proposed to have two nurses to assist with showering him.
His carer complained frequently of Mr Revelle’s refusal to eat; he rarely left his bed. It is my considered opinion and those of the other nurses involved in his care that it would be unsuitable for Mr Revelle to return to his home.

15 On 15 October 2000 the deceased signed an enduring power of attorney in favour of Mr Druitt. It was prepared by Mr Druitt and witnessed by Mr Bolster, a solicitor who gave a certificate under s163F(2) of the Conveyancing Act 1919. Mr Bolster was not called and in the absence of evidence from him I do not think any weight should be given to the certificate. Mr Bolster was not a solicitor who had acted previously for the deceased. He was picked by Mr Druitt as a local solicitor. Mr Druitt did not know him either.

16 On 24 November 2000 the deceased made a new will. This appointed Mr Druitt as the executor and gave the estate in equal shares to Jean and the six children of Mr Druitt. In other words, they took one seventh each. This will was written out by Mr Druitt and then typed by his daughter on her typewriter. According to Mr Druitt he had spoken to the deceased who had instructed him what to do and then wrote it out for his daughter and she typed it. He said that the deceased had said, “look my sister Jean, she is deteriorating and she is into dementia and she will never go back home because she is a permanent patient at Kaloola. Now I want to make sure she gets something out of the estate, so I am going to give her a seventh share”.

17 Prior to this event Sandra had filed an application with the Guardianship Board for the appointment of a manager for the deceased. Mr Druitt was aware of that. Mr Stott, a son of Sandra, had filed a similar application on 13 December 2000. It is not quite clear why this was done. In any event both applications were heard together and determined by orders of the Tribunal on 18 January 2001. Both applications were for appointment of a guardian and of a financial manager. Both were dismissed. In its reasons the Tribunal found that the deceased was a person under a disability although it did not state on what basis this conclusion was reached. The Tribunal nevertheless held, as it was entitled to do, that the deceased was not in need of a guardian, his accommodation being suitable, his general health good and he not being a person where major decisions were likely to be required. The Tribunal stated that in the event of the deceased being unable to give consent in the future to major medical treatment then Sandra as his most recent carer would be regarded as his “person responsible” for the purpose of giving consent on his behalf.

18 So far as financial management was concerned the following passages appear in the reasons:

Financial management
Mr Revelle has cognitive deficits, which render him incapable of managing his financial affairs. Ms Biswas reported that her original cognitive assessment of him in 1997 found deficits in verbal memory, insight, problem solving/abstract reasoning and in money skills. When she assessed him in January, 2001, she found that these problems were worse and that he had developed visual memory deficits. She found that he also had some difficulties and confusion with money handling.

The Tribunal heard that, prior to his nursing home placement Mr Revelle was managing his own finances with assistance from Mr Druitt. In October, 2000, however, he executed a Power of Attorney in favour of his brother. He did not remember doing this but he told Ms Biswas that he wanted his brother to manage his finances. He confirmed this at the hearing. Ms Biswas and Ms Bridgement both recommended the appointment of an independent financial manager, Ms Bridgement commenting on Mr Revelle's vulnerability to financial exploitation.
…
The Tribunal examined the relevant documents and took verbal evidence as to the manner in which Mr Revelle's finances are currently managed. While the arrangements made are unusual, they are in line with Mr Revelle's longstanding habits and there did not appear to be any mismanagement of funds.
The Tribunal found, therefore, that Mr Revelle, while incapable of managing his affairs, is not currently in need of a financial manager. His present accommodation protects him from the dangers raised by Mrs Revie and Mr Stott and he did express a clear preference for Mr Druitt to manage his affairs.

The application was, therefore dismissed.

19 I should state here that there is some difficulty about the manner in which documents tendered in evidence should be treated. Four folders amounting to 1071 pages were tendered without objection as Exhibit D. Volume 1 of that bundle includes documents which were referred to and which, for the most part, were the documents of significance in this action. It was accepted that unless documents were referred to in oral evidence or submissions then I was not expected to take them into account. I have proceeded on that basis, unsatisfactory as it is. In hindsight I should perhaps have insisted that documents not be tendered but merely be a court bundle, those referred to in evidence being separated and tendered at the end. No more than 30 other pages were referred to. However, the Guardianship Tribunal’s decision and other material before the Tribunal are in evidence without objection. As McLelland J said in Estate of Bellew (13 August 1992, unreported) this decision does not determine capacity but the material can be considered. That decision (as to capacity) was followed by Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Fairlie-Cunninghame (1993) 32 NSWLR 377. This is of some importance when I come to consider the medical evidence.

20 Towards the end of 2000 the telephone service at Short Street was discontinued as a result of arrangements or instructions given by Mr Druitt, presumably as attorney. Sandra said she asked the deceased whether he would sign a letter to arrange its reconnection and he agreed. She prepared the letter and returned the next day. The deceased said, “You get to buggery out of here. I’m not doing anything for you”. I accept this evidence. The next day Mr Druitt produced a document which was signed by the deceased, which is as follows:

Dated 5th December, 2000
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN


My name is LEONARD WILLIAM LESLIE REVELLE and I wish to state that on 3rd December, inst. I was approached by my niece, Sandra Revie, at the Kaloola Nursing Home where I am a permanent patient. She stated to me that my brother, Roy Druitt, was a thief and a rogue and he would rob me of everything, the house that I own at Wentworthville, and any money that I have.

She wanted me to sign a statement to that effect. I told her that she was a dishonest person and that I wouldn't sign anything for her and get herself away from me and leave me alone. Also, my brother, Roy, and myself have always been honest with any dealings that we have had with one another over the past 60 years. Also I told her I didn't want to hear any more of her lies.

