FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Barilaro v Shanks-Markovina (No 3) [2021] FCA 1100
File number(s): NSD 484 of 2021 Judgment of: RARES J Date of judgment: 31 August 2021 Catchwords: DEFAMATION – juries – application under s 40 of Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) for trial by jury – whether jury best able to determine all issues, including if imputations conveyed and defamatory – where Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) and Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) amended since proceedings commenced – where statutory amendments add new defences and complexity to proceeding – whether new defences available to publishers for online publications in place before and after Defamation Act amended – possible impact of Covid-19 pandemic on mode of trial – where jury trial likely to be more expensive and take significantly longer than trial by judge alone – held: not in the interests of justice for proceeding to be tried by jury. Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 39, 40
Judiciary Act1903 (Cth) s 79
Defamation Amendment Act 2020 (NSW)
Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) ss 3, 10A, 12A, 12B, 26, 29A, 30, 31
Jury Act 1977 (NSW) s 20
Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) ss 14B, 14C, 56A, 73A
Cases cited: Adeang v the Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2016] FCA 1599
Barilaro v Shanks-Markovina (No 2) [2021] FCA 950
Capic v Ford motor Company Australia Limited (Adjournment) [2020] FCA 486
Channel Seven Adelaide Pty Ltd v Manock (2007) 232 CLR 245
Channel Seven Sydney Pty Ltd v Fierravanti-Wells (2011) 81 NSWLR 315
Chau v the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (No 3) (2021) 386 ALR 36
Joukhador v Network Ten Pty Ltd (2021) 388 ALR 318
Lange v The Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520
Reader’s Digest Services Pty Ltd v Lamb (1982) 150 CLR 500
Division: General Division Registry: New South Wales National Practice Area: Other Federal Jurisdiction Number of paragraphs: 53 Date of hearing: 31 August 2021 Counsel for the Applicant: Ms S Chrysanthou SC with Mr B Dean Solicitor for the Applicant: Mark O’Brien Legal Counsel for the First Respondent: Dr M J Collins QC with Mr C Parkins and Mr D J Helvadjian Solicitor for the First Respondent: Xenophon Davis Counsel for the Second Respondent: Ms L Barnett
Solicitor for the Second Respondent Ashurst ORDERS
NSD 484 of 202` BETWEEN: JOHN BARILARO
Applicant
AND: JORDAN SHANKS-MARKOVINA
First Respondent
GOOGLE LLC
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
RARES J
DATE OF ORDER:
31 AUGUST 2021
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
Interlocutory application for leave to file an amended defence
1.The first respondent have leave to file an amended defence substantially in the form of Exhibit 1 on the interlocutory application filed on 25 August 2021 on or before 3 September 2021.
2.The applicant file and serve a reply to the first respondent’s amended defence on or before 10 September 2021.
3.The first respondent pay the applicant’s costs thrown away by reason…
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- Case
- [2021] FCA 1100
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Orders
Orders of the court
Interlocutory application for leave to file an amended defence
1. The first respondent have leave to file an amended defence substantially in the form of Exhibit 1 on the interlocutory application filed on 25 August 2021 on or before 3 September 2021.
2. The applicant file and serve a reply to the first respondent’s amended defence on or before 10 September 2021.
3. The first respondent pay the applicant’s costs thrown away by reason of the amendment to the defence but otherwise the costs of the interlocutory application filed on 25 August 2021 be the parties’ costs in the cause.
Interlocutory application for trial by jury
4. The interlocutory application filed on 16 July 2021 be dismissed.
5. The respondents pay the applicant’s costs in respect of paragraph 3 of the interlocutory application filed on 16 July 2021.
Further timetable
6. The proceeding be referred to mediation by the Registrar, such mediation to occur on or before 29 October 2021.
7. The matter be set down for hearing on 21 March 2022 for an estimated 10 days.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Likewise, the publishers submitted that the evaluation of questions of whether the disputed and the contextual imputations were conveyed and, where relevant, were substantially true, as well as whether the material relied on was proper material, were matters which a jury was best able to determine. They argued that the evaluation of the impact of any imputations that the jury found to be true, whether contextual or otherwise, and the overall effect on Mr Barilaro’s reputation, are matters which were appropriate for a jury. They contended that these were value judgments as to the effect of the imputations on the reputation of the applicant and that a judge necessarily would be speculating about the extent to which any particular imputation or combination of imputations had harmed Mr Barilaro’s reputation. The publishers submitted that damages would be best determined by a jury in a trial on all issues which would include the extent, if any, to which Mr Barilaro’s reputation had been harmed and what, if any, award ought be payable to vindicate and compensate him, including for any element of aggravated damages. Consideration Prior to the Amendment Act, there was some uncertainty within the State systems that used juries in defamation trials as to whether it was for the judge or the jury to determine the issue, under the implied freedom or s 30 of the Defamation Act, of the reasonableness of the conduct of a publisher in publishing for the purposes of establishing a defence of qualified privilege. Now, the new s 30(6) of the Defamation Act requires that issue be determined by the jury for the statutory defence. All parties accepted that, as Allsop CJ, Rares and Besanko JJ held in Wing v Fairfax Media Publications (2017) 255 FCR 61, provisions as to the mode of trial, including ss 21 and 22 of the Defamation Act and its analogues as to the right of any party to elect for a trial by jury in the State courts, were not picked up under s 79 of the Judiciary Act1903 (Cth) because they were necessarily inconsistent with the powers that ss 39 and 40 of the Federal Court Act conferred on this Court to determine whether the trial of some or all issues should not be by judge alone, but by a jury. In Wing 255 FCR, Allsop CJ and Besanko J said at 72–73 [37]:First, trial by judge alone is the normal mode of trial in a civil proceeding in this Court. Secondly, the Court has a discretion to direct a trial with a jury either of all the issues of fact in a civil proceeding or of particular issues of fact in the proceeding. Thirdly, the power is a broad one constrained by only one broad criterion being that the “ends of justice appear to render it expedient to do so”. Fourthly, stating the matter broadly, the issue raised by ss 39 and 40 is whether in the particular case and, bearing in mind that the normal mode of trial of a civil proceeding in this Court is by a judge without a jury, it would promote, further or be conducive to the attainment of justice for there to be a trial with a jury. Important considerations will be the nature of the issues or allegations in the case and the particular circumstances of the case.(emphasis added)