Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Bekier (Evidentiary Ruling)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Bekier (Evidentiary Ruling) [2025] FCA 237

File number: NSD 1082 of 2022
Judgment of: LEE J
Date of judgment: 14 March 2025
Catchwords: EVIDENCE – voir dire – whether sworn testimony of a witness at an inquiry is subject to the prohibition in s 17(2) of the Royal Commissions Act 1923 (NSW) – whether the relevant provision of the State law is “picked up” in federal jurisdiction by reason of s 79 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) – whether the probative value of evidence is substantially outweighed by the dangers listed in s 135 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) – evidence on voir dire admitted in the trial
Legislation:

Constitution s 109

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 56, 56(1), 106, 106(2), 135, 192, 192(2), 192(2)(a), 192(2)(b), 192(2)(c), 192(2)(d), 192(2)(e)

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 79

Casino Control Act 1992 (NSW) ss 30, 143, 143A(2)

Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) ss 8, 9(3)(b), 26, 135

Royal Commissions Act 1923 (NSW) ss 17, 17(2)

Cases cited:

ASIC Macdonald (No 7) [2008] NSWSC 1367

ASIC v Citigroup Markets Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2007] FCA 121; (2007) 157 FCR 310

ASIC v Rich [2006] NSWSC 643; (2006) 201 FLR 207

Dixon v Citiline Developments Pty Ltd [2018] FCA 1446

Herron and Another v HarperCollins Publishers Australia Pty Ltd and Another [2022] FCAFC 68; (2022) 292 FCR 336

Lehrmann v Network Ten Pty Limited (Expert Evidence) [2023] FCA 1577

R v BD (1997) 94 A Crim R 131

Australian Law Reform Commission, Evidence (Interim) (Report 26, 1985)
Stephen Odgers, Uniform Evidence Law (19th ed, LawBook Co, 2024)
Stephen Odgers, Uniform Evidence Law (3rd ed, LBC Information Services, 1998)
Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Regulator and Consumer Protection
Number of paragraphs: 46
Date of hearing: 14 March 2025
Counsel for the plaintiff: Dr R Higgins SC with Ms S Patterson
Solicitor for the plaintiff: Norton Rose Fulbright
Counsel for the first defendant: Mr J Williams SC with Mr J Entwisle
Solicitor for the first defendant: Gilbert + Tobin
Counsel for the second defendant Mr P Wood with Mr B Hancock
Solicitor for the second defendant Gadens Lawyers
Counsel for the fifth defendant: Mr M Darke SC with Mr P Meagher
Solicitor for the fifth defendant: Gilbert + Tobin
Counsel for the sixth to ninth defendants: Mr M Henry SC with Ms Z Hillman and Ms L Rich
Solicitor for the sixth to ninth defendants: Arnold Bloch Leibler
Counsel for the tenth to eleventh defendants: Mr R Dick SC with Ms A Lyons and Ms Z Bush
Solicitors for the tenth to eleventh defendants: Arnold Bloch Leibler

RULING

NSD 1082 of 2022
BETWEEN:

AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS COMMISSION

Plaintiff

AND:

MATTHIAS MICHAEL BEKIER

First Defendant

PAULA MAREE MARTIN

Second Defendant

GREGORY FRANCIS HAWKINS (and others named in the Schedule)

Third Defendant

RULING MADE BY:

LEE J

DATE OF RULING:

14 MARCH 2025

THE…

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Details
Case
[2025] FCA 237
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case before the court was a voir dire concerning the admissibility of certain evidence in a proceeding brought by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission against Bekier. The dispute centred on whether sworn testimony of a witness at an inquiry was subject to the prohibition in section 17(2) of the Royal Commissions Act 1923 (NSW). Additionally, the court had to determine whether the relevant provision of the State law was "picked up" in federal jurisdiction by reason of section 79 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). Finally, the court had to consider whether the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the dangers listed in section 135 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). Ultimately, the court found the evidence to be admissible in the trial.

The court considered the three-step process outlined in section 135 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). The first step was to assess the probative value of the evidence. The second was to assess the danger that the evidence might be unfairly prejudicial to a party. The third step was to undertake a balancing exercise to determine whether the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger. The court found that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the dangers. The evidence on the voir dire was admitted in the trial.

The court's reasoning was based on the definition of "probative value" in the Dictionary of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). The court found that the evidence could rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue. The court also found that the dangers of admitting the evidence did not substantially outweigh the probative value. The court considered the mandatory considerations in section 192 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) and found that the evidence should be admitted.

The court found the evidence to be admissible in the trial. The court's reasoning was based on the three-step process outlined in section 135 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). The court found that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the dangers. The evidence on the voir dire was admitted in the trial.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

As is well known, s 135 provides: 135 General discretion to exclude evidenceThe court may refuse to admit evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger that the evidence might:(a)be unfairly prejudicial to a party; or (b)be misleading or confusing; or (c)cause or result in undue waste of time. Although the parties’ submissions were not structured in this way, s 135 involves a three-step process. The first is to assess the probative value of the evidence, with the term “probative value” defined in the Dictionary of the EA in the following terms:probative value of evidence means the extent to which the evidence could rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue. The second step is to assess the danger that the evidence might (relevantly for present purposes) be unfairly prejudicial to a party. The third step is to undertake a balancing exercise to determine whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by such danger, and if I am satisfied that it is, that evidence may be excluded. In undertaking this third aspect of the process, as I explained in Herron (at 426–427 [390]–[391]), the general discretion needs to be exercised in accordance with s 192 of the EA. That section provides: 192 Leave, permission or direction may be given on terms (1)If, because of this Act, a court may give any leave, permission or direction, the leave, permission or direction may be given on such terms as the court thinks fit.(2)Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account in deciding whether to give the leave, permission or direction, it is to take into account:(a)the extent to which to do so would be likely to add unduly to, or to shorten, the length of the hearing; and(b)the extent to which to do so would be unfair to a party or to a witness; and (c)the importance of the evidence in relation to which the leave, permission or direction is sought; and (d)the nature of the proceeding; and (e)the power (if any) of the court to adjourn the hearing or to make another order or to give a direction in relation to the evidence.(Emphasis added). It is well accepted that the terms “leave, permission or direction” in s 192 carry a broad meaning and encompass an order or direction to admit or exclude evidence: see ASIC v Rich [2006] NSWSC 643; (2006) 201 FLR 207 (at 210 [9] per Austin J) and ASIC v Citigroup Markets Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2007] FCA 121; (2007) 157 FCR 310 (at 311–312 [7]–[8] per Jacobson J). Further, the use of the phrase “is to take into account” dictates that the considerations in s 192(2) are mandatory to the extent that they are applicable. B PROBATIVE VALUE In assessing the probative value of the proposed evidence, it is worth having regard to various aspects of the pleading. The amended statement of claim (at [116]) refers to the fact that on 12 June 2019, Mr Angus Buchanan (Star’s Due Diligence Programme Manager) sent an email to Ms Martin, Mr White and Mr Houlihan, attaching a copy of a report on Suncity that he and his team had compiled in 2018 when he was employed by the Hong Kong Jockey Club (HKJC).

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established