Re Occhipinti
[2023] VSC 730
•7 December 2023
| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted |
AT MELBOURNE
COMMON LAW DIVISION
TRUSTS, EQUITY & PROBATE LIST
S PRB 2020 23683
IN THE MATTER of the estate of GIUSEPPA OCCHIPINTI, deceased
| GIOVANNA GURRIERI | Plaintiff |
| v | |
| KATIA COMITINI | Caveator |
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JUDGE: | Moore J |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
DATE OF HEARING: | On the papers |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 7 December 2023 |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | Re Occhipinti |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2023] VSC 730 |
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WILLS AND ESTATES – Caveats – Application by plaintiff for grant of probate opposed by caveator – Caveator alleges testator subject to undue influence at time of making will –Whether particulars establish prima facie case of testamentary undue influence – Prima facie case established—Gardiner v Hughes[No 2] [2019] VSCA 198 – Montalto v Sala (2016) 15 ASTLR 393 – Re Robustelle (No 2) [2023] VSC 72.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Plaintiff | Mr J Rizzi | Natoli Legal |
| For the Caveator | Mr M J Biviano | Costanzo Lawyers |
HIS HONOUR:
Introduction
The deceased died on 24 November 2019 at 85 years of age. She was survived by her four sisters, Giovanna Gurrieri (the plaintiff), Emilia Guastella, Maria Costantin, and Lucia Aurora Zigarella, and her niece, Katia Comitini (the caveator).
The deceased left a will dated 15 October 2014 (the 2014 will) by which she appointed the plaintiff as her executor and provided for her estate to be held on trust and distributed in equal shares to her four sisters.
The caveator filed a caveat in relation to the deceased’s estate on 22 June 2020. Although she is not a beneficiary under the 2014 will, the caveator is the sole beneficiary and executor under the deceased’s penultimate will dated 19 May 2006 (the 2006 will). If probate of the 2014 will is not granted, the 2006 will would stand as the last valid will of the deceased. The caveator’s standing to challenge the 2014 will was accordingly not in issue.
The caveator seeks to impugn the validity of the 2014 will on four bases:
(a) the deceased lacked testamentary capacity when she made the will;
(b) the will was made without the deceased’s knowledge and approval;
(c) the will was made in suspicious circumstances;[1] and
(d) the deceased made the will under the undue influence of three of her sisters (the plaintiff, Ms Guastella and Ms Costantin) (the Sisters), or either of them.
[1]Although this terminology is not used in the grounds of objection lodged by the caveator, the relevant paragraphs of the grounds are properly characterised in this way.
The plaintiff applied for a grant of probate of the 2014 will on 17 July 2020. The inventory of assets and liabilities filed with the plaintiff’s application records the gross value of the estate as $921,275.83 and that the deceased also has an interest in properties in Italy, the value of which was undetermined.
By an affidavit sworn 1 September 2017, Daniela Petrolo, legal practitioner, deposed that the deceased executed the 2014 will in her presence and in the presence of another legal practitioner. Ms Petrolo deposed that the deceased was non-verbal due to a stroke, that she read each clause of the 2014 will to the deceased and that the deceased acknowledged that she understood and accepted each clause by nodding her head. Ms Petrolo states that the deceased executed the 2014 will by placing a mark at the foot of each page.
The execution clause of the 2014 will included the recital that Ms Petrolo ’read over and translated in the Italian language to the [deceased] she being an Italian and Italian being the customary language understood by her) and she seemed fully to understand the same and the nature and effect thereof…’. Ms Petrolo deposed that she understands Italian and was able to translate the 2014 will to the deceased.
The plaintiff accepts that the caveator has established a prima facie case to challenge the validity of the 2014 will on the grounds of testamentary capacity, suspicious circumstances and knowledge and approval. The present issue for determination is whether the caveator has established a prima facie case on the undue influence ground.
Grounds of objection
In many cases, including this one, the assessment of whether there is a prima facie case to justify a matter proceeding to trial is undertaken by reference to the particulars of the grounds of objection which, for the purposes of that task, are to be treated as true.
