Barilaro v Shanks-Markovina (No 3)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Barilaro v Shanks-Markovina (No 3) [2021] FCA 1100

File number(s): NSD 484 of 2021
Judgment of: RARES J
Date of judgment: 31 August 2021
Catchwords: DEFAMATION – juries – application under s 40 of Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) for trial by jury – whether jury best able to determine all issues, including if imputations conveyed and defamatory – where Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) and Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) amended since proceedings commenced – where statutory amendments add new defences and complexity to proceeding – whether new defences available to publishers for online publications in place before and after Defamation Act amended – possible impact of Covid-19 pandemic on mode of trial – where jury trial likely to be more expensive and take significantly longer than trial by judge alone – held: not in the interests of justice for proceeding to be tried by jury.  
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 39, 40

Judiciary Act1903 (Cth) s 79

Defamation Amendment Act 2020 (NSW)

Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) ss 3, 10A, 12A, 12B, 26, 29A, 30, 31

Jury Act 1977 (NSW) s 20

Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) ss 14B, 14C, 56A, 73A

Cases cited:

Adeang v the Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2016] FCA 1599

Barilaro v Shanks-Markovina (No 2) [2021] FCA 950

Capic v Ford motor Company Australia Limited (Adjournment) [2020] FCA 486

Channel Seven Adelaide Pty Ltd v Manock (2007) 232 CLR 245

Channel Seven Sydney Pty Ltd v Fierravanti-Wells (2011) 81 NSWLR 315

Chau v the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (No 3) (2021) 386 ALR 36

Joukhador v Network Ten Pty Ltd (2021) 388 ALR 318

Lange v The Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520

Reader’s Digest Services Pty Ltd v Lamb (1982) 150 CLR 500

Swain v Waverley Municipal Council (2005) 220 CLR 517

Wing v Fairfax Media Publications (2017) 255 FCR 61

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Other Federal Jurisdiction
Number of paragraphs: 53
Date of hearing: 31 August 2021
Counsel for the Applicant: Ms S Chrysanthou SC with Mr B Dean
Solicitor for the Applicant: Mark O’Brien Legal
Counsel for the First Respondent: Dr M J Collins QC with Mr C Parkins and Mr D J Helvadjian
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Xenophon Davis
Counsel for the Second Respondent:

Ms L Barnett

Solicitor for the Second Respondent Ashurst

ORDERS

NSD 484 of 202`
BETWEEN:

JOHN BARILARO

Applicant

AND:

JORDAN SHANKS-MARKOVINA

First Respondent

GOOGLE LLC

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

RARES J

DATE OF ORDER:

31 AUGUST 2021

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

Interlocutory application for leave to file an amended defence

1.The first respondent have leave to file an amended defence substantially in the form of Exhibit 1 on the interlocutory application filed on 25 August 2021 on or before 3 September 2021.

2.The applicant file and serve a reply to the first respondent’s amended defence on or before 10 September 2021.

3.The first respondent pay the applicant’s costs thrown away by reason…

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Details
Case
[2021] FCA 1100
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, John Barilaro brought defamation proceedings against Shane Martin Shanks, trading as ‘friendlyjordies’, and Google, an online platform operator, over a number of online publications. The publishers applied for the trial of the proceeding to be by jury. The publishers contended that it was appropriate for a jury to determine whether the imputations were conveyed and whether they were substantially true, as well as the impact of the imputations on Mr Barilaro's reputation and the appropriate amount of damages to compensate Mr Barilaro. The publishers submitted that these were value judgments as to the effect of the imputations on Mr Barilaro's reputation that a judge would be speculating to determine. The court considered that the proceeding involved significant complexity and, given the uncertainty as to when the current Covid-19 lockdown will end, it was likely to take significantly longer and involve significantly more cost to the parties if tried by jury. The court concluded that it was not in the interests of justice for the proceeding to be tried by jury. The application for trial by jury was dismissed. Costs were awarded to Mr Barilaro. The proceeding was referred to mediation and set down for hearing on 21 March 2022.