(signed) L W Revelle

21 The defendant also typed out and signed a letter which he wrote to Sandra dated 5 December 2000 the contents of which are as follows:

20/57 Bellevue Avenue
Georges Hall 2198
5th December, 2000

Mrs Sandra Revie
9 Short Street
Wentworthville

Dear Madam,

I am Roy Henry Druitt, your Uncle, and I have been informed that you have attempted to influence my brother, Leonard William Revelle, also your uncle, on 3rd December, 2000, to sign an untrue and derogative statement regarding me, which he bluntly refused to sign.

I have advised Leonard Revelle that he should not sign anything unless I am present at the signing, as I have an Enduring Power of Attorney over him and that it would be illegal for him to do so, as this Power has been stamped and Registered by the respective Government Authority.

So please refain [sic] from any further futile attempts to get him to sign any statements from you or anyone else, otherwise you will be liable now that I have advised you.

Finally Mr Revelle has made a statement regarding other things that you said to him on 3rd December inst.

Trusting that you will comply in order to obviate any further unpleasantness .

Signed
[signed] R Druitt

The defendant admitted in evidence that he wrote this partly as a threat to Sandra, knowing that the second paragraph of it was not correct.

22 On 21 December 2000 the deceased signed a statutory declaration which once again was prepared by Mr Druitt. It was in the following terms:

STATUTORY DECLARATION
I, LEONARD WILLIAM LESLIE REVELLE
Of 9 Short Street, Wentworthville in the State of New South Wales do solemnly and sincerely declare as follows:

That I am the sole owner of the above property. I state here also that my brother, Roy Henry Macquarie Druitt, has an Enduring Power of Attorney over me which I had wholeheartedly agreed with. He has informed me that Sandra Revie, my niece, has told him that I promised to leave my property to her on my death. This is incorrect. I only permitted her and her mother, Jean Mary Revie, to stay in my home and have never requested either of them to pay rent or any of the household accounts. Sandra Revie originally asked me could she and her mother come and live with me at my home that they would be company for me and I agreed. But they were not very good company as they spent most of their time working in their Workroom at the back of the house, which had only been passed by the Parramatta Council to be only used as a Tool Shed.

This Declaration was read out
to the Deponent because he has
limited vision and he has said
that he understands it fully
And I make this solemn declaration conscientiously believing the same to be true and by virtue of the provisions of the “Oaths Act 1900-1953”.
Subscribed and declared at Granville )
This twenty first day of December )
One thousand nine hundred and 2000 ) [signed]
Before me ) L W Revelle
)
[signed] CJ Murphy Justice of the Peace )
2/28 Railway Parade
Condell Park

As I have accepted the general thrust of the evidence of Sandra as to the basis upon which she moved to Short Street, the facts set out in this declaration are untrue. This has the result either that Mr Druitt prepared this document himself without real input from the deceased and got the deceased to sign it, or that the deceased signed a document which contained statements of fact which were not correct. If, as Mr Druitt alleged, the document was prepared after discussions with his brother, it goes to support a finding that the deceased was unable to bring a reasoning mind to the situation.

23 The will admitted to probate was prepared by Mr Druitt, who typed it out on his typewriter and then gave it to his grandson to prepare a better copy on his computer. That will once again appointed the defendant as executor with his son as substitute executor and divided the estate equally between the six children of Mr Druitt. In other words, Jean was omitted as a beneficiary. The evidence given by Mr Druitt in cross-examination about the 1999, 2000 and 2001 wills was as follows:

Q. Why did he want to change his will in 2001, do you say?
A. Now I've done that, well I didn't actually - I've got that information there. But in the 1999 will she was mentally stable, my sister. That's why he wanted a home for her to live in. Then he made the 2000 will. In this time, as you know with Katrina's evidence, with her experience, Katrina's experience as a nursing sister at the Balmain Geriatric Hospital, she observed that her mother was getting - fast getting into dementia, and started to wander away from the house. He said to me, "Well look, we'll just give her a seventh share in that 2000 will.”

Then when she was in the nursing home before he made this last will, she didn't recognise or know him or me, so he said, "Look, there is no good of us leaving anything to her. She has got her pension, she will be getting the entitlement from Centrelink for the nursing home. She has got all the money that she needs, so therefore there is no purpose in putting her in. She won't go home.”


Q. That was something that you said to him, wasn't it?
A. No, we discussed that, he told me.

Q. You might have raised it and he agreed?
A. No, he knew she didn't recognise him.

Q. Again, this document was discussed, you say, with the deceased?
A. Yeah.

Q. And taken home?
A. Yeah.

Q. Prepared?
A. I typed it out, and then I got my grandson to put it through the computer.

Q. There was no opportunity for the deceased to make any changes if he wished to when it came back, because it had already been typed out?
A. He had the opportunity.

Q. It had already been typed out?
A. Yeah, he could have disagreed.

Q. But he didn't?
A. No.

Q. He just said, "yes", and signed it?
A. After it had been read out to him and he fully understood it, he signed.


This evidence was similar to that of Mr Druitt in an affidavit sworn on 15 July 2005 long after most of the relevant evidence in the case was filed. I treat it with some caution. Mr Druitt was shown during his oral evidence to be reasonably calculating. On the medical evidence it is unlikely the deceased would have spoken like this. Mr Druitt admitted making some incorrect statements to the Guardianship Tribunal. He denied, then reluctantly accepted that the 1999 will was related to Sandra’s bankruptcy.

