Defamation—Damages—Exemplary damages—When may be awarded. Appeal—New trial—Misdirection that exemplary damages may be awarded—Excessive damages awarded—Counsel's prejudicial advocacy at trial—New trial generally or limited to damages.
Decisions
1966, June 2. The following written judgments were delivered: McTIERNAN J. I agree with the conclusion of the State Full Court that no miscarriage of justice resulted from the refusal of the trial judge to grant the defendant's application for the discharge of the jury or for a long adjournment of the trial. I also agree that the amount of damages awarded under the first and second counts is excessive, and that there should be a new trial of each count limited to damages. I would not interfere with the order of the State Full Court that the new trial be limited to damages. This order is based on the decision of the majority of the Court. I agree with their reasons for confining the new trial to the issue of damages. It seems to me that the explanation of the large amounts of damages assessed under the first and second counts is that the jury understood from the summing up that they could award both compensatory and exemplary damages under each of those counts. In my view, the question whether there was proof of circumstances which would entitle the jury to award exemplary damages should be decided according to decisions of this Court. I have stated my reasons for not departing from those decisions in Uren v. John Fairfax &Sons Pty. Ltd. (1966) 117 CLR 118 . In my opinion, there is no evidence of such circumstances. I think that for these reasons the verdict on the first count and the verdict on the second count should be set aside. As I have said, I think that the issue of liability should not be tried again. (at p191)
2. As regards the third and fourth counts: in my view the words of the libels are extemely offensive to the plaintiff. He is identified by the evidence as one of the persons to whom the libels referred. The defendant has put forward no plea of justification. It disavowed throughout the case that it was contending that the imputations cast on the plaintiff were true. I think that the defamatory words themselves carry an implication of actual malice. The defendant tendered a large number of publications of political matter ostensibly referable to its pleas under s. 17 (h) of the Defamation Act, 1958 (N.S.W.). One of these publications, Ex. 132, consists of pages of Hansard reporting a debate in Parliament held on 29th and 30th November 1962. A speech reported at p. 2829 contains these passages: "I invite honorable members to look at the remarks of the honorable member for . . . which followed fairly closely after his interview with a man who is, I understand, not only the…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Uren [1966] HCA 37
Case
[1966] HCA 37
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Australian Consolidated Press Ltd (ACP) appealed to the High Court of Australia from a judgment of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, which had awarded damages to Mr. Uren for libel. The libel arose from an article published by ACP in *The Daily Telegraph* newspaper, which Mr. Uren alleged was defamatory of him.
The High Court was required to determine whether the article, as published, bore a defamatory meaning concerning Mr. Uren. Specifically, the court had to consider whether the words used, in their ordinary and natural meaning, conveyed a defamatory imputation about Mr. Uren's character or reputation.
The High Court, in a majority decision, found that the article did not bear a defamatory meaning. The judges reasoned that the ordinary reader of the article would not have understood it to convey the imputations of dishonesty or disloyalty that Mr. Uren alleged. The court applied the principle that a publication is only defamatory if it lowers the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally, and that the meaning must be derived from the words themselves as ordinarily understood. The appeal was allowed, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of New South Wales was set aside.