Clime Capital Limited v UGL Pty Limited

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Clime Capital Limited v UGL Pty Limited [2020] FCA 66

File number: VID 1390 of 2017
Judge: ANASTASSIOU J
Date of judgment: 5 February 2020
Catchwords: REPRESENTATIVE PROCEEDINGS – application for approval of settlement pursuant to s 33V of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – where common fund order previously made under s 33ZF of the Act – whether fund equalisation order available under s 33V of the Act – whether proposed settlement fair and reasonable – funding commission percentage – claim of applicants for reimbursement payments – approval granted
Legislation:

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 674(2)

Class Actions Practice Note (GPN-CA) 

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), ss 33V, 33X, 33Y, and 33ZF

Cases cited:

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Richards [2013] FCAFC 89

BMW Australia Ltd v Brewster;Westpac Banking Corporation v Lenthall [2019] HCA 45

Bradgate (Trustee) v Ashley Services Group Limited (No 2) [2019] FCA 1210

Earglow Pty Ltd v Newcrest Mining Limited [2016] FCA 1433

Harrison v Sandhurst Trustees Ltd [2011] FCA 541

HFSP Pty Ltd (Trustee) v Tamaya Resources Ltd (in liq) (No 3) [2017] FCA 650

Kuterba v Sistex Medical Limited (No 3) [2019] FCA 1374

Liverpool City Council v McGraw-Hill Financial, Inc (now known as S&P Global Inc) [2018] FCA 1289

McKenzie v Cash Converters International Ltd (No 3) [2019] FCA 10

Melbourne City Investments Pty Ltd v UGL Limited [2015] VSC 540

Modtech Engineering Pty Limited v GPT Management Holdings Limited [2013] FCA 626

P Dawson Nominees Pty Ltd v Brookfield Multiplex Limited (No 4) [2010] FCA 1029

Date of hearing: 4 and 16 December 2019
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Corporations and Corporate Insolvency
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 42
Counsel for the Applicant:  Ms R. M. Doyle SC with Ms A. M. Folie
Solicitor for the Applicant:  Phi Finney McDonald
Counsel for the Respondent:  Mr K. A. Loxley
Solicitor for the Respondent: Herbert Smith Freehills

ORDERS

VID 1390 of 2017
BETWEEN:

CLIME CAPITAL LIMITED (ACN 106 282 777)

Applicant

AND:

UGL PTY LIMITED (ACN 009 180 287)

Respondent

JUDGE:

ANASTASSIOU J

DATE OF ORDER:

 17 DECEMBER 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

In these orders:

·Funded Group Member means a Registered Group member who entered into a litigation funding agreement with IMF which has not been terminated.

·Group Member means those persons referred to in paragraph 3 of the Statement of Claim, other than those persons who have opted out of the proceeding pursuant to section 33J of the Act.

·Individual Gross Entitlement means the pro rata entitlement of a Participating Group Member to a share of the Settlement Sum (as defined in the Settlement Distribution Scheme) before any deductions are applied to the Settlement Sum on account of legal costs, funding commission or any other deductible expense or amount identified in these Orders or the Settlement Distribution Scheme.

·Participating Member means a person who is a Registered Group Member…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 66
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, Clime Capital Limited sought approval for a settlement with UGL Pty Limited regarding a representative proceeding. The dispute involved alleged non-disclosure issues concerning a major project, the Ichthys Project, which was a $900 million power plant construction project in the Northern Territory. The court had to decide whether a funding equalisation order (FEO) could be made under section 33V of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) as an alternative to a common fund order (CFO) under section 33ZF. The court also needed to assess if the proposed settlement was fair and reasonable for all group members.

The court's reasoning was grounded in the well-established principles for approving settlements in representative proceedings. The primary task was to ensure the settlement was fair and reasonable for group members. The court relied on previous case law and expert opinions to conclude that a FEO could indeed be made at the conclusion of a proceeding or upon settlement. The court found that while a CFO might not be appropriate for an early stage settlement unrelated to compromise approval, a FEO could equitably distribute costs among group members. The court approved the settlement after determining it was within the range of reasonable outcomes, taking into account various factors such as the complexity of the litigation, the stage of the proceedings, and the risks involved. The settlement included provisions for the distribution of settlement sums, funding commission payments, and reimbursement of legal costs.