Orders

Orders of the court

Interlocutory application for leave to file an amended defence

1. The first respondent have leave to file an amended defence substantially in the form of Exhibit 1 on the interlocutory application filed on 25 August 2021 on or before 3 September 2021.

2. The applicant file and serve a reply to the first respondent’s amended defence on or before 10 September 2021.

3. The first respondent pay the applicant’s costs thrown away by reason of the amendment to the defence but otherwise the costs of the interlocutory application filed on 25 August 2021 be the parties’ costs in the cause.

Interlocutory application for trial by jury

4. The interlocutory application filed on 16 July 2021 be dismissed.

5. The respondents pay the applicant’s costs in respect of paragraph 3 of the interlocutory application filed on 16 July 2021.

Further timetable

6. The proceeding be referred to mediation by the Registrar, such mediation to occur on or before 29 October 2021.

7. The matter be set down for hearing on 21 March 2022 for an estimated 10 days.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Mr Barilaro also pleads in his reply to Google’s defence that none of the bruz video consisted of any expression of opinion, none of imputations 9(a)–(e) was an expression of opinion and Google had reasonable grounds to believe that any opinion was not honestly held by Mr Shanks at the time of publication. The evidence on this application At an earlier case management hearing, I raised with the parties that one of the concerns relevant to determining whether the ends of justice would appear to render it expedient to direct a trial by jury in this proceeding, was the impact on daily life, including on the conduct of court proceedings, of the Covid-19 pandemic that has affected Australia since late March 2020, in varying ways and at varying times. Mr Shanks relied on statements that the Prime Minister had published on 6 and 13 August 2021 on behalf of the National Cabinet, comprising the leaders of each of the Commonwealth, States and Territories, about a four-step national plan. The leaders had agreed that the plan would operate once 80 per cent of all eligible Australians, being those aged over 16 years, have been fully vaccinated. The plan envisaged a return to normal life based on staged relaxations of governmental restrictions currently in place on daily and community activities, as the number of fully vaccinated persons increased. A solicitor for Mr Shanks referred to estimates that in New South Wales, the target of 80 per cent of all persons eligible and aged over 16 years would be met at about 9 November 2021. If this target is achieved, the plan anticipates that the current lockdown being experienced in both metropolitan Sydney and in particular, the more restrictive conditions in certain Sydney local government areas, might be eased and life might return to what, on one view, could be described as “normal”. Mr Shanks’ solicitor gave evidence of Google Analytics statistics that revealed the audience of the matters complained of comprised about 90 per cent males. Approximately 85 per cent of the audience were in Australia; 27 per cent were aged between 18 and 24, 50 per cent between 25 and 34 years old; and about 14 per cent between 35 to 44 years. That evidence also revealed that the audience for the bruz video comprised about 60 per cent of subscribers to ‘friendlyjordies’, Mr Shanks’ trading name, and about 72 per cent of them for the Secret Dictatorship video. Mr Barilaro’s solicitor, Paul Svilans, made an affidavit, in which he said that, based on his 25 years of practice in defamation law, in trials involving both jury and judge alone hearings, jury trials took, on average, about 25 per cent longer to conclude and were, therefore, commensurably more expensive than judge alone trials. Mr Svilans also pointed out that, in his experience, significant tactical decisions as to how to conduct a proceeding before a jury will be made that may not be the same if the trial were conducted before a judge alone. Mr Svilans annexed to his affidavit a number of online publications by or on platforms operated by Mr Shanks or friendlyjordies. One of those publications occurred on 3 May 2021, when Mr Shanks published a video entitled ‘bruz: eternal’ on YouTube, which had attracted over 684,000 views. In that, Mr Shanks referred to Mr Barilaro and Mr Svilans, in disparaging language. Another publication that Mr Svilans annexed was made by Mr Shanks’ solicitors on their Twitter account on 15 July 2021. They published a note of thanks to 24,000 individual donators who had supported Mr Shanks by crowd funding that, by then, raised $1,000,060,300 “to support Friendlyjordies with his ongoing legal battle against Deputy Premier John Barilaro”. Mr Svilans noted that the bruz video had attracted nearly 785,000 views, over 75,000 likes and about 5000 comments and the Secret Dictatorship video nearly 400,000 views, over 39,000 likes and about 4000 comments since their first publications. The parties’ submissions

