Cantor v Audi Australia Pty Limited (No 7)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Cantor v Audi Australia Pty Limited (No 7) [2022] FCA 317

File numbers: NSD 1307 of 2015
NSD 1308 of 2015
NSD 1459 of 2015
NSD 1472 of 2015
NSD 1473 of 2015
Judgment of: YATES J
Date of judgment: 1 April 2022
Catchwords: CONSUMER LAW – representative proceedings – whether the Court should make non-publication orders, on the ground that non-publication is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice – ss 37AF and 37AG(1)(a) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – whether the Court should approve the applicants’ legal costs – whether the Court should approve the Administrator’s costs of administering the Settlement Scheme – where costs verified as being reasonable by a costs expert – whether the Court should make a self-executing order for approval of further costs, where the Court should retain control of the approval process for further costs
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 37AE, 37AF, 37AG, 37AJ, 33V, 33ZF, Pt VAA

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 59, 75

Cases cited:

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Valve Corporation (No 5) [2016] FCA 741

Cannon v Griffiths & Ors (No 2) [2015] NSWSC 1329

Cantor v Audi Australia Pty Limited (No 5) [2020] FCA 637

Clime Capital Limited v UGL Pty Limited [2020] FCA 66

Gray v State of Victoria (Department of Education and Early Childhood Development) [2017] FCA 353

Hogan v Australian Crime Commission [2010] HCA 21; 240 CLR 651

Lifeplan Australia Friendly Society Limited v S&P Global Inc [2018] FCA 379

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Regulator and Consumer Protection
Number of paragraphs: 81
Date of last submissions: 18 March 2022
Date of hearing: 15 March 2022
Counsel for the Applicants
in NSD 1307 of 2015, and
NSD 1308 of 2015:
Dr P Cashman
Solicitor for the Applicants
in NSD 1307 of 2015, and
NSD 1308 of 2015:
Bannister Law
Solicitor for the Applicants
in NSD 1459 of 2015,
NSD 1472 of 2015, and
NSD 1473 of 2015:
Mr J K Schimmel of Maurice Blackburn Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondents
in NSD 1307 of 2015,
NSD 1308 of 2015,
NSD 1459 of 2015,
NSD 1472 of 2015, and
NSD 1473 of 2015:
Mr I J M Ahmed
Solicitor for the Respondents
in NSD 1307 of 2015,
NSD 1308 of 2015,
NSD 1459 of 2015,
NSD 1472 of 2015, and
NSD 1473 of 2015:
Clayton Utz

ORDERS

NSD 1307 of 2015
BETWEEN:

RICHARD CANTOR

Applicant

AND:

AUDI AUSTRALIA PTY LIMITED (ACN 077 092 776)

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

YATES J

DATE OF ORDER:

1 APRIL 2022

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

Definitions

1.Confidential Settlement Documents means the information and evidence in:

(a)Paragraphs 5 to 15 of the confidential affidavit of Julian Klaus Schimmel affirmed on 10 December 2019 and Annexure 2 to the Deed of Release and Settlement, comprising Annexure JK-67 to the confidential affidavit of Julian Klaus Schimmel affirmed on…

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Details
Case
[2022] FCA 317
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Cantor v Audi Australia Pty Limited (No 7) involved the applicants seeking non-publication orders under sections 37AF and 37AG(1)(a) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice. The applicants also sought approval of their legal costs and the administrator's costs of administering the settlement scheme, as verified by a costs expert. Additionally, the applicants requested a self-executing order for approval of further costs, where the court would retain control of the approval process for such costs. The court was required to consider whether the information sought to be protected had been published, the relevance of the information, and the necessity of the non-publication orders based on the principles established in previous cases.

The court concluded that the information for which protection was sought had not been published. The principles guiding the application of section 37AF were clear, with a primary objective being to safeguard the public interest in open justice. The court emphasised that the word "necessary" in section 37AG(1)(a) was significant and that the power of the court under the act was enlivened only if it appeared necessary to make a particular order to prevent prejudice. The court found that the information provided by the respondents was not relevant to the specific information they sought to protect. The court also noted that the emails provided as evidence were of scant value due to their hearsay nature and lack of sourcing.

The court approved the applicants' reasonable costs and the administration costs for the period up to and including 31 October 2021. It also made non-publication orders for certain appendices and settlement documents, treating them as confidential and restricting their disclosure to specified parties. The court further directed that the administration of the settlement was completed on 21 September 2021, with the dismissal of the proceedings taking effect on that date. The court also outlined a process for the approval of further costs from 1 November 2021 onwards, including the filing of further expert reports and the resolution of any objections by the respondents.

