FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AES20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship & Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 1448
Appeal from: AES20 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2020] FCCA 2363 File number(s): NSD 1000 of 2020 Judgment of: CHEESEMAN J Date of judgment: 23 November 2023 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for leave to appeal interlocutory decision of the then Federal Circuit Court of Australia – where judicial review application summarily dismissed at show cause hearing – whether decision attended by sufficient doubt – whether substantial injustice would result from leave to appeal being refused – Held: application dismissed Legislation: Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) rr 35.13, 44.12
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1A)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 424AA(1)(b)(iii)
Cases cited: Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Miraki [2022] FCAFC 96
GFV18 v Minster for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1817
SZLXE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 1312
SZTKB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 653
VAUX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158
Division: General Division Registry: New South Wales National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 36 Date of hearing: 14 November 2023 Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms K Pieri of MinterEllison Solicitor for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs.
ORDERS
NSD 1000 of 2020 BETWEEN: AES20
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
CHEESEMAN J
DATE OF ORDER:
23 NOVEMBER 2023
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for leave to appeal be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs.
3.The first respondent’s name be changed to “Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs”.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
CHEESEMAN J
INTRODUCTION
The applicant, a citizen of India, seeks leave to appeal from a decision of the then Federal Circuit Court of Australia, now the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia, to dismiss an application for judicial review: AES20 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2020] FCCA 2363 (PJ). The application for judicial review was in respect of a decision of the second respondent, the Administrative Appeal Tribunal, to affirm a decision of a delegate of the first respondent, the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs to deny the applicant a protection visa. The primary judge convened a show cause hearing under r 44.12 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) (FCC Rules) as then in force. The primary judge summarily dismissed the applicant’s application for judicial review at the show cause hearing.
The primary judge’s decision was interlocutory: r 44.12(2) of the FCC Rules. Therefore, the applicant requires leave to appeal: s 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).…
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- Case
- [2023] FCA 1448
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues in this case were whether the Circuit Court's decision was attended by sufficient doubt to warrant an appeal, and whether substantial injustice would result if leave to appeal was refused. The applicant argued that the Circuit Court erred in finding that the AAT had not acted unreasonably by not adjourning the hearing, and that the AAT had failed to consider the correct social group to which the applicant belonged when assessing his protection visa application.
The court found that there was no sufficient doubt as to the correctness of the Circuit Court's decision. The Circuit Court had properly considered the evidence and concluded that the AAT had not erred in finding that the applicant's claims lacked credibility. The applicant had not provided any new evidence to support his claims before the AAT, despite being given an opportunity to do so. The court also found that the applicant's claims regarding the AAT's consideration of the correct social group were misconceived, as the applicant's application did not include any claim to fear harm due to membership of a particular social group. The court held that the AAT was not obliged to consider a claim that was not properly before it.
The court dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding that there was no sufficient doubt as to the correctness of the Circuit Court's decision, and that substantial injustice would not result if leave to appeal was refused. The court ordered that the applicant pay the Minister's costs and that the Minister's name be changed to "Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs".
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for leave to appeal be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs.
3. The first respondent’s name be changed to “Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs”.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
For these reasons, the Tribunal found that the applicant did not satisfy the criteria set out in either s 36(2)(a) or s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and accordingly, affirmed the decision of the delegate not to grant a protection visa.PRIMARY JUDGE’S DECISION The applicant sought judicial review in the Circuit Court on two grounds, expressed in substance as follows:(1)the Tribunal failed to provide the applicant with adequate opportunity resulting in a miscarriage of justice and the violation of the principles of procedural fairness; and(2)the Tribunal failed to consider the correct social group to which the applicant belongs and therefore applied an incorrect test for the need to grant a protection visa. The first ground was particularised by reference to the Tribunal’s alleged failure to adjourn the hearing despite accepting that the applicant could have been nervous throughout the proceeding. In dismissing the first ground, the primary judge observed that the applicant’s claim that the Tribunal acted unreasonably by not adjourning the hearing to a later date was necessarily fact dependent. The primary judge found that: (1) there was no evidence that the applicant had sought an adjournment; (2) there was a nearly three-year period between the delegate’s decision and the Tribunal hearing during which time the applicant could have prepared arguments and evidence in support of his application; (3) the applicant was on notice that the whole of his account was in issue; and (4) the Tribunal’s preparedness to accept that the applicant was nervous was made in the context of its credit findings and did not suggest that the applicant was unable to articulate his claims before the Tribunal. Accordingly, the primary judge found that the Tribunal’s decision not to consider an adjournment was not legally unreasonable. Regarding the second ground, the primary judge found that the applicant had failed to establish jurisdictional error by reason of the Tribunal failing to consider the applicant’s claim to fear harm on the basis of his membership of a particular social group. The applicant contended that his claim based on social group was independent of and separate to his claim to fear harm on the basis of his political opinion. The primary judge found this ground was misconceived. The particulars relied upon before the primary judge defined the applicant’s “correct social group” as being “Indian citizen of Tamil ethnicity, young male, worker of NTP alleged to have links with banned LTTE organisation in India and [as] a protestor of NTP due to its political opinion”. The applicant contends that “these aspect” put together were not considered by the Tribunal. The primary judge found that the applicant’s protection visa application did not include any claim to fear harm due to membership of a particular social group. The claim advanced before the Tribunal was expressly confined to a fear of harm if returned “due to my political affiliation and opinion”: PJ[23].The primary judge also noted that the basis of the applicant’s claim was similarly confined in his interview before the delegate. The primary judge found that the applicant did not advance a claim based on alleged membership of a social group. Accordingly, there was no error on the part of the Tribunal in failing to engage with a contention that was not an essential integer of the claim advanced. The primary judge observed that the Tribunal had engaged in an ‘active intellectual process’ and ‘gave genuine consideration’ to the applicant’s claims before affirming the delegate’s decision: PJ[24]. The primary judge noted that the Tribunal had come to its conclusion on the basis of adverse credibility findings and independent country information. The primary judge added that in any event the factual premise that the purported claim based on social group was predicated was rejected — the Tribunal did not accept the applicant had any involvement with the NTP or had been imputed to have such involvement. The Tribunal was under no obligation to consider a claim in these circumstances whether or not the claim had been expressly articulated or one which arose in the materials: PJ[26].