Herron v HarperCollins Publishers Australia Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Herron v HarperCollins Publishers Australia Pty Ltd [2020] FCA 805

File numbers: NSD 1620 of 2017
NSD 1621 of 2017
Judge: JAGOT J
Date of judgment: 3 June 2020
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – documents produced under compulsion at Royal Commission – whether documents protected under ss 118 and 119 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) – whether documents were created for dominant purpose of provision of legal advice – whether documents were protected by s 17(2) of Royal Commissions Act 1923 (NSW) – discussion of scope of s 17(2) of Royal Commissions Act 1923 (NSW)
Legislation:

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)

Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cth)

Royal Commissions Act 1923 (NSW)

Cases cited:

Australian Securities and Investment Commission v Rich & Anor [2006] NSWSC 643; (2006) 201 FLR 207

Feldman v Nationwide News Pty Limited & Ors [2018] NSWSC 715; (2018) NSWSC 715

Hart v Herron, unreported jury trial before Fisher J, Supreme Court proceeding 12781 of 1979

Hartmann v Commissioner of Police (1997) 91 A Crim R 141

Hatfield v TCN Channel Nine Proprietary Limited [2010] NSWCA 69; (2010) 77 NSWLR 506

Herron v McGregor (1986) 6 NSWLR 246

Hood v R (1997) 91 A Crim R 526

R v Bayeh [1999] NSWCCA 82

Smith and Anor v The Queen [2007] WASCA 163; (2007) 213 FLR 12

Sorby v The Commonwealth [1983] HCA 10; (1983) 152 CLR 281

Date of hearing: 3 June 2020
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area:  Other Federal Jurisdiction
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 24
Counsel for the Applicants: S Chrysanthou with B Dean and N Olson
Solicitor for the Applicants: Company Giles
Counsel for the Respondents: T Blackburn SC with A D’Arville
Solicitor for the Respondents: Banki Haddock Fiora

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

NSD 1620 of 2017
BETWEEN:

JOHN HERRON
Applicant

AND:

HARPERCOLLINS PUBLISHERS AUSTRALIA PTY LTD ACN 009 913 517

First Respondent

STEVE CANNANE

Second Respondent

NSD 1621 of 2017
BETWEEN:

JOHN GILL
Applicant

AND:

HARPERCOLLINS PUBLISHERS AUSTRALIA PTY LTD ACN 009 913 517

First Respondent

STEVE CANNANE

Second Respondent

JAGOT J:

Background

  1. Two issues have arisen in this proceeding concerning the use which can be made of three documents.  The documents are identified as documents 11, 15 and 17.  I propose to mark document 11 headed “STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN GILL”, undated, as MFI1, document 15 headed “BACKGROUND NOTES – DR. John GILL AND CHELMSFORD” as MFI2, and document 17, the first page of which is a covering letter from solicitors Foulsham & Geddes, dated 13 April 1989, to the Royal Commission into Former Chelmsford Private Hospital and Mental Health Services as MFI3.

  2. The applicants contend that the documents cannot be deployed in any way in this proceeding, because they are privileged pursuant to either s 118 or s 119 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (the Evidence Act), and are otherwise afforded the protection given by s 17(2) of the Royal Commissions Act 1923 (NSW) (the Royal Commissions…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 805
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Herron v HarperCollins Publishers Australia Pty Ltd was a case heard by the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The dispute centred around the admissibility of certain documents produced under compulsion at a Royal Commission. The primary question before the court was whether these documents were protected under sections 118 and 119 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) and section 17(2) of the Royal Commissions Act 1923 (NSW). Specifically, the court needed to determine if the documents were created for the dominant purpose of providing legal advice, which would render them subject to legal professional privilege.

The court examined the evidence provided in the affidavit of Jessie McKenzie, a solicitor, who testified that certain documents were related to legal proceedings and were prepared under a duty of confidence. The court found that one document, MFI1, was likely prepared for the dominant purpose of providing legal advice to Dr Herron, thus qualifying for protection under section 119 of the Evidence Act. However, the court was not satisfied that another document, MFI2, was prepared for the dominant purpose of providing legal advice, and therefore did not qualify for privilege under section 118 or 119. Similarly, the court determined that MFI3, despite being unwillingly produced, did not constitute a confidential communication within the meaning of the Evidence Act.

In conclusion, the court held that MFI1 was protected under section 119 of the Evidence Act, while MFI2 and MFI3 were not. This decision underscores the importance of establishing the dominant purpose for which a document was created when determining its admissibility in legal proceedings. The court's findings will have implications for future cases involving the disclosure of documents under compulsion at a Royal Commission.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

I will deal with the privilege question first.Privilege under the Evidence Act On the evidence which is before me in an affidavit of Jessie McKenzie, solicitor, dated 3 June 2020, MFI1 is described as a document which was produced to the Royal Commission by Blake Waldron on behalf of the Medical Defence Union. The document, according to the affidavit, is related to proceedings brought by Mr Barry Hart against Dr Herron and Fairfield Heights Community Hospital Pty Ltd, being Hart v Herron & Anor, an unreported jury trial before Fisher J, Supreme Court proceeding 12781 of 1979 (the Supreme Court proceedings). The affidavit states that the solicitors would have been under a duty of confidence in relation to any witness statements taken in preparing Dr Herron’s case, and that Ms McKenzie infers that Blake Dawson Waldron, consistent with its ethical duties, would have retained confidentiality in its file representing Dr Herron on behalf of the Medical Defence Union at the time MFI1 was produced to the Royal Commission. Consistently with Ms McKenzie’s affidavit, I infer that MFI1 is a confidential document prepared for the dominant purpose of Dr Herron being provided with professional legal services relating to an Australian proceeding, namely the Supreme Court proceedings. Accordingly, I am satisfied on the evidence that this document is subject to s 119 of the Evidence Act. The fact that the document has been produced under compulsion to the Royal Commission, a consequence of the operation of s 17(1) of the Royal Commissions Act, does not mean that privilege in the document which is MFI1 has been waived. Accordingly, I would conclude that s 119 applies to MFI1. Ms McKenzie’s affidavit also deals with MFI2, noting that it was a document prepared by Dr Gill and said to have been produced by Dr Gill unwillingly to the Royal Commission. Ms McKenzie also refers to the fact that there were proceedings on foot, Herron v McGregor (1986) 6 NSWLR 246, and that Dr Gill was involved in this litigation at about the time MFI2 was likely to be prepared. Ms McKenzie infers that MFI2 is a confidential document prepared by Dr Gill for the dominant purpose of obtaining legal advice. I am unable to draw the same inference from the evidence and the text of MFI2. It is unclear what MFI2 was prepared for. The evidence does not satisfy me that it was prepared for the dominant purpose of the provision of legal advice or for the dominant purpose of a client being provided with professional legal services relating to an Australian or overseas proceeding. Accordingly, I do not accept that MFI2 is subject to s 118 or s 119 of the Evidence Act. In terms of MFI3, Ms McKenzie states that the document is a statement prepared by Dr Gill’s solicitor on instructions from Dr Gill, produced by Dr Gill unwillingly to the Royal Commission. This accords with the covering letter by the solicitors for Dr Gill to the Royal Commission. However, this does not mean that the document constitutes a confidential communication within the meaning of ss 118 and 119 of the Evidence Act. The document is a statement which was prepared for the purposes of tender to the Royal Commission. The fact that Dr Gill was providing the statement apparently unwillingly does not mean that at the time the document was prepared the person who made it, being Dr Gill, or the person to whom it was made, being the solicitors, were under an express or implied obligation not to disclose the contents of the document.

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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