24 The will was witnessed by Mr Murphy and Mr Bonko. Mr Murphy has since died. According to Mr Druitt he read out the will to the deceased in the presence of the attesting witnesses, stopping after each sentence and saying, “Do you understand and do you agree” and on each occasion the deceased said, “Yes”. The evidence of Mr Bonko on affidavit was almost in precisely the same words.

25 I pause here to say that there is no evidence of any attesting witness of the will made in 2000. No application is made that this will be admitted to probate. In the statement of claim the plaintiff, without any proper introduction of facts, claims the deceased lacked capacity to make this will. Mr Druitt denied this allegation. But there the matter lay. I will return to this procedural problem

26 The final document of some significance is a statutory declaration of 15 October 2001 signed by the deceased. Again this was prepared by the defendant, and set out the reasons why the deceased had not included Sandra in his will. Once again it is probably worth setting this out in full:

STATUTORY DECARATION


I, LEONARD WILLIAM LESLIE REVELLE of 9 Short Street, Wentworthville, in the state of New South Wales, do solemnly declare as follows: - that I am the sole owner of the above property.

1. In relation to my Last Will and Testament, dated 4-10.01. I wish to declare that there were many reasons for not including Sandra Revie in my Will, namely:

2. Between 1985 to 1997 I had lent Sandra Revie, a total of $25,000, which to this day no repayments have been made.

3. Sandra asked me in March 1995, if she and her mother, Jean Revie, could live with my late brother, Henry Druitt and myself, to be company for us both, and I agreed. Sandra has not been asked to pay rent at anytime.

4. Sandra Revie and her mother, Jean Revie moved into my home in April 1995 and set up her business CAVILL AVENUE KNITWEAR at 9 Short Street, Wentworthville and was granted bankruptcy on 27th May 1999

5. At a later date Sandra Revie asked could her 2 sons and 1 daughter come and live with me, and I again agreed. The 2 sons and daughter eventually left, but Sandra Revie and her mother stayed on.

6. On 7.8.2000, Sandra Revie placed her mother and me in Nursing Homes for a 9 weeks Respite Care. Later Sandra Revie arranged for my sister, Jean and myself to be permanent patients.

7. On 21.8.2000, I asked my brother, Roy Druitt, to go to my house and get my keys to my house, which were hanging on a hook in my bedroom and approximately $1,000.00, which was in my wallet in the same bedroom. The keys and the money were not there and Sandra Revie refused to hand them both over to my brother, and she still has not to this day.

8. On 4.10.2000, Sandra Revie applied to the Guardianship Tribunal to have a Public Guardian placed over me.

9. On 4.12.2000, I issued a Letter of Demand to Sandra Revie for my keys.

10. On 8.12.2000, Sandra Revie took out a Caveat on my property; this was made to Lapse by my solicitor, Helen Mackenzie.

11. On 16.12.2000, Sandra Revie's son, Adrian Stott, applied to the Guardianship Tribunal to have a Financial Manager appointed over me.

12. On 18.1.2001, The Guardianship Board Committee dismissed both Sandra Revie and Adrian Scott's applications, as being unnecessary.

13. On 4.4.2001, my solicitor, Helen Mackenzie, sent a letter to Sandra Revie's solicitor, L.M.G., giving her 28 days to vacate my home.

14. On 10.5.2001, my brother, Roy Druitt, rang Sandra, and she told him she had not vacated.

15. My solicitor has had a Supreme Court Summons served on Sandra Revie, for her Eviction, but she has informed me that she is going to defend the Case on the grounds that I promised her my house on my death, which is utterly untrue.

This declaration was read out to
the Deponent because he has
limited vision and he has said
that he understands it fully.

And I make this declaration conscientiously believing the same to be true and by virtue of the provisions of the "Oaths Act of 1900".
Subscribed and declared at Granville )
This 15th day of October ) [signed]
The year two thousand and one ) L W Revelle
Before me [signed] C J Murphy )
Justice of the Peace
2/29 Railway Parade
Condell Park

27 While Mr Druitt was reluctant to admit it, I think the ultimate effect of the cross-examination was that the solicitor he was instructing in connection with the caveat proceedings referred to suggested that this document be prepared. By this time there is no doubt that Mr Druitt was expressing to the deceased his view that the move of Sandra at least, and perhaps her mother as well, into Short Street was part of a plan to get that house for themselves or probably for Sandra. The deceased could not have remembered the dates set out. It was not suggested he was shown documents to confirm them. The statements about one daughter and one son moving to Short Street are not correct. Neither is the first sentence of paragraph 3.

28 After the date of death of the deceased Mr Druitt asked Dr Adams, who was at that time the attending general practitioner for the deceased for a report. She seems to have taken over the care on 7 February 2001. The report is as follows:

To whom it may concern 6-11-01
Re: Leonard Revelle DOB 24.3.07 formerly of Kaloola Nursing Home. Date of death 21-10-01.
Mr Leonard Revelle was admitted under my care 7/2/01.
I found Leonard co-operative at all times. His speech was difficult to understand but with patience he could communicate his needs quite well.
Leonard enjoyed his own company and stayed in his room rather than mix with other residents. This I thought was his choice and there was never any problem re his behaviour.
Leonard was always pleasant when I spoke with him, enquired and questioned if he didn’t understand. The staff commented that he was a very nice man and I concur with that.
Sincerely
Dr Sue Adams

It is important to understand that the deceased was not admitted under her care in February 2001, but this is probably the date on which he came under her care. Paragraph 4 of the affidavit of Dr Adams is as follows:

4. I have consulted my notes and the nursing home’s notes and ascertained that no formal testing of the deceased’s mental capacity was carried out during the time he lived at the nursing home. No issue concerning capacity was brought to my attention. My experience in communicating with the deceased was as described in my letter dated 6th November 2001.