The court made several orders, including the approval of costs, the implementation of non-publication orders, the completion of the settlement administration, and the process for handling further costs. The non-publication orders were to operate until the earlier of 1 February 2024 or further order of the court.

Orders

Orders of the court

Definitions

1. Act means the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).

2. Confidential Settlement Documents means the information and evidence in:

(a) Paragraphs 5 to 15 of the confidential affidavit of Julian Klaus Schimmel affirmed on 10 December 2019 and Annexure 2 to the Deed of Release and Settlement, comprising Annexure JK-67 to the confidential affidavit of Julian Klaus Schimmel affirmed on 10 December 2019;

(b) Annexure 2 to the Deed of Release and Settlement in Annexure JKS-68 to the confidential affidavit of Julian Klaus Schimmel affirmed on 20 March 2020;

(c) The Settlement Payment Methodology specified in Annexure JKS-69 to the confidential affidavit of Julian Klaus Schimmel affirmed on 20 March 2020;

(d) The expert report of Terence Michael Potter dated 20 March 2020 including all appendices;

(e) AAU.500.069.0001, VGA.500.093.0001, VGA.500.093.0002, and VGA.500.093.0003, which form part of Exhibit AGR1 to the Affidavit of Alexandra Gay Rose sworn 24 March 2020;

(f) Paragraphs 3.1(2) and (3), 6.1 to 6.25 and Annexure A to the expert report of Abe Tomas dated 20 March 2020 and the letter of instruction from Maurice Blackburn Pty Ltd (Maurice Blackburn) to Mr Tomas;

(g) Paragraphs 8 to 9 of the confidential affidavit of Gregory John Williams sworn on 25 March 2020;

(h) The formula in section 6.1.1, footnote 33, and the charts in section 6.2.8, of the Confidential Settlement Administration Report provided to the Court on 17 December 2021; and

(i) Annexures D and E of the Confidential Settlement Administration Report provided to the Court on 17 December 2021.

3. Deed means the Deed of Release and Settlement approved in Order 6(a) made on 1 April 2020.

4. Further Costs means, in respect of the period from 1 November 2021 onwards:

(a) the Maurice Blackburn component of the Applicants’ Reasonable Costs (as defined in clause 1.1 of the Deed); and

(b) Administration Costs.

5. Further Costs Report means any further expert report from Ian Ramsey-Stewart verifying the reasonable amounts of the Further Costs.

6. Maurice Blackburn means Maurice Blackburn Pty Ltd in its capacity as the lawyers for the Applicants in proceedings NSD1459/2015, NSD1472/2015 and NSD1473/2015 and/or in its capacity as the Administrator of the Settlement Scheme appointed in Order 10 made on 1 April 2020.

7. Settlement Administration Report means the report as to the completion of the Settlement Scheme provided by Maurice Blackburn to the Court on 17 December 2021 as noted in paragraph 6 of the orders made on 21 December 2021.

8. Settlement Scheme means the Settlement Scheme (version 3) approved in Order 1 made on 20 November 2020.

9. The following terms have the meanings given to them in the Settlement Scheme:

(a) Administration Costs;

(b) Administrator;

(c) Aggregate Settlement Sum;

(d) Participating Group Member;

(e) Settlement Account;

(f) Settlement Payment; and

(g) Settlement Sum Interest.

Costs up to 31 October 2021

10. Pursuant to ss 33V and 33ZF of the Act:

(a) the Maurice Blackburn component of the Applicants’ Reasonable Costs (as defined in clause 1.1 of the Deed) in respect of the period from 1 March 2020 up to and including 31 October 2021 are approved in the amount of $889,142.49, such costs being verified as reasonable in the report of Ian Ramsey-Stewart dated 14 February 2022 and filed herein, and are to be paid by the Respondents in accordance with clause 5.1 of the Deed.

(b) Administration Costs in respect of the period up to and including 31 October 2021 be approved in the amount of $5,504,881.22, such costs being verified as reasonable in the report of Ian Ramsey-Stewart dated 14 February 2022 and filed herein, and are to be paid in accordance with order 11.

