Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Richards

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Richards [2013] FCAFC 89

Citation: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Richards [2013] FCAFC 89
Appeal from: Richards v Macquarie Bank Limited (No 4) [2013] FCA 438
Parties: AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS COMMISSION v TRACEY RICHARDS and MACQUARIE BANK LIMITED (ABN 46 008 583 542)
File numbers: QUD 267 of 2013
QUD 349 of 2013
Judges: JACOBSON, MIDDLETON & GORDON JJ
Date of judgment: 12 August 2013
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – representative proceedings – Court approval of proposed settlement – orders pursuant to ss 33V and 33ZF of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – fairness and reasonableness of terms of settlement – distribution to group members – assessment of fairness and reasonableness of “funders’ premium” – public interest in facilitation of fair and reasonable settlement
Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth)
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)
Cases cited: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Chats House Investments Pty Ltd (1996) 71 FCR 250
Bienstein v Bienstein (2003) 195 ALR 225
Carnie v Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd (1995) 182 CLR 398
DarwallaMilling Co Pty Ltd (ACN 009 698 631) v F Hoffman-La Roche Ltd (No 2) (2006) 236 ALR 322
Jarra Creek Central Packing Shed Pty Ltd v Amcor Limited [2011] FCA 671
Lopez v Star World Enterprises Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 104
McMullin v ICI Australia Operations Pty Ltd (No 6) (1998) 84 FCR 1
P Dawson Nominees Pty Ltd v Brookfield Multiplex Limited (No 4) [2010] FCA 1029
Re Luck (2003) 78 ALJR 177
State Bank of New South Wales v Brown (as liq of Parkston Ltd (in liq)) (2001) 38 ACSR 715
Tasfast Air Freight Pty Ltd v Mobil Oil Australia Ltd [2002] VSC 457
Date of hearing: 5 August 2013
Date of last submissions: 6 August 2013
Place: Brisbane
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 60
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr M Colbran QC with Ms L Nichols and Mr S Wubbeling
Solicitor for the Appellant: Australian Securities and Investments Commission
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr R Merkel QC with Mr G Donnellan
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Levitt Robinson Solicitors
Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr J Sheahan SC with Mr A Pomerenke
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Allens

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

QUD 267 of 2013

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS COMMISSION
Appellant

AND:

TRACEY RICHARDS
First Respondent

MACQUARIE BANK LIMITED (ABN 46 008 583 542)
Second Respondent

JUDGES:

JACOBSON, MIDDLETON & GORDON JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

12 AUGUST 2013

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY (HEARD IN BRISBANE)

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.By 4:00pm on 19 August 2013, the parties be directed to bring in orders to give effect to these reasons for judgment.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).




IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT…

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Details
Case
[2013] FCAFC 89
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Richards, the Federal Court of Australia was tasked with assessing the fairness and reasonableness of a proposed settlement in a representative proceeding under Part IVA of the Federal Court of Australia Act. The proceeding was initiated by Mrs Richards and involved a class of investors who had suffered losses due to financial products offered by Storm Financial. The litigation sought to address the terms of a proposed settlement, particularly the imposition of a levy on certain group members to cover legal costs, which was later supplemented by a "funders’ premium" offered only to clients of a specific law firm, Levitt Robinson. The fairness of this premium became a central issue in the case.

The court had to determine whether the proposed settlement was fair and reasonable to all group members, considering the ex post facto offer of advantageous terms only to clients of Levitt Robinson. The legal issues included the applicability of sections 564 of the Corporations Act 2001 and 109(10) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966, and whether these sections, along with relevant case law, provided an appropriate analogy to the circumstances of the case. The court found that these statutory regimes and cases did not provide an appropriate analogy due to the inequality of opportunity afforded to group members to share in the funders’ premium.

The court's reasoning concluded that the settlement could not be considered fair and reasonable to all group members, given the ex post facto offer of advantageous terms only to clients of Levitt Robinson. This constituted a substantial wrong that the Court was obliged to correct. Consequently, the orders directed the parties to bring in orders to give effect to these reasons for judgment, ensuring that the settlement addressed the identified errors of principle and provided a fair resolution for all group members.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. By 4:00pm on 19 August 2013, the parties be directed to bring in orders to give effect to these reasons for judgment.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