I am of the view that the evidence of Dr Adams is of little weight on the question of testamentary capacity.

29 Although the deceased told Sandra to “Get to buggery out of here” after the telephone account problems, she continued to visit him, according to her evidence, weekly or more often. She said in one affidavit that on some occasions the deceased was responsible and reasonable and on other occasions he was hostile to her. The last time she saw him was in July 2001, when the nurses asked her to stop visiting as the deceased became agitated when she visited. Insofar as Mr Druitt said in evidence that she did not visit the deceased after December 2000, that was incorrect and he eventually accepted that.

30 Just prior to his death, proceedings were commenced in the deceased’s name for possession of the Short Street property. Mr Druitt said he took this action as attorney after discussion with the deceased. Little turns on this. The power of attorney remained in force at that time.

31 Whatever his views as to the arrangement when Sandra moved into Short Street, it is clear that Mr Druitt came to the view that there was some grand plan by Sandra to get the house. At transcript page 111 the following passage appears in cross-examination of Mr Druitt:

Q. Thank you. Now, it is the case that in 1995 - forget the hostility between yourself and Sandra - you were happy that Sandra was moving in with the deceased, were you not?
A. In some respects.

Q. You say--
A. I know that there was [a] plan in mind.

NEEDHAM: Could that be struck out?

HIS HONOUR: No, I do not think so.

At transcript page 115 to 116 there is the further passage:


Q. You had the view, didn't you, that Mr Revie should not have been admitted into a nursing home at that point?
A. You keep coming back to that. I mean the judge, he said he would leave the plan in there. Well, there was a plan in mind to get into that house and to get the house eventually. The Guardianship Tribunal was a means of getting me off the scene, to help my brother. Because there would be a public guardian, a public financial manager, and I would have nothing to do with him. Then they would concentrate on him to get the house off him. Sorry I had to go into all that.

Q. That's all right. You had that view?
A. For quite a time, yes.

Q. At the time he went into the nursing home?
A. Yes.

At page 125 there is a passage

Q: You say that she moved in for the benefit only of rent-free accommodation?
A: That was a part and parcel of it, but as I said previously, there was a plan in mind.

And at transcript page 140 the final passage:


Q. Now, it was your view, was it not, yours, not necessarily your brother's, I am asking about yours, that Sandra was a dishonest person?
A. I had that feeling after different consultations with my brother.

Q. You have told the court that you had a feeling that Mrs Revie had a plan from the time she moved in; it is the case that you felt that?
A. Oh, theoretical.

Q. You thought in December 2000 that she was a dishonest person?
A. It is a bit of a strong word that, yes.

Probate issues

32 It is important to bear in mind that the issues raised on the pleadings go only to testamentary capacity and undue influence. There is no claim of fraud or that the testator did not know and approve of the contents of the 2001 will.

Testamentary capacity

33 While the proceedings commenced with a claim for revocation of a grant, it is still for the person who propounded the will the subject of a grant in common form to establish its validity in this action. This was a will made by a man aged 94, blind or almost blind in one eye, confined to a nursing home, mostly in bed, and found by the Guardianship Tribunal to be incapable of managing his affairs. These matters throw doubt upon capacity, discharging the evidentiary onus on the plaintiff to overcome any presumption that a will valid on its face and duly executed was that of a person of sound and disposing mind.

34 As I have pointed out quite recently in Kerr v Badran [2004] NSWSC 735, lay evidence of the activities, conversations, family circumstances and relationships of the deceased and evidence from doctors, often general practitioners who were treating doctors during the lifetime of the deceased, usually is of far more value than reports of expert specialist medical practitioners who have never seen the deceased. In this case, the evidence of Dr Adams was not of much assistance. That is not said in a derogatory sense, but merely states the position. There was no evidence of conversations she had and in the relevant nursing home situation she was not called upon to consider questions of mental ability or capacity. Dr Singh was not called. His absence was not explained. His report of 9 October 2000 raised doubts as to capacity. His patient records were not put into evidence. He was an obvious witness, presumably available to either party and as the ultimate onus was on Mr Druitt, one would have expected that he might call him. Nonetheless in a case such as this I do not consider that any Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 inference should be drawn against either party.

35 Evidence relevant to the issue is contained in the report in evidence of an occupational therapist, Sue Biswas, dated 9 January 2001 and produced at the request of the Guardianship Tribunal for its hearing. Ms Biswas is an experienced occupational therapist. Dr Rosenfeld, whose evidence I will come to shortly, said that occupational therapists were persons qualified to test and report on cognitive ability. No objection was made to the report. Again I would have expected her to be called to give evidence.

36 Ms Biswas had seen the deceased on two occasions prior to that occasion on which her report was based. Those occasions were 16 October 1997 and 2 October 2000. The first occasion was at Westmead Geriatric Day Hospital when an initial cognitive assessment was carried out. The second was at Kaloola to assess whether higher level of care in that nursing home was the appropriate care for the deceased. The third occasion when she saw the deceased was on 9 January 2001 at Kaloola when, at the request of the Guardianship Tribunal, she carried out a cognitive/functional assessment. The following passages appear in her report:

SOCIAL STATUS :

Mr. Revelle was living with his sister, niece and her son (since 1995) prior to his admission to Kaloola A.C.F. in September 2000. Prior to this his niece cared for him and his sister who has advanced dementia. His niece found she was unable to care for them when her son, who has epilepsy, became unwell. At this time his case manager, Kaye Bridgement, organised respite for Mr. Revelle and his sister in Kaloola A.C.F. This has since become a permanent placement for them both. On my visit today Mr. Revelle is still clearly stating that he is happy to remain in Kaloola. Mr Revelle also has a brother who is in regular contact with him and who he gave Power of Attorney to in October 2000. Mr. Revelle advised us today that he gave his brother Power of Attorney 12 to 14 years ago and appeared unaware of doing this recently. In my original contact with Mr. Revelle and in Kaye's contact recently we observed and were advised by his niece that Mr. Revelle is difficult and often verbally aggressive.

