Trustee for the Salvation Army (NSW) Property Trust v Becker

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NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL

CITATION:      Trustee for the Salvation Army (NSW) Property Trust & Anor v Becker & Anor [2007]  NSWCA 136
This decision has been amended. Please see the end of the judgment for a list of the amendments.

FILE NUMBER(S):
40538/06

HEARING DATE(S):               14 & 15 May 2007

JUDGMENT DATE: 15 June 2007

PARTIES:
Trustee for the Salvation Army (NSW) Property Trust trading as the Salvation Army - 1st Appellant
The Australian Council of the Royal Flying Doctors Service of Australia - 2nd Appellant
Reginald Alfred Becker - 1st Respondent
Public Trustee of New South Wales - 2nd Respondent

JUDGMENT OF:       Mason P Ipp JA McColl JA   

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: Supreme Court - Equity Division

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):          3332/03

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:     Nicholas J

LOWER COURT DATE OF DECISION:    25 July 2006

LOWER COURT MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:
Reginald Alfred Becker v Public Trustee of New South Wales & 2 Ors [2006] NSWSC 743
Reginald Alfred Becker v Public Trustee of New South Wales & 2 Ors [2006] NSWSC 1146

COUNSEL:
DE Grieve QC/ CJ Bevan/ E Young - Appellants
LJ Ellison SC/ J Wilcher - Respondents

SOLICITORS:
Mallesons Stephen Jaques - Appellants
Tress Cox Lawyers - 1st Respondent
Public Trustee of New South Wales - 2nd Respondent

CATCHWORDS:
SUCCESSION – wills, probate and administration – validity of a will – knowledge and approval of the will – whether the testatrix approved of the contents of her will – undue influence and fraud – whether such concepts must be pleaded separately – whether the testatrix was coerced into, and did not intend and desire, the impugned disposition – whether the principal beneficiary made a wilfully false statement to gain for herself a benefit under the will – whether there existed a ‘grand plan’ on the part of the principal beneficiary to acquire the primary asset in the will
COSTS – whether the circumstances of this case justified the departure from the ordinary rule regarding costs in probate proceedings, namely, that costs should follow the event – Calderbank offers – whether there existed an element of genuine compromise in certain Calderbank offers made to the charities – whether the charities acted reasonably in continuing the case after the Calderbank offer had been made – whether, generally speaking, there exists a role for offers of compromise in probate actions

LEGISLATION CITED:

CASES CITED:
Abalos v Australian Postal Commission (1990) 171 CLR 167
Barry v Butlin (1838) 2 Moo PC 480
Boyse v Rossborough (1857) 6 HLC 2
Bridgewater v Leahy (1998) 194 CLR 457
Buckley v Maddocks (1891) 12 LR (NSW) Eq 277
Burns
‘Elders and Testamentary Undue Influence in Australia’ (2005) 28(1) University of New South Wales Law Journal 145
Colgate Palmolive v Cussons (1993) 118 ALR 248
Craig v Lamoureux [1920] AC 349
Devries v Australian National Railways Commission (1993) 177 CLR 472
Estate Late Hazel Ruby Grounds
Page v Sedawie
Re [2005] NSWSC 1311
Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118
Hall v Hall…

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Details
Case
[2007] NSWCA 136
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of *Trustee for the Salvation Army (NSW) Property Trust v Becker* concerned an appeal to the Court of Appeal of New South Wales regarding the validity of a will. The dispute centred on allegations of undue influence and fraud in relation to a disposition made by the testatrix, Miss Wilson, in favour of Ms Abel. The appellants, representing charities, contended that the will was invalid due to undue influence and fraud, while Ms Abel, the principal beneficiary, defended its validity.

The primary legal issues before the Court of Appeal were whether the trial judge erred in finding that the testatrix had knowledge and approval of the contents of her will, and whether the evidence established undue influence or fraud. Specifically, the charities argued that the judge's findings were inconsistent with incontrovertible facts or based on demonstrably improbable evidence. The court was required to consider the principles governing the assessment of evidence in probate matters, particularly concerning allegations of coercion and the testator's true intentions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings. The court applied the principles established in cases such as *Devries v Australian National Railways Commission*, *Abalos v Australian Postal Commission*, and *Fox v Percy*, which emphasise the importance of the trial judge's assessment of witness credibility and the factual matrix. The court found that the trial judge had properly preferred the evidence of Ms Abel over the untested statement of Miss Wilson, as recounted by Mrs Mawson, regarding the alleged coercion. The judge's assessment of Ms Abel's credibility and the improbability of her having made the alleged false statement to Miss Wilson were crucial to the decision. The court concluded that the charities had not demonstrated that the trial judge erred in his factual findings or in his application of the relevant legal principles.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal dismissed.

