Lloyd (Respondent) v Google LLC (Appellant)

Case [2021] UKSC 50


Michaelmas Term

[2021] UKSC 50

On appeal from: [2019] EWCA Civ 1599

JUDGMENT

Lloyd (Respondent) v Google LLC (Appellant)

before

Lord Reed, President


Lady Arden
Lord Sales
Lord Leggatt
Lord Burrows

JUDGMENT GIVEN ON

10 November 2021

Heard on 28 and 29 April 2021
Appellant
Antony White QC
Edward Craven

(Instructed by Pinsent Masons LLP (London))

Respondent

Hugh Tomlinson QC Oliver Campbell QC

Victoria Wakefield QC

(Instructed by Milberg London LLP)

1st Intervener (Information Commissioner)

Gerry Facenna QC Nikolaus Grubeck

(Instructed by Information Commissioner’s Office)

2nd Intervener (Open Rights Group)
(written submissions only)
Robert Palmer QC
Julianne Kerr Morrison

(Instructed by AWO)

3rd Intervener (Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry and Association of British

HealthTech Industries (ABPI and ABHI))
(written submissions only)
Lord Anderson of Ipswich KBE QC

Robin Hopkins Rupert Paines

(Instructed by CMS Cameron McKenna Nabarro Olswang LLP (London))

4th Intervener (Liberty, Coram Children’s Legal Centre and Inclusion London)
(written submissions only)
Dan Squires QC
Aidan Wills
Tim James-Matthews

(Instructed by Liberty, Coram Children’s Legal Centre and Deighton Pierce Glynn)

5th Intervener (Internet Association)
(written submissions only)
Christopher Knight
(Instructed by Linklaters LLP (London))
6th Intervener (TECHUK Ltd (trading as techUK))
(written submissions only)
Catrin Evans QC
Ian Helme
(Instructed by RPC LLP (London))

LORD LEGGATT: (with whom Lord Reed, Lady Arden, Lord Sales and Lord Burrows agree)

A. INTRODUCTION

1.          Mr Richard Lloyd - with financial backing from Therium Litigation Funding IC, a

commercial litigation funder - has issued a claim against Google LLC, alleging breach of its duties as a data controller under section 4(4) of the Data Protection Act 1998 (“the DPA 1998”). The claim alleges that, for several months in late 2011 and early 2012,

Google secretly tracked the internet activity of millions of Apple iPhone users and used the data collected in this way for commercial purposes without the users’ knowledge or consent.

2. The factual allegation is not new. In August 2012, Google agreed to pay a civil penalty of US$22.5m to settle charges brought by the United States Federal Trade Commission based upon the allegation. In November 2013, Google agreed to pay US$17m to settle consumer-based actions brought against it in the United States. In

England and Wales, three individuals sued Google in June 2013 making the same
allegation and claiming compensation under the DPA 1998 and at common law for
misuse of private information: see Vidal-Hall v Google Inc (Information Comr
intervening) [2015] EWCA Civ 311; [2016] QB 1003. Following a dispute over
jurisdiction, their claims were settled before Google had served a defence. What is
new about the present action is that Mr Lloyd is not just claiming damages in his own
right, as the three claimants did in Vidal-Hall. He claims to represent everyone resident
in England and Wales who owned an Apple iPhone at the relevant time and whose
data were obtained by Google without their consent, and to be entitled to recover
damages on behalf of all these people. It is estimated that…

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Lloyd (Respondent) v Google LLC (Appellant) [2021] UKSC 50
Case
[2021] UKSC 50
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CaseChat Overview and Summary

Lloyd v Google LLC was a case in which the Supreme Court considered the scope of the representative procedure under CPR rule 19.6. The case involved a claim by Richard Lloyd, on behalf of all Apple iPhone users in England and Wales, against Google LLC for breach of the Data Protection Act 1998. Lloyd sought to bring a representative action for damages, arguing that a uniform sum could be awarded to each class member without the need for individualised evidence. The Supreme Court considered the legal issues of whether damages could be awarded under the DPA 1998 without proof of material damage or distress, and whether individualised evidence was necessary to establish the extent of unlawful processing in each case. The Court concluded that compensation under the DPA 1998 could only be awarded for material damage or distress, and that individualised evidence was necessary to establish unlawful processing and the extent of any damage. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the claim had no real prospect of success due to the necessity of individualised evidence for each class member.

Orders

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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