PHYSICAL STATUS :
Mr. Revelle has poor mobility and prior to admission to the A.C.F. had regular falls. He mobilises short distances only with a walking frame and requires supervision with his mobility and assistance with transfers. He is taken longer distances in a wheelchair. He still spends most of his day in bed and is reluctant to participate in the A.C.F. activities. He has poor activity tolerance and becomes short of breath on exertion. He is also very thin.

COGNITIVE STATUS :
In my original contact with Mr. Revelle in 1997 a cognitive assessment was carried out and he was found to have deficits in verbal memory, insight, problem solving/abstract reasoning and in money skills. He also showed very poor insight into his problems on the home visit that was carried out at this time. He denied any problems and declined any services, equipment or modifications that were recommended. He was also observed to be verbally aggressive to his niece and his sister. In the cognitive assessment carried out today it was found that he has now developed visual memory deficits and that he has deteriorated further with his orientation, verbal memory, insight and problem solving/abstract reasoning.

At the request of the tribunal I particularly looked at his money management skills. He had difficulty identifying the coins and talked in shillings and in cents. He was able to show correct amounts for items tested but became quickly confused when asked to show the amount required with a different combination of coins. He also had difficulty calculating the change he would need if paying in larger amounts. He was also unable to say how the A.C.F. was being payed [sic] and was unclear about amounts of money that he had given his niece. He however stated he had given her considerable amounts of money over a long period of time including a thousand a month while she lived with him and a recent amount of five thousand dollars he reported giving her for a tax debt.

A completely accurate assessment was difficult due to Mr. Revelle's poor eyesight and the language problems caused by his dysarthria. It was very difficult to understand everything he was saying. He appears to have a reasonably good long term memory but became confused with some details. He was also able to state clearly what he wanted to come out of the tribunal hearing and appeared to understand what was happening.

FUNCTIONAL STATUS :
Mr. Revelle is currently requiring assistance with all his self care tasks and is dependent on the A.C.F. for all domestic tasks. His leisure activities are very restricted due to his reluctance to participate in A.C.F. activities and as stated above spends most of the day alone lying on his bed. There is however a long history of Mr. Revelle doing this. He listens to the radio and was able to give details of recent items in the news. He was also compliant with talking to us and pleasant. He has no problems with incontinence.

IMPRESSION
Mr. Revelle is appropriately placed at high level of care and has clearly stated he is happy to stay in the A.C.F. However due to his lack of insight he still felt that he would have no problems managing at home. He appears to be quite passive about where he stays and it is unlikely he will need Guardianship Tribunal intervention with this.

Mr. Revelle has been observed to have significant cognitive deficits that are particularly relevant in the area of financial management and appears to still be giving out amounts of money recently to his niece and was unable to give clear details of what had become of it. He was unaware of recently granting his brother Power of Attorney. He, however, very clearly stated that he wants his brother to look after his finances and that he wants his niece and her son out of the house so it can be sold. He would benefit from financial management.

Due to the considerable observed and reported conflict between Mr. Revelle and his niece and her son and between the niece, her son and the brother it is likely that he would benefit from an independent financial manager. It is not clear whether Mr. Revelle's long standing resentment of his niece is warranted and she states she cared for him and he denies this. He is, however, unable to give clear details of how he managed without her assistance. He also has a long history of being difficult and verbally aggressive and has very poor insight into his needs and problems. From details given to us by Mr. Revelle his niece and her son appear to have had some difficulty with their financial management. This all would indicate that an independent financial manager would be recommended.

This is a difficult and complicated situation and it is difficult to know what is the best recommendation. I hope this report is beneficial. If you require any further details please contact me on 9845-6903.

37 Dr Tuly Rosenfeld was called by the plaintiff. He gave a report dated 21 January 2004 based on examination of the nursing home records, Westmead Hospital records and Guardianship Tribunal records. He is an experienced specialist geriatrician. He considered that the deceased had an aggressive cognitive function deterioration from 1997 until 2001. He concluded that he thought that the deceased would have had testamentary capacity in 1999 but not in 2000 or later. It is important to understand that no challenge is made to the 1999 will, other than it is not the last will of the deceased. Dr Rosenfeld said that based on the report of a CT scan in October 1997 it was clear the deceased by then was suffering a vascular disease, a common cause of dementia.

38 Dr Rosenfeld accepted that dementia itself did not determine testamentary capacity. His opinion was that the deceased suffered from a progressive vascular type of dementia. He considered by November 2000 this deterioration was considerably advanced and was related to frontal lobe disease resulting in deficits in executive functioning in matters relating to initiative, comprehension and judgment. In his report, confirmed in oral evidence, he stated that the deceased’s lack of understanding of his need for care, his lack of short term memory and his inability to reason indicated that he was not able to weigh appropriately the claims of persons who were the natural objects of his bounty.

39 By the date of hearing Dr Rosenfeld had read the affidavit evidence. This did not alter his opinion. Dr Rosenfeld accepted that a person with dementia can respond appropriately to cues in daily life but that admission to a nursing home where the situation is different can cause more confusion.

