QHXW and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (Migration)
[2025] ARTA 615
•26 May 2025
QHXW and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (Migration) [2025] ARTA 615 (20 May 2025)
Date:20 May 2025
Applicant/s: QHXW
Respondent: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs
Tribunal Number: 2025/1564
Tribunal:General Member J Papalia
Place:Perth
Date of decision: 20 May 2025
Date of written reasons: 26 May 2025
Decision:The Tribunal affirms the reviewable decision.
Statement made on 26 May 2025 at 3:29pm
........................................................................
General Member
CATCHWORDS
MIGRATION – visa cancellation – absorbed person visa – Mandatory cancellation under s 501(3A) of Migration Act 1958 – Where Applicant does not pass the character test –– Possession of CEM – Grooming - whether there is another reason to revoke cancellation – consideration of Direction no. 110 – protection of Australian community – strength, nature and duration of ties to Australia – expectations of the Australian community – legal consequences of decision – extent of impediments if removed – Applicant is a 47-year-old citizen of NZL –– Reviewable decision affirmed – Reasons for anonymisation
LEGISLATION
Citizenship Act 1977 (NZ)
Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1978 (Qld)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth)
Returning Offenders (Management and Information) Act 2015 (NZ)
CASES
Ismail v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (2024) 94 ALJR 196
Plaintiff M1/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs (2022) 275 CLR 582
Re CLKQ and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] ARTA 231
SECONDARY MATERIALS
Department of Corrections (NZ), FAQs for Returning Offenders (Web Page, January 2019) < align="left">Direction no. 110 – Visa refusal and cancellation under section 501 and revocation of a mandatory cancellation of a visa under section 501CA (Cth)
Helmus & Ors, ‘Static-99R: Strengths, limitations, predictive accuracy meta-analysis and legal admissibility review’, Psychology, Public Policy and Law 2022 Vol 28(3), pp 307-331 < align="center">Statement of Reasons
The decision in this matter was made on 20 May 2025 and provided to the parties with a note that written reasons would be provided within a reasonable time.[1] These are those written reasons.
THE APPLICATION
[1] See Khalil v Minister for Home Affairs (2019) 271 FCR 326, [41], [48].
The Applicant is a 47-year-old New Zealand citizen who seeks review of a decision not to revoke the mandatory cancellation of his absorbed person visa (APV).[2] He came to Australia in September 1980, at the age of 3 with his Australian citizen father and brother.[3] Despite being eligible to apply for Australian citizenship by descent, whether by design or simply as the result of neglect, the Applicant did not do so prior to his committing offences in Queensland as an adult.[4] Because the Applicant lacks the formal legal relationship with the Australian community conferred by citizenship, he is liable to have his permission to remain in the Australian community cancelled. This occurred on 15 November 2022 as a consequence of his conviction and sentence for sexual offences.[5] The Applicant made representations seeking revocation of the cancellation of his APV, and, on 25 February 2025, the delegate of the Respondent (Minister) refused to revoke the cancellation under s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act) (Non-Revocation Decision).[6]
[2] Exhibit 1, p 30.
[3] Exhibit 1, p 96.
[4] See Exhibit 3.
[5] Exhibit 1, p 71.
[6] Exhibit 1, p 30.
This Tribunal has jurisdiction to review the Non-Revocation decision. For the following reasons, the Tribunal has determined that the correct decision is to affirm the decision. In other words, the Tribunal has found that the APV should not be restored to the Applicant.
BACKGROUND
The Applicant was born in Wanganui, New Zealand, in July 1977.[7] He acquired the status of a New Zealand citizen at birth.[8]
[7] Exhibit 1, p 82.
[8] Citizenship Act 1977 (NZ) s 6(1)(a); see Love v The Commonwealth (2020) 270 CLR 152 (Love), [156], [233].
The Applicant’s parents were Australian-born citizens, then residing in New Zealand.[9] This gave the Applicant a contingent right to acquire Australian citizenship by descent.[10] However, Australian citizenship was not automatically conferred and the Applicant never obtained it.
[9] Exhibit 1, pp 81-83, 428.
[10] See Australian Citizenship 1948 (Cth) s 10B (repealed); Love, [11]; Re Carey and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] AATA 2142, [5]-[6].
Whilst in New Zealand, the Applicant’s parents separated.[11] The family (not including the mother) returned to Australia in September 1980.[12]
[11] Cross-examination on 15 May 2025.
[12] Exhibit 1, p 96.
Consequently, on 1 September 1994, the Applicant was taken to have been granted the APV, which confers a right to remain in but not re-enter Australia, by operation of s 34(2) of the Migration Act.
The Applicant’s remaining family consists of his father and older brother, who reside in New South Wales.[13] He does not keep in contact with any extended relatives.[14]
[13] Cross-examination on 12 May 2025; Exhibit 1, p 90.
[14] Ibid.
The Applicant has a criminal history in Queensland, commencing in December 2000. However, the conduct that is of real concern occurred from June 2018. This will be discussed further below.
On 13 May 2019, the Applicant was convicted in the Dalby District Court of ‘grooming a child under 16 years of age with intent to procure engagement by that child in a sexual act’.[15] The Applicant was sentenced to 15 months’ imprisonment, suspended after serving a period of three months’ imprisonment, for an operational period of two years.
[15] Exhibit 1, pp 46, 188-190.
On 17 August 2022, the Applicant was convicted in the same Court of knowingly possessing child exploitation material (CEM) on 12 February 2021.[16] He was sentenced to nine months’ imprisonment, cumulative upon the balance of the suspended imprisonment order imposed in May 2019, which was ordered to be served.[17] That is, the Applicant was required to serve a total effective sentence of 21 months’ imprisonment.
[16] Exhibit 1, pp 46, 206-210.
[17] Ibid. See also Exhibit 1, pp 66-68.
On 15 November 2022, the Applicant’s APV was mandatorily cancelled under s 501(3A) of the Migration Act (Cancellation Decision).[18]
[18] See Exhibit 1, pp 71-77.
The Applicant was notified of the Cancellation Decision by hand on 17 November 2022[19] and invited to make representations to the Minister requesting revocation of this decision.[20] He requested revocation on 13 December 2022 (with a written request dated 5 December 2022) and submitted a personal circumstances form and written submissions in support.[21]
[19] See Exhibit 1, p 354.
[20] See Exhibit 1, pp 72-75.
[21] See Exhibit 1, pp 78-94.
On 25 February 2025, the Minister’s delegate refused to revoke the Cancellation Decision under s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act (Reviewable Decision).[22]
[22] Exhibit 1, p 30.
The Applicant was notified of the Reviewable Decision on 26 February 2025.[23] He sought review of that decision before the Tribunal by application dated 4 March 2025.[24]
[23] Evidence on 12 May 2025; Exhibit 1, pp 17, 22.
[24] Exhibit 1, pp 8-21.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The question for determination by the Tribunal is whether the decision not to revoke the mandatory cancellation of the Applicant’s APV is the ‘correct or preferable decision’ on the material before the Tribunal.[25]
[25] Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth) (ART Act) ss 9, 54, 56(1)(a); See also Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority (2008) 235 CLR 286, [140]-[143]; Re Becker and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1977) 1 ALD 158, 161-162.
Section 501CA(4) of the Migration Act provides that a mandatory cancellation may be revoked if:
(a)the Applicant makes representations in accordance with the invitation to do so given by the Minister under s 501CA(3); and
(b)the decision-maker is satisfied that:
(i)the Applicant passes the character test (as defined by s 501); or
(ii)there is another reason why the mandatory cancellation should be revoked.
In Plaintiff M1/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs (‘M1/2021’),[26] the majority of the High Court described s 501CA(4) as conferring ‘a wide discretionary power’ to revoke a mandatory cancellation, if the decision-maker (whether the Minister, their delegate, or the Tribunal on review of a delegate’s decision) is satisfied that there is ‘another reason’ why the cancellation should be revoked.[27] The majority held in the same paragraph that the assessment of whether there was, in fact, ‘another reason’ was to be undertaken by reference to the representations made by the Applicant.[28]
[26] (2022) 275 CLR 582 (M1/2021)
[27] M1/2021, [22].