The final orders approved the settlement agreement between the parties, appointed an administrator for the settlement distribution scheme, dismissed the claims between the parties, and outlined the terms for the distribution of settlement sums, costs, and expenses. The court also granted a funding equalisation order to ensure equitable distribution of costs among group members. The court further ordered that certain evidence not be disclosed without prior consent or leave of the court to prevent prejudice to the administration of justice.

Orders

Orders of the court

In these orders:

· Funded Group Member means a Registered Group member who entered into a litigation funding agreement with IMF which has not been terminated.

· Group Member means those persons referred to in paragraph 3 of the Statement of Claim, other than those persons who have opted out of the proceeding pursuant to section 33J of the Act.

· Individual Gross Entitlement means the pro rata entitlement of a Participating Group Member to a share of the Settlement Sum (as defined in the Settlement Distribution Scheme) before any deductions are applied to the Settlement Sum on account of legal costs, funding commission or any other deductible expense or amount identified in these Orders or the Settlement Distribution Scheme.

· Participating Member means a person who is a Registered Group Member but is not a Prohibited person.

· Prohibited Person means a person named on the list provided by the Respondent’s insurers to Phi Finney McDonald pursuant to order 24 of his Honour Justice Murphy made on 24 October 2019.

· Registered Group Member means:

(a) a Group Member who entered into a litigation funding agreement with IMF by 30 November 2018;

(b) a Group Member who registered in accordance with orders 18 and 19 made by his Honour Justice Murphy on 23 October 2019 (as varied by Order 2 made by his Honour Justice Murphy on 20 December 2019 and order 2 made by his Honour Justice Murphy on 16 July 2019).

· Unfunded Group Member means a Registered Group Member who has not entered into a litigation funding agreement with IMF.

Approval of Settlement

1. Pursuant to sections 33V and 33ZF of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (Act):

(a) settlement of the proceeding as between the Applicant and the Respondent upon the terms set out in the Settlement Agreement executed by the Applicant, the Respondent, Phi Finney McDonald Pty Limited, and IMF Bentham Ltd (IMF), and dated 13 September 2019 (Settlement Agreement) be approved; and

(b) subject to orders 12 and 13 below, the scheme for the distribution of the settlement sum (Settlement Distribution Scheme) (and any annexures therein) filed by the Applicant (together, Settlement Documents) be approved.

2. Pursuant to section 33ZF of the Act or otherwise, the Court authorises the applicant nunc pro tunc for and on behalf of persons who meet the definition of “Group Member” in paragraph 3 of the second further amended statement of claim filed on 12 June 2019 and who did not file an opt out notice (Group Members) to enter into and give effect to the Settlement Documents and the transactions contemplated therein for and on behalf of Group Members.

3. Pursuant to section 33ZB and section 33ZF of the Act, the persons affected and bound by the settlement of the proceedings be the Applicant, the Respondent and the Group Members.

4. Pursuant to section 33ZF of the Act, Mr Jeremy Alexander Zimet be appointed administrator of the Settlement Distribution Scheme (Administrator) and is to act in accordance with the rules of the Settlement Distribution Scheme, subject to any direction of the Court.

5. Pursuant to sections 22, 23 or 33ZF of the Act, Federal Court Rules rule 1.32 and/or the Court’s implied jurisdiction, the claims in the proceeding as between the Applicant and Respondent be dismissed, on the basis that the dismissal is a defence and absolute bar to any claim (either direct or indirect) or proceeding by the Applicant or any Group Member as against the Respondent (and its Related Parties as defined in the Settlement Agreement) which is in respect of, or arise out of, the same, similar or related circumstances raised in the proceeding.

