Lewis v Philips Electronics Australia Ltd trading as Philips Healthcare

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Lewis v Philips Electronics Australia Ltd trading as Philips Healthcare [2023] FCA 1486

File number(s): VID 565 of 2021
Judgment of: MURPHY J
Date of judgment: 22 November 2023
Date of publication of reasons: 28 November 2023
Catchwords: REPRESENTATIVE PROCEEDINGS – practice and procedure – application to discontinue a representative proceeding – subsequent application to substitute a group member as applicant – whether substitution should be granted – how, if the proceeding is unsuccessful should any adverse costs order be apportioned between the former and substituted applicant
Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 33T, 33V, 33X, 33Z, 33ZF, 43
Cases cited:

Auskay International Manufacturing & Trade Pty Ltd v Qantas Airways Limited [2010] FCA 1302

Babscay Pty Ltd v Pitcher Partners [2020] FCA 1610

Bray v F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd [2003] FCA 1505

Carnie v Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd [1995] HCA 9; 182 CLR 398

Carpenders Park Pty Ltd (as trustee of the Carpenders Park Pty Ltd Staff Superannuation Fund) v Sims Ltd [2021] FCA 984

Dyczynski v Gibson [2020] FCAFC 120: 280 FCR 583

Elliot-Carde v MacDonald’s Australia Ltd [2023] FCAFC 162

Francis (Trustee) v Oculus Accounting Pty Ltd (No 2) [2021] FCA 1275; 400 ALR 701

Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan [2002] HCA 54; 211 CLR 540

Greentree v Jaguar Land Rover Australia Pty Ltd (Carriage Application) [2023] FCA 1209

Kelly v Willmott Forests Ltd (in liquidation) (No 4) [2016] FCA 323; (2016) 335 ALR 439

OasisFund Management Ltd v Royal Bank of Scotland NV [2010] NSWSC 584

P Dawson Nominees Pty Ltd v Brookfield Multiplex Ltd (No 2) [2010] FCA 176

Perera v GetSwift Ltd [2018] FCA 732; 263 FCR 1

Simonetta v Spotless Group Holdings Limited [2017] FCA 1071

Templeton v Leviathan Pty Ltd [1921] HCA 55; 30 CLR 34

Thomas v Powercor Australia Ltd (Ruling No 1) [2010] VSC 489

Tomlinson v Ramsey Food Processing Pty Ltd [2015] HCA 28; 256 CLR 507

Tongue v Tamworth City Council [2004] FCA 1702; 141 FCR 233

Watson v Maximus Holdings (NSW) Pty Ltd [2021] FCA 87

1           Wilkinson v Wilson Security Pty Ltd [2022] FCA 756 Wilkinson v Wilson Security Pty Ltd (No 2) [2022] FCA 1161

Division: General Division
Registry: Victoria
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Regulator and Consumer Protection
Number of paragraphs: 45
Date of hearing: Determined on the papers
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Z Partos
Solicitor for the Applicant: Carbone Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondents: Ms F Roughley SC
Solicitor for the Respondents:  Clayton Utz
Counsel for Ms Lindbloom: Dr P Cashman and Ms T Fishburn
Solicitor for Ms Lindbloom: GMP Law

ORDERS

VID 565 of 2021
BETWEEN:

PETER LEWIS

Applicant

AND:

PHILIPS ELECTRONICS AUSTRALIA LTD T/AS PHILIPS HEALTHCARE

First Respondent

PHILLIPS RS NORTH AMERICA LLC

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

MURPHY J

DATE OF ORDER:

22 NOVEMBER 2023

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

The substitution application

1.Eva Lindbloom be substituted for Peter Lewis…

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Details
Case
[2023] FCA 1486
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Lewis v Philips Electronics Australia Ltd trading as Philips Healthcare, the Federal Court was presented with an application to substitute a group member as the representative party in a class action proceeding. The applicant, Peter Lewis, initially sought to discontinue the proceeding but later applied to substitute Eva Lindbloom as the representative party. The court was tasked with determining whether it had the power to substitute a group member as the representative party, and if so, under what circumstances and conditions this substitution could occur.