[28] M1/2021, [22]. See also Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v Viane (2021) 274 CLR 398, [13]-[15]; Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs v McQueen (2024) 94 ALJR 594, [6].
In exercising the power under s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act, the Tribunal must comply with Direction no. 110 – Visa refusal and cancellation under section 501 and revocation of a mandatory cancellation of a visa under section 501CA (the Direction)[29] given by the Minister under s 499(1) of the Migration Act.[30]
[29] Direction cl 1.
[30] Direction cl 5.1(4); Migration Act s 499(2A).
Informed by the principles set out in cl 5.2 of the Direction, the Tribunal must take into account the factors identified in cls 8 and 9 of the Direction (to the extent relevant in the particular case) in deciding the application.[31] In this review, those factors are:
(a)the protection of the Australian community from criminal or other serious conduct;
(b)the strength, nature and duration of ties to Australia;
(c)the expectations of the Australian community;
(d)the legal consequences of the decision; and
(e)the extent of impediments if removed.
[31] Direction cl 6.
THE HEARING AND THE EVIDENCE
The Applicant appeared in-person before the Tribunal over two days on 12 and 15 May 2025. The Applicant was self-represented. The Minister was represented by Ms Taggart of counsel, instructed by Ms Rezae of Sparke Helmore Lawyers.
The following documents were marked as exhibits:
(a)Hearing Bundle, including the Minister’s Statements of Facts, Issues and Contentions (RSFIC) and the parties’ supporting documentary material (Exhibit 1);
(b)Undated letter from the Applicant’s father provided with the Application for Review (Exhibit 2); and
(c)Email from Ms Rezae regarding the Applicant’s citizenship status with annexed notification of invalid application for conferral approval dated 27 June 2024 (Exhibit 3).
At the hearing, the Applicant was advised, in simple terms, of his right to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination prior to his giving evidence.[32] He was also provided an opportunity to respond to matters put to him and to provide answers to questions asked by the Tribunal which were directed at relevant considerations under the Direction.
[32] See Bainbridge v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCA 1080, [64]-[65].
The Tribunal took oral evidence from the Applicant and his father.
CONSIDERATION
Representations in accordance with invitation
Regulation 2.52(2)(b) of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (Regulations) prescribes that any representations seeking revocation must be made to the Minister within 28 days after the person is given notice of the mandatory cancellation under s 501CA(3)(a) of the Migration Act.
As discussed at [12] above, the Applicant made representations seeking revocation of the Cancellation Decision within that timeframe.
Accordingly, the Tribunal is satisfied that the Applicant made representations in accordance with the invitation for the purposes of s 501CA(4)(a) of the Migration Act.
Character test
The Tribunal must decide whether the Applicant passes the character test as defined by
s 501 of the Migration Act.[33] Failure to pass the character test arises as a matter of law.[34][33] See Smith v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCA 652, [40]. See also Direction cl 5.1(3) and Annexure A.
[34] See Re Harrison and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 106 ALD 666, [63].
Section 501(6) of the Migration Act sets out that a person does not pass the character test if
(a)the person has a substantial criminal record (as defined by subsection (7)); or
…
(e)a court in Australia or a foreign country has:
(i) convicted the person of one or more sexually based offences involving a child; or
(ii) found the person guilty of such an offence, or found a charge against the person proved for such offence, even if the person was discharged without conviction;
The term ‘substantial criminal record’, includes when ‘the person has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 months or more’.[35]
[35] Migration Act s 501(7)(c).
As referred to above, in May 2019 and August 2022, respectively, the Applicant was convicted by the District Court of Queensland of sexually based offences involving children contrary to ss 218B and 228D of the Criminal Code (Qld). He was sentenced to terms of imprisonment which, in the first instance (and notwithstanding that the first sentence was suspended),[36] exceed 12 months, and do so on an aggregate basis in any event.[37]
[36] See Brown v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 183 FCR 113, [9], [12], [114].
[37] See Migration Act s 501(7)(d).
Accordingly, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the Applicant passes the character test for the purposes of s 501CA(4)(b)(i) of the Migration Act based on the circumstances set out in both ss 501(6)(a) and 501(6)(e)(i).
Is there ‘another reason’?
As the Tribunal is not satisfied that the Applicant passes the character test, the Tribunal must then determine whether, having regard to the representations made by the Applicant, and to any relevant primary and other considerations contained within the Direction, there is ‘another reason’ why the Cancellation Decision should be revoked.
Further guidance as to how the Tribunal is to apply the considerations in the Direction to this question can be found in cl 7, which provides that:
1In applying the considerations (both primary and other), information and evidence from independent and authoritative sources should be given appropriate weight.
2The primary consideration at 8.1 below (protection of the Australian community) is generally to be given greater weight than other primary considerations. Otherwise, primary considerations should generally be given greater weight than the other considerations.
3One or more primary considerations may outweigh other primary considerations.
PRIMARY CONSIDERATIONS
Protection of the Australian Community
The Tribunal is required to consider whether the Australian community requires protection from harm said to have arisen from the criminal activity or other serious conduct engaged in by the Applicant to date, and from any risk of such harm arising in the future.[38] This is a two-stage process, requiring consideration of both the nature and seriousness of conduct to date, and the risk to the community if further offences are committed or the applicant engages in other serious conduct.[39]
[38] See Direction cls 8(1) and 8.1.
[39] Direction cl 8.1(2).
In addressing this overall question, the Tribunal is directed to ‘keep in mind that the safety of the Australian community is the highest priority of the Australian Government’ and to have
particular regard to the principle that entering or remaining in Australia is a privilege that Australia confers on non-citizens in the expectation that they are, and have been, law abiding, will respect important institutions, and will not cause or threaten harm to individuals or the Australian community.[40]
[40] Direction cl 8.1(1).
Nature and seriousness of the conduct to date
On 14 December 2000, the Applicant, then in his early 20s, assaulted a carer in an aged care home, causing her bodily harm.[41] This ‘very unpleasant’ and ‘bizarre’ conduct was described by the Dalby District Court in May 2001 as arising from a combination of epilepsy medication and drinking.[42] The Applicant was sentenced to 12 months’ probation and no conviction was recorded.[43] He successfully completed probation in May 2002.[44]
[41] See Exhibit 1, pp 297, 300.
[42] See Exhibit 1, p 300.
[43] See Exhibit 1, pp 300-301.
[44] Exhibit 1, p 305.
In the evening of 5 September 2013, the Applicant was found by police in the vicinity of the Darby Courthouse in an intoxicated state.[45] At one stage during this interaction, the Applicant became aggressive and pushed the officers away from him, including by palming one of the officers in the face.[46] The Applicant was convicted of assaulting the officer in the performance of his duty in December 2013 and fined $300.[47]
[45] See Exhibit 1, p 268
[46] See Exhibit 1, pp 264, 268.
[47] Exhibit 1, pp 253, 297.
In late September 2018, the Applicant left his mobile telephone at the back patio of a rural property where some of his friends resided, and to which he would visit on weekends.[48] Someone present at the property opened the mobile and discovered a series of messages of a sexual nature on Instagram between the Applicant (then 41) and one of the resident children (Child A, then aged 13).[49] The Applicant had known Child A for about four or five years.[50] The mobile was eventually provided to police and the Applicant charged with involving or exposing Child A to indecent material offences, which were committed for trial in the District Court.
[48] See Exhibit 1, pp 53, 195.
[49] Exhibit 1, 195.
[50] See Exhibit 1, pp 53, 195 [3].
Before the District Court, the Applicant was charged on indictment with one count of grooming a person under the age of 16 years with intent to facilitate the procurement of that person to engage in a sexual act, contrary to then s 218B(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.[51] He entered a guilty plea to this charge on 13 May 2019[52] and, as already noted above, sentenced to 15 months’ imprisonment, which was conditionally suspended after three months.
[51] Exhibit 1, pp 188-189.
[52] Exhibit 1, p 190.