6. Pursuant to section 33ZF of the Act, that the releases and pleas in bar in the Settlement Agreement and order 5 above, operate without prejudice to:

(a) the right of any party to the Settlement Agreement to make an application to enforce the Settlement Agreement in a new proceeding; or

(b) the right of any Group Member to make an application to the Court in accordance with the terms of the Settlement Distribution Scheme; or

(c) the right of the Administrator to refer any issues relating to the Settlement Distribution Scheme to the Court for direction or determination in accordance with the terms of the Settlement Distribution Scheme.

7. Pursuant to sections 22, 23 or 33ZF of the Act, rule 1.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 and/or the Court’s implied jurisdiction there be no orders as to costs and all previous orders for costs in the proceeding be vacated with effect from the date of the completion of the administration of the Scheme, being the date on which the final distribution from the Settlement Distribution Fund is confirmed by the Administrator.

Applicant’s Costs and Expenses

8. Pursuant to section 33V and/or section 33ZF of the Act:

(a) the Applicant’s legal costs and disbursements on a solicitor and own client basis, incurred in connection with the proceeding on its own behalf and on behalf of all group members in the proceeding be approved in the amount of $5,950,000 as being reasonable;

(b) the costs and disbursements incurred by the Administrator, in connection with the administration of the Settlement Distribution Scheme, from the date of the approval of the Settlement Documents to the date of completion of distribution of the Settlement Sum (within the meaning of the Settlement Distribution Scheme), be approved in an amount identified in the report of a legal costs expert (appointed by the Court to provide an independent expert report for this purpose) as being reasonable;

(c) the Applicant’s claim for compensation for the time and expenses incurred in the interests of prosecuting the proceeding on behalf of group members as a whole be approved in the amount of $82,281.64.

Funding Equalisation Order

9. Pursuant to section 33V and/or section 33ZF of the Act:

(a) the Applicant and Participating Group Members who have signed litigation funding agreements with IMF (Funded Group Members) are to pay to IMF, pursuant to those agreements, a total funding commission of $4,050,000;

(b) the Individual Gross Entitlements of Participating Group Members who have not signed litigation funding agreements with IMF (Unfunded Group Members) be reduced by an amount in the same proportion as the reduction in the Individual Gross Entitlements of Funded Group Members by their payment of the funding commission; and

(c) the amount referred to in (b) is to be distributed on a pro rata basis to all Participating Group Members so that all Participating Group Members equally share the burden of the cost to Funded Group Members of the funding commission.

Other

10. Pursuant to section 33V and/or section 33ZF of the Act, the project costs incurred by IMF in connection with the proceeding be approved in the amount of $15,054.40 as being reasonable.

11. Until 10 February 2020 and subject to further order, pursuant to s 37AF and s 37AG(1)(a), on the ground that the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice, the following evidence is not to be published or disclosed without the prior express consent of the Applicant and/or prior leave of the Court to any person or entity other than the Court, the Applicant, IMF and their legal advisors:

(a) the report of the Court-appointed costs referee Mr Ian Ramsey-Stewart dated 18 November 2019 including annexures, which report was provided to the Chambers of Justice Anastassiou on 18 November 2019;

(b) the affidavit of Timothy Michael Luke Finney affirmed on 27 November 2019 including its annexure;

(c) the affidavit of Timothy Michael Luke Finney affirmed on 4 December 2019 including its annexure; and

(d) the affidavit of Timothy Michael Luke Finney affirmed on 12 December 2019 including its annexure.

12. The time for any appeal from these orders be extended to 14 days following delivery of reasons for judgment (Appeal Deadline).