40 It is convenient to set out part of the oral evidence of Dr. Rosenfeld. The reference to item 3 is the doctor’s discussion of the requirements for testamentary capacity, item 3 in his list being “the testator should be able to recall and understand the claims of potential heirs or family”.

41 In cross-examination the following passage appears at transcript page 81:

Q. Could I take you back to item 3 in your report. You say, "The testator should be able to recall and understand the claims of potential heirs and family." I am suggesting to you that the report of Ms Biswas shows, at least by January 2001, the deceased was able to do that?
A. Is that a question?

Q. It is a question, what do you say to that?
A. Could you rephrase the question please?

Q. I am going to suggest to you that at least by 2001 the deceased was able to recall and understand the claims of potential heirs and family?
A. I disagree completely.

Q. Having refreshed your memory of Sue Biswas' report, you say that you disagree with her conclusions?
A. I disagree with the implication, I will qualify my disagreement. The disagreement is that she refers, or you referred in referring to her document about long-term memory, and long-term memory is something that is often preserved into the late stages of dementia. Long-term memory has to be - there is a clear distinction between long-term memory and short term memory. In relation to the comments about the radio, one of the most important aspects about this man, the deceased's dementing illness, is the patchy nature of the frontal lobe impairments. He has frontal lobe disease. In fact, one of the things about frontal lobe disease, as I have just said to you before, is the responsiveness to the cues and things that are going on for you at the moment. If somebody comes into the room and asks you what was on the radio, and it was a big and important event or thing that struck you, you may well have been able to relate to it.

There is a very important distinction, however, between being able to remember snippets of short-term memory and then being able to judge and weigh issues in relation to those bits of memory, because in frontal lobe disease the ability to carry various types of information in the frontal lobe while you juggle them up and down and compare them and weigh them, is very seriously impaired.


Q. Doctor, one doesn't have to have perfect memory to have testamentary capacity?
A. The issue of judgment and being able to weigh lots of different bits of memory is very important.

Q. The question I'm asking you, one doesn't have to have perfect memory to have testamentary capacity?
A. I don't know if anyone I know has perfect memory.

Q. Indeed, some people whose memory isn't good at all can still have testamentary capacity?
A. Absolutely.

Q. You agree with that?
A. I agree with that.

Q. Going back to item 3, you again refer to this potentially influenced situation. Is that the same, are you making the same comment in item 3 as you did in item 5?
A. Only in that one of the reasons that you can be, that you are so susceptible to influence in frontal lobe disease is your reacting to and responding to just what is going on at the moment. So if somebody says to you something at that particular moment, it is fresh in your mind and you are making a judgment in relation to that, you will be influenced by that particular bit of memory, information. But the issue that I have referred to in three is about the ability to judge and weigh and use executive functions.

Q. You are saying he had that ability in 1999, but not in 2000 or 2001, is that what you are saying?
A. It was clearly significantly worse in 2000 and 2001, because his dementia had progressed.

Q. I didn't ask you whether it was worse. Did he have it or not?
A. It is hard for me to answer that in absolute terms, because I've said before, and I believe strongly that this, the deceased had a progressive cognitive impairment that goes back to at least 1997, probably before. So all his aspects of cognitive capacity were gradually being eaten away. But at the time of 1999, because of those frontal lobe impairments, and because of his situation, he was able to respond and judge because of his situation, and even despite his earlier less significant cognitive impairments in that regard. But he clearly had frontal lobe disease going back a long time.

Q. Doctor, people who suffer dementia, is it the case they have good days and bad days?
A. Very much so. That's absolutely correct.

Q. On their good days they appear quite normal?
A. Yes, that's true.

In re-examination the following passage appears in the transcript of evidence at page 84:


Q. You were asked a number of questions about the report of Sue Biswas, the occupational therapist. Firstly, how much weight do you place when assessing historical cognitive function, on occupational therapists reports?
A. An occupational therapist is trained in assessing physical and physical and cognitive function, particularly cognitive function in its relation to physical function. So you need cognitive function, or good cognitive function to be able to go about your daily activities, and particularly instrumental activities like cooking, cleaning and using telephones and things like that. So in answer to the question, occupational therapists are good at that.

Q. It was put to you that by 2001 the report of Ms Biswas shows that the deceased was able to recall and understand claims of heirs and family, do you recall that question? You said you disagreed completely?
A. I did.

Q. I would like to take you to parts of the Biswas report. On page 994 in the second paragraph under "Cognitive Status", I would like you to assume that the statement that the deceased gave the plaintiff $1,000 a month while she lived with him, I would like you to assume that that is untrue. I would like you to assume that the reference to a recent amount of $5,000 dated back to 1996. Do either of those assumptions strengthen or weaken your complete disagreement with Mr Flaherty's assessment?
A. They strengthen, because - can I qualify it?

Q. Yes.
A. It strengthens it because it is clear that even though the deceased was able to apparently recall things and give those bits and information to somebody who was examining, they weren't accurate. If they weren't accurate, if that's the assumption then that just highlights my conclusions.

Q. Over the page, page 995, at the top of the page under the heading "Impression", Ms Biswas said that the deceased felt that he would have no problems managing at home, and she refers to his lack of insight. Again, that does have an impact on the evidence that you have given to this Court?
A. Again it backs up that, my opinion, because the lack of insight is a very prominent feature of the frontal lobe dysfunction and inability to weigh and judge.

Q. What about the next sentence, "He appears to be quite passive about where he stays"?
A. Again, that just confirms and backs up the fact that one of the features of frontal lobe disease is the passivity. Well, rather actually lack of initiative too, it is those executive functions which are lacking. So it is initiative planning.