The Tribunal and the District Court were provided with nine example conversations between the Applicant and Child A, during 30 June 2018 and 21 September 2018.[53] The Applicant continues to deny that he engaged in the conduct for sexual gratification. Instead, he says this was ‘more for attention’, because he was ‘depressed, lonely’ and wanted to feel ‘important’.[54] The District Court found that the Applicant’s ‘conduct clearly was designed to facilitate the procurement of [Child A] engaging in a sexual act and that [this] was done for [his] sexual gratification’ and that there was clearly ‘sexual context’.[55] That intention is evident from the terms of each conversation and goes towards the Applicant’s insight and risk of re-offending (discussed below).
[53] See Exhibit 1, pp 195-197, 222-223.
[54] Cross-examination on 12 May 2025.
[55] Exhibit 1, pp 222-223.
The sentencing judge considered the grooming to be at the lower end of seriousness and that there was not any psychological impact on the victim other than having the capacity to normalise sexual conduct.[56]
[56] Ibid.
The Applicant served the immediate term of imprisonment between 16 May 2019 and 12 August 2019.[57] During this short period of imprisonment, the Applicant was assessed by Queensland Corrective Services (QCS) as being a low to moderate risk of re-offending.[58]
[57] See Exhibit 1, pp 399, 402-407.
[58] See Exhibit 1, p 315.
One of the consequences of the grooming conviction was that the Applicant became a reportable offender under the Child Protection (Offender Reporting and Offender Prohibition Order) Act 2004 (Qld) (CP Act). He was notified of this on 24 May 2019 and 12 August 2019.[59]
(a)In November 2020, the Applicant failed to comply with his reporting obligations under the CP Act by failing to advise police of a change of residential address and employment.[60]
(b)In February 2021, police attended the Applicant’s address as part of their sex offender management obligations.[61] The Applicant’s mobile telephone was subject to voluntary examination and it was discovered that he had been using or had downloaded accounts on seven different social media platforms.[62]
[59] See Exhibit 1, pp 403-404, 407.
[60] See Exhibit 1, pp 230, 234-235.
[61] See Exhibit 1, p 226.
[62] Exhibit 1, pp 226 [2], 230-231, 236-243.
Subsequent analysis of the Applicant’s mobile by police revealed 138 video files and 30 images saved in the gallery, all of which constituted CEM.[63] All of the images and most of the videos depicted prepubescent children engaging in sexual activity or had a clear focus on their genitals.[64] The videos included:
(i)a 14-year-old naked girl having sexual intercourse with an adult male;
(ii)pre-teen children having oral sex; and
(iii)prepubescent girls engaged in highly sexualised behaviour.
[63] See Exhibit 1, p 226 [4]
[64] Exhibit 1, pp 226-227.
The Applicant was charged with possession of CEM and failing to report in accordance with his obligations under the CP Act. The CEM offences were committed for trial in the District Court, with two associated use carriage service offences under the Commonwealth Criminal Code.[65]
[65] Exhibit 1, p 230-232.
The Commonwealth offences were discontinued prior to trial.[66] On the second day of trial in August 2022, the Applicant admitted his guilt to the possession of CEM.[67] The trial judge (Jarro DCJ) dealt with the Applicant for the possession charge, ten summary breach charges under the CP Act, and for breaching the suspended imprisonment order imposed by Lynch DCJ KC in May 2019 by re-offending.[68] His Honour remarked:
[QHXW], you should know that possessing child exploitation material is abhorrent. It is inconceivable to normal members of the community that people can derive some sort of sick evil pleasure from viewing these materials. These are, you have heard, not victimless crimes. Children are being abused, and by viewing that material, you encourage a market for this sort of warped behaviour. Children are vulnerable. They deserve protection from the law, whereas people who commit these sorts of offences against children, that is, who encourage markets for this sort of behaviour, deserve contempt by the community and must face the full consequences for their actions. So the sentence that I have to impose today must stop you and others from committing these or similar sorts of offences. It must make it clear that the community, acting through the Court, denounces the sort of conduct in which you were involved in, and it must punish you in an extent and in a way that is just in all of the circumstances.[69]
[66] See Exhibit 1, p 216.
[67] See Exhibit 1, p 209.
[68] See Exhibit 1, pp 47-50.
[69] Exhibit 1, pp 48-49.
The Applicant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 21 months’ imprisonment (including the re-activated suspended sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment).[70] No further punishment was imposed for the ten (10) summary charges.[71]
[70] See Exhibit 1, pp 49-50, 66-68.
[71] Exhibit 1, p 49.
The Applicant was refused release on parole and served his full term. He was detained under s 189(1) of the Migration Act on 16 May 2024, and remains in immigration detention pending the outcome of the review.
The Minister, consistent with the guidance in cls 8.1.1(1)(a)(i)-(ii) of the Direction, contended that the Tribunal should find that the Applicant’s offending to date, being constituted by child sexual offending, is viewed very seriously by the Australian Government and the Australian community.[72]
[72] RSFIC, [39].
The Minister also raised the Applicant’s two prior convictions for violent crimes, namely the assault occasioning bodily harm in 2000 and the assault public officer in 2013, with regard to cl 8.1.1(1)(a)(i) of the Direction.[73]
[73] RSFIC, [39(h)], [44], [52].
Lastly, the Minister contended that there was a general trend of increasing seriousness (citing cl 8.1.1(1)(e) of the Direction).[74]
[74] RSFIC, [39(i)].
The Applicant submitted that he had ‘never gone out of [his] way to hurt anyone, [and that the offending] was out of character and [demonstrative of] bad judgment, [or so far as the assaults were concerned,] alcohol related’.[75]
Overall finding – nature and seriousness of conduct to date
[75] Submissions on 12 May 2025.
The Tribunal considers the Applicant’s conduct to date to be very serious. Whilst there was no evidence that the Applicant’s conduct in 2018 inflicted psychological harm on Child A, it did have the capacity to normalise sexual conduct for that child. [76] The Tribunal also agrees with Judge Jarro’s remarks cited above regarding the fact that possession of CEM is not a victimless crime.[77] The objective seriousness of both the grooming and CEM offences is reflected in the sentences of imprisonment imposed by the District Court.
[76] See Exhibit 1, pp 56, 223
[77] See also R v Liddington (1997) 18 WAR 394 (Liddington), 395-396, 403; Phintong v R [2011] WASCA 192, [24].
The Applicant’s prior history of violence appears to have been related to alcohol or drug misuse. This seems have been resolved and the Tribunal notes that the Applicant’s epilepsy is controlled by medication and that he has taken steps to reduce his alcohol intake.[78]
[78] See Exhibit 1, pp 223, 407; evidence on 12 May 2025.
The Tribunal considers the grooming offence to be the most serious offence to date. As the State Prosecutor submitted to the District Court in 2019, there was ‘persistent and protracted contact’ between the Applicant and Child A, involving ‘frequent indecent conversations as well as encouraging the child to send explicit images of herself’.[79]
[79] See Exhibit 1, p 58.
The Applicant’s subsequent conduct, including breaching his obligations under the CP Act in December 2020 and February 2021, and by also downloading and possessing CEM during this period, is of concern because it is demonstrative of an ongoing risk of recidivism.
There is also an element of frequency between June 2018 and February 2021.[80] The Tribunal accepts that holistically there is an element of increasing seriousness between the Applicant’s earlier isolated periods of drug-induced violence and the more recent sexual offending.
[80] See Direction cl 8.1.1(1)(e).
The Tribunal finds that that the Applicant’s recent conduct had the potential to corrupt and exploit children and that this is harm to which the Government is committed to protecting against. The fact that the Applicant was not warned about the consequences of such conduct for his migration status, or that he has otherwise generally been a law-abiding resident prior to 2018, is of no moment.
Risk to the Australian community should the Applicant engage in further conduct
The Tribunal is required to have regard to the future risk that may be posed by the Applicant to the Australian community by considering, cumulatively, the nature of the harm to individuals or to the community should the Applicant engage in further criminal or other serious conduct, and the likelihood of the Applicant engaging in such conduct.[81]
[81] Direction cls 8.1.2(2)(a)-(b).