13. Distribution in accordance with the Settlement Distribution Scheme shall not commence until after the Appeal Deadline.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The subject matter of the alleged non-disclosure concerned problems the respondent encountered with a major project it had undertaken called the Ichthys Project. This was a $900 million project for the construction and commissioning of a combined cycle power plant in the Northern Territory. Evidence and materials relied upon by the applicant The applicant relies upon the following evidence and materials: (1)Submissions in support of the proposed settlement by the applicant dated 27 November 2019 and 12 December 2019;(2)Submission in support of the proposed settlement by the respondent dated 2 and 13 December 2019; (3)Affidavits of Mr Timothy Michael Luke Finney dated 27 November 2019, and 4 and 12 December 2019, the solicitor on record for the applicant;(4)A confidential counsel opinion of Ms Rachel Doyle SC and Ms Alexandra Folie dated 27 November 2019, concerning the merits of the proposed settlement; and(5)A report of Mr Ian Ramsey-Stewart and appendices dated 18 November 2019, concerning the costs incurred by the solicitors for the applicant. Applicable principles As I have said, the relevant principles are well-established. Accordingly, it is unnecessary to again adumbrate them. Rather, I respectfully adopt the recent economical statement of the principles by Middleton J in Bradgate (Trustee) v Ashley Services Group Limited (No 2) [2019] FCA 1210 (at [9] to [10]): The principles applicable to court approval of settlements of representative proceedings are well-established. The fundamental task of the Court is to determine whether the settlement is fair and reasonable having regard to the interests of the group members who will be bound by it. Justice Lee recently summarised the applicable principles in McKenzie v Cash Converters International Ltd (No 3) [2019] FCA 10 at [24] as follows:First, the Court assumes an onerous and protective role in relation to group members’ interests, in some ways similar to Court approval of settlements on behalf of persons with a legal disability; secondly, the Court must be astute to recognise that the interests of the parties before it and those of the group as a whole (or as between some members of the group and other members) may not wholly coincide; thirdly, and connected to the second point, the Court should be alive to the possibility that a settlement may reflect conflicts of interest or conflicts of duty and interest between participants in the common enterprise which has conducted the representative proceeding; fourthly, the Court should understand that at that point of settlement approval, the interests of the parties have merged in the settlement and both sides may not critique the settlement from the perspectives of the group members who may suffer a detriment or obtain lesser benefits through the settlement; fifthly, the Court must decide whether the proposed settlement is within the range of reasonable outcomes, not whether it is the best outcome which might have been won by better bargaining (in this way, the Court’s task is not to second-guess the applicant’s lawyers, and it should recognise that different applicants and different lawyers will have different appetites for risk).(Citations omitted)Further, when the Court performs its supervisory and protective role, and in particular when assessing whether the proposed settlement falls within the range of reasonable outcomes, the Court relies heavily on the applicant’s counsel who, as guided by [14.4] of the Class Actions Practice Note (GPN-CA), should address the following factors:(1)the complexity and likely duration of the litigation;(2)the reaction of the class to the settlement;(3)the stage of the proceedings;(4)the risks of establishing liability;(5)the risks of establishing loss or damage;(6)the risks of maintaining a class action;(7)the ability of the respondent to withstand a greater judgment;(8)the range of reasonableness of the settlement in light of the best recovery;(9)the range of reasonableness of the settlement in light of all the attendant risks of litigation; and(10)the terms of any advice received from counsel and/or from any independent expert in relation to the issues which arise in the proceeding.Consideration