The allegation of undue influence is contained in paragraph 3 of the grounds of objection filed by the caveator on 2 October 2020 (the grounds of objection). The particulars to that paragraph simply adopt the particulars to paragraph 2 (which alleges suspicious circumstances), which in turn refer in part to paragraph 1 (which alleges lack of testamentary capacity). It is accordingly necessary to set out the grounds of objection in full:
1.The deceased lacked testamentary capacity during the time shortly prior to and at the time of the execution of the will on 15 October 2014.
Particulars
a.On 19 May 2006, the Deceased executed a Will appointing the Caveator, the Deceased's niece as the sole beneficiary and executor of the Estate of the Deceased (Prior Will).
b. On 1 October 2009, the Deceased had a massive stroke, in which the left side of her brain was completely damaged. The stroke caused her to suffer hemiparesis on the right side of her body and a global dysphasia that was both receptive and expressive. She could not speak at all and only emitted a du-da sound. She was unable to read or write or play children's games. She only understood simple instructions by shaking or nodding her head.
c. On 23 March 2010, Dr D.A Barbaro, the Deceased [sic] General Practitioner prepared a medical report to VCAT which confirmed:-
i. He had known the Deceased for 18 years;
ii. She had a disability in that that she had suffered a large cerebral stroke resulting in the right side deficit and speech loss. Her mobility was via a wheelchair and the date of the stroke was 1 October 2010; and
iii. Her prognosis of recovery was poor and that she was unable to make reasonable decisions for healthcare, general living circumstances and financial and legal affairs.
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d. Due to the Deceased's mental impairment, disability and impairment, and due to lack of cognitive capacity on 20 April 2010, the Caveator was appointed administrator of the estate of the Deceased pursuant to section 43 Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 pursuant to an order made by VCAT. The order of VCAT provide [sic] that:-
The Tribunal is satisfied that the proposed represented person has a disability; is unable by reason of that disability to make reasonable judgments about their estate; and needs an administrator.
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e. The Deceased resided with the Caveator and was looked after by the Caveator for a period of approximately 2 years. During that time the Deceased continued to display a lack of cognitive capacity and was unable to make decisions for herself. She lacked testamentary capacity.
f. In December 2011, the Deceased had a trial period in a nursing home, at the request of the social worker and Giovanna Gurrieri, Emilia Guastella and Maria Costantin, the Deceased's sisters (the Sisters), including the Plaintiff. Those living arrangements became permanent in January 2012, where she remained as she could not take care of herself.
g. On 7 March 2012, the report of Dr Irene Tan, Geriatrician from Bundoora Care Extended Centre confirmed in her medical report that the Deceased had a left middle cerebral artery infarct in 2009 which left her with right hemiparesis and a significant dysphasia together with post CVA epilepsy. She also had other problems including atrial fibrillation, hypertension, GORD and a history of right mastectomy. The report confirmed that the Deceased was alert and understood she had suffered a stroke and able to communication [sic] with simple questions that required a yes or no answer, but unable to obtain a consistent and definitive answer as to where she wanted to live.
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h.On 26 March 2012, the report of Bronwen Price, Social Worker from Northern Health confirmed that the Deceased was able to perceive simple concepts and make choices by nodding and gesturing in the selection of meals but not conversations of more complexity regarding her accommodation. The report confirmed that simple [sic] senior staff of Aberdeen Aged Care also confirmed that they were unsure if she understood conversations other than simple instructions.
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i. In 2013, the Deceased's ex-husband and his niece Mirella de Girolamo, made application to have the Caveator removed as guardian and financial administrator of the Deceased.
j. On or about 11 April 2013, VCAT revoked the administration order granted to the Caveator and appointed an independent administrator, FTL Judge & Papaleo Pty Ltd as administrator of the estate of the Deceased to manage her affairs. At the time of this appointment, the Deceased's condition had not improved and she continued to display a lack of cognitive capacity and was unable to make decisions for herself. The order provided:-
The Tribunal is satisfied that the represented person has a disability; is unable by reason of that disability to make reasonable judgments about their estate; and needs an administrator.
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k. On 15 October 2014, the Deceased signed a new Will prepared by Natoli Howell, at their offices, with an X purportedly appointing the Plaintiff as executor and leaving the estate in 4 equal parts, one part to each of the Sisters and one part to another sister, Lucia Aurora Ziccarello (Lucia) (2014 Will).