In making this risk assessment, the Tribunal is directed:
to have regard to the Government’s view that the Australian community’s tolerance for any risk of future harm becomes lower as the seriousness of the potential harm increases [and that] some conduct and the harm that would be caused, if it were to be repeated, is so serious that any risk that it may be repeated may be unacceptable.
There is no statutory constraint on the way that risk is assessed by the Tribunal other than that there must be a rational and probative basis for the assessment.[82]
Nature of harm
[82] See BSJ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1181, [68]; Hambledon v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 7, [41].
The Minister contended that in respect of further sexual or violent offending, the nature of the harm that would likely be caused should such conduct be repeated includes serious physical injury, psychological injury, and financial harm to the persons involved.[83]
[83] RSFIC, [56]-[58].
The Tribunal generally agrees with that submission regarding the nature of harm caused by sexual offences. Children are abused, violated and degraded to create the market for possession of CEM.[84] They are also not usually in a position where they can protect themselves.[85] The Applicant’s grooming of Child A had similar potential, including that it normalised such conduct for the child. Offences of the kind previously committed by the Applicant involve taking advantage of the sexual exploitation of children, which harm may include serious and long-lasting psychological damage as well as other injuries.[86]
[84] See Liddington, 403.
[85] See R v Jones (1999) 108 A Crim R 50, [31].
[86] See Furber v The Queen [2008] WASCA 233, [40]-[45]; RQRP v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 266, [45]-[49];
The Tribunal otherwise does not consider there to be a realistic potential for further acts of violence (distinct from the likelihood of commission of further sexual offences).
Likelihood of re-offending
The Applicant intends to live with his father in Sydney and to obtain employment. He said that he was prepared to undertake any programmatic intervention the Tribunal required of him. He also made the point that he would be ‘watched and monitored on release’ as part of his obligations under the CP Act, including on a quarterly basis.
The Minister contended that, on the evidence before the Tribunal, the Applicant poses a real and unacceptable risk of re-offending.[87]
[87] RSFIC, [59].
The Applicant in oral closing submissions correctly apprehended that the Tribunal (and the Respondent) were principally concerned by that risk. He noted that his previous violent offences were alcohol-related and that he had taken steps to address his alcohol use. He then made the following frank submission regarding his risk of further sexual offending:
I made an attempt [on 12 May 2025] to try and describe myself, on what was going on at them times; on what I was thinking and I don’t think I did a great job. I made it sound like I was uncaring or didn’t understand the seriousness or not. And that is not true. The Respondent said I was very secretive. I think it would be more unproud or I don’t like to talk about what happened – cos it does not make me feel good. I don’t like what I did. I don’t like how it made me feel. As I said, I am – there is a lot of remorse there.
The Tribunal queried the Applicant about what he meant by ‘remorse’ in circumstances where his previous evidence to the Tribunal on 12 May 2025 had been that he did not have a sexual interest in Child A and where he also sought to minimise the sexual nature of the conversations between him and Child A.[88] The Applicant responded:
I say remorseful because as [counsel] said, I did put [Child A] in danger. I did take advantage of her, and I did – now, as I said, I have always stuck by my belief that I was doing it for attention. Now, maybe if that is denial, that I did not wish to look at myself in a different way, then maybe that is something that I have to look at it. But as I said, I have always looked at like I did this just to make myself feel better. And that was for attention and so forth. But, as I said, I did use her to get that feeling. And, to, the best way I can try and work on the public’s safety is just to focus on what I did from 22 to today - and that is the programmes, the work programmes. Even so, I did knock back a programme to focus on work. As I said, to me at the time, I thought I was doing a better thing for myself than doing a programme.
[88] Cf State of Western Australia v Rayapen [2023] WASCA 55, [141]-[142].
The Applicant accepted, following the above exchange and when challenged by the Tribunal, that he required further treatment to deal with his sexual interest in teenage girls. To understand how the Applicant came to accept that proposition during closing submissions on 15 May 2025, it is necessary to consider the historical risk assessments and representations that have been made, including the Applicant’s evidence under cross-examination on 12 May 2025.
First, the Applicant was assessed by QCS in May 2019 as being a low to moderate risk of
re-offending for the purposes of his security classification in prison.[89] He was seen by QCS psychologists on 16 May 2019, 12 June 2019 and 8 July 2019 and their clinical notes indicate a stable mental state.[90]
[89] See Exhibit 1, p 315. This included a score of 4 out of 22 on the Risk of Re-offending-Prison Version (RoR-PV): see pp 313-314.
[90] See Exhibit 1, pp 402-407.
The Applicant was discharged on the suspended imprisonment order on 12 August 2019 and was reminded of his obligations under the CP Act at that time.[91]
[91] Exhibit 1, p 407.
The Applicant was returned to custody on 23 August 2022.[92] He was seen by a QCS psychologist on the same day.[93] The following day, the RoR-PV actuarial tool was applied to the Applicant, producing a score of 8 out of 22 or ‘Standard/Moderate’.[94]
[92] Exhibit 1, p 407.
[93] Exhibit 1, pp 407-408.
[94] See Exhibit 1, p 338-339.
The Applicant applied for parole 10 September 2022.[95] As part of that process, on 14 September 2022, the Applicant was seen by a correctional counsellor for the purposes of a Rehabilitation Needs Assessment (RNA).[96] The counsellor records in notes for this interaction that:
[The Applicant] appeared to have limited insight into the seriousness of his offending and was noted to minimise his behaviours.
Noted that the prisoner did not engage in euphoric recall of the offending, he did make justifications for his offending.
[95] See Exhibit 1, p 363.
[96] Exhibit 1, pp 365, 409.
On 26 September 2022, QCS made a fresh security classification decision for the Applicant, concluding that the Applicant remained a high security classification (as previously classified).[97]
[97] See Exhibit 1, pp 345-347
The Applicant’s APV was mandatorily cancelled on 15 November 2022. He was notified of this decision on the same day.
The Applicant subsequently made representations to the Minister’s Department seeking revocation of that decision. Those representations in December 2022 included:
I pleaded guilty in 2019 to grooming after adding my friend’s daughter on Instagram & texting – while it was all non-sexual, and I made no advances, I agree I should have gone to her parents when the girl [began] asking coming of age questions – putting her at risk of future predators. In 2021, I failed to report work and social media. I do believe I have learnt from mistakes. I understand where and what I did wrong & how to do better.[98]
[98] Exhibit 1, p 91.
On 22 December 2022, the Parole Board Queensland (PBQ) sent the Applicant a natural justice letter, indicating their preliminary view that the Applicant poses an unacceptably high risk to the community on parole.[99] In this letter, the PBQ noted their view that the Applicant had outstanding treatment needs, which was:
[99] See Exhibit 1, pp 363-367.
evidenced by [his] RNA, where it states:
- [the Applicant was] dismissive of [his] offending;
- That [the Applicant was] not sexually attracted to the victim and that [he] thought [he was] being a friend to the victim;
- [The Applicant] minimised [his] offending by stating that the images and videos obtained did not come from pornography sites, and instead from chat rooms;
- [The Applicant] downloaded the content in error and did not look at it;
- [The Applicant] engaged in victim blaming and claimed, ‘I thought that I was helping her’; and
- [The Applicant] did not appear remorseful.
At the conclusion of the RNA it is recommended that [the Applicant] complete a sex offending program to address [his] offending behaviours. As such, the Board recommends you complete the Getting Started: Preparatory Program (‘GS:PP’).
Until [he] completes the GS:PP, the Board believes [his] risk to the community is unacceptably high. The Board believes the risk [he] poses is likely to be less if [he] is supervised after completing [the] GS:PP.
On 4 January 2023, the Applicant wrote to the PBQ and asked them to consider that he was employed full-time prior to his most recent sentencing; that he spent a significant period of time in custody; and that ‘…the court’s rulings on my 2019 grooming charge (illegible) was non-sexual and [he] said No to the Girl’s advances, but [did] place her at risk of future predators by not telling her parents…’.[100]
[100] Exhibit 1, pp 368-369.