Decision

Reasons for decision

I turn now to the first preliminary question referred to above, namely the power to make a FEO pursuant to s 33V of the Act, including as an alternative to a CFO pursuant to s 33ZF. FEO in place of CFO at conclusion of the proceeding or upon settlement In BMW Australia, the plurality, Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ held that the Court does not have power under s 33ZF of the Act to make an early CFO unrelated to the approval of a compromise pursuant to s 33V. Their honours (at [46] and [50]) construed the power under s 33ZF as “essentially supplementary” and thus authorised orders apt to determination by the Court of the issues in the proceeding, as distinct from inducing third party support for the proceeding. This reasoning was essentially agreed with by Nettle J (at [125]) and Gordon J (at [145]). The Court was not strictly required to decide whether s 33V(2) conferred a power to make a CFO at the time of the settlement of a proceeding and did not specifically make any finding as to that question. However, the Court clearly distinguished between the making of a CFO at an early stage in a proceeding unconnected to the approval of a compromise and the making of a FEO at the conclusion or settlement of the proceeding. The plurality (at [90]) held that at the stage of judgment while a FEO “falls squarely within the terms of the s 33ZF… the same cannot be said of a CFO.” Their honours (at [88]) reasoned: … While it must be accepted that the burden of the amounts that funded group members have agreed to pay to the funder under their agreements with the funder must be distributed fairly, a FEO is apt equitably to distribute those amounts whereas a CFO seeks to impose an additional cost by imposing new obligations on the unfunded group members. The honours (at [89]) further said: A FEO is clearly available where a settlement is reached. A settlement must be approved by the court [citing s 33V], and, in approving a settlement, the court must be satisfied that it is "fair and reasonable to all group members" [Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Richards [2013] FCAFC 89 at [55]]. A settlement that allows some group members to ride for free would not be fair and reasonable to the other group members. Gordon J at [134] to [135] agreed with the plurality and at [168] to [169] said:…the free rider problem was addressed by making funding equalisation orders to redistribute the additional amounts received "in hand" by unfunded class members pro rata across the class as a whole.It was not suggested by any of the parties to these appeals that the legislative scheme did not allow for the making of a funding equalisation order. In short, there is already an accepted solution to the problems which the common fund order supposedly seeks to address. The accepted solution referred to by Gordon J is well established by authorities in this Court since P Dawson Nominees Pty Ltd v Brookfield Multiplex Limited (No 4) [2010] FCA 1029. See also Modtech Engineering Pty Limited v GPT Management Holdings Limited [2013] FCA 626; Earglow Pty Ltd v Newcrest Mining Limited [2016] FCA 1433; HFSP Pty Ltd (Trustee) v Tamaya Resources Ltd (in liq) (No 3) [2017] FCA 650; Liverpool City Council v McGraw-Hill Financial, Inc (now known as S&P Global Inc) [2018] FCA 1289; and Bradgate (Trustee) v Ashley Services Group Limited (No 2) [2019] FCA 1210.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As I have said, the relevant principles are well-established. Accordingly, it is unnecessary to again adumbrate them. Rather, I respectfully adopt the recent economical statement of the principles by Middleton J in Bradgate (Trustee) v Ashley Services Group Limited (No 2) [2019] FCA 1210 (at [9] to [10]): The principles applicable to court approval of settlements of representative proceedings are well-established. The fundamental task of the Court is to determine whether the settlement is fair and reasonable having regard to the interests of the group members who will be bound by it. Justice Lee recently summarised the applicable principles in McKenzie v Cash Converters International Ltd (No 3) [2019] FCA 10 at [24] as follows:First, the Court assumes an onerous and protective role in relation to group members’ interests, in some ways similar to Court approval of settlements on behalf of persons with a legal disability; secondly, the Court must be astute to recognise that the interests of the parties before it and those of the group as a whole (or as between some members of the group and other members) may not wholly coincide; thirdly, and connected to the second point, the Court should be alive to the possibility that a settlement may reflect conflicts of interest or conflicts of duty and interest between participants in the common enterprise which has conducted the representative proceeding; fourthly, the Court should understand that at that point of settlement approval, the interests of the parties have merged in the settlement and both sides may not critique the settlement from the perspectives of the group members who may suffer a detriment or obtain lesser benefits through the settlement; fifthly, the Court must decide whether the proposed settlement is within the range of reasonable outcomes, not whether it is the best outcome which might have been won by better bargaining (in this way, the Court’s task is not to second-guess the applicant’s lawyers, and it should recognise that different applicants and different lawyers will have different appetites for risk).(Citations omitted)Further, when the Court performs its supervisory and protective role, and in particular when assessing whether the proposed settlement falls within the range of reasonable outcomes, the Court relies heavily on the applicant’s counsel who, as guided by [14.4] of the Class Actions Practice Note (GPN-CA), should address the following factors:(1)the complexity and likely duration of the litigation;(2)the reaction of the class to the settlement;(3)the stage of the proceedings;(4)the risks of establishing liability;(5)the risks of establishing loss or damage;(6)the risks of maintaining a class action;(7)the ability of the respondent to withstand a greater judgment;(8)the range of reasonableness of the settlement in light of the best recovery;(9)the range of reasonableness of the settlement in light of all the attendant risks of litigation; and(10)the terms of any advice received from counsel and/or from any independent expert in relation to the issues which arise in the proceeding.Consideration