I.On 18 February 2016, the Sisters were appointed joint administrators of the estate of the Deceased pursuant to [the] Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 pursuant to an order made by VCAT. A further order was made by VCAT on 2 July 2019 reappointing the Sisters as joint administrators. The order of VCAT stated that:-
The Tribunal is satisfied that the represented person has a disability; is unable by reason of that disability to make reasonable judgments about their estate and needs an administrator.
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m. On 24 November 2019, the Deceased passed away aged 85.
n. At the time of entering the 2014 Will, the Deceased was subject of administration order, her condition had not improved and she continued to display a lack of cognitive capacity and was unable to make decisions for herself. She lacked mental capacity to:-
i.understand the nature of effect of entering into a Will and the disposal of property;
ii. give instructions regarding the disposal of her estate; and
iii.understand the terms and approve the contents of the will.
2.Giovanna Gurrieri, Emilia Guastella and Maria Costantin, who are persons benefiting under the will or at least one of them, either prepared or obtained the will or were instrumental in preparing or obtaining the same.
Particulars
a. The Caveator refers to and repeats the particulars in paragraph 1 herein.
b. At the time of entry into 2014 Will which was executed at the offices of Natoli Howell, the Deceased:-
i. was living in a nursing home facility Aberdeen Aged Care Facility;
ii. under an administration order because she was unable by reason of her disability to make reasonable judgments about her estate;
iii. was unable to communicate to instruct solicitors to prepare her Will;
iv. was unable to attend a solicitor's office without being taken there by one or more of the Sisters; and
v. did not have the mental capacity to provide the instructions to make the 2014 Will.
c. The instructions for the 2014 Will could have only been provided by one or more of the Sisters.
d. The administrator, FTL Judge & Papaleo Pty Ltd in its report to VCAT on the review of the Deceased's position dated 2 February 2016 confirmed that:-
'The Administrator has been advised by different members of Mrs Occhipinti's family that she wishes to make a new Will. Upon receiving these requests we have advised that Mrs Occhipinti will need to see her doctor and have him provide a medical report confirming that she has testamentary capacity. The Administrator is yet to be provided with a report confirming this and if one is provided will make funds available to meet the costs.'
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e. The administrator did not arrange for the 2014 Will and cost of engaging Natoli Howell to prepare the Will was not paid for by the administrator or the Deceased. The financial records accompanying the report of 2 February 2016 do not establish the payment of such legal fees for the preparation of the Will. The legal costs were incurred by a party who obtained a benefit under the 2014 Will being one of the Sisters.
f. In light of the above matters, the Will could have only been prepared on the instructions given one or more of the Sisters to the solicitor or alternatively at their direction or suggestion to the Deceased, or exerting undue influence over the Deceased to enter the 2014 Will, as they were agitating for the change to the Prior Will for their benefit.
3. The 2014 Will was procured by the undue influence of Giovanna Gurrieri, Emilia Guastella and Maria Costantin, or at least one of them.
Particulars
The Caveator refers to and repeats the particulars for Ground 2 above.
4.The deceased did not know, understand and approve of the contents of the 2014 Will.
Particulars
The Caveator refers to and repeats the particulars for Ground 1 above and further says that she lacked capacity to know, approve or understand the contents of the 2014 Will at the time of its signing.
Legal principles
In Re Robustelle (No 2),[2] I recently considered the relevant principles relating to determining whether there exists a prima facie case in the context of a claim of undue influence in the making of a will. I summarised the general principles in relation to prima facie case as follows: [3]
The Court of Appeal authoritatively set out the approach to determining the existence of a prima facie case in Gardiner v Hughes (No 2).[4] Although made in the context of an application for the revocation of a grant, the statements of principle by the Court are equally applicable to cases involving the objection to the making of a grant.
The Court of Appeal identified that the task for a caveatrix is to show that there is a ‘case for investigation’, or ‘something to go on’.[5] The question is whether the allegations made by the caveatrix, assuming them to be true, call for further investigation.[6] Mere speculation will not, however, suffice.[7] …
… [T]he Court of Appeal criticised an approach to determining the existence of a prima facie case in which particulars of objection were separately examined in isolation from each other. The Court emphasised that the task is to determine ‘whether the particulars as a whole constituted a narrative warranting further investigation’,[8] with the weight to be attached to individual particulars to be determined with regard to the ‘overall narrative’.[9]
[2][2023] VSC 72 (‘Re Robustelle (No 2)’).
