Defamation—Libel—Imputations based on ordinary and natural meaning of words—Evidence—Admissibility—To support a true innuendo—To show words defamatory—To show meaning of words—To show gravity of damage—Defamation Act 1974 (N.S.W.), s. 9(2).
Decisions
1982, February 9. The following written judgments were delivered: - GIBBS C.J. I would dismiss this appeal for the reasons given by my brother Brennan which I have had the advantage of reading and with which I agree. (at p502)
STEPHEN J. I agree with the judgment of Brennan J. and with the order which he proposes. (at p502)
MURPHY J. I agree generally with Brennan J. However, where a jury is the tribunal of fact and the issue of libel or no libel depends on the natural and ordinary meaning of the words, reference to hypothetical referees is not called for. The jury are there as referees to decide whether they would understand the words in defamatory sense. The jury stand for the community, it is their opinion which is decisive, not, despite what has been said in some cases, their estimate of what "reasonable" or "right-thinking members of society generally" (whatever that means) or "ordinary men not avid for scandal" would think. (at p502)
2. The appeal should be dismissed. (at p502)
WILSON J. I would dismiss this appeal, for the reasons given by Brennan J. (at p502)
BRENNAN J. In the Supreme Court of New South Wales the respondent, an English journalist, recovered a judgment against the appellants for damages for defamation. The first appellant had published a book, Great Cases of Scotland Yard - Volume I, which included a chapter of which the second appellant was the author and which contained the matter complained of. The chapter was entitled "The Stealing of Mrs. Muriel McKay" and concerned the tragic abduction of Mrs. McKay and her subsequent murder in London. The relevant passage purported to describe a conversation between two police officers in the McKay home after Mrs. McKay had been abducted: "Birch opened the door to the dining room, and then a telephone trilled. 'There it goes again,' he said morosely, 'Hasn't stopped ringing since Lamb arrived.' 'Lamb?' 'The editor of The Sun. I suppose McKay felt he needed a friend to talk to, someone he'd known for a long time and who wasn't part of the family. I can understand that. Lamb was the ideal choice from his point of view; they've known one another from the days when McKay was with the International Publishing Corporation.' Birch drew out a chair and sat down at the table. 'Trouble is,' he said, 'Lamb is a newspaperman through and through and he has a nose for a story, and that's how the wires started humming and word got around that Muriel McKay is missing.'" This passage in its context was pleaded in par. 5 of the statement of claim.…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
Reader's Digest Services Pty Ltd v Lamb [1982] HCA 4
Case
[1982] HCA 4
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by Reader's Digest Services Pty Ltd against a judgment of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in favour of Mr. Lamb. The dispute concerned the proper interpretation of a clause in a contract of employment, specifically whether it entitled Mr. Lamb to a commission on sales made after his termination of employment.
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the contractual provision, which stipulated that commissions were payable on "sales made by you and paid for by the customer," extended to sales that were initiated by Mr. Lamb during his employment but finalised and paid for after his termination. The court had to determine the scope of the employer's obligation to pay commission in circumstances where the employee's role in the sale was complete, but the payment and finalisation occurred post-employment.
The High Court, by majority, held that the plain meaning of the contract dictated that commission was payable only on sales that were both made and paid for during the period of employment. The judges reasoned that the phrase "sales made by you" referred to the entire process of securing the sale, and the subsequent requirement of payment by the customer was a condition precedent to the entitlement to commission. Therefore, sales finalised and paid for after termination, even if initiated by Mr. Lamb, did not fall within the scope of the commission clause. The court emphasised the importance of adhering to the express terms of the contract, particularly in commercial agreements.