AMC18 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AMC18 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FCA 1136

Appeal from: AMC18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 463
File number(s): VID 384 of 2022
Judgment of: HILL J
Date of judgment: 17 September 2025
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of Federal Circuit and Family Court (Div 2) – Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirmed refusal of protection visa – whether Tribunal hearing conducted in a manner giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias – whether Appellant should be granted leave to raise a new argument challenging a finding that the Appellant had made at least one fraudulent statutory declaration – leave refused – appeal dismissed
Cases cited:

AZAFF v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 176

Bullmore v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCAFC 99; (2024) 304 FCR 370

CGA15 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 46; (2019) 268 FCR 362

Chen v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 41; (2022) 288 FCR 218

DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 2; (2018) 258 FCR 175

DBWG v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCAFC 3; (2024) 301 FCR 344

Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 3; (2022) 289 FCR 21

Fualau v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 11

Jatin v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 150

Masi-Haini v Minister for Home Affairs [2023] FCAFC 126; (2023) 298 FCR 277

NADH of 2001 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 328; (2001) 214 ALR 464

NADH of 2001 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 328; (2004) 214 ALR 464

NWQR v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCAFC 30

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30; (2003) 77 ALJR 1165

Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H [2001] HCA 28; (2001) 179 ALR 425

Sharma v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 227; (2017) 256 FCR 1

SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80

VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158; (2004) 238 FCR 588

XRZG v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCAFC 131; (2024) 305 FCR 349

Division: General Division
Registry: Victoria
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 58
Date of hearing: 10 September 2025
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr A Krohn
Solicitor for the Appellant: Clothier Anderson Immigration Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondents: Ms J Lucas
Solicitor for the Respondents: Clayton Utz

ORDERS

VID 384 of 2022
BETWEEN:

AMC18

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

HILL J

DATE OF ORDER:

17 SEPTEMBER 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The name of…

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Details
Case
[2025] FCA 1136
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Appellant, a Lebanese citizen, appealed against the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) affirming the refusal to grant her a protection visa. The Appellant had entered Australia on a prospective spouse visa in 2013, but later applied for a protection visa, claiming that she would be harmed if she returned to Lebanon due to her marriage to a Muslim man. The AAT upheld the refusal of the protection visa, and the Appellant sought judicial review in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (FCFCOA), which was dismissed. The Appellant subsequently appealed to the Federal Court, raising two grounds for appeal.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal hearing was conducted in a manner that gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias, and whether the Appellant should be granted leave to raise a new argument challenging a finding that the Appellant had made at least one fraudulent statutory declaration. The court considered the arguments put forward by the Appellant and assessed the merits of the proposed grounds of appeal.

The court found that the Appellant's argument on Ground 1, which concerned the apprehension of bias, was without merit. The court held that the Tribunal's questioning, while vigorous, was aimed at understanding the Appellant's claims and did not give rise to any reasonable apprehension of bias. The court emphasised that the whole transcript should be considered and the hypothetical fair-minded lay observer was properly informed about the proceedings. The court also found that Ground 2 lacked sufficient merit to warrant the grant of leave to raise it for the first time on appeal.

Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed with costs, to be agreed or taxed in default of agreement. The court also amended the names of the respondents to reflect the current titles of the parties involved in the case.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The name of the First Respondent is amended to “Minister for Immigration and Citizenship”.