[3]Ibid [14]–[16].
[4][2019] VSCA 198 (‘Gardiner v Hughes (No 2)’).
[5]Ibid [41].
[6]Ibid [80].
[7]Ibid [41].
[8]Ibid [82].
[9]Ibid [83].
As to undue influence, I summarised the relevant principles as follows:[10]
[10]Re Robustelle (No 2) (n 2), [37]–[40].
… The essential concept is encapsulated in the following statement by Sir JP Wilde in Hall v Hall:[11]
[11][1868] LR1P&D 481, 482. To which the Court of Appeal referred with approval in Montalto v Sala (2016) 15 ASTLR 393 at [26] (‘Montalto v Sala’).
To make a good will a man must be a free agent. But all influences are not unlawful. Persuasion, appeals to the affection or ties of kindred, to a sentiment of gratitude for past services, or pity for future destitution, or the like, — these are all legitimate, and may be fairly pressed on a testator. On the other hand, pressure of whatever character, whether acting on the fears or the hopes, if so exerted as to overpower the volition without convincing the judgment, is a species of restraint under which no valid will can be made. Importunity or threats, such as the testator has not the courage to resist, moral command asserted and yielded to for the sake of peace and quiet, or of escaping from distress of mind or social discomfort, these, if carried to a degree in which the free play of the testator’s judgment, discretion or wishes, is overborne, will constitute undue influence, though no force is either used or threatened. In a word, a testator may be led but not driven; and his will must be the offspring of his own volition, and not the record of someone else’s.
Undue influence requires that the testator be coerced into doing that which he or she does not desire to do.[12] It must be shown that a testator did not intend the disposition recorded in their testamentary instrument.[13] Further, as stated by Sir J Hannen in Wingrove v Wingrove:[14]
… it is not sufficient to establish that a person has the power unduly to overbear the will of the testator. It is necessary also to prove that in the particular case that power was exercised, and that it was by means of the exercise of that power, that the will such as it is, has been produced.
In his review of the authorities in Nicholson v Knaggs, Vickery J identified that, in the context of the making of testamentary instruments, coercion has a wide meaning and ‘is not confined to conduct involving the persuasion of an unwilling person by some kind of threat or force’.[15] The ‘degree and nature of pressure which has the effect of invalidating the will making process will vary according to the particular vulnerability and susceptibility of an individual testator’.[16] Such an effect can be achieved in a variety of circumstances and relationships and can be the product of a chain of events, or a single event.[17]
The above principles were recently canvassed by McMillan J[18] in Moloney v Hayward.[19] Her Honour identified that the primary element of undue influence in a probate context is ‘that the conduct overbears the will of the testator so that the will is made without intending or desiring the disposition thereby made’.[20] Whether influence exercised over a testator is, at law, ‘undue’, is a ‘question of the nature and extent of that influence’.[21] Ultimately, the party alleging undue influence must show that ‘the circumstances attending the execution of the will are inconsistent with the will having been obtained other than by undue influence’.[22]
[12]Wingrove v Wingrove (1885) 11 PD 81, 82.
[13]Trustee for the Salvation Army (NSW) Property Trust v Becker [2007] NSWCA 136, [64].
[14]Wingrove (n 12), 83. See also: Montalto v Sala (n 11), [32]: ‘Particulars which are consistent only with the opportunity to influence a testator or testatrix are insufficient’.
[15]Nicholson v Knaggs [2009] VSC 64, [140].
[16]Ibid [149].
[17]Ibid [150].
[18]Sitting as an Auxiliary Justice in the Supreme Court of South Australia.
[19][2022] SASC 79.
[20]Ibid [340].
[21]Ibid [344].
[22]Ibid [350].
Caveator’s submissions
It was submitted on behalf of the caveator that the grounds of objection establish a prima facie case that the 2014 will was procured by the undue influence of all or any of the Sisters as the particulars support the following propositions:
(a) The deceased suffered a stroke in October 2009 which caused damage to her brain and further caused a number of mental and physical health issues.
(b) As a result, the deceased was subject to administration orders made by the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) on 20 April 2010 and again on 11 April 2013 pursuant to the Guardianship and Administration Act 1986. In making these orders, VCAT found the deceased was unable to make reasonable judgments about her estate. FTL Judge Papaleo Pty Ltd (the administrator) had been appointed as an independent administrator in the period before the deceased made the 2014 will.
