McKenzie v Cash Converters International Ltd (No 3)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

McKenzie v Cash Converters International Ltd (No 3) [2019] FCA 10

File number: NSD 601 of 2016
Judge: LEE J
Date of judgment: 18 January 2019
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for disqualification of judge on the basis of apprehended bias – whether hypothetical lay observer might apprehend that a settlement approval application pursuant to s 33V of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) might be determined otherwise than on its merits – disqualification application dismissed

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – observations on appropriate procedure for raising the issue of apprehended bias

Legislation:

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 144

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) Pt IVA, Pt VAA s 33V

Class Actions Practice Note (GPN-CA)        

Cases cited:

Attorney-General of New South Wales v Bar-Mordecai [2009] NSWSC 117

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Richards [2013] FCAFC 89

Barton v Walker [1979] 2 NSWLR 740

Bienstein v Bienstein [2003] HCA 7; (2003) 195 ALR 225

British American Tobacco Services Ltd v Laurie [2011] HCA 2; (2011) 242 CLR 283

Caason Investments Pty Limited v Cao (No 2) [2018] FCA 527

Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Jackson McDonald (a firm) [2014] WASC 301

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337

Isbester v Knox City Council [2015] HCA 20; (2015) 255 CLR 135

Johnson v Johnson [2000] HCA 48; (2000) 201 CLR 488

Kelly v Willmott Forests Ltd (in liquidation) (No 4) [2016] FCA 323

Laws v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1990) 170 CLR 70

Lopez v Star World Enterprises Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 104; (1999) ATPR 41-678

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng [2001] HCA 17; (2001) 205 CLR 507

P Dawson Nominees Pty Ltd v Brookfield Multiplex Ltd (No 4) [2010] FCA 1029

R v Watson; ex parte Armstrong (1976) 136 CLR 248

Re JRL; ex parte CJL (1986) 161 CLR 342

Williams v FAI Home Security Pty Ltd (No 4) [2000] FCA 1925; (2000) 180 ALR 459

Date of hearing: 3 December 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Regulator and Consumer Protection
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 43
Counsel for the Applicant: Ms A Rao
Solicitor for the Applicant: Maurice Blackburn
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr J G Giles SC with Ms H Mann
Solicitor for the Respondents: Herbert Smith Freehills

ORDERS

NSD 601 of 2016
BETWEEN:

KIM MCKENZIE

Applicant

AND:

CASH CONVERTERS INTERNATIONAL LTD ACN 069 141 546

First Respondent

CASH CONVERTERS (CASH ADVANCE) PTY LTD ACN 127 866 308

Second Respondent

CASH CONVERTERS (STORES) PTY LTD ACN 127 343 293 (and another named in the Schedule)

Third Respondent

JUDGE:

LEE J

DATE OF ORDER:

18 JANUARY 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The interlocutory application filed by the respondent on 3 December 2018 be dismissed.

2.Any issue as to the costs of the interlocutory application filed by the respondent on 3 December 2018 be determined…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 10
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

McKenzie v Cash Converters International Ltd (No 3) involved an application by the defendant, Cash Converters International Ltd, for the disqualification of the judge, his Honour Justice Gilmour, on the basis of apprehended bias. The underlying dispute was a proposed class action settlement, with Cash Converters seeking approval of the settlement under section 33V of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). McKenzie opposed the application for disqualification, arguing that it was not made in good faith and was instead an attempt to delay proceedings.

The primary legal issue the court had to decide was whether the judge should be disqualified due to an apprehended bias based on the hypothetical perspective of a lay observer. Cash Converters argued that the judge had previously provided advice on a related proceeding, potentially leading to a bias. McKenzie contended that the judge's past involvement was not such that a reasonable observer would apprehend bias. The court had to assess the steps involved in such an allegation, including whether the judge had formed an opinion on a relevant aspect of the matter, whether the judge would apply that opinion without fresh consideration, and whether the issue should be considered afresh in relation to the particular case.

