Herron v HarperCollins Publishers Australia Pty Ltd (No 2)

Link copied
Case Copied 19 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Herron v HarperCollins Publishers Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2022] FCAFC 119   

Appeal from:

Herron v HarperCollins Publishers Australia Pty Ltd (No 3) [2020] FCA 1687

Herron v HarperCollins Publishers Australia Pty Ltd (No 4) [2021] FCA 1021

File number(s): NSD 1387 of 2020
Judgment of: RARES, WIGNEY AND LEE JJ
Date of judgment: 3 June 2022
Catchwords:

DEFAMATION – where Full Court allowed appeal reversing primary judge’s findings that defamatory imputations not conveyed and the defence of justification was established – where retrial of publishers’ defence of justification to some but not all of defamatory imputations found to have been conveyed – where publishers had no defence to one defamatory imputation – whether defence to other imputations precluded applicant being entitled to entry of judgment before retrial – whether there is common law defence of “contextual imputation”

COSTS – where applicant in one proceeding heard together with another gave undertaking to pay costs ordered against applicant in other proceeding – where primary judge dismissed both proceedings with costs – where applicant for payment of whose costs undertaking given by applicant in other proceeding died before hearing of appeal – where Full Court set aside judgments for respondents in both proceedings but found deceased applicant’s cause of action abated on his death – whether Full Court should reserve costs of deceased applicant’s proceeding pending retrial of other proceeding  

Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 37M and 43

Defamation Act 1974 (NSW)

Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) ss 10, 26, 30, Sch 4

Defamation Amendment Act 2020 (NSW) Sch 1

Cases cited:

Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Wing (2019) 271 FCR 632

Barilaro v Shanks-Markovina (No 2) (2021) 393 ALR 417

Burstein v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 1 WLR 579

Fairfax Digital Australia & New Zealand Pty Ltd v Kazal (2018) 97 NSWLR 547

Herron v HarperCollins Publishers Australia Pty Ltd [2022] FCAFC 68

Ryan v Davies Bros Limited (1921) 29 CLR 527

The Herald & Weekly Times Ltd v Popovic (2003) 9 VR 1

Whelan v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd (2002) 56 NSWLR 89

Woodger v Federal Capital Press of Australia Pty Ltd (1992) 106 FLR 183

Law Reform Commission of New South Wales, Defamation (Report No 11, 1971)

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Other Federal Jurisdiction
Number of paragraphs: 34
Date of hearing: 3 June 2022
Counsel for the Second Appellant: Ms S Chrysanthou SC and Mr B Dean
Solicitor for the Second Appellant: Company (Giles)
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr T Blackburn SC and Mr A d’Arville
Solicitor for the Respondents: Banki Haddock Fiora

ORDERS

NSD 1387 of 2020
BETWEEN:

JOHN HERRON

First Appellant

JOHN GILL

Second Appellant

AND:

HARPERCOLLINS PUBLISHERS AUSTRALIA PTY LTD ACN 009 913 517

First Respondent

STEVE CANNANE

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

RARES, WIGNEY AND LEE JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

3 JUNE 2022

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be allowed.

2.The respondents pay the second appellant’s costs of the appeal. 

3.In…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Herron v HarperCollins Publishers Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2022] FCAFC 119
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Herron v HarperCollins Publishers Australia Pty Ltd (No 2), the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia considered issues arising from a defamation claim. John Herron, the applicant, sued HarperCollins Publishers Australia Pty Ltd, the respondents, for defamation. The primary judge had dismissed the case, finding that the defamatory imputations were not conveyed and that the defence of justification was established. The Full Court allowed the appeal, reversing the primary judge’s findings and ordering a retrial of the respondents' defence of justification to some but not all of the defamatory imputations found to have been conveyed.

The key legal issues before the court were whether the defence of partial justification could be considered a common law defence of “contextual imputation,” whether the applicant was entitled to entry of judgment before a retrial, and whether the Full Court should reserve the costs of the deceased applicant’s proceeding pending the retrial of the other proceeding. The publishers argued that the defence of partial justification could be considered a common law “defence of contextual imputation,” but the court rejected this argument. It found that partial justification was a defence at common law to a number of imputations, only some of which could be justified or could be sought to be justified. The court held that it was well established that a pleading of defence of justification of common law required the whole libel that is all the defamatory imputations to be proved as true.