(c) At the time of entry into the 2014 will, which was executed at a solicitors office, the deceased:
(i) was living in a nursing home facility;
(ii) was under an administration order;
(iii) was unable to speak at all and only emitted a ‘du-da’ sound;
(iv) was unable to read, write or play children’s games; and
(v) only understood simple instructions by shaking or nodding her head.
(d) It followed that the deceased was unable to communicate to instruct solicitors, did not have the mental capacity to give instructions and was unable to attend a solicitor’s office without the assistance of the Sisters. The deceased signed the will with an ‘X’ and, by inference, was unable to provide instructions in writing.
(e) The administrator confirmed to VCAT that they did not arrange for the will to be made, nor pay the costs. The caveator alleges that these costs were paid by someone who was to benefit under the 2014 will, being one or more of the Sisters. Furthermore, the administrator had confirmed in its report to VCAT in 2016 that family members had been seeking that the deceased make a new will.
(f) Various medical and other reports (which were not before the Court) confirmed that the deceased did not have testamentary capacity and had limited ability to communicate.
(g) The Sisters are the only persons who benefit under the 2014 will.
The caveator submits that the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the above propositions is that instructions for the 2014 will could have only been provided by one or more of the Sisters and that they coerced the deceased to enter into the 2014 will for their own benefit.
The caveator had not been provided with a copy of the 2014 will file prepared by the relevant solicitors. As a consequence it was submitted that she was limited in providing further particularisation of their ground of undue influence, specifically any involvement by the plaintiff in the preparation of the 2014 will.
Plaintiff’s submissions
The plaintiff submitted that the particulars to the grounds of objection do not establish a case for investigation in respect of alleged undue influence. There was nothing in the particulars to suggest that the 2014 will was the product of coercion by the Sisters, or any of them. The manner in which the allegation was expressed in the grounds of objection was said to be telling: the inclusion in paragraph 3 of the words, ‘or at least one of them’, immediately after ‘the will was procured by the undue influence of Giovanna, Emilia and Maria …’, indicated that the caveator had no direct evidence that the 2014 will was procured by the coercion of either of the Sisters.
It was submitted that, at best, the particulars to the grounds of objection might be consistent with the opportunity to influence the deceased. However, in reliance on the judgment of McMillan J in Re Theodoulou,[23] it was submitted that the mere opportunity to influence a testator was insufficient to establish a prima facie case.
[23][2018] VSC 601.
Further, the plaintiff submitted that the particulars wrongly invited the Court to presume that the 2014 will was procured by the undue influence of one or more of the Sisters. This was contrary to the principle that testamentary undue influence will not be presumed, but must be established by clear and convincing proof.
Consideration
The legal principles referred to by the plaintiff in the two preceding paragraphs may be accepted. They are reflected in the observations by the Court of Appeal in Montalto v Sala[24] where the Court dismissed an appeal from orders striking out particulars of objection to a grant of probate based on a claim of undue influence. It did so because the allegation of undue influence would have been dismissed even if evidence was adduced at trial which supported the particulars; the allegations as particularised did not satisfy the test of undue influence.[25] ‘There [was] no allegation of influence let alone that the influence was undue. There [was] no allegation that, in making the dispositions under the [will], the testatrix was coerced or that her will was overborne in circumstances that her judgment was not convinced’.[26] The Court of Appeal also stated that:[27]
Particulars which are consistent only with the opportunity to influence a testator or testatrix are insufficient.[28] Undue influence will not be presumed.[29]
[24]Montalto v Sala (n 11).
[25]Ibid [31].
[26]Ibid.
[27]Ibid [32].
[28]Winter v Crichton (1991) 23 NSWLR 116, 121 (Powell J).
[29]John Ross Martyn and Nicholas Caddick QC (eds), Williams, Mortimer and Sunnucks on Executors, Administrators and Probate (Sweet & Maxwell, 20th ed, 2013) 217. See also Veall v Veall (2015) 46 VR 123, 173 [166].