The primary legal issue was whether the Court had the authority to substitute a group member as the representative party in a class action proceeding. This involved interpreting sections 33T and 33Z(1)(g) of the Australian Consumer Law (ACL) and considering the broader context of the Federal Court's powers in representative proceedings. The Court examined previous case law, particularly Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan and Auskay International Manufacturing & Trade Pty Ltd v Qantas Airways Limited, to understand the legislative intent behind these provisions. The court also considered the role of group members in class actions and the potential for a representative party to be inadequate in representing the interests of the group.

The Court concluded that it had the power to substitute a group member as the representative party pursuant to sections 33T and 33Z(1)(g) of the ACL. The court noted that the legislative intent was to provide the Federal Court with a broad and flexible set of powers to address the unique circumstances of representative proceedings. It held that where a representative party was no longer able to adequately represent the group members' interests, the Court could intervene to ensure that the group members' claims were adequately represented and advanced. The Court also held that the power to substitute a representative party could be exercised either on the application of a group member or by the Court on its own motion.

In light of the findings, the Court granted the application to substitute Eva Lindbloom for Peter Lewis as the representative applicant in the proceeding. The Court issued an order for the applicant to file and serve an amended originating application and a second further amended statement of claim by a specified date. The question of the apportionment of any liability for the respondents’ costs between Mr Lewis and Ms Lindbloom was reserved, pending further determination. The discontinuance application was dismissed with no order as to costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

The substitution application

1. Eva Lindbloom be substituted for Peter Lewis as representative applicant in the proceeding.

2. On or before 4:00 pm on 28 November 2023, the Applicant shall file and serve an Amended Originating Application and a Second Further Amended Statement of Claim.

3. Any question as to the apportionment of any liability for the Respondents’ costs between Mr Lewis and Ms Lindbloom is reserved.

The discontinuance application

4. The discontinuance application be dismissed with no order as to costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

