Taylor v Nationwide News Pty Limited

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Taylor v Nationwide News Pty Limited [2023] FCAFC 117

Appeal from: Taylor v Nationwide News Pty Limited (No 2) [2022] FCA 149; (2022) 404 ALR 266
File number(s): NSD 146 of 2022
Judgment of: WIGNEY, O’CALLAGHAN AND JACKSON JJ
Date of judgment: 25 July 2023
Catchwords: DEFAMATION – appeal against primary judge’s findings that no imputations conveyed in trial by judge alone – whether primary judge erred in finding that imputations not conveyed – appeal dismissed
Legislation: Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 8
Cases cited:

Bazzi v Dutton (2022) 289 FCR 1

Boensch v Pascoe (2019) 268 CLR 593

Drummoyne Municipal Council v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1990) 21 NSWLR 135

Favell v Queensland Newspapers Pty Ltd [2005] HCA 52; (2005) 79 ALJR 1716

Gatto v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2022] VSCA 66

Herron v HarperCollins Publishers Australia Pty Ltd [2022] FCAFC 68

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499

John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Rivkin [2003] HCA 50; (2003) 77 ALJR 1657

Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1964] AC 234

Massoud v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (2022) 109 NSWLR 468

Rush v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (No 7) [2019] FCA 496

Reader’s Digest Services Pty Ltd v Lamb (1982) 150 CLR 500

Taylor v Nationwide News Limited (No 2) [2022] FCA 149; (2022) 404 ALR 266

Trkulja v Google LLC (2018) 263 CLR 149

V’landys v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2023] FCAFC 80

Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Other Federal Jurisdiction
Number of paragraphs: 103
Date of hearing: 22 August 2022
Counsel for the Appellant: KP Smark SC with NG Olson
Solicitor for the Appellant: James Legal
Counsel for the Respondents: DR Sibtain with T Senior
Solicitor for the Respondents: Thomson Geer

ORDERS

NSD 146 of 2022
BETWEEN:

DANIEL TAYLOR

Appellant

AND:

NATIONWIDE NEWS PTY LIMITED

First Respondent

BRENDEN HILLS

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

WIGNEY, O’CALLAGHAN AND JACKSON JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

25 JULY 2023

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the respondents’ costs.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT

INTRODUCTION

  1. The appellant sued Nationwide News Pty Ltd and its reporter, Mr Brenden Hills (together, the respondents) for defamation in respect of a “special report” published on 23 June 2019 in The Sunday Telegraph. 

  2. The appellant brought the proceeding under the surname “Taylor”.  That is his mother’s surname.  He swore an affidavit below in which he referred to himself as “Daniel Taylor aka Daniel Ibrahim” and “Daniel Taylor”.  He also deposed that in 2007 he “adopted” his father’s surname (Ibrahim). 

  3. The appellant pleaded that the matter complained of contained three defamatory imputations, namely that he is a mobster; a member of the mafia; and a criminal involved in organised crime.

  4. The primary judge found that none of the three imputations pleaded by the appellant was conveyed…

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Details
Case
[2023] FCAFC 117
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Taylor v Nationwide News Pty Limited involved an appeal against the primary judge's findings that certain imputations were not conveyed in a trial conducted by the judge alone. The dispute centred around a publication by Nationwide News which the appellant, Taylor, claimed was defamatory. The court was required to decide whether the primary judge erred in finding that the publication did not convey the defamatory imputations in question.

The legal issues before the court were whether the primary judge correctly interpreted the meaning of the publication and whether the imputations of criminal involvement were effectively conveyed to the ordinary reader. The court examined the primary judge's reliance on the "bane and antidote" concept and whether the statement that Taylor was "cleared" of charges sufficiently negated the imputations of criminal activity. The appeal argued that the primary judge misread the principles articulated by McHugh J regarding the ordinary reasonable reader's interpretation of defamatory material.

The court found that the primary judge did not err in concluding that the imputations were not conveyed as the statement of being "cleared" of charges was sufficient to negate the imputations of criminal involvement in the context of the publication. The court held that the ordinary reasonable reader would not necessarily be inclined to the most extreme interpretation of the material and that the balance of the publication, including the statement that Taylor was cleared of charges, did not convey the defamatory imputations. The appeal was dismissed, and Taylor was ordered to pay the respondents' costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondents’ costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The submission about that paragraph involved these propositions:(1)Her Honour erred at [96] in relying on the “bane and antidote” concept, because a statement that the appellant was “cleared” “is insufficient to overcome references to him being charged with handling proceeds of crime, in the context of a salacious and sensationalist publication which depicted his family as a criminal organisation like the Mob”.(2)The statement that the appellant was “cleared” of charges “contains nothing like a ‘refutation’ of any imputation that [he] was involved in criminality generally” and “reads as a begrudging acknowledgment of what occurred on the public record, rather than as a true vindication”.(3)The proposition that the ordinary reasonable reader strikes a balance between the most extreme available meaning and the most innocent is a misreading of what McHugh J said at 1661-62 [26];(4)Although not expressly stated, the primary judge’s reasoning at [98] assumes that the ordinary reasonable reader “will tend to situate the meaning of a piece of matter in the middle ground of the range of available meanings”, and that this is to “misread” what McHugh J said at 1661-62 [26] because:(a)his Honour said in that paragraph that the ordinary reasonable reader does not necessarily give equal weight to every part of the publication;(b)features such as headlines, photographs, get up and headings may assume particular importance, and defamatory statements in one part of an article are not automatically negated by somewhat contrary statements in another part;(c)while the reader is not avid for scandal, he or she might well be encouraged to indulge in scandal by the content and tone of the matter (citing Drummoyne Municipal Council v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1990) 21 NSWLR 135 at 137 (Gleeson CJ); Rush v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (No 7) [2019] FCA 496 at [80] (Wigney J));(d)the matter inclined decisively away from any “centre point” and towards the clear implication that the Ibrahims, including the appellant, were involved in serious criminality; and(e)the primary judge erred in holding that a statement that the appellant was cleared of charges was sufficient to overcome the suggestion that he too was involved in criminal activity.CONSIDERATION Legal principles There was no dispute on appeal about any question of legal principle. The parties accepted that the approach to appellate review of a trial judge’s findings as to whether a publication conveys an imputation is that of a rehearing where the appeal court is in as good a position as the judge below was to determine the proper inference to be drawn from the objective evidence (here, the report). See Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531 at 547 (Gibbs ACJ, Jacobs and Murphy JJ). In that regard, we think that it should no longer be necessary for counsel to draw the court’s attention to the obiter dicta of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria in Gatto v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2022] VSCA 66, that a factual finding by a trial judge whether a matter complained of conveyed an imputation is a discretionary judgment, in respect of which appellate review should proceed in accordance with the principles in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499. That statement of principle was obviously wrong, as judges of this court have said many times. See, by way of example, Bazzi v Dutton (2022) 289 FCR 1 at 7 [22]-[28] (Rares and Rangiah JJ) and 15 [53] (Wigney J); and V’landys v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2023] FCAFC 80 at [72] (Rares J, with whom Katzmann and O’Callaghan JJ agreed).