Q. You were asked in the context of being able to weigh up the claims of the deceased's family, the third paragraph in that impression section in the third line Ms Biswas says, "It is not clear whether Mr Revie's long-standing resentment of his niece is warranted and she states she cared for him and he denies this." What impact does that have on your evidence?
A. Well, again it is confirmatory. It just shows if the assumptions and the knowledge, the information I have been given, and he is denying the information, which is apparently otherwise true.

Q. The next sentence, "He is however unable to give clear details of how he managed upon his assistance"?
A. It is the same confirmatory, yeah.

Q. You were asked some questions about the deceased's memory. Ms Biswas notes in the second paragraph of the impression that, "He was unaware of the recent granting his brother power of attorney." What impact would forgetting a power of attorney have upon your opinion of impairment of executive function through frontal lobe damage?
A. It would be confirmatory, particularly if Biswas had specifically - and I presume she did, specifically asked him about that in regard, as a direct question, because I would have thought that that would have been a fairly important issue. Again, it backs up the fact that his memory and his ability to put those bits of long-term memory, even in their context in terms of thinking and judgment, it is pretty haphazard.

This evidence, particularly the re-examination, I consider to be valuable. I accept it. It is of more assistance than Dr Rosenfeld’s written expert report, which on its own would have been of little assistance.

42 I think this evidence should also be considered in the light of the documents signed by the deceased. The first of those documents is that signed on 5 September 2000. I accept the evidence of Sandra about the telephone account and the type of letter she asked her uncle to sign, which at that time had not been written out. Accepting for the moment that the deceased signed this 5 September document of his own will, it shows a complete misunderstanding of the position. I find as a fact that it was at Mr Druitt’s suggestion that this document and the others like it came into existence. If the deceased agreed to them they show an inability to comprehend the true facts, particularly so far as the first statutory declaration is concerned, the understanding upon which Sandra moved into Short Street.

43 There is really little other helpful evidence on the question of testamentary capacity. Mr Bonko, one of the attesting witnesses, said that there was some conversation with the deceased for about five or ten minutes about the daily routine, how he felt and what were his needs, but he did not remember any specific details. Mr Druitt said the deceased was able to discuss matters heard on the radio. He said, “we discussed all sorts of things, he would tell me different things and we’d discuss them between ourselves.” Miss McKenzie, a solicitor, had visited the deceased in the nursing home in connection with a lapsing notice for a caveat lodged by Sandra. She could perhaps have given useful evidence but was not called.

44 It is necessary for the court to be satisfied that the deceased knew and understood that the document he was signing was a will and what that meant; that he understood the general nature and extent of his assets available for disposition under his will; and that he was able to consider and evaluate the respective claims of persons having a claim upon his estate and whom he would be expected to consider in disposing of his estate: Banks v Goodfellow [1870] LR 5 QB 549. It is not necessary to consider the fourth requirement as there is no claim of delusion.

45 Although there must be some doubt about the matter in view of the evidence about the power of attorney I think it more likely than not that the deceased understood that he was making a will. As he had very limited property comprising Short Street and money in bank accounts, it is at least more likely than not that he was aware of this, although there is nothing to show he understood the value of Short Street or the amounts held in bank accounts.

46 The evidence of Ms Biswas and Dr Rosenfeld is very significant and in the absence of any useful evidence to the contrary must put the court in considerable doubt as to the ability of the deceased to consider those persons who might have a claim on his estate and to weigh up those claims. Mr Druitt really admitted it was he who suggested that his children should be objects of the testator’s bounty. As against that there can be no doubt that on the basis that I have found a will was made in 1995, the making of a new will in 1999 was a sensible act having regard to the bankruptcy of Sandra. She was still an undischarged bankrupt at the date of death of the deceased. It is however true that by the time her mother died she had been discharged. It is also true that the debt upon which the bankruptcy was founded was only for an amount of about $2,600 and the amount required to obtain an annulment was only about $6,000. Whether the deceased knew of that is not established by any evidence. If the evidence of Mr Druitt is accepted then the statements of the deceased as to the reason for making changes to his will in 2000 and 2001 would have a logical basis so as to vary and then delete the gifts to Jean. It was at that time that the deceased was annoyed with Sandra for having brought the application to the Guardianship Tribunal and on his understanding of her having arranged for him to become a patient in the nursing home. The reason why this carries less weight than it otherwise would in my view is that the letter signed by the deceased of 5 December and the statutory declaration signed by him shortly thereafter contain statements which were not correct. On the version of Mr Druitt the deceased must have regarded them as correct as they were made after discussion with him. I have little doubt that they were put together having regard to a conversation which was led by Mr Druitt. If the statements which Mr Druitt says the deceased made about the reasons for changing his will were in fact made then once again I have little doubt that they were made at the instigation of Mr Druitt. There is no suggestion that the deceased gave any consideration of any claim Sandra might have or to the continued possibility that she might obtain a discharge from her bankruptcy and inherit the whole of her mother’s estate in due course in any event. Nor is it suggested the deceased considered any claim of Sandra’s children who it seems likely from the evidence had more contact with the deceased than Mr Druitt’s children.

47 This is a difficult case. In Re Estate Griffith (deceased) Easter v Griffith (1995) 217 ALR 284 at 295 Gleeson CJ said the court should be very careful in coming to a decision that an elderly testator lacks testamentary capacity. It is important to bear in mind that: “a residual doubt (as to capacity) is not enough to defeat the plaintiff’s claim unless it is felt by the Court to be substantial enough to preclude a belief that the document propounded is the will of a testatrix who possessed sound mind, memory and understanding at the time of the execution”: Worth v Clasohm (1952) 86 CLR 439 at 453. However, in the light of the evidence of Dr Rosenfeld, and in light of the documents set out which I think establish the deceased was unable to bring proper reasoning to them, and in the absence of any significant evidence from the defendant’s side about capacity, and in light of my conclusion that the evidence of Mr Druitt was unreliable – I conclude that I am not satisfied the deceased had the necessary capacity at the time the 2001 will was made.

