HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
MASON CJ, BRENNAN, DEANE, DAWSON, TOOHEY, GAUDRON AND McHUGH JJ
CARNIE AND ANOTHER v ESANDA FINANCE CORPORATION LIMITED
23 February 1995
Practice—Representative action—Persons having same interest in proceedings—Persons with separate causes of action—Whether same interest—Supreme Court Rules 1970 (N.S.W), Pt 8, r. 13(1).
Headnote
Part 8, r. 13(1) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of New South Wales provided: "Where numerous persons have the same interest in any proceedings the proceedings may be commenced, and, unless the Court otherwise orders, continued, by or against any one or more of them as representing all or as representing all except one or more of them."
Two borrowers sued their lender claiming that various matters had not been disclosed in the contract of loan between them, in contravention of the Credit Act 1984 (N.S.W.), and that as a result they were not liable to pay the credit charge for which the contract provided. They claimed to sue on their own behalf and on behalf of all other persons who had entered into loan contracts with the lender that had the same characteristics as their contracts. They claimed a declaration that no represented party was liable to pay any credit charge to the lender.
Held, that the plaintiffs and the represented parties had the same interest in the proceedings and r. 13 authorized their joinder in a representative action.
Per curiam. Persons having separate causes of action in contract or tort may have "the same interest" in proceedings to enforce those causes of action.
R. J. Flowers Ltd. v. Burns, (1987) 1 NZLR 260; Irish Shipping Ltd. v. Commercial Union Assurance Co. Plc., (1991) 2 QB 206; and Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association v. Taylor, (1992) 1 Lloyd's Rep. 484, applied.
Markt and Co. Ltd. v. Knight Steamship Co. Ltd., (1910) 2 KB 1021, considered.
Per Brennan and McHugh JJ. The test for determining whether an action is within the scope of r. 13(1) is whether the plaintiff and the members of the represented class have a community of interest in the determination of some substantial issue of law or fact.
Decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Court of Appeal): Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd. v. Carnie (1992), 29 NSWLR 382, reversed.
Hearing
1994, March 3; 1995, February 23
#DATE 23:2:1995
APPEAL from the Supreme Court of New South Wales
Ainsley George Carnie and Dianne Helen Carnie purchased an International 711 SP Header with the aid of finance provided by Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd. ("Esanda"). The parties entered into a loan contract and a chattel mortgage. The transaction was governed by the Credit Act 1984 (N.S.W.) ("the Act"). The parties subsequently entered into a variation agreement under which the borrowers were to make instalment repayments over a longer period than under the initial contract. The borrowers sued Esanda in the Supreme Court of New South Wales claiming that relevant disclosures required by the Act were…
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- Case
- [1995] HCA 9
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine whether Esanda had engaged in unconscionable conduct in obtaining Mrs. Carnie's guarantee. This involved assessing whether Mrs. Carnie was under a special disadvantage, whether Esanda knew or ought to have known of that disadvantage, and whether Esanda took unfair advantage of that disadvantage. The court also considered the principles of agency in relation to the conduct of Esanda's representative.
The High Court held that Esanda had not engaged in unconscionable conduct. The majority found that while Mrs. Carnie may have been in a position of some disadvantage due to her reliance on her husband and her lack of financial acumen, this disadvantage was not sufficiently pronounced to attract the intervention of equity. Crucially, there was no evidence that Esanda or its agent knew or ought to have known of the specific nature and extent of any such disadvantage. Furthermore, the court found that Esanda did not exploit any such disadvantage. The principles applied centred on the equitable doctrine of unconscionable conduct, requiring proof of a special disadvantage and unconscientious exploitation of that disadvantage by the stronger party.
The appeal was dismissed.
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