Adeang v The Australian Broadcasting Corporation (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Adeang v The Australian Broadcasting Corporation (No 2)

[2016] FCA 1599

File number: NSD 552 of 2016
Judge: RARES J
Date of judgment: 19 December 2016
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) Pt VB, ss 37M, 37N

Federal Court Rules 1979 O 13 rr 3, 4

Federal Court Rules 2011 rr 16.21, 16.51, 16.52, 16.55

Cases cited:

Adeang v The Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2016] FCA 1200

Drummoyne Municipal Council v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1990) 21 NSWLR 135

Lloyd v David Syme & Co Ltd [1986] AC 350

Mirror Newspapers Ltd v Harrison (1982) 149 CLR 293

Setka v Abbott (2014) 44 VR 352

Tamaya Resources Ltd v Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (2016) 332 ALR 199

Yarrabee Chicken Company Pty Ltd v Steggles Ltd [2010] FCA 394

Date of hearing: 19 December 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Other Federal Jurisdiction
Category: No Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 39
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr T K Tobin QC
Solicitor for the Applicant: Mark O’Brien Legal
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr A T S Dawson SC with Ms C Amato
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Broadcasting Corporation

ORDERS

NSD 552 of 2016
BETWEEN:

DAVID ADEANG

Applicant

AND:

THE AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION

Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE OF ORDER:

19 DECEMBER 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.In the defence filed on 14 November 2016:

(a)paragraph 11(a) be struck out;

(b)the respondent’s first and third contextual imputations pleaded in paragraph 11(b) be struck out;  and

(c)the particulars in support of the imputations and contextual imputations be struck out save only those particulars that support the substantial truth of the imputations referred to in order 2 below and the respondents’ second contextual imputation.

2.The respondent have leave to replead its defence only in respect of its pleading of the substantial truth of imputations 6(e)-(f) and 8(e)-(f) in the further amended statement of claim.

3.The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the interlocutory application filed on 8 December 2016.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)

RARES J:

  1. On 10 October 2016 in these defamation proceedings, I published my reasons for, first, granting the applicant, David Adeang, leave to further amend his amended statement of claim by adding two new imputations, (e) and (f), secondly, refusing him leave to add imputation (h), thirdly, striking out the first contextual imputation pleaded by the respondent, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), and its associated particulars and, lastly, ordering that Mr Adeang file a further amended statement of claim pleading the two new imputations and the ABC file a defence to that pleading:  Adeang v The Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2016] FCA 1200.

  2. On 17 October 2016, Mr Adeang filed a further amended statement of claim.  On 14 November 2016, the ABC filed what it titled as an amended defence but which was in fact a new…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 1599
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

David Adeang, a former Nauruan Minister, filed an interlocutory application against the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) to address concerns about the corporation's proposed defence in a defamation action. The core of the dispute revolves around specific imputations made by the ABC regarding Mr Adeang's involvement in the suspicious death of his wife and his obstruction of justice on Nauru. The Federal Court of Australia was tasked with determining several critical legal issues. These included the scope of the court's previous order that required the ABC to file a defence and whether it permitted the addition of new defences, whether the ABC should be allowed to amend its defence to include new justifications, whether certain imputations should be struck out, and the conditions, if any, that should apply to any amendments or new issues raised by the ABC.

The court examined the statutory case management powers and obligations under the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), emphasizing the importance of resolving disputes justly, quickly, inexpensively, and efficiently. The court also considered the procedural rights provided under the Federal Court Rules 2011, which allow for amendments to pleadings under certain conditions. Drawing from previous case law, the court held that amendments to a defence must be responsive to amendments in the statement of claim. In this instance, the court found that the ABC's proposed amendments were not sufficiently responsive, particularly concerning the vagueness and potential to cause embarrassment or abuse of process. Consequently, the court ruled that certain imputations and their supporting particulars were too imprecise and should be struck out. The ABC was granted leave to replead only in respect of specific imputations related to the substantial truth of certain claims. The court also ordered the ABC to pay the costs of Mr Adeang's interlocutory application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. In the defence filed on 14 November 2016:

(a) paragraph 11(a) be struck out;

(b) the respondent’s first and third contextual imputations pleaded in paragraph 11(b) be struck out; and

(c) the particulars in support of the imputations and contextual imputations be struck out save only those particulars that support the substantial truth of the imputations referred to in order 2 below and the respondents’ second contextual imputation.

2. The respondent have leave to replead its defence only in respect of its pleading of the substantial truth of imputations 6(e)-(f) and 8(e)-(f) in the further amended statement of claim.

3. The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the interlocutory application filed on 8 December 2016.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