The court found that the arguments advanced by Cash Converters were flawed. It was noted that even if the judge had previously formed an opinion based on a different universe of material, the nature of the inquiry required in a section 33V application would necessitate fresh consideration of the facts and arguments. The court concluded that a reasonable observer would not apprehend that the judge might prejudge the settlement approval application based on the past advice. Therefore, the application for disqualification was dismissed.

The court also addressed procedural observations regarding the appropriate manner in which the issue of apprehended bias should be raised. The interlocutory application was dismissed, and any issue regarding the costs of the interlocutory application was to be determined by 31 January 2019.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The interlocutory application filed by the respondent on 3 December 2018 be dismissed.

2. Any issue as to the costs of the interlocutory application filed by the respondent on 3 December 2018 be determined on 31 January 2019.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Fifthly, before leaving the hypothetical observer’s attributed knowledge, I should make a further point: although senior counsel for Cash Converters accepted, correctly as it happens, that as a tolerably busy barrister who acted in a large number of class actions, it would not be expected that I have any present recollection of being provided with material or providing advice in relation to the Proposed Proceeding, it is somewhat difficult to make too much of this point. Although well-informed, an ordinary hypothetical observer may find it difficult to appreciate how the prosaic details of briefs quickly depart and recede into the Cimmerian darkness of lost professional memory. As senior counsel for Cash Converters submitted, it is reasonable to assume a hypothetical observer may consider that the provision of material on the substantive application may possibly prompt some form of memory. On balance, I think it is fair to proceed on this basis. I will put to one side as being irrelevant my certitude, that at this remove, my ignorance of the details of the Proposed Proceeding is so profound as to make any “triggering” of cogitations on a long forgotten and relatively insignificant brief as unlikely as they would be unwelcome. F CONSIDERATION I set out above the various steps involved in considering an application for disqualification for apprehended bias. Justice Hayne’s analysis in Jia Legeng is, with respect, a useful reminder of what is actually involved in such an allegation. At 564 [185], his Honour observed:Saying that a decision-maker has prejudged or will prejudge an issue, or even saying that there is a real likelihood that a reasonable observer might reach that conclusion, is to make a statement which has several distinct elements at its roots. First, there is the contention that the decision-maker has an opinion on a relevant aspect of the matter in issue in the particular case. Secondly, there is the contention that the decision-maker will apply that opinion to that matter in issue. Thirdly, there is the contention that the decision-maker will do so without giving the matter fresh consideration in the light of whatever may be the facts and arguments relevant to the particular case. Most importantly, there is the assumption that the question which is said to have been prejudged is one which should be considered afresh in relation to the particular case. Even assuming contemporary recollection (or “revived” memory) of previously expressed views, how it could be reasonable to hold the view that the factors identified might amount to an apprehension of prejudgment which would not be amenable to fresh consideration in the light of the facts and arguments to be advanced on the substantive application on the basis of different material, was never an issue really grappled with by Cash Converters. Dealing with the three steps identified by Gageler J in Isbester (see [20] above) it seems to me that Cash Converters have identified the step 1 “factors” as being that in 2014, I performed the tasks which I have already detailed which would have required some views being formed (on the basis of a different universe of material) on matters which may be relevant to the current proceeding. It is hypothesised that this might cause an apprehension that the s 33V application might be resolved otherwise than on its merits. As to step 2, the articulation of how the identified factors might cause that deviation is, as I understand it, that these factors might be perceived as bearing upon my neutral evaluation of the s 33V application, in the sense that I might bring a pre-formed view, and a “revived” knowledge of the matters considered in advising on the Proposed Proceeding, to the evaluation required on the s 33V application. Given the type of enquiry demanded by the s 33V application which I have explained above, this step 2 articulation is one which, with respect, I find difficult to follow. Be that as it may, where the argument seems to me clearly flawed arises at step 3, the consideration of the reasonableness of the apprehension of that deviation being caused by the factors identified.