2. The name of the Second Respondent is amended to “Administrative Review Tribunal”.

3. The appeal is dismissed with costs, to be agreed or taxed in default of agreement.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the following reasons, the appeal is dismissed with costs.BACKGROUND Arrival in Australia (Sep 2013): The Appellant is a citizen of Lebanon. She was previously twice denied entry visas to Australia. On 22 September 2013, she arrived in Australia on a prospective spouse visa. The Appellant’s parents had arranged for her to marry her cousin, Tony (J [1]). The Appellant claims that the relationship with Tony ended a short time after she entered Australia (J [2]). Relationship with Mr A (Nov 2013): Around November 2013, the Appellant met Mr A. She claims that she and Mr A fell in love, and that she told her family that she wished to marry Mr A but her parents refused, because Mr A was a Muslim and the Appellant is a Christian (J [3]). Application for spouse visa (Jun 2014): On 23 June 2014, the Appellant lodged an application for a Spousal visa, sponsored by a Mr K (a friend of the Appellant’s). The Appellant and Mr K were married in a civil ceremony at Wyong F3 Café on 11 June 2014. On 26 May 2015, the Appellant withdrew the visa application, apparently due to a breakdown in the relationship with Mr K (J [4]). Around this time, the Appellant and Mr A attempted to get married. Initially a Muslim cleric, Sheikh Legha, refused to marry them because the Appellant was still married to another man (Mr K). Before the delegate, the Appellant stated that a day after she moved in with Mr A in May 2015 a different Muslim cleric verbally married her to Mr A. (In the Tribunal, she stated that this occurred a few days later: Tribunal reasons for decision (AAT) [39].) Application for protection visa (Jun 2015): On 10 June 2015, the Appellant applied for a protection visa. She claimed to fear harm on her return to Lebanon because she is a Christian married to a Muslim man. The Appellant claims that her family threatened to kill her, Mr A and her children if she returns (J [6]). Delegate refuses visa (Dec 2015): On 8 December 2015, a delegate of the First Respondent (the Minister) refused to grant the Appellant a protection visa (J [7]). Tribunal application (May 2015): On 17 December 2015, the Appellant applied to the Tribunal for merits review of the refusal decision. The Appellant attended a Tribunal hearing on 6 November 2017. She and Mr A each gave evidence. Tribunal affirms refusal (Jan 2018): On 5 January 2018, the Tribunal affirmed the decision not to grant the Appellant a protection visa (J [7]). Judicial review application (Feb 2018, Oct 2021): On 2 February 2018, the Appellant applied to the FCFCOA for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision. On 6 October 2021, the Appellant filed an amended originating application. The amended originating application contended that the Tribunal had not accorded the Appellant procedural fairness, by conducting the hearing of her application for review in a manner which gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. Primary judge dismisses the application (Jun 2022): On 14 June 2022, the primary judge dismissed the amended originating application.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

For these reasons, proposed Ground 2 lacks sufficient merit to warrant the grant of leave to raise it for the first time on appeal.CONCLUSION For the reasons set out above, the appeal is dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Consideration (Ground 1): The Appellant’s argument on Ground 1 is the same as put to the primary judge, and should be rejected for essentially the same reasons as those given by his Honour. Ultimately, when the transcript is read as a whole, the passages complained of are properly seen as no more than robust and forthright questioning by the Tribunal member, and do not give rise to any reasonable apprehension of bias. Need to consider the whole transcript in the light of the claims made: Two general points should be made at the outset.·First, apprehended bias is assessed by considering the whole of the hearing, not individual passages in isolation: SZRUI at [75] (Robertson J). I note that the Court does not have an audio recording of the Tribunal hearing, so this ground is being determined on the basis of the transcript of that hearing.·Second, the hypothetical fair-minded lay observer is properly informed as to the nature of the proceedings, the matters in issue, and the conduct which is said to give rise to an apprehension of bias: Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H [2001] HCA 28; (2001) 179 ALR 425 at [28] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ). The significance of the first point is that the Tribunal asked the Appellant many of the same questions as it asked Mr A, and tested her claims with some vigour. (For example, the Tribunal member stated to the Appellant at one point that it “doesn’t make sense” that the Appellant thought she could be married twice.) The Appellant does not make any complaint about this questioning. That occurred before Mr A gave evidence. The stage of the hearing is relevant: a vigorous intervention early in a hearing may be less readily excused than one at a later stage where it is designed to permit the decision-maker to comprehend the issues: Bullmore v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCAFC 99; (2024) 304 FCR 370 at [43] (point 5) (the Court). For example, in Sharma, the Tribunal made statements about the appellant in that case being evasive and rehearsed at such an early stage in the hearing that it might suggest to a reasonable lay observer that the Tribunal member had closed his mind to any explanation from the appellant on the relevant matter: Sharma at [36]. Here, by contrast, the Tribunal’s questioning of Mr A occurred after it had already heard evidence on the topic from the Appellant, which was largely to the same effect. In addition, the Tribunal’s questioning of Mr A began with several attempts by the Tribunal to get Mr A to tell the Tribunal of the circumstances surrounding the claimed religious marriage by the sheikh. Then, as part of the first exchange relied on by the Appellant, the Tribunal member sets out his concern that it is not possible in Australia for the Appellant to be married twice and states: “So I’m just wondering why she would agree to it and why you would seek to do that”. These statements indicate that the Tribunal was genuinely seeking to have Mr A explain to the Tribunal what had occurred.