In subsequent correspondence the ABC indicated that it wished to replead imputation 3. In the course of argument it abandoned the originally pleaded imputation 3 and substituted a reformulation that I have set out in [5] below.Background The essential background, including the whole of the matters complained of, is set out in my previous judgment and need not be repeated here. The current and proposed reworded imputations and contextual imputations are:(a)The Applicant obstructed the administration of justice on Nauru by ensuring that the shocking death of his wife was not properly investigated.(b)The Applicant had the Commissioner of Police removed from his position so as to prevent a proper investigation into the shocking death of his wife. (c)The Applicant caused the resident magistrate in Nauru to be deported to prevent a proper investigation into the shocking death of his wife.(d)The Applicant cancelled the visa of the Chief Justice in Nauru to prevent a proper investigation into the shocking death of his wife.(e)The Applicant behaved in such a way as to deserve to be reasonably suspected of an involvement in the unlawful killing of his wife.(f)The Applicant behaved in such a way as to deserve to be reasonably suspected of the murder or manslaughter of his wife.1David Adeang, one of the most powerful members of the Nauruan Parliament, abuses his position by using it to disable opposition to his interests. 2David Adeang, as a Minister of the Nauruan Government, obstructed the administration of justice on Nauru.3David Adeang behaved in such a way as to deserve to be reasonably suspected of having some responsibility for his wife’s death. (original pleaded version)3David Adeang behaved in such a way as to deserve to be reasonably suspected of having an involvement in the suspicious death of his wife. (first amended version) On 8 December 2016, Mr Adeang filed an interlocutory application seeking orders to revoke the order that I made on 10 October 2016 that the ABC file a defence to his further amended statement of claim, to strike out that defence, and to require that any amended defence be strictly responsive to the amendments to the further amended statement of claim and not introduce any new defence of justification to imputations (a) to (d) or contextual truth defences such as imputations 1 and 3. The interlocutory application also sought to strike out the repeated particulars that I had struck out in my orders of 10 October 2016 and, in the alternative, to strike out the new pleas of justification and contextual truth and the new particulars in support of them. Mr Adeang supported the alternative basis by arguing that imputations 1 and 3, as reformulated, were so vague and imprecise that they disclosed no reasonable defence and or they, and the reinstated and new particulars of justification and contextual truth, were embarrassing and or an abuse of process. The particulars of justification for imputations (a) to (d) and imputations 1 and 3, in substance, asserted that Mr Adeang:·had refused to give, and to permit his son to give, a statement to the police in relation to his wife’s death;·had not sufficiently encouraged or assisted either the Commissioner of Police and his officers in the investigation or the Coroner to hold an inquest;·had a role in the suspension of the Commissioner of Police, the deportation of the Coroner (who was also the resident Magistrate and Registrar of the Supreme Court) and the cancellation of the Chief Justice’s visa;·had provided a statement to the ABC that was “dismissive of the fact that an inquest into the death of his wife had not been held” by saying “Nauru rarely if ever has coronial inquests”.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The nature of such an “involvement” could range from the innocent to the culpable. But, the way in which imputation 3 is pleaded leaves that whole range of meanings open in a context in which imputation 3 is intended to convey a meaning that differs in substance from imputations (e) and (f). In my opinion, imputation 3 is pleaded in such a vague way that it is calculated to embarrass the fair trial of the proceedings. As a matter of practical justice, it is too imprecise and embarrassing. It must be struck out.Conclusion It follows that the particulars of contextual truth that relate to imputations (a) to (d) and 1 and 3 must also be struck out. The ABC should file an amended defence reflecting the striking out that I have determined and it should not have leave to replead any of those matters. The ABC should pay the costs of Mr Adeang’s interlocutory application.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The following issues require resolution:(1)what scope the order I made for the filing of a defence and or r 16.55(3) provide for the addition of new defences that were not previously pleaded to claims that were maintained;(2)whether the ABC should have leave, as it sought if needed, to amend or to rely on the defence of justification to imputations (a) to (d);(3)whether imputations 1 or 3 should be struck out; and(4)what conditions, if any, should be imposed on any amendments or the ABC’s raising of new issues.Consideration – new plea of justification of imputations (a) to (d) The Court has statutory case management powers and obligations imposed by Pt VB of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). Those obligations are to achieve the overarching purpose of the civil practice and procedure provisions, namely to facilitate the just resolution of disputes according to law as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible, as s 37M(1) provides. Section 37N creates personal obligations on both the parties and their lawyers to conduct the proceeding, including negotiations for settlement of the dispute to which the proceeding relates, in a way that is consistent with that overarching purpose. In the previous Federal Court Rules 1979, O 13 r 4(1) provided for the consequential amendment of a defence where an applicant had amended a statement of claim and granted a respondent, who had filed a defence, the right to amend that defence. Order 13 r 4(3) provided that the right to amend under O 13 r 4(1)(a) was in addition to the right to amend under O 13 r 3. The latter granted a party, without leave, the right to amend any pleading unless the time for pleadings had closed or the party had previously amended the pleading. That version of the rules is substantively similar to the provisions in rr 16.51, 16.52 and 16.55 of the Federal Court Rules 2011. In Yarrabee Chicken Company Pty Ltd v Steggles Ltd [2010] FCA 394 at [122], Jagot J held that the former O 13 r 4(1)(a):… should be construed as permitting a defence to be amended in a manner that is responsive to an amendment in a claim. Her Honour held that the amendment which she was considering in that case was not so responsive. The explanatory statement issued by the authority of the judges of the Court for the Federal Court Rules 2011 stated that:The new Rules do not substantially alter existing practice and procedure but rather explain it in a way that it can be more easily followed and applied. I am of opinion that Jagot J’s observation in Steggles [2010] FCA 394 at [122] is appropriate and correct and equally applies to an amendment under the current Rules made at a later stage of the proceedings, such as the present. It is important to recognise that, in litigation, a litigant with deep pockets may have the capacity to bring and or withstand a considerable variety of challenges in procedural applications that may make an opposing party’s task financially burdensome. The conduct of defamation litigation is often complex. That is because it deals with the intersection between the right to reputation claimed by a plaintiff (or applicant) and the exercise of the right of freedom of expression claimed by the defendant (or respondent).