On 9 January 2023, the Applicant self-nominated to participate in alcohol and drug programmes in custody, but this was not supported by QCS on the basis that substance abuse was not noted to be part of the sexual offending.[101]
[101] See Exhibit 1, p 415.
On 2 February 2023, the PBQ wrote back to the Applicant. They summarised the January submission and stated that the last submission was
…in contrast with the sentencing remarks of Judge Lynch KC, dated 13 May 2019, where his Honour said you made statements that indicated [he was] sexually aroused by looking at [the Child]. This is in addition to a conversation in which [he] asked the complainant child to show herself or at least a photograph of herself naked. Further, there was a conversation in which there was explicit discussion about sexual intercourse, and the possibility of sexual intercourse.[102]
[102] See Exhibit 1, p 371.
On 27 February 2023, the Applicant sent the Respondent’s Department a letter where he indicated that:
…It is not my intent to argue my guilt or innocence in any of these matters but rather to defend my character…In 2018, I was charged for grooming a girl under the age of sixteen, a charge I’d plead[ed] guilty to in 2019. I give no excuses for this, after putting myself into a situation that got out of control very fast and my behaviour was very poor. As the adult, it was my responsibility to be mature and keep her safe, something I failed to do by not going to her parents and I regret how I acted still. I was given a suspended sentence of twelve months, after serving three. It was this suspended sentence I would breach in 2021 after being charged with [possession] of multiple underage images and videos downloaded to my phone from a[n] online group chat. While I stand by my defence that I believe the chat was a simple online gaming group and I had no[t] viewed any of the material, I agree I should have taken greater care to monitor what files were being downloaded to my phone.[103]
[103] Exhibit 1, pp 93-94.
The Applicant completed the GS:PP between 21 March 2023 and 5 May 2023.[104] The programme completion report contains generally favourable comments regarding the Applicant’s participation. It indicates that he had a score of 4 on the Static-99R actuarial tool. This is ‘Risk Level IVa – Above average risk’ on the Static 99R Coding Manual 2016 (revised), indicating a meaningfully elevated risk when compared with other adult male sex offenders.[105] The completion report contains a summary of the Applicant’s offending in his own words as follows:
[104] See Exhibit 1, pp 380-383.
[105] See Exhibit 1, p 380; Helmus & Ors, ‘Static-99R: Strengths, limitations, predictive accuracy meta-analysis and legal admissibility review’, Psychology, Public Policy and Law 2022 Vol 28(3), pp 307-331 <
[The Applicant] described that he was drinking heavily and suffering from depression in the lead up to his offending. [The Applicant] reported he was invited to live with his best friend and his partner on their farm following concerns they had in relation to [the Applicant’s] mental health. His friend’s partner had three children from a previous relationship, two boys aged 14 and 17, and a nine-year-old daughter. Whilst living at the farm [the Applicant] recounted he began spending the entire day with her and at times staying up all night. [The Applicant] advised that he would lie on the victim’s bed in her bedroom to play playstation with her. Significantly, [the Applicant] identified he ceased spending time with his best friend due to his work hours and preferred to spend his time with the victim.
[The Applicant] stated he eventually was offered work and moved back into the local township but would still visit the farm on the weekends so he could spend time with the victim who was now around the age of 11. He said at this point there was a lot of talk and gossip in relation to the time he was spending with the victim, however he did not see the issue. He described how in early 2016 the victim had made them both beaded bracelets and referred to them as a “friendship bracelets”. He then went on to report they had a fight following the victim giving him the bracelet, where she was calling him names, but within his presentation it was unclear how they became engaged in the argument. He described this as a major red flag, acknowledging he should [have] recognised there was an issue within his interactions with the victim.
At the end of 2016 [the Applicant] was laid off from his cleaning job and started to fall into old habits of drinking and isolating himself. He identified the only time he didn’t want to drink was when he was spending time with the victim child. Once the victim had a phone, he commenced interacting with her via texts. [The Applicant] advised in the beginning they would talk about normal things but before long she was telling him ‘secrets’ he would keep from her parents. He spoke about how on the morning of the victim’s 13th birthday she texted him details relating to her engagement in sexual behaviour. [The Applicant] described how he had become angry at this and told her how it was too much information and that he should tell her parents. He said she had accused him of being jealous and at the time he did not want to admit that she was right. Following this he stated the relationship between them changed and their texting and games became more sexual where he described the victim would [engage in sexualised behaviour]. He acknowledge[d] how he would smile and laugh when she did this. [The Applicant] spoke of an occasion where the victim had text[ed] him and asked him to come to her room and have sex with her. He stated his answer was that he didn’t have protection and did not want to get her pregnant or get caught. He also discussed additional messages of a sexual nature after this occasion.
…
[The Applicant’s] disclosure regarding this offence is consistent with official information. It was noted within his presentation [the Applicant] described and reflected largely on the behaviour of the victim. Once challenged on this, he was able to reflect more on himself and acknowledged he was the adult and it was his responsibility to act as such, demonstrating insight. Future treatment should explore his perceptions of appropriate sexual behaviour and boundaries.
[The Applicant] reported he served three months imprisonment before being released in 2019. He stated following his release he was found to have an application on his phone with chats that contained Child Exploitation Material (CEM). [The Applicant] denied accessing this material purposefully and stated he was using the application to download pirated movies and games…
Official documentation regarding this offence indicates there were multiple folders of CEM present on his mobile device, inclusive of video files depicting female children of similar age to the victim of his grooming offence. It is recommended this be further explore[d] with [the Applicant] in future treatment.
…
Themes and patterns identified throughout [the Applicant’s] Autobiography include loneliness throughout his life, a lack of respect for women, a lack of parental guidance and role modelling from his father as he was shut down, using alcohol to cope and ongoing commitment issues. His strengths included recognition, acknowledgement around needing to end unhealthy relationships, will power, strong work ethic and perseverance.
The GS:PP facilitators recommended that the Applicant undergo formal assessment using the Stable 2007 actuarial tool, which considers dynamic risk factors for sexual recidivism, and that he participate in a Medium Intensity Sexual Offending Program (MISOP).[106]
[106] Exhibit 1, pp 380-382.
On 7 July 2023, the PBQ sent another natural justice letter to the Applicant, inviting him to comment on their preliminary view that, notwithstanding his employment in custody, good behaviour and participation in the GS:PP, he posed an unacceptably high risk to the community.[107] This letter included reference to a view, reported to have been conveyed by the Applicant to an officer of the Board on 8 June 2023, that he did not require further intervention within custody or the community but would be willing to participate if required to do so.[108] The Board noted that until the Applicant completed the MISOP they believed his risk to be unacceptably high and that his risk would be less if supervised after completion of that course.[109]
[107] Exhibit 1, pp 384-389.
[108] See Exhibit 1, pp 387,422.
[109] Exhibit 1, p 387.
The Applicant was refused release on parole on 17 August 2023.
The Applicant had been shortlisted for the MISOP since November 2022.[110] He was transferred to Wolston Correctional Centre in June 2023 for that purpose.[111] In the event, the Applicant declined to participate in the MISOP in August 2023 on the basis that he would be serving his full-term and preferred to participate in vocational education.[112] The Applicant completed a kitchen course in March 2024,[113] and was discharged from state custody on 16 May 2024.[114]
[110] See Exhibit 1, p 419.
[111] See Exhibit 1, p 420.
[112] See Exhibit 1, p 423; evidence on 12 May 2025.
[113] See Exhibit 1, p 400.
[114] See Exhibit 1, pp 425-426.
The Applicant was taken into immigration detention thereafter, where he remains. He has not undertaken any courses in immigration detention.[115]
[115] Evidence on 12 May 2025.
The Applicant was cross-examined regarding his risk of sexual offending, as follows:
Counsel: In 2019, you were convicted of grooming a child under 16 with intent to procure a sex act, do you agree with that?
Applicant: Yes.
Counsel: And you plead guilty to that, is that correct?
Applicant: Yes.
Counsel: And are you aware of what pleading guilty to that charge means?
Applicant: I wasn’t at the time. It probably took a bit later to learn exactly what I had done. But, yeh – I do, yeh, realise pleading guilty what I had done.
Counsel: Ok. I might just unpack that a little bit. When you say that you didn’t at the time?
Applicant:At the time, I didn’t actually realise what grooming was. I kind of didn’t realise what the seriousness of what I had done. It wasn’t until I had done the programmes and sort of realised the gravity of what, yeh, the sex programmes and that. And said, at the time, I sort of had that attitude that I didn’t think I had done anything wrong.
Counsel: But, in terms of the offence itself, it was grooming a child under 16 with intent to procure a sex act?
Applicant: Yes.
Counsel:So, you have an understanding of about what that means, that you agreed that you did?
Applicant: Yes.
Counsel:Ok. Can you explain to me what you understand that conviction means?
Applicant:We were just, we were texting and yeh they said I was very inappropriate with the texting, some of the messages I sent to her.
Counsel:And that, in particular, the term with intent to procure a sex act, means that you were intending to groom that child so that you could engage in sexual behaviour with them?
Applicant: Yes, well that’s what they said, yes.
Counsel: And you don’t agree with that?
Applicant: No. But that’s, I pleaded guilty to it, so I will accept it.
Counsel: So, having plead guilty to it, you don’t agree that that’s?
Applicant:I agreed that I was very inappropriate with some of the words that I said, and some of the messages that I had sent. But, yeh, I was never – I don’t believe that I was trying to go for a sexual relationship. But I did agree that I was inappropriate with some of the words that I used and stuff.
Counsel:And, at the time you pleaded guilty, you had a lawyer available to you?
Applicant: I did, yes.
…
Counsel: [Counsel took the Applicant to his letter sent to the Minister’s Department in February 2023, extracted at [76] above].
Do you consider that that is a full explanation about your offending behaviour?
Applicant:In ways, there’s, I still do and I still don’t. This was written before I did the sex offender’s course. I still do agree with some of that. I do wish I had gone to her parents and told her parents a lot of what was said and what was going on. But there’s, also, yes, I was definitely the adult, so I did take a lot of the responsibility. But yeh learning a lot of things after doing the sex offender’s course, about how things I did, things I said, and that yeh I would have definitely wrote things a lot different.
Counsel:I see. So, if you had the opportunity to write it again, what is it that you would say?
Applicant:I would probably, like, I say like ‘I found myself in a situation that got out of control’. I would say that ‘I put myself in a situation’. That, I said, I could have went to people. That, and yeh – I put myself into a situation, by texting a minor and, I think I was enjoying the attention she was giving me. So, in a way, I didn’t want it to end. She was giving me attention, I was enjoying that. And, as I said, I say that ‘I found myself in a situation that I couldn’t control’, but it was a situation that I was enjoying at that time.
Counsel:When you say, enjoying, you got sexual gratification from those messages?
Applicant:It was more the attention. I was in a spot where I was like, yeh, depressed, I was lonely and she was making me feel important.
Counsel:Yes, but my question is - you get sexual gratification from those messages?
Applicant:No. It was not a sexual sort of – if you, there are copies of the messages she sent and they weren’t what you would class as sexual.
…
Counsel:Are you able to give some explanation about your contacting [Child A after your release from prison in 2019, in 2021-2022?]
Applicant: Yeh. It was never in my reporting. It was never a requirement.
Counsel: Is that a complete answer?
Applicant:No. We only contacted her. She contacted me to play an online game. I said no. Then there was nothing in my reporting to say that she couldn’t contact me or I shouldn’t contact her. So, I didn’t think much of it, so I never reported it. But it was not like a phone conversation. She sent me a text. I said no. I didn’t think, as I said, I didn’t think that it was anything that needed to be reported.
…
Counsel: So, can I just go to the contact you say occurred. You have said that the child got in contact requesting to play a game?
Applicant: Yep.
Counsel: And, also, that she sent you a text?
Applicant: She texted my aunt - one of the women that I was living with, yes.
Counsel:I see. So, can I just stop. Was there one form of contact or did she contact you in different ways?
Applicant:She texted my aunt and asked if we wanted to play online games. And then, yeh, she would text me on the PlayStation.
Counsel: So, she texted you directly?
Applicant: Yeh, on the PlayStation.
Counsel:And how did she know, do you know, that you were living with your aunt?
Applicant: No, well, she just texted my aunt. I don’t know.
Counsel: And which aunt was this?
Applicant:Not my aunt, it was my ex-wife’s aunt. Yeh, I just call her my aunt. My ex-wife’s aunt. So, she was just a friend.
Counsel:And do you have any idea how this child knew that you were staying with this person, how to get in contact with this person?
Applicant:She talks to her.
Counsel:Did they know each other?
Applicant:Yeh.
Counsel:How do they know each other?
Applicant:Her, the lady I was living with, her son is the step-father.
Tribunal:The step-father of the girl?
Applicant:Yep.
Counsel:And the fact of that message was passed on to you?
Applicant:Yeh.
Counsel:And what did you do?
Applicant:Nothing at the time. I just said no. I said no. Then later yeh we started texting on the PlayStation.
Counsel:Can you tell me about the texting on the PlayStation?
Applicant:It wasn’t much texting. We just played an online game.
Counsel:I see. So, you played an online game?
Applicant:Yep.
Counsel:And what was the texting?
Applicant:Just to play an online game.
Counsel:Ok. So, can you give a bit more detail about what the texting said? Was there more than one text?
Applicant:No, as I said, it was just do you want to come online and play a game.
Counsel:And who sent that?
Applicant:She did.
Counsel:And you didn’t send anything in reply?
Applicant:No, I just went online and played a game.
Counsel:And, at the time, that didn’t strike you as entirely inappropriate?
Applicant:This was, as I said in that other letter, when I did the three months for the first imprisonment. It was, it was not enough. I came out thinking that I had. As I have said, I had that attitude thinking that I had done nothing wrong. It wasn’t until I had done the longer course at Woodford, that, when I started doing the sex education programmes, that I actually started to realise what I have done. But, at that period, I didn’t think that I had done anything wrong or even, yeh, that was what I was saying about the letter, it took me a while to realise that what I had actually done.
Counsel:But, in your evidence today, your evidence is still, for example, that you don’t consider any of the messages you exchanged with that child to be sexual in nature?
Applicant:No. I said that they were inappropriate but I don’t believe that they, that I was trying to have sex with her, no.
Counsel: No but -
Applicant:But I say that they were inappropriate.
Counsel:But the evidence you have given is, you deny that the messages themselves were sexual in nature?
Applicant:Yes.
…
Counsel:And part of the child exploitation material that was found to be in your possession included a video of a young 14-year-old boy and girl engaging in sex, is that correct?
Applicant:I don’t know. I never saw any of it.
Counsel:I see. I suggest to you -
Applicant:I was. They did, they told me what it was.
Counsel:I suggest to you that you did see that material?
Applicant:Yep.
Counsel:And that, you had been aware of what was on it prior to your conviction?
Applicant:Yep.
Counsel:You agree with that?
Applicant:Sorry?
Counsel:Do you agree?
Applicant:It was downloaded from a Telegram account.
Counsel:Yes. And so, when I say I am suggesting to you, I am saying that when your evidence that you didn’t see that video is not true and, in fact, that you had watched and seen that video?
Applicant:No. Nah. I mighta, what that site was. I was aware of what was on there. That was what I told them. So, I did take responsibility. I knew very well what videos and stuff was on there. But I downloaded a bunch. When you do a batch download, it just downloads all mods and everything from the page. And, usually, I would keep the mods and delete all the videos. And this time I just kept the videos.
Tribunal:Mr [Applicant], isn’t Telegram a bit like WhatsApp, it is a messaging service?
Applicant:Yes.
Tribunal:So, how is it that you wouldn’t be aware of what you were downloading on the message service?
Applicant:That’s what I meant. As I said, I was fully aware of what I was getting. I was just trying to get the game mods. So, I would keep the game mods and then I would delete all of the videos. But this time, I didn’t get around to deleting the videos. So, as I have said, I was aware of what was on the page and what I was getting, but I was not going on there to get the videos. I was just trying to get the game mods. But yeh it was stupid.
Counsel:So, you knew, at the time, you were downloading videos of children having sex?
Applicant:Yeh.
Counsel:The better explanation, isn’t it, is that you downloaded that material because you wanted to watch it?
Applicant:I can’t make you believe what I say, I can only give you what I was trying to do.
Counsel:And you wanted to watch it because children of that age engaging in sexual is something that gives you sexual gratification?
Applicant:Nope.
After the above exchanges, the Applicant was subsequently taken by counsel to his application(s) for parole and the GS:PP completion report (summarised above). He talked about how he never saw himself as a ‘predator’. That, in 2018, he thought he was just being a friend to Child A and that it took him a long time to realise that he probably was grooming her (but this was not his initial intention). He admitted that there had been ‘a number of failures’, including texting Child A, not telling her parents and spending too much time with her. The Applicant did not think he ‘targeted’ Child A.
As observed above in the premise to this section of reasoning, for most of the Applicant’s evidence he continued to deny a sexual interest in Child A. His attention was drawn in cross-examination to the texts of the nine example conversations from 2018. Notwithstanding the clear sexual context to those messages, the Applicant tried to suggest that some of the messages did not reveal sexual interest or amount to sexual advances. He described the messages as in effect ‘playful banter’ or ‘us being stupid at the time’. This evidence was far from convincing. For example, with respect to Conversation 1, the Applicant was asked by counsel about what context was necessary to understand or explain sending ‘I got horny just looking at u’ to a child? His response was that this was what he meant about ‘being inappropriate’ and was why he pleaded guilty to grooming. In Conversation 2, the Applicant asked Child A for photographs in various states of undress. He tried to suggest that his original intention in this conversation was as a form of mentoring or pastoral care because the child was being bullied at school about her appearance. However, he later admitted that the subsequent messages in this extract of conversation was why he ‘got done for grooming’ and were ‘inappropriate’. Counsel asked the Applicant to read all of the conversations and asked him whether his evidence remained that the messages he engaged in were not sexual in nature? He admitted that they were ‘definitely sexual in nature’ but said that what he was getting out of it was ‘attention’, not ‘sexual gratification’. He tried to suggest that his earlier evidence (quoted at [88] above) was that he was not getting sexually aroused during this period or that the messages were not sexually motivated. He confirmed during cross-examination that he did not believe that he required further treatment but was willing to undergo it if this was required of him.
The Tribunal finds, based on the evidence before it, that the Applicant poses an above average risk of re-offending in a sexual way. It is evident that:
(a)the Applicant has a history of sexual offending with regard to teenage girls;
(b)the Applicant has unmet treatment needs, including requiring further professional assessment of his dynamic risk factors and subsequent therapy;
(c)the Applicant has very limited insight into those risk factors, including his underlying motivations for prior conduct; and
(d)there are limited protective factors going forward, namely the Applicant’s father (and to a lesser extent, his brother) and his reporting obligations under the CP Act.
The Applicant also has very poor judgement and consequential thinking, including by electing not to complete the MISOP programme in state custody, contacting Child A after his first conviction and sentence, and by generally denying the recommendations of those qualified to give it that he has unmet treatment needs.
The Tribunal considered the Applicant to have a level of contrition. However, the Tribunal agrees with the Minister’s closing submission that this goes ‘hand in glove with insight’ in the overall assessment of risk.
The Tribunal further agrees with the Minister’s closing submission that the combination of the Applicant’s limited insight and poor judgement is ‘striking’ and that the offending in this case only stopped because it was discovered.
Conclusion on the protection of the Australian community
The Tribunal has found the Applicant poses an above average risk of re-offending in a sexual way. The question that arises then is whether that risk is ‘unacceptable’?
The Tribunal recently referred to this balancing exercise in Re CLKQ and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] ARTA 231 at [90]-[91].
In the Tribunal’s view, the risk of repetition of child sexual abuse in this case crosses the threshold where any risk of repetition is properly considered to be ‘unacceptable’ for the purposes of the Direction.[116]
[116] Direction cls 5.2(6)-(8), 8.1(1), 8.1.1(1)(a)(i)-(ii), 8.1.2(1)-(2), 8.5(2)(c).
The Minister submitted that, if the Tribunal reached those conclusions, it should find that this primary consideration would weigh determinatively against revocation.[117]
[117] RSFIC, [42]; closing submissions.
The Tribunal finds this primary consideration to weigh against revocation.
Strength, nature and duration of ties to Australia
The Tribunal is required to consider any impact of the decision on the Applicant’s immediate family members in Australia.[118] The Tribunal must also consider the strength, nature, and duration of any other ties that the Applicant has to the Australian community, having regard to how long he has resided in Australia,[119] and the ‘strength, duration and nature of any family or social links with Australian citizens, Australian permanent residents and/or people who have an indefinite right to remain in Australia’.[120]
[118] Direction cl 8.3(1).
[119] Direction cl 8.3(2)(a).
[120] Direction cl 8.3(2)(b).
The Applicant’s status as a New Zealand citizen belies the fact that his only ties to that country is his birth and short residence there as an infant. The Applicant’s immediate family consists of his Australian-citizen father and older brother, who are each 83 and 52 years of age, respectively. Both live in New South Wales. The father lives in Sydney. The older brother lives in Dubbo. The Applicant has been resident in Australia for some 45 years and has never left since arriving in September 1980. He was educated in New South Wales and then moved to Queensland, where he was employed, married, divorced, and imprisoned.
The Tribunal received written and oral evidence from the Applicant’s father.[121] He was supportive of the Applicant living with him in New South Wales notwithstanding that he had no real knowledge of the Applicant’s sexual offending. He wrote:
…While I con[s]ider [m]y health to be in good condition, I do need his help around the house and going to the store and I believe living with me would be better for [the Applicant] than having him released to live alone, as he has no friends, family or emotional support in New Zealand.[122]
…
[The Applicant’s] older brother comes to visit me on a [fortnightly basis], and is looking forward to seeing his brother. [The Applicant] does suffer from [social anxiety] … [h]is brother has always been someone he can sociali[s]e and communicate comfortably [with]. They have always been close and I believe separating them would be a cruel punishment.[123]
[121] See Exhibit 1, p 430; Exhibit 2.
[122] Exhibit 2.
[123] Exhibit 1, p 430.
The Applicant also testified that this father’s advanced age reduced the prospects of him being able to travel to New Zealand to see him, should he be unsuccessful in this application.
The above evidence was not challenged by the Minister. The Tribunal therefore finds that the impact of an adverse decision on the Applicant’s immediate family weighs in favour of revocation.
The Tribunal also accepts that the Applicant has built a life in Australia and that he has family and social links to this country, and to no other. Until he received notice of the mandatory cancellation, the Applicant thought he was Australian and did not know that his permission to remain in this country could be rescinded. The Applicant’s offending began in adulthood and therefore does not detract from the weight which should be given to his lengthy residence, family, and social links.[124]
[124] Direction cl 8.3(2)(a)
The Minister accepted that that this consideration weighed in the Applicant’s favour but submitted that it should not outweigh the other primary considerations.[125]
[125] RSFIC, [68].
The Tribunal finds that this primary consideration, including the impact on the Applicant’s immediate family and the strength, nature and duration of the Applicant’s ties to Australia, weighs in favour of revocation.
Expectations of the Australian Community
This primary consideration is a ‘kind of deeming provision’,[126] which requires the Tribunal to consider the Minister’s articulation of community expectations.[127]
[126] YNQY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1466, [76].
[127] Direction, cl 8.5(4).
Clause 8.5(1) of the Direction provides that ‘the Australian community expects non-citizens to obey Australian laws while in Australia’. The Direction goes on to state that:[128]
[w]here a non-citizen has engaged in serious conduct in breach of this expectation, or where there is an unacceptable risk that they may do so, the Australian community, as a norm, expects the Government would not allow such a non-citizen to enter or remain in Australia.
[128] Direction, cl 8.5(1).
Clause 8.5(2) then adds to that first ‘norm’ and indicates that non-revocation may be appropriate in a particular case ‘simply because the nature of the character concerns or offences is such that the Australian community would expect that the person should not be granted or continue to hold a visa’. It specifies ‘commission of serious crimes against …children’, including ‘crimes of a violent or sexual nature’ and ‘commission of crimes against government representatives or officials due to the position they hold, or in the performance of their duties’, as attracting that further expectation.[129]
[129] Direction, cls 8.5(2)(c)-(d).
The Applicant has not obeyed Australian laws whilst he has been in Australia. He relevantly engaged in very serious offending and conduct about which the Tribunal has already made findings. This conduct also attracts the second norm because it includes sexual offending against children and because the Applicant has previously been convicted of assaulting a police officer in the performance of their duty.
These norms apply ‘regardless of whether the Applicant poses a [measurable] risk of causing physical harm to the Australian community’.[130] Nevertheless, the Tribunal notes that it does consider the Applicant to pose an unacceptable risk of re-offending in a sexual way but that there is negligible risk of repetition concerning the previous assault public officer offence.
[130] Direction cl 5.2(8).
However, this does not mean that the Tribunal is to assess what the Australian community’s expectations would be in this particular case. The Minister referred the Tribunal to Ismail v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (2024) 94 ALJR 196 at [51]-[52], where the High Court unanimously held that an equivalent direction in the previous Direction 90 was ‘to be weighed with other relevant matters as required by paras 6 and 7 of [the] Direction’.[131]
[131] RSFIC, [75].
In assessing the weight to be given to the norms contained with the Direction, the Tribunal is guided by the principles articulated at cl 5.2 of the Direction. Specifically:
1Australia has a sovereign right to determine whether non-citizens who are of character concern are allowed to … remain in Australia. Being able to … remain [here] is a privilege [conferred] on non-citizens in the expectation that they are, and have been, law-abiding, will respect important institutions…, and will not cause harm to individuals or the Australian community.
2The safety of the Australian Community is the highest priority of the Australian Government.
3Non-citizens who engage or have engaged in criminal or other serious conduct should expect to … forfeit the privilege of staying in Australia.
4The Australian community expects that the Australian Government can and should … cancel [non-citizen’s] visas, if they engaged in conduct…that raises serious character concerns … regardless of whether [they pose a risk] of causing physical harm to the Australian community.
5With respect to decisions to …revoke cancellation of a visa, Australia may afford a higher level of tolerance of criminal or other serious conduct by non-citizens who have lived in the Australian community for most of their life, or from a very young age.
6[Whilst the Tribunal must consider the Applicant’s particular circumstances, the nature of some conduct, or the harm that would be caused if it were to be repeated] may be so serious that even strong countervailing considerations may be insufficient to justify…revoking a mandatory cancellation.
7The inherent nature of certain conduct [such as child sex offences] is so serious that even strong countervailing considerations may be insufficient to justify …revoking a mandatory cancellation, even if the information available at the time of consideration suggests that the non-citizen does not pose a [measurable] risk of causing physical harm to the Australian community.
The Tribunal finds that this primary consideration weighs against revocation.
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
Legal consequences of the decision
The Tribunal is required to consider the legal consequences of its decision.[132] That is, the Tribunal must have regard to the statutory framework in which the power to revoke a mandatory cancellation decision exists, including the direct and immediate consequences of an exercise of the power (including any decision under s 105 of the ART Act).
[132] Direction cl 9.1(1). See also NBMZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 220 FCR 1, [3], [9]-[10]; Taulahi v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 246 FCR 146, [84], [88].
There are three major consequences of visa refusal or cancellation under s 501 and related provisions:
(a)
a prohibition, within the migration zone, on applying for other types of visas under
s 501E of the Migration Act (other than a protection visa or a bridging (removal pending) visa);[133]
(b)refusal/cancellation of other visa applications/visas under s 501F of the Migration Act; and
(c)the possible application of periods of exclusion and special return criteria under s 503 of the Migration Act and SRC 5001 and 5002 in Sch 5 to the Migration Regulations. This includes permanent exclusion where SRC 5001 applies unless the Minister acts personally to grant a permanent visa to the person under s 195A.
[133] See also Migration Act s 46(1)(d).
These adverse consequences can each be avoided by a positive decision to revoke the cancellation decision, and it should not be assumed that Parliament has evinced any preference as to the outcome of the review.[134]
[134] See Stoneley and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 143, [36].
When the Applicant’s APV was cancelled, he became an ‘unlawful non-citizen’.[135] That is, a non-citizen in the migration zone that did not hold a visa that is in effect.[136] Because of that status (and the fact that he is an alien for constitutional purposes), the Applicant was liable to be detained under s 189(1) of the Migration Act. That occurred on 16 May 2024, when he was released from the state custody.
[135] Migration Act s 15.
[136] See Migration Act ss 13-14.
The Applicant is relevantly required to be detained under the Migration Act until he is either removed from Australia under s 198 or he is granted a visa (including having his APV restored to him under s 501CA(4)).[137] Sections 198(1) and (2B) of the Migration Act relevantly provide for removal either at written request or where there has been a mandatory cancellation and a subsequent decision made not to revoke that cancellation, respectively.
[137] Migration Act ss 196(1)(a), 196(1)(c), 196(4)-(5), 501C(6)-(7).
There is no reason to suppose that any required removal to New Zealand would not be practicable in the reasonably foreseeable future. Further, the Applicant is not presently the subject of a protection finding.[138] On the material before the Tribunal, there is no apparent basis upon which Australia’s non-refoulement obligations could be engaged with respect to New Zealand.
[138] See Direction cl 9.1.2.
The Minister’s counsel accepted that a likely consequence of a decision to affirm the reviewable decision would be that the Applicant would be excluded from Australia and from the living members of his family into the foreseeable future, and that this would be a factor that would favour revocation.
The legal and other consequences of the Tribunal’s decision weigh in favour of revocation.
Extent of impediments if removed
The Tribunal must consider the extent of any impediments that the Applicant may face if removed from Australia to New Zealand, in establishing himself, and in maintaining basic living standards (in the context of what is generally available to other citizens in that country), taking into account the Applicant’s age and health, whether there are substantial language or cultural barriers, and any social, medical and/or economic support available to him in New Zealand.[139]
[139] Direction cl 9.2(1).
The Applicant is 47-years-old. He testified that he is generally in good health, save that he has a long-standing epileptic condition for which he is medicated and that he is also on unspecified medication for depression and anxiety. That evidence is generally supported by the documentary material before the Tribunal, including clinical notes from QCS.[140] There is no reason to suspect that the Applicant will not be able to obtain medication and treatment in New Zealand for these conditions.
[140] See e.g. Exhibit 1, pp 420-421.
Between 2019 and 2022, the Applicant worked at a piggery. He testified that he had approximately $7,000 in superannuation arising from that employment. In prison, he completed a kitchen hand course in March 2024.
During the hearing, the Applicant accepted that there were not substantial language or cultural barriers with respect to New Zealand. The Tribunal agrees that Australia and New Zealand have deep historical and cultural ties; our close relationship predates federation.[141] That acceptance does not diminish the fact that the Applicant has spent most of his life in Australia, from an early age, and that he has no familial or social supports in New Zealand.
[141] See National Museum of Australia, New Zealand becomes a separate colony (Web Page, 18 September 2024) < Federal Council of Australasia (1885) (Imp.), s 1; Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Imp.), s 6; Bonser v La Macchia (1969) 122 CLR 177, [38]: Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, New Zealand country brief (Web Page) <
On any return to New Zealand, the Applicant may be subject to supervision by New Zealand authorities under the Returning Offenders (Management and Information) Act 2015 (NZ).[142] He would also have access to the social, medical and/or economic supports that are available to other New Zealand citizens.[143]
[142] See Department of Corrections, FAQs for Returning Offenders (Web Page, January 2019) < Ibid. See also RSFIC, [82]-[83].
The Minister’s counsel submitted in closing that there were not any impediments to the Applicant establishing himself and maintaining basic living standards in New Zealand. However, it was accepted that the Applicant may face ‘some difficulty' in re-establishing himself in New Zealand.[144]
[144] RSFIC, [82].
The Tribunal considers that the Applicant will be deeply affected by