I consider the Court also has power to substitute a group member as the representative party pursuant to s 33Z(1)(g) of the Act. It provides:Section 33Z Judgment - powers of the Court(1)The Court may, in determining a matter in a representative proceeding, do any one or more of the following: …(g) make such other order as the Court thinks just. In Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan [2002] HCA 54; 211 CLR 540 at [267], Kirby J said in relation to s 33Z(1):From these provisions, it is clear that the Parliament intended to arm the Federal Court with a wide and flexible armoury of powers, capable of being adapted to the particular needs and novel circumstances of representative proceedings and any matter in such proceedings. The question of power to substitute a representative party was briefly dealt with in Auskay International Manufacturing & Trade Pty Ltd v Qantas Airways Limited [2010] FCA 1302 at [7] (Tracey J). In that decision counsel for the applicant accepted that the power to substitute an applicant was not to be found in s 33T. Perhaps that concession was made because the applicant did not contend that it was unable to adequately represent group members’ interests. Even so, treating that as the basis of the concession, I would be disinclined to accept that s 33T is not a source of power to substitute the representative party. The judgment in Auskay indicates that the applicant no longer wished to continue as the representative party. To my mind, where an applicant no longer wishes to continue as the representative party, that immediately raises a question as to whether the applicant is able to adequately represent group members’ interests. I very much doubt that group members would see it as being in their interests that they were represented what may be large, complex and difficult litigation by a representative party who no longer wishes to perform the obligations of that important role. In Auskay Tracey J appears to accept that, in the circumstances of that case, s 33T does not provide power to substitute another group member as the applicant. But given his Honour’s view (at [9]) that the Court had power under s 33Z(1)(g) of the Act and under Order 6 of the (then) Federal Court Rules to order that another group member be substituted for Auskay as representative parties, the issue evaporated. At that time Order 6 of the Federal Court Rules contained a broad power to substitute parties to a proceeding (Bray v F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd [2003] FCA 1505 at [14]) and the position is similar under the present Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (the Rules). Rules 9.10 and 9.11 do not expressly provide for the substitution of an applicant party, but it is plain from their terms that the Rules include a broad power to substitute parties. I do not accept that the alleges that Pt IVA of the Act evinces a legislative intent that the power to substitute a group member as the representative party is limited to circumstances where a group member applies to the Court. It is relevant that the role of a group member in a class action is essentially passive until after resolution of the common issues, and he or she may show, or have, little interest in the case unless or until the common issues are resolved in their favour: P Dawson Nominees Pty Ltd v Brookfield Multiplex Ltd (No 2) [2010] FCA 176 at [31] (Finkelstein J); Thomas v Powercor Australia Ltd (Ruling No 1) [2010] VSC 489 at [37]-[39] (Forrest J). Some group members may not even be aware of the proceeding and therefore unable to apply to the Court. Other group members may be aware of the proceeding but forced to rely on the applicant or the applicant’s solicitors for information about the progress of the case, and therefore not in a position to understand that the applicant was not adequately representing their interests. The likelihood of group members being independently well-informed about whether the applicant is adequately performing his or her role is low: Legg M, “Judge’s Role in Settlement of Representative Proceedings: Lessons from United States Class Actions” (2004) 78 Australian Law Journal 58, 64.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Mr Cossalter said that GMP intends to conduct the proceeding without a litigation funder, and is considering whether to make an application for a “solicitors’ common fund order” citing the recent decisions in Elliot-Carde v MacDonald’s Australia Ltd [2023] FCAFC 162 (Beach, Lee and Colvin JJ) and Greentree v Jaguar Land Rover Australia Pty Ltd (Carriage Application) [2023] FCA 1209 (Lee J). CONSIDERATION If Ms Lindbloom is substituted as the applicant in the proceeding then Mr Lewis will no longer be the applicant and Carbone Lawyers will no longer be acting for the applicant in the proceeding. In that event the proceeding can continue and, strictly speaking, it is unnecessary to decide the discontinuance application. Section 33T(1) of the Act provides:Section 33T Adequacy of representation(1)If, on an application by a group member, it appears to the Court that a representative party is not able adequately to represent the interests of the group members, the Court may substitute another group member as representative party and may make such other orders as it thinks fit.Thus, under s 33T, provided it appears to the Court that the applicant is not able adequately to represent group members’ interests, on the application of a group member the Court has power to substitute a group member as the representative party. I do not however accept that the Court only has power to substitute a group member as the representative party upon the application by a group member. In Perera v GetSwift Ltd [2018] FCA 732; 263 FCR 1 at [361] Lee J said, and I agree:More generally, a representative who is not and cannot conduct the proceeding in the interests of group members has demonstrated an inability adequately to represent those group members. Even absent an application by a group member, the broad power contained in s 33ZF will allow the Court to intervene in order to ensure the claims of group members are being adequately represented and advanced.The power under s 33ZF(1) may be exercised by the Court of its own motion, or on the application of a party or group member . I consider the Court also has power to substitute a group member as the representative party pursuant to s 33Z(1)(g) of the Act. It provides:Section 33Z Judgment - powers of the Court(1)The Court may, in determining a matter in a representative proceeding, do any one or more of the following: …(g) make such other order as the Court thinks just. In Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan [2002] HCA 54; 211 CLR 540 at [267], Kirby J said in relation to s 33Z(1):From these provisions, it is clear that the Parliament intended to arm the Federal Court with a wide and flexible armoury of powers, capable of being adapted to the particular needs and novel circumstances of representative proceedings and any matter in such proceedings. The question of power to substitute a representative party was briefly dealt with in Auskay International Manufacturing & Trade Pty Ltd v Qantas Airways Limited [2010] FCA 1302 at [7] (Tracey J). In that decision counsel for the applicant accepted that the power to substitute an applicant was not to be found in s 33T. Perhaps that concession was made because the applicant did not contend that it was unable to adequately represent group members’ interests. Even so, treating that as the basis of the concession, I would be disinclined to accept that s 33T is not a source of power to substitute the representative party.