NEW SOUTH WALES. Defamation-Slander-Parliamentary election-Statements at public meetings-
Defamatory meaning-Damage to plaintiff's character-Plaintiff a candidate- Privileged occasion-Misdirection and non-direction of dry-Findings possibly influenced by irrelevant considerations-Defamation Act 1912 (N.S.W.) (No. 32 of 1912), sec. 5*-Supreme Court Rules (N.S.W.), r. 151B*.
At a parliamentary by-election for a mining constituency, both the respon- dent and one S. claimed to represent the New South Wales Labor Party as the Dixon, E vatt "selected" candidate. The appellant was the leader of the party, and the respondent had been closely associated with him in its management and control. Prior to, and during the electoral campaign, the respondent made statements to the press to the effect that he wished to alter the control of the Labor movement in New South Wales and terminate the "dictatorship" of the appellant. At a number of meetings addressed by the appellant during * Sec. 5 of the Defamation Act 1912
Rule 151B of the Regulae Generales (N.S.W.) provides as follows :-" (1)
of the Supreme Court of New South On the trial of any action for defama-
Wales provides that "no direction, tory words not imputing an indictable
omission to direct, or decision as to offence, the jury under the plea of not
the admission or rejection of evidence guilty may consider whether the words
given by the Judge presiding at the set forth in the declaration were spoken
trial shall without the leave of the on an occasion when the plaintiff's
Court be allowed as a ground for character was likely to be injured there- by. (2) If the jury are of opinion that the
objection was taken at the trial to the said words were spoken on an occasion
direction, omission, or decision by the when the plaintiff's character was not
party on whose behalf the notice of likely to be injured thereby, they may find a verdict for the defendant."
the campaign and subsequently, which were attended mainly by miners and other members of the Labor Party, the appellant strongly criticized the respon- dent for contesting the election. He said, inter alia, that the respondent had the support of persons associated with disruption in the Labor movement, that he was making the same kind of attack on the appellant as were the adversaries of the Labor movement, that he was actuated by motives of self- interest, that he was a concealed enemy of the Labor Party, that his conduct in opposing the selected and endorsed Labor candidate was an act of treachery to the rank and file and the leadership of the Labor Party, and that the enemies of the Labor movement were getting the respondent to pull away support from a leader whom they could not buy. In an action for slander in respect of the statements made by the appellant at these meetings, counsel for both sides asked the Judge to rule on the question whether the respondent or…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
Lang v Willis [1934] HCA 51
Case
[1934] HCA 51
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
This case involved an appeal to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The appellant, John Thomas Lang, was the leader of the New South Wales Labor Party, and the respondent, Albert Charles Willis, was a candidate in a parliamentary by-election. The dispute arose from statements made by Lang at public meetings during the election campaign, in which he strongly criticised Willis, who was also contesting the election as a Labor candidate, creating a contest between two claimants for the party's endorsement. Willis brought an action for slander against Lang, alleging that the statements were defamatory.
The legal issues before the High Court included whether the trial judge had erred in his rulings regarding the interpretation of the Labor Party's rules for candidate selection, and whether certain statements made by Lang were capable of imputing that Willis had been bribed and bought by political opponents. The court also considered whether the occasion on which the statements were made was privileged and whether the jury's verdict for the defendant was reasonable, particularly in light of section 5 of the Defamation Act 1912 (N.S.W.).
A majority of the High Court, comprising Rich, Evatt, and McTiernan JJ., allowed the appeal. They held that the trial judge was correct in withdrawing from the jury the innuendo that Willis had been bribed and bought by political opponents, finding that the statements made did not support such an imputation. The majority also found that the jury's verdict, which found that the statements were not spoken on an occasion likely to injure the plaintiff's character, was open to them under section 5 of the Defamation Act 1912, given the context of a heated political contest. Starke and Dixon JJ. dissented, arguing that the defamatory statements necessarily injured Willis's character and that the jury's finding to the contrary was unreasonable. They also noted that election speeches to large, unidentified audiences were not necessarily privileged.
The High Court, by a majority, reversed the decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales and ordered that the appeal be allowed, effectively reinstating the jury's verdict in favour of the appellant, Lang.