11. The Administration Costs approved by order 10(b) are to be paid as follows:

(a) first, by the Administrator applying all funds remaining in the Settlement Account to the payment of Administration Costs, with those remaining funds comprising:

(i) Settlement Sum Interest, which is to be applied to the payment of Administration Costs in accordance with clause 9.4 of the Settlement Scheme;

(ii) $41,798.23 in unpaid Settlement Payments, which amount is to be applied to the payment of Administration Costs in accordance with clauses 11.4 and 13.3(c) of the Settlement Scheme; and

(iii) the surplus of $5.22 between the Aggregate Settlement Sum and the money that was distributed to Participating Group Members by the Administrator, as a result of rounding in the calculation of Settlement Payments, as described in paragraph 6.4.5 of the Settlement Administration Report;

(b) secondly, the balance of the approved Administration Costs is to be notified by the Administrator to the Respondents’ legal representatives, and is to be paid by the Respondents in accordance with clause 9.3 of the Deed and clause 14.1 of the Settlement Scheme.

Further Costs (from 1 November 2021 onwards)

12. Within 5 business days of receiving any Further Costs Report, Maurice Blackburn will serve it on the Respondents.

13. Within 5 business days of the Further Costs Report being served, the Respondents will notify Maurice Blackburn whether or not they object to payment of any of the Further Costs.

14. If the Respondents notify Maurice Blackburn that they object to payment of any of the Further Costs, Maurice Blackburn and the Respondents are to confer and seek to resolve the Respondents’ objections and agree upon any orders that may be sought in order to do so.

15. If the Respondents notify Maurice Blackburn that they do not object to payment of any of the Further Costs:

(a) within 5 business days of receiving the notification from the Respondents, Maurice Blackburn is to:

(i) file the Further Costs Report; and

(ii) after conferring with the Respondents, provide to the chambers of Yates J a minute of proposed orders for the approval of the Further Costs; and

(b) the approval of the Further Costs is to be determined in chambers unless the Court directs otherwise.

Expert Reports

16. Pursuant to ss 37AF and 37AG(1)(a) of the Act, until further order, on the ground that the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice, appendices 4 to each of the two reports of Ian Ramsey-Stewart dated 14 February 2022 and filed herein:

(a) be treated as confidential;

(b) to the extent that such material is held by the Court in paper form, be held with the Court file in envelopes marked “Not to be opened except by leave of the Court or a Judge” or destroyed;

(c) to the extent that such material is held by the Court in electronic form, be kept in a confidential section of the relevant Court file;

(d) not be published, made available (whether electronically or otherwise) or disclosed to any other person than:

(i) the Court;

(ii) the applicants in proceedings NSD1459 of 2015, NSD1472 of 2015 and NSD1473 of 2015;

(iii) Maurice Blackburn; and

(iv) Ian Ramsey-Stewart, being a costs expert engaged by Maurice Blackburn

such permitted disclosures to be on terms that none of those persons or entities disclose the appendices or any part thereof to any person or entity other than those listed in this order.

17. As soon as practicable, Maurice Blackburn is to file a redacted copy of the Settlement Administration Report, with the redactions concealing the information that is the subject of Order 20.

Exhibits AGR-1 and AGR-2

18. Notwithstanding notation 22 made on 1 April 2020, from the date of these orders, the solicitors for the Respondents are no longer bound to retain the USB containing exhibits AGR-1 and AGR-2 to the affidavit of Alexandra Gay Rose dated 24 March 2020.

Notations Sought

19. For the purpose of Order 11(c) made on 1 April 2020, and:

(a) having regard to the Settlement Administration Report,

(b) but without prejudice to the parties’ or the Administrator’s rights to seek orders consequential to the Deed and/or Settlement Scheme or other orders ancillary to the completion of the settlement or the conclusion of the proceedings,

the administration of the settlement was completed on 21 September 2021 when the final Settlement Payment was paid to a Participating Group Member and, accordingly, the dismissal of the proceeding took effect on that date.

Confidential Settlement Documents

20. Pursuant to sections 37AF and 37AG(1)(a) of the Act, on the ground that that the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice, the Confidential Settlement Documents:

(a) be treated as confidential;

(b) to the extent that such material is held by the Court in paper form be held with the Court file in envelopes marked “Not to be opened except by leave of the Court or a Judge” or destroyed;

(c) to the extent that such material is held by the Court in electronic form, be kept in a confidential section of the relevant Court file;

(d) not be published, made available (whether electronically or otherwise) or disclosed (by publication or otherwise) to any other person than:

(i) the Court;

(ii) the applicants in proceedings NSD1459 of 2015, NSD1472 of 2015 and NSD1473 of 2015 and their legal representatives;

(iii) the applicants and the legal representatives of the applicants in proceedings NSD1307 of 2015 and NSD1308 of 2015;

(iv) the respondents in proceedings NSD1459 of 2015, NSD1472 of 2015, NSD1473 of 2015, NSD1307 of 2015 and NSD1308 of 2015 and their legal representatives; and

(v) Maurice Blackburn in its capacity as Settlement Administrator; and

(vi) Michael Potter and Boyd Harris of Axiom Forensics, being accounting experts engaged by the Settlement Administrator.