Decision

Reasons for decision

I think that the matter is finely balanced, and perhaps with a simpler case it would be appropriate to make such an order. However, I am conscious that this proceeding has already given rise to two substantive arguments, the application for leave to appeal that is pending, and the pleadings have not yet closed. In Adeang v the Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2016] FCA 1599 at [9] and [22], I noted that one interlocutory argument in that matter, in which there were senior and junior counsel on both sides, had exposed the parties to costs on each side of over $30,000. I have had regard to the fact that this matter, if it proceeded with a jury, would be likely to require further substantive interlocutory applications to make pre-trial rulings about the conduct of the trial. Moreover, in the context of the need to deal with the effect of the Amendment Act and the unusual added complexity this entails, it is likely that a jury trial in this proceeding will take significantly longer and involve significantly more cost to the parties than a judge alone trial. In particular, I am mindful that both publishers appear on the evidence to be capable of sustaining, with their deep pockets, a multiplicity of interlocutory and other skirmishes, together with a protracted trial, but that Mr Barilaro, on the evidence before me, may not: cf Manock 232 CLR at 293 [97]. Conclusion I am not satisfied that the ends of justice appear to render it convenient to order a jury in this matter and for the reasons above, I dismiss the application. I will order the publishers to pay Mr Barilaro’s costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Likewise, the publishers submitted that the evaluation of questions of whether the disputed and the contextual imputations were conveyed and, where relevant, were substantially true, as well as whether the material relied on was proper material, were matters which a jury was best able to determine. They argued that the evaluation of the impact of any imputations that the jury found to be true, whether contextual or otherwise, and the overall effect on Mr Barilaro’s reputation, are matters which were appropriate for a jury. They contended that these were value judgments as to the effect of the imputations on the reputation of the applicant and that a judge necessarily would be speculating about the extent to which any particular imputation or combination of imputations had harmed Mr Barilaro’s reputation. The publishers submitted that damages would be best determined by a jury in a trial on all issues which would include the extent, if any, to which Mr Barilaro’s reputation had been harmed and what, if any, award ought be payable to vindicate and compensate him, including for any element of aggravated damages. Consideration Prior to the Amendment Act, there was some uncertainty within the State systems that used juries in defamation trials as to whether it was for the judge or the jury to determine the issue, under the implied freedom or s 30 of the Defamation Act, of the reasonableness of the conduct of a publisher in publishing for the purposes of establishing a defence of qualified privilege. Now, the new s 30(6) of the Defamation Act requires that issue be determined by the jury for the statutory defence. All parties accepted that, as Allsop CJ, Rares and Besanko JJ held in Wing v Fairfax Media Publications (2017) 255 FCR 61, provisions as to the mode of trial, including ss 21 and 22 of the Defamation Act and its analogues as to the right of any party to elect for a trial by jury in the State courts, were not picked up under s 79 of the Judiciary Act1903 (Cth) because they were necessarily inconsistent with the powers that ss 39 and 40 of the Federal Court Act conferred on this Court to determine whether the trial of some or all issues should not be by judge alone, but by a jury. In Wing 255 FCR, Allsop CJ and Besanko J said at 72–73 [37]:First, trial by judge alone is the normal mode of trial in a civil proceeding in this Court. Secondly, the Court has a discretion to direct a trial with a jury either of all the issues of fact in a civil proceeding or of particular issues of fact in the proceeding. Thirdly, the power is a broad one constrained by only one broad criterion being that the “ends of justice appear to render it expedient to do so”. Fourthly, stating the matter broadly, the issue raised by ss 39 and 40 is whether in the particular case and, bearing in mind that the normal mode of trial of a civil proceeding in this Court is by a judge without a jury, it would promote, further or be conducive to the attainment of justice for there to be a trial with a jury. Important considerations will be the nature of the issues or allegations in the case and the particular circumstances of the case.(emphasis added)