The Full Court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders made by the primary judge, and ordered a retrial of the respondents' defence of justification to some but not all of the defamatory imputations found to have been conveyed. The court also ordered that the respondents pay the second appellant’s costs of the appeal and that the applicant’s costs of and occasioned by the trial that commenced on 1 June 2020, and thrown away, be paid by the respondents. The Full Court dismissed the respondents' interlocutory application with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The respondents pay the second appellant’s costs of the appeal.

3. In proceeding NSD1620/2017 (the Herron proceeding):

(a) The orders made on 25 November 2020 be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered that:

(i) John Gill be released from his undertaking to pay any costs that may be ordered against the applicant, John Herron.

(b) It be noted that:

(i) The applicant died and the proceeding abated on 7 February 2021.

4. In proceeding NSD1621/2017 (the Gill proceeding):

(a) The orders made on 25 November 2020 be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered that:

(i) Judgment be entered for the applicant.

(ii) The proceeding be reallocated to a docket judge for a retrial on the remaining issues.

(iii) The applicant’s costs of and occasioned by the trial that commenced on 1 June 2020, and thrown away, be paid by the respondents.

(b) Orders 1 and 5 made on 26 August 2021 be set aside.

5. The respondents’ interlocutory application filed on 16 June 2021 be dismissed with costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Decision

Reasons for decision

I will deal with each of the issues in turn. The entry of judgment issue The publishers argued that in Woodger v Federal Capital Press of Australia Pty Ltd (1992) 106 FLR 183 at 200–201, Miles CJ had explained his understanding of the defence of partial justification in five numbered propositions, the fourth of which was as follows:Where the plaintiff alleges a particular defamatory meaning, the defendant may, without denying that defamatory meaning, seek to assert a separate and additional defamatory meaning which is justified and the effect of which is so serious that there can be no further injury to the plaintiff’s reputation caused by the meaning upon which the plaintiff relies. This is what is called in New South Wales the defence of contextual imputation. In my view, it applies in the Australian Capital Territory. (emphasis added) The publishers contended that, as McColl JA pointed out, in dissent, in Fairfax Digital Australia & New Zealand Pty Ltd v Kazal (2018) 97 NSWLR 547 at 551 [12]:Views differ as to whether it is a defence to the cause of action, which is the publication of defamatory words or merely relevant to the question of damages, and if proven, results in a reduction of damages (Herald & Weekly Times Ltd v Popovic (2003) 9 VR 1; [2003] VSCA 161 at [306(iii)] (Gillard AJA; with whom Winneke ACJ and Warren AJA relevantly agreed); cf Whelan [v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd (2002) 56 NSWLR 89] at [54]ff). In Whelan v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd (2002) 56 NSWLR 89 at 102 [58], Levine J quoted in full the passage from Miles CJ’s reasons that included proposition 4, that I have set out at [7] above. The publishers argued that it ought be left to a retrial to determine whether, as Miles CJ suggested, a defence of partial justification, based on their pleas in respect of all of the imputations alleged by Dr Gill other than imputation L, would amount to, in effect, what Miles CJ described as a common law “defence of contextual imputation”. The publishers’ argument should be rejected. There is debate in the authorities about the nomenclature of whether partial justification is in fact a defence or simply a plea in mitigation of damage. First, Levine J said in Whelan 56 NSWLR at 108 [79]–[80] that a defendant is:not entitled to justify the separate distinct meaning with a view to defeating that (untrue) meaning of which the plaintiff expressly complains. His Honour said that this principle did not derogate from the common law defence of partial justification. He had explained (at 56 NSWLR at 108 [76]) that partial justification was a defence at common law to a number of imputations, only some of which could be justified or could be sought to be justified. Secondly, in Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Wing (2019) 271 FCR 632 at 641–642 [19]–[20], and again at 662–663 [92]–[93], Besanko, Bromwich and Wheelahan JJ discussed the principles upon which a person may seek to justify some, but not all, of the pleaded defamatory imputations or meanings. Importantly, they referred with approval to The Herald & Weekly Times Ltd v Popovic (2003) 9 VR 1 at 63 [306], where Gillard AJA, with whom Winneke ACJ and Warren AJA agreed, said that it was well established that a pleading of defence of justification of common law required: The whole libel that is all the defamatory imputations must be proved as true; it is no defence to prove that part of the defamatory libel is true. (emphasis added)