Montalto v Sala did not, however, concern the requirement for a caveator to establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that the particulars of objection revealed a case for investigation, as explained by the Court of Appeal some three years later in Gardiner v Hughes (No 2). The Court of Appeal’s analysis of the prima facie requirement in Gardiner v Hughes (No 2) leads me to conclude that the plaintiff’s submissions in this proceeding must be rejected.
Although it is true as the plaintiff submitted that the particulars to the grounds of objection relied on by the caveator do not include any actual allegation that the 2014 will was the product of coercion by the Sisters, or any of them, that absence is not determinative as to whether a prima facie case has been established. In Gardiner v Hughes (No 2), the Court of Appeal specifically allowed for the ‘role for inferences in deciding whether the particulars establish a prima facie case’, continuing: [30]
The parties proceeded before us on the basis that the applicants would show a prima facie case if they particularised facts which justified an inference that the deceased lacked testamentary capacity. As the formulations of the ‘prima facie’ test show, they would also succeed if the facts particularised justify the conclusion that there is a ‘case for investigation’ in that regard or ‘some ground’ for making the application. That conclusion may also involve the drawing of inferences from the particularised facts. …
[30]Gardiner v Hughes (No 2) (n 4), [12] (citations omitted).
The Court of Appeal later returned to the issue of the drawing inferences in the context of the prima face case test, stating that:[31]
… it will not simply be a question of deciding whether an inference justifying revocation should be drawn from the facts relied upon, or which of two possible inferences is to be preferred. Those would be matters for trial. Nor is the true question even whether the inference sought to be relied on is available on the facts (although if that were so, there would be a prima facie case for investigation as to whether or not the inference should be drawn). There may be a case for investigation even if all the facts needed to justify the inference in question are not yet known or alleged, but there is enough to ‘go on’ to call for a trial. That will be the case if there is a reasonable explanation for the facts relied upon which, if shown to be correct, would justify revoking probate. Each case will of course depend on its particular facts. But in every case the onus rests on the party raising the doubt as to validity.
[31]Ibid [42] (citations omitted).
The Court of Appeal emphasised that ‘application of the prima facie test did not require a determination whether or not the particulars, in isolation or taken together, justified an inference of testamentary incapacity’: [32]
Instead, the question was whether the allegations, assuming them to be true, called for further investigation as to the testamentary capacity of the deceased. If so, resolution of that question was a matter for trial. The fact that a particular allegation might, depending on the context, either support an inference of incapacity or not did not mean that the case did not warrant further investigation based on that allegation. That very process of investigation would determine whether or not the inference should be drawn.
[32]Ibid [80]-[81].
Applying these principles, the overall narrative disclosed by the particulars describes a very unusual circumstance: a non-verbal woman of some 80 years of age who had suffered a serious stroke and who was subject to an administration order, executed a will which dramatically altered the testamentary dispositions of her penultimate will, and she took this action without any involvement by her administrator. The caveator, as the sole beneficiary of the 2006 will, was removed and replaced with the deceased’s four sisters.
The execution of the 2014 will allegedly occurred in circumstances where the administrator was approached by members of the deceased’s family conveying the deceased’s wishes to amend her will. The administrator informed these family members that a medical report attesting to the deceased’s testamentary capacity would need to be obtained and then the administrator would provide funds for the legal costs. It is unclear whether or not any medical report was obtained.
Although it is not the only conclusion capable of being drawn from these allegations as further elaborated by the propositions advanced by the caveator set out in [13], it is arguably open to infer from them, assuming them to be true, that the instructions for the 2014 will were provided by one or more of the Sisters, and that they, or one of them, coerced the deceased to enter into the will for their own benefit. An alternative inference is that the deceased sought the assistance of her Sisters to update her will, the result being the 2014 will which she freely made.
Which of these inferences should be drawn is a matter for trial when evidence of all of the relevant facts and circumstances will be adduced. In considering whether there is a prima facie case, the Court is not required to determine whether or not the particulars relied upon by the caveator justify an inference of undue influence. It is sufficient to conclude, as I do, that the particulars and the inferences which might be drawn from them, establish a case for investigation as to whether the 2014 will was made as result of the exercise of undue influence by the Sisters, or one of them. The particularised grounds of objection disclose a narrative warranting further investigation as to whether the deceased was subject to testamentary undue influence when she made the 2014 will.
I will hear from the parties as to the appropriate form of orders and as to costs.
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