2. Appellants to pay the costs of the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

Essentially, the issues raised on appeal in regard to undue influence and fraud are factual questions and the appeal, in substance, turns squarely on the principles laid down in Devries v Australian National Railways Commission (1993) 177 CLR 472, Abalos v Australian Postal Commission (1990) 171 CLR 167 and Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118. In regard to those principles, the charities contended only that the judge made findings inconsistent with incontrovertible facts or acted on glaringly improbable evidence.The facts that were common ground or found by the trial judge In 1995, Mr Becker, his wife and Miss Wilson were parishioners of the Baptist Church, Mosman. Miss Wilson was in poor health and was living alone at her house in Mosman. From 1995 to about July 2000 (when Miss Wilson was admitted to Royal North Shore Hospital), Mr Becker and his wife assisted Miss Wilson frequently with her banking and shopping and visited her at her home from time to time. Mr Becker did other chores for her and assisted her generally. Other members of the church visited Miss Wilson at her home. In December 1995, Ms Abel, together with her two sons and a daughter, came to live in a rented flat at Cremorne. She, too, joined the Baptist Church, Mosman, and became a volunteer “frail age group person”. Mr Becker had encouraged members of the congregation to visit Miss Wilson, and, in response, Ms Abel began to visit her at her house in Mosman. They became friendly and Miss Abel became a regular visitor. In July 2000, Ms Abel became so concerned that Miss Wilson was living alone and in poor health that she arranged for her to be taken by ambulance and admitted to Royal North Shore Hospital. Later, Miss Wilson was transferred to Greenwich Hospital and, on 16 October 2000, to the Harley Nursing Home in Cremorne (“Harley”), where she remained until she died. There she was under the care of a general practitioner, Dr Clifford Hing. As the judge observed, the conditions from which she suffered included asthma, ischaemic heart disease, congestive cardiac failure, diabetes, vascular disease, recurrent painful leg ulcers and back pain. Her mobility was limited and she needed a wheelchair. On 31 July 2000, Miss Wilson gave the Public Trustee her general power of attorney. On the same day, she made a will appointing the Public Trustee the executor and trustee of her estate and giving her entire estate to the charities. This represented a testamentary change. On 1 December 1967, Miss Wilson had made a will on a newsagent’s will form which had been attested by her neighbours. By that will, the Public Trustee was appointed executor of her estate which she bequeathed to the Royal Institute for Deaf and Blind Children. While at Harley, Miss Wilson had numerous regular visitors. These included Mr Becker and Ms Abel. Ms Abel visited about twice a week and on many occasions took Miss Wilson for outings, usually to Balmoral for meals at the Bathers Pavilion. In about December 2000, Ms Abel told Miss Wilson that she and her two children were required to vacate the flat she was then renting. In early January 2001, Miss Wilson consented to Ms Abel and her two children moving into the house. Mr Becker confirmed with Miss Wilson that she wanted this to happen. On 8 February 2001, Miss Wilson advised the Public Trustee that Ms Abel would live in her house. In mid-February 2001, Ms Abel and the children moved in. Since then, Ms Abel has lived continuously in the house.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In Craig v Lamoureux, Viscount Haldane (at 357) set out the requirements of proving probate undue influence as follows: “As was said in the House of Lords when Boyse v Rossborough [(1856) 6 HLC 2 (at 49)] was decided, in order to set aside the will of a person of sound mind, it is not sufficient to show that the circumstances attending its execution are consistent with the hypothesis of its having been obtained by undue influence. It must be shown that they are inconsistent with a contrary hypothesis. Undue influence, in order to render a will void, must be an influence which can justly be described by a person looking at the matter judicially to have caused the execution of a paper pretending to express a testator’s mind, but which really does not express his mind, but something else which he did not really mean.”Mrs Mawson’s evidence In considering the charities’ arguments, I shall deal with that based on Mrs Mawson’s evidence first, as it was the main plank of their contentions. Mrs Mawson’s evidence was the only evidence that tended to establish, directly, that Ms Abel coerced Miss Wilson and suborned her will. I accept that the conversation with Miss Wilson, to which Mrs Mawson referred, took place shortly after Miss Wilson had signed the Balmoral will. I reiterate that Nicholas J accepted Mrs Mawson’s account of that conversation. In view of the importance of this conversation, I shall repeat the essential parts of it. Mrs Mawson said that she found Miss Wilson crying and, upon inquiry, Miss Wilson stated that Ms Abel had forced her to sign the will leaving her the Mosman property. Miss Wilson said:“I didn’t want to do it. I wanted to leave the will as it was.”When Mrs Mawson asked what Miss Wilson meant and specifically inquired what Ms Abel had done, Miss Wilson said that Ms Abel had cried and told her “that she and her children would be on the street if I didn’t leave the house to her”. Miss Wilson asked: “[w]hat can I do?” There is no evidence as to any reply that Mrs Mawson gave as to this question. Ms Abel denied making the statements attributed to her by Miss Wilson. His Honour said (at [80]), “left to choose between the tested evidence of Ms Abel and the untested statement of Miss Wilson, I prefer Ms Abel’s evidence”. This issue was very much a matter for the trial judge. Nicholas J stated that it was improbable that Ms Abel made the statement attributed to her. His Honour found Ms Abel to be a credible and trustworthy witness. He observed that she was not shaken in cross-examination. He pointed out that Ms Abel was not questioned about her capacity to maintain herself and the children, whether she lived in the house or not, or to rent accommodation. His Honour accepted Ms Abel’s testimony that she was paying the outgoings for the house and also Miss Wilson’s expenses when they went on outing and when she purchased other items for Miss Wilson. His Honour accepted Ms Abel’s testimony, in effect, that she was not impecunious and would not have been homeless had Miss Wilson not left her the house. Having regard to his Honour’s assessment of Ms Abel’s character and credibility as a witness, he regarded it as improbable that she would have lied about her situation to Miss Wilson. This, again, was essentially a matter for his Honour’s decision as trial judge and he has not been shown to have erred in this respect.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established