21. Pursuant to section 37AJ of the Act, Order 20 shall operate until the earlier of midnight on 1 February 2024 or further order of the Court.

AND THE COURT NOTES THAT:

22. The average net Settlement Payment (after deducting Funding Payments for Participating Group Members with that obligation) was $2,819; and

23. The total number of Participating Group Members is 43,894 and total number of Registered Affected Vehicles is 43,697.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Insofar as the emails purport to give evidence of facts, they are plainly hearsay. Section 75 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (the Evidence Act) provides that, in an interlocutory proceeding, the hearsay rule (s 59 of the Evidence Act), does not apply to evidence if the party who adduces it also adduces evidence of its source. In a number of instances, the facts asserted by Ms Ferrari are not sourced. I consider these emails to be of scant evidential value. Further, it is unclear how the information in the emails that is said to relate to the German proceeding, and the US and Canadian class action settlements, is at all relevant to the specific information that the respondents seek to protect in the present applications. All that can be said to emerge from Ms Ferrari’s emails is that there appears to have been publication of some information concerning the German proceeding, and the US and Canadian class action settlements. The respondents do not dispute that fact. However, the information that has been published is not the information (in terms of its specific content) that the respondents seek to protect here. I agree with the respondents that the starting point for my consideration of the present interlocutory applications must be the text of ss 37AF and 37AG of the Act as it applies to the particular information in respect of which the respondents seek the proposed non-publication orders. On the evidence before me, the information, for which protection is sought, has not been published. The principles that guide the application of s 37AF are expressed in a number of cases. The principles are not in doubt. The lodestar is provided by s 37AE of the Act: in deciding whether to make a non-publication order, the Court must take into account that a primary objective of the administration of justice is to safeguard the public interest in open justice. Where a non-publication order is sought to be based on the ground specified in s 37AG(1)(a)—necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice—regard must be had to the significance of the word “necessary”. In Hogan v Australian Crime Commission [2010] HCA 21; 240 CLR 651, the High Court considered the meaning of “necessary” in the context of the now repealed s 50 of the Act (the predecessor to the regime provided in Pt VAA). At [30] – [33], the High Court said:30As it appears in s 50, “necessary” is a strong word. Hence the point made by Bowen CJ in Australian Broadcasting Commission v Parish, that the collocation of necessity to prevent prejudice to the administration of justice and necessity to prevent prejudice to the security of the Commonwealth “suggests Parliament was not dealing with trivialities”. Further, as indicated earlier in these reasons: (a) s 50 is an example of a provision authorising the Federal Court to make orders for the exercise of its jurisdiction other than in open court as mandated by s 17(1); and (b) “the administration of justice” spoken of in s 50 is that involved in the exercise by the Federal Court of the judicial power of the Commonwealth; this is a more specific discipline than broader notions of the public interest.31It is insufficient that the making or continuation of an order under s 50 appears to the Federal Court to be convenient, reasonable or sensible, or to serve some notion of the public interest, still less that, as the result of some “balancing exercise”, the order appears to have one or more of those characteristics.32If it appears to the Federal Court, on the one hand, to be necessary to make a particular order forbidding or restricting the publication of particular evidence or the name of a party or witness, in order to prevent either species of prejudice identified in s 50, or, on the other hand, that that necessity no longer supports the continuation of such an order, then the power of the Federal Court under s 50 is enlivened. The appearance of the requisite necessity (or supervening cessation of it) having been demonstrated, the court is to implement its conclusion by making or vacating the order. The expression in s 50 “may … make such order” is to be understood in this sense.33It may tend to distract attention from the particular terms of s 50 to describe the Federal Court as embarking upon the exercise of a “discretion” when entertaining an application under s 50. Once the court has reached the requisite stage of satisfaction, it would be a misreading of s 50 to treat it as empowering the court nevertheless to refuse to make the order, or to leave in operation the now impugned order. It would, for example, be an odd construction of s 50 which supported the refusal of an order under s 50 notwithstanding that it appeared to the court to be necessary to make an order to prevent prejudice to the security of the Commonwealth.(Footnotes omitted.)

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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