Background

Background to the litigation

Against that background, it is necessary to turn to consider what occurred here.FACTS The proceeding was commenced by Mrs Richards as a representative proceeding under Pt IVA of the FCA on 24 December 2010. Mrs Richards and those group members who agreed to retain Levitt Robinson entered into retainer agreements with that firm. The retainer agreements and costs disclosures issued to those group members by Levitt Robinson were updated from time to time from June 2010 to March 2013. The retainer agreements addressed the question of funding the litigation by stating that those persons who participated in the representative action (the Funding Group Members) would be subject to a levy to cover legal costs. The proposed levy was set out in a sliding scale by reference to the amount of the person’s losses as a share of their investment in, and funding of, Storm’s financial products. The scale ranged from a levy of $5,000 for those who had suffered losses of less than $250,000, to $25,000 for those with losses in excess of $5 million. The scale of levies in the retainer agreement was not calculated mathematically. Thus, the amounts of the proposed levies were not proportional to the losses suffered by the investors. The only other terms of the retainer agreement to which we need refer are those set out in an addendum. Relevantly, those terms included disclosure that the levies were estimates which may “need to be revised” in the course of litigation and that the solicitors estimated that if the proceeding was successful, they would recover approximately 70% of their costs. Importantly, nothing was said in the retainer agreement of any possible uplift payable to those investors who paid the levy. They were however informed that group members, other than Mrs Richards as the representative applicant, would not be liable to an adverse costs order. The investors who retained Levitt Robinson (the Funding Group Members) were part of the represented group. That is to say, they were group members. But they did not comprise all the group members. The group members included persons not represented by Levitt Robinson. Many of them were members of an action group called Storm Investors Consumer Action Group (SICAG) which consisted of some hundreds of investors. SICAG was formed in early 2009. It elected a committee to coordinate the actions of its members. It maintained a database of members including their contact details. During the course of the litigation, the principal of Levitt Robinson, Mr Stewart Levitt, kept in contact with his clients by Bulletins sent to them by post or email. If “specifically approved” by him, Mr Levitt also arranged for the Bulletins to be sent to members of SICAG. He did so by sending the Bulletin to the committee of SICAG in the expectation that the Bulletin would then be emailed or posted to SICAG members whose addresses appeared on the SICAG database. Mr Levitt also kept in contact with his clients by attending a large number of public meetings commencing in the second half of 2009. A schedule recording the dates of the meetings from 4 February 2011 to 3 April 2013 was in evidence. He also attended meetings with individual clients. Although Mr Levitt’s affidavit does not say so expressly, it seems likely that some of the persons who attended the public meetings were not clients of his firm. That is to say, they may well have included group members other than those represented by Levitt Robinson.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Before turning to the question of the appropriate orders, it is necessary to address the question of the applicability of s 564 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the Corporations Act) and s 109(10) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (the Bankruptcy Act) and the cases that have considered those sections. It is unnecessary to traverse all of the cases cited by Counsel for Mrs Richards and Counsel for MBL dealing with these provisions. We do not accept ASIC’s submission, put at a level of general principle, that the fixing and payment of a reward for funding litigation, akin to the Funders’ Premium, could not be justified by reference to these decisions; even though they are decisions of courts exercising a discretion conferred by a different statute in a different statutory context. There may be circumstances where those statutory regimes, and the cases that have considered them, do provide an appropriate analogy. However, in the present case, those statutory regimes, and the cases that have considered them, do not provide an appropriate analogy. They do not provide an appropriate analogy because, as we have noted, there was inequality of opportunity afforded to group members to share in the Funders’ Premium on the terms offered, ex post facto, to clients of Levitt Robinson: see [42]-[53] above. Whether or not all creditors were given an opportunity to contribute, where the fault lies for any failure to provide that opportunity and the likely response to being given an opportunity to contribute, are all relevant considerations in assessing an application under s 564 of the Corporations Act: see, by way of example, State Bank of New South Wales v Brown (as liq of Parkston Ltd (in liq)) (2001) 38 ACSR 715 at [31] (Spigelman CJ) and at [100]-[102] (Hodgson JA). In the present case, not only was there inequality of opportunity afforded to group members to share in the Funders’ Premium but advantageous terms were offered, after the settlement was reached at the mediation, and those terms were available only to clients of Levitt Robinson: see [42]-[53] above. If there is an analogy, it is that a small number of group members (who were also clients of Levitt Robinson) were able to place a bet on a horse race after the race had run and knowing the result of the race. The cases dealing with the s 564 of the Corporations Act and s 109(10) of the Bankruptcy Act may be put to one side.LEAVE AND ORDERS An issue arose as to whether the orders made by the trial judge were final or interlocutory: c.f. Re Luck (2003) 78 ALJR 177 at [4] and Bienstein v Bienstein (2003) 195 ALR 225 at [25]. We do not need to consider that issue. This is not an appeal where, if we had been the position of the primary judge, we would have just taken a different course. With respect to the primary judge, we consider that there were the errors of principle identified above which cannot be ignored. In the circumstances outlined, the settlement cannot be said to be fair and reasonable to all group members. A substantial wrong has occurred which the Court is obliged to correct.