FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Taylor v Nationwide News Pty Limited [2023] FCAFC 117
ORDERS
NSD 146 of 2022 BETWEEN: DANIEL TAYLOR
Appellant
AND: NATIONWIDE NEWS PTY LIMITED
First Respondent
BRENDEN HILLS
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
WIGNEY, O’CALLAGHAN AND JACKSON JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
25 JULY 2023
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the respondents’ costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT
INTRODUCTION
The appellant sued Nationwide News Pty Ltd and its reporter, Mr Brenden Hills (together, the respondents) for defamation in respect of a “special report” published on 23 June 2019 in The Sunday Telegraph.
The appellant brought the proceeding under the surname “Taylor”. That is his mother’s surname. He swore an affidavit below in which he referred to himself as “Daniel Taylor aka Daniel Ibrahim” and “Daniel Taylor”. He also deposed that in 2007 he “adopted” his father’s surname (Ibrahim).
The appellant pleaded that the matter complained of contained three defamatory imputations, namely that he is a mobster; a member of the mafia; and a criminal involved in organised crime.
The primary judge found that none of the three imputations pleaded by the appellant was conveyed…
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- Case
- [2023] FCAFC 117
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the primary judge correctly interpreted the meaning of the publication and whether the imputations of criminal involvement were effectively conveyed to the ordinary reader. The court examined the primary judge's reliance on the "bane and antidote" concept and whether the statement that Taylor was "cleared" of charges sufficiently negated the imputations of criminal activity. The appeal argued that the primary judge misread the principles articulated by McHugh J regarding the ordinary reasonable reader's interpretation of defamatory material.
The court found that the primary judge did not err in concluding that the imputations were not conveyed as the statement of being "cleared" of charges was sufficient to negate the imputations of criminal involvement in the context of the publication. The court held that the ordinary reasonable reader would not necessarily be inclined to the most extreme interpretation of the material and that the balance of the publication, including the statement that Taylor was cleared of charges, did not convey the defamatory imputations. The appeal was dismissed, and Taylor was ordered to pay the respondents' costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the respondents’ costs.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The submission about that paragraph involved these propositions:(1)Her Honour erred at [96] in relying on the “bane and antidote” concept, because a statement that the appellant was “cleared” “is insufficient to overcome references to him being charged with handling proceeds of crime, in the context of a salacious and sensationalist publication which depicted his family as a criminal organisation like the Mob”.(2)The statement that the appellant was “cleared” of charges “contains nothing like a ‘refutation’ of any imputation that [he] was involved in criminality generally” and “reads as a begrudging acknowledgment of what occurred on the public record, rather than as a true vindication”.(3)The proposition that the ordinary reasonable reader strikes a balance between the most extreme available meaning and the most innocent is a misreading of what McHugh J said at 1661-62 [26];(4)Although not expressly stated, the primary judge’s reasoning at [98] assumes that the ordinary reasonable reader “will tend to situate the meaning of a piece of matter in the middle ground of the range of available meanings”, and that this is to “misread” what McHugh J said at 1661-62 [26] because:(a)his Honour said in that paragraph that the ordinary reasonable reader does not necessarily give equal weight to every part of the publication;(b)features such as headlines, photographs, get up and headings may assume particular importance, and defamatory statements in one part of an article are not automatically negated by somewhat contrary statements in another part;(c)while the reader is not avid for scandal, he or she might well be encouraged to indulge in scandal by the content and tone of the matter (citing Drummoyne Municipal Council v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1990) 21 NSWLR 135 at 137 (Gleeson CJ); Rush v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (No 7) [2019] FCA 496 at [80] (Wigney J));(d)the matter inclined decisively away from any “centre point” and towards the clear implication that the Ibrahims, including the appellant, were involved in serious criminality; and(e)the primary judge erred in holding that a statement that the appellant was cleared of charges was sufficient to overcome the suggestion that he too was involved in criminal activity.CONSIDERATION Legal principles There was no dispute on appeal about any question of legal principle. The parties accepted that the approach to appellate review of a trial judge’s findings as to whether a publication conveys an imputation is that of a rehearing where the appeal court is in as good a position as the judge below was to determine the proper inference to be drawn from the objective evidence (here, the report). See Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531 at 547 (Gibbs ACJ, Jacobs and Murphy JJ). In that regard, we think that it should no longer be necessary for counsel to draw the court’s attention to the obiter dicta of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria in Gatto v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2022] VSCA 66, that a factual finding by a trial judge whether a matter complained of conveyed an imputation is a discretionary judgment, in respect of which appellate review should proceed in accordance with the principles in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499. That statement of principle was obviously wrong, as judges of this court have said many times. See, by way of example, Bazzi v Dutton (2022) 289 FCR 1 at 7 [22]-[28] (Rares and Rangiah JJ) and 15 [53] (Wigney J); and V’landys v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2023] FCAFC 80 at [72] (Rares J, with whom Katzmann and O’Callaghan JJ agreed).