SZJSS v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZJSS & ANOR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2009] FMCA 886
MIGRATION – Review of Refugee Review Tribunal decision – refusal of a Protection (Class XA) visa – no reviewable error – application dismissed.
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 94
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu [1999] HCA 21
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng [2001] HCA 17
NACB v Minister for Immigration & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 235
NADH of 2001 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2004) 214 ALR 264
NAIS v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] HCA 77
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte S20/2002 (2003) 198 ALR 59
Re Refugee Review Tribunal ex parte H (2001) 179 ALR 425
SFGB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 231
SZDGC v Minister for Immigration [2008] FMCA 1638
SZIIF v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship (2008) 102 ALD 366
SZMSJ v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2009] FMCA 102
First Applicant: SZJSS
Second Applicant: SZJLFG
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP
Second Respondent: REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File Number: SYG 3009 of 2008
Judgment of: Lloyd-Jones FM
Hearing date: 15 April 2009
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 11 September 2009

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicants: Mr J Young
Solicitors for the Applicants: Diab & Associates
Counsel for the Respondents: Ms T Wong
Solicitors for the Respondents: DLA Phillips Fox

ORDERS

  1. The application filed on 19 November 2008 is dismissed.

  2. The applicants are to pay the first respondent’s costs and disbursements of and incidental to the application.

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT
SYDNEY

SYG 3009 of 2008

SZJSS

First Applicant

SZLFG

Second Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

The proceedings

  1. The applicants are husband (SZJSS) and wife (SZLFG) from Nepal.  They arrived in Australia on Visitor’s visas on 22 February 2006 and applied to the Department of Immigration & Citizenship for Protection (Class XA) visas on 5 April 2006.  That application was refused on 3 July 2006 by a delegate of the Minister.

  2. The applicants applied for review of the delegate’s decision to the first constituted Refugee Review Tribunal (“Tribunal 1”) on 25 July 2006.  Tribunal 1 affirmed the delegate’s decision in a decision handed down on 19 October 2006.  The applicants sought judicial review of Tribunal 1’s decision in the Federal Magistrates Court on 22 November 2006.  On 15 August 2007, Smith FM found jurisdictional error in Tribunal 1’s decision, quashed that decision and remitted the matter to the Tribunal to be determined according to law. 

  3. A second and differently constituted Tribunal (“Tribunal 2”) affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the applicants Protection visas and handed down its decision on 3 January 2008.  On 25 January 2008, the applicants filed an application in the Federal Magistrates Court for review of Tribunal 2’s decision.  On 8…

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Details
Case
[2009] FMCA 886
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of SZJSS v Minister for Immigration, the court was tasked with reviewing the decision of the Third Refugee Review Tribunal (Tribunal 3) in relation to the applicant’s claims for refugee status. The applicant, Mr Young, contested the Tribunal's decision to reject his claims for protection and sought judicial review of that decision. The central legal issues revolved around whether the Tribunal had properly assessed the applicant's credibility and the weight to be given to specific pieces of evidence, such as headmaster's letters, in light of previous inconsistent statements made by the applicant.

The court examined the Tribunal's reasoning and whether it had committed a jurisdictional error by not adequately considering the inconsistencies in the applicant's evidence. The applicant argued that the Tribunal should have been more forgiving given the traumatic experiences he had endured and the stress of multiple hearings. The court noted that while it was not necessary to accept all claims uncritically, a certain degree of sensitivity and understanding of the difficulties faced by refugee claimants was required. The court found that the Tribunal had indeed accepted many of the applicant's claims, but had focused its decision on the current conditions in Nepal and the lack of evidence that the applicant would face persecution if he returned. The court also highlighted that unlike in a previous case (SZIIF), the Tribunal in this case did not reject the applicant's claims due to inconsistencies but instead based its decision on the changed circumstances in Nepal.

Ultimately, the court concluded that the Tribunal had not erred in its assessment of the applicant's claims. The court found that the Tribunal's decision was based on the applicant's inability to provide evidence of a real chance of future persecution, rather than on an improper assessment of his credibility. The applicant's submissions regarding the significance of the headmaster's letters and the impact of delays and trauma on his ability to provide consistent evidence were considered but did not change the outcome.

The court dismissed the application for judicial review and ordered that the applicants were to pay the costs of the first respondent.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

The application filed on 19 November 2008 is dismissed.

2.