48 In case it is not clear I summarize my reasons as to the finding about the credit of Mr Druitt. I find his evidence about there being no 1995 will to be untrue; I find he prepared documents signed by the deceased some of which contained statements he knew were untrue; and I consider his evidence about the plan was given to hide the true basis upon which he knew Sandra moved to Short Street.

49 There is no application for probate of the 2000 will. The pleadings did raise an issue on it and on the evidence had it been propounded I would have found against it. The proper course would have been for Sandra to have served citations on the beneficiaries under that will to give them the opportunity to propound it. Mr Druitt of course as executor named in it had the opportunity of propounding it in the alternative to the 2001 will. He did not do so and in the events which have happened his children would have been the persons cited. It can be assumed they have knowledge of these proceedings although they are not bound by the result. In the circumstances I consider the appropriate course is to order a grant of probate of the 1999 will in common form. It is unfortunate this procedural problem went unnoticed. It did so because the probate file was attached to the equity file and not under the eyes of the Registrar in Probate, who normally attends to such procedural matters. That does not mean that I should not have identified the problem when the actions were transferred to me at a late stage for hearing. It is, however, also the responsibility of counsel appearing in contested probate actions to ensure that all necessary persons are parties or the subject of citation.

Undue influence

50 In view of the decision on testamentary capacity it is not really necessary to deal with this claim. However, as the issue was raised and in probate actions this gives rise to serious allegations of coercive conduct, it is desirable to deal with it briefly.

51 The onus is on the person alleging undue influence to prove it. It is not sufficient to establish pressure or importuning conduct bearing on the deceased. What is needed for a claim of undue influence to be successful is evidence that the conduct of the person or persons alleged to be exerting pressure was such that it amounted to coercion so that it overbore the free will of the testator: Wingrove v Wingrove (1885) LR 11 PD 81; Boyse vRossborough (1857) 6 HL Cas 1; Winter v Crichton (1991) 23 NSWLR 116.

52 The only particular of this allegation in the statement of claim is:

The defendant prepared the will of 4th October 2001.


It is stated in the statement of claim that further particulars would be supplied. I do not know whether they were or not, but none were before me. The particulars supplied might go to the issue of knowledge and approval. On its own it goes nowhere on undue influence. As I understood it the argument of Ms Needham, SC for the plaintiff was:

(i) Mr Druitt prepared the documents I have set out in this judgment, some of which contained untrue statements;

(ii) Mr Druitt also prepared the wills, or they were prepared at his direction;

(ii) He had the other documents signed by the deceased;

(iv) This established that he was able to exercise control over the deceased;

(v) That this ability to control meant that the will was not the will of the deceased whose free will was overborne.

53 It is made clear in Wingrove that the power to control does not establish that coercion was exercised. It is clear, and in fact admitted by Mr Druitt that he discussed the contents of the 2000 and 2001 wills with the deceased and prepared them after those discussions. He may even have suggested the contents. That does not mean the deceased was coerced into signing them. Mr Bonko, the attesting witness of the 2001 will, was not even cross-examined about this.

54 It is generally recognized that it is extremely difficult to prove undue influence. The person who could give the best evidence is dead. That does not mean that it is impossible to establish undue influence, although I know of no case in New South Wales where the issue has been successfully raised. In any event the claim for undue influence in this action fails.

Equity proceedings

55 It was accepted that it would not be necessary to consider the separate equity claims if I came to the decision I have on the probate action. I have already explained why I consider the claim for breach of contract fails. I consider also that the claim for a charge fails. It seems likely that the amount spent by Sandra on the improvements to Short Street as a result of which she claims a charge is in the vicinity of $12,000.00. The shed which was erected with those moneys was erected so that she could carry out her sewing business there. There is no evidence the shed added to the value of the property. Without such evidence and having regard to the benefit which the plaintiff obtained from it, I consider a case for a charge fails.

56 I do not think it desirable to make any decision on the Family Provision Act claim. That is because as a result of the decision in the probate action, it is clear that unless an appeal against that decision succeeds, the claim under the Family Provision Act must fail. It will be necessary to frame an order preserving the plaintiff’s rights to pursue her Family Provision Act claim in the event of there being an appeal which succeeds in the probate action.

Costs

57 I will hear submissions on costs. In the absence of special circumstances costs of the issue of undue influence must be borne by the plaintiff.

In the Probate action No 104146 of 2004:

1. The grant of probate of the will dated 4 October 2001 be revoked.

2. The defendant lodge such grant in the Registry.

3. Letters of administration with the will dated 30 August 1999 annexed of the estate of Leonard William Leslie Revelle deceased, be granted to Sandra Joan Revie, the administrator with the will annexed of Jean Mary Revie, a beneficiary under the said will dated 30 August 1999.

4. The cross-claim be dismissed.

In the Equity action 2236/02:

1. The claims other than the claim under the Family Provision Act 1982 be dismissed.

2. The claim under the Family Provision Act be stayed until the later of:

(a) the expiration of the time to appeal in the Probate action;

(b) in the event of an appeal until 28 days after the determination of the appeal;
(c) in the event of there being no appeal or the appeal being dismissed the said Family Provision Act claim be dismissed with no order as to costs.
(d) Liberty to apply on 7 days’ notice for variation of this order 2.
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