FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AMC18 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FCA 1136
Appeal from: AMC18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 463 File number(s): VID 384 of 2022 Judgment of: HILL J Date of judgment: 17 September 2025 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of Federal Circuit and Family Court (Div 2) – Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirmed refusal of protection visa – whether Tribunal hearing conducted in a manner giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias – whether Appellant should be granted leave to raise a new argument challenging a finding that the Appellant had made at least one fraudulent statutory declaration – leave refused – appeal dismissed Cases cited: AZAFF v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 176
Bullmore v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCAFC 99; (2024) 304 FCR 370
CGA15 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 46; (2019) 268 FCR 362
Chen v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 41; (2022) 288 FCR 218
DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 2; (2018) 258 FCR 175
DBWG v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCAFC 3; (2024) 301 FCR 344
Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 3; (2022) 289 FCR 21
Fualau v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 11
Jatin v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 150
Masi-Haini v Minister for Home Affairs [2023] FCAFC 126; (2023) 298 FCR 277
NADH of 2001 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 328; (2001) 214 ALR 464
NADH of 2001 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 328; (2004) 214 ALR 464
NWQR v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCAFC 30
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30; (2003) 77 ALJR 1165
Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H [2001] HCA 28; (2001) 179 ALR 425
Sharma v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 227; (2017) 256 FCR 1
SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80
VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158; (2004) 238 FCR 588
XRZG v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCAFC 131; (2024) 305 FCR 349
Division: General Division Registry: Victoria National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 58 Date of hearing: 10 September 2025 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr A Krohn Solicitor for the Appellant: Clothier Anderson Immigration Lawyers Counsel for the Respondents: Ms J Lucas Solicitor for the Respondents: Clayton Utz ORDERS
VID 384 of 2022 BETWEEN: AMC18
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
HILL J
DATE OF ORDER:
17 SEPTEMBER 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The name of…
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- Case
- [2025] FCA 1136
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal hearing was conducted in a manner that gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias, and whether the Appellant should be granted leave to raise a new argument challenging a finding that the Appellant had made at least one fraudulent statutory declaration. The court considered the arguments put forward by the Appellant and assessed the merits of the proposed grounds of appeal.
The court found that the Appellant's argument on Ground 1, which concerned the apprehension of bias, was without merit. The court held that the Tribunal's questioning, while vigorous, was aimed at understanding the Appellant's claims and did not give rise to any reasonable apprehension of bias. The court emphasised that the whole transcript should be considered and the hypothetical fair-minded lay observer was properly informed about the proceedings. The court also found that Ground 2 lacked sufficient merit to warrant the grant of leave to raise it for the first time on appeal.
Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed with costs, to be agreed or taxed in default of agreement. The court also amended the names of the respondents to reflect the current titles of the parties involved in the case.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The name of the First Respondent is amended to “Minister for Immigration and Citizenship”.
2. The name of the Second Respondent is amended to “Administrative Review Tribunal”.
3. The appeal is dismissed with costs, to be agreed or taxed in default of agreement.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Consideration (Ground 1): The Appellant’s argument on Ground 1 is the same as put to the primary judge, and should be rejected for essentially the same reasons as those given by his Honour. Ultimately, when the transcript is read as a whole, the passages complained of are properly seen as no more than robust and forthright questioning by the Tribunal member, and do not give rise to any reasonable apprehension of bias. Need to consider the whole transcript in the light of the claims made: Two general points should be made at the outset.·First, apprehended bias is assessed by considering the whole of the hearing, not individual passages in isolation: SZRUI at [75] (Robertson J). I note that the Court does not have an audio recording of the Tribunal hearing, so this ground is being determined on the basis of the transcript of that hearing.·Second, the hypothetical fair-minded lay observer is properly informed as to the nature of the proceedings, the matters in issue, and the conduct which is said to give rise to an apprehension of bias: Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H [2001] HCA 28; (2001) 179 ALR 425 at [28] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ). The significance of the first point is that the Tribunal asked the Appellant many of the same questions as it asked Mr A, and tested her claims with some vigour. (For example, the Tribunal member stated to the Appellant at one point that it “doesn’t make sense” that the Appellant thought she could be married twice.) The Appellant does not make any complaint about this questioning. That occurred before Mr A gave evidence. The stage of the hearing is relevant: a vigorous intervention early in a hearing may be less readily excused than one at a later stage where it is designed to permit the decision-maker to comprehend the issues: Bullmore v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCAFC 99; (2024) 304 FCR 370 at [43] (point 5) (the Court). For example, in Sharma, the Tribunal made statements about the appellant in that case being evasive and rehearsed at such an early stage in the hearing that it might suggest to a reasonable lay observer that the Tribunal member had closed his mind to any explanation from the appellant on the relevant matter: Sharma at [36]. Here, by contrast, the Tribunal’s questioning of Mr A occurred after it had already heard evidence on the topic from the Appellant, which was largely to the same effect. In addition, the Tribunal’s questioning of Mr A began with several attempts by the Tribunal to get Mr A to tell the Tribunal of the circumstances surrounding the claimed religious marriage by the sheikh. Then, as part of the first exchange relied on by the Appellant, the Tribunal member sets out his concern that it is not possible in Australia for the Appellant to be married twice and states: “So I’m just wondering why she would agree to it and why you would seek to do that”. These statements indicate that the Tribunal was genuinely seeking to have Mr A explain to the Tribunal what had occurred.