The applicants are to pay the first respondent’s costs and disbursements of and incidental to the application.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Ms Wong submits that Mr Young also relies upon para.144 of Tribunal 3’s reasoning for its decision:The Tribunal gives the two “headmasters” letters no weight for an additional reason. In regard to the second letter the applicant told an earlier Tribunal that he had not asked for the letter, that his brother had sent it to him and that his brother too had not asked for it…Much more significant though, the applicant was inconsistent in his evidence as to the providence of the letters, and this goes directly to the question of his bona fides. He told the presently constituted Tribunal that he did not ask for the letters several times. On this evidence, the Tribunal has come to the view that both the headmaster’s letters and the particular contents were solicited. (CB 382, emphasis added) Ms Wong submits that from this extract, it is apparent that Tribunal 3 relied upon the applicant’s evidence that he had requested the letters in determining that they should be given no weight. The Tribunal accepted the applicant’s most recent evidence and made a finding based upon this rather than rejecting the applicant’s evidence due to inconsistencies over time, as had occurred in SZIIF. Ms Wong submits that Mr Young relies upon para.145 of Tribunal 3’s decision which does not refer to inconsistencies at all. Therefore, that none of the three paragraphs relied upon by the applicant contain findings of a type which led to jurisdictional error in SZIIF. Unlike SZIIF, the present Tribunal accepted many of the applicant’s claims of persecution (CB 377-37 at [106]-[115]). The Tribunal’s determination that the applicant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution was instead based principally upon on the change conditions in current day Nepal (over two years since the ceasefire) and the applicant’s inability to provide any evidence that he would continue to be targeted if he lived in the large Nepalese cities (CB 378 at [115]; CB 381 at [138]-[141]; CB 382-383 at [147]-[149]. Justice Weinberg in SZIIF at [27] reviewed the findings and reasons of that Tribunal decision and reproduced the following passage: Firstly, the applicant told the Department, at an interview, that he was beaten up once. He told T3 that he was beaten up on 2 occasions. Whilst he explained that he was nervous, I do not accept that even a nervous person would omit details of a serious attack when claiming protection from harm that occurred to him in his country of nationality. Secondly, the applicant told T3 that he was so seriously injured when he was attacked on the 1st occasion in 2001 he required medical treatment and on the 2nd occasion in 2001 he required hospitalisation for a few days. He did not inform the Department or TI or T2 that his injuries were so extensive in the Ukraine that he required medical treatment and on the 2nd occasion required hospitalisation. Ms Wong submits that the Tribunal in SZIIF conducted a minute dissection of each of the applicant’s individual claims to determine whether they appeared consistently throughout the course of the various Tribunal hearings. These are the types of discrepancies which would emerge if a person is asked to give an account of their claims on successive occasions. In other words, they are the sort of minute details a person might forget over a number of years. After extracting this portion of the third Tribunal’s reasons for its decision, Weinberg J went through each one of these inconsistencies and found that really they were distinctions without a difference:In my view, T3 erred in finding that there were discrepancies of any consequence between the appellant’s earlier statements and what he said during the course of the hearing. T3 appears to have taken a number of the appellant’s earlier statements out of context. It has also attributed to him things that he simply did not say. That is, of course, quite unfair. More than that, it undermines the foundation upon which T3 rejected the appellant’s claims. It shows that there was no proper basis for concluding that he had invented a history of persecution in order to obtain a visa. (SZIIF at [57], emphasis added)

Decision

Reasons for decision

In SZIIF, Weinberg J found:61 …the delegate who first dealt with this matter displayed an awareness of the need to approach refugee claims with appropriate sensitivity to the principles that govern fact finding in such matters. He was far more attuned to that need than was T3. It has been said, correctly in my view, that a person who applies for refugee status may have been traumatised in the past in a way that can adversely affect that person’s ability to present claims in a coherent and plausible manner. In addition, the procedure used in deciding a refugee’s application can be stressful and this can further interfere with his ability to recall his background accurately and to express his claims consistently.62 Of course, this does not mean that a delegate or the Tribunal is required to accept uncritically all claims made. It does, however, mean that the benefit of the doubt should be given to asylum seekers who are generally credible but unable to substantiate all their claims. 64 Underlying the Minister’s submission is a misconception. It is assumed that factual errors, leading to a finding that an applicant is not a witness of truth, cannot give rise to jurisdictional error. 66 I accept that at common law want of logic is not synonymous with error of law…67 The decision of the High Court in NAIS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] HCA 77; (2005) 228 CLR 470 provides a useful illustration of the fine lines that sometimes have to be drawn… 83 Speaking generally, therefore, NAIS stands as support for the proposition that lengthy delay, unacknowledged by the Tribunal in its reasons for decision, can give rise to jurisdictional error. 86 The Minister did not specifically challenge the proposition that the decision in NAIS established that delay could, in some circumstances, give rise to a denial of procedural fairness. Nor did he necessarily accept that proposition. He submitted, however, that the particular circumstances of this case were far removed from those in NAIS… 88 I accept the Minister’s submission that NAIS is not directly in point. However, the principles underlying the majority view seem to me to be relevant, by analogy, to the particular circumstances of this case. Mr Young submits that there is greater similarity between this matter and SZIIF. That there have been a number of years where the applicant has been required to give successive accounts of persecution. This is particularly so when there has been some trauma to the applicant. In the matter before this Court, Tribunal 3 accepted that the applicant’s claims were largely true and that he had been subjected to incidents in the past that may amount to persecution. What Tribunal 3 did not find is that there is a real chance that the applicant will suffer persecution in the future. Mr Young argues that the Tribunal 3 did not say that it did not accept the headmaster’s letters but that it accepted that the letters originated from the relevant school (CB 382 at [143]). He submits this is akin to finding the letters genuine. The Tribunal also accepted that the applicant would face harm in Kathmandu (CB 381-2 at [142]). However, it indicated that it would not consider it because of the matters set out at paras.143 and 144. Mr Young argues that if there were a shift, it is incumbent on the Tribunal to take into account the time period and the number and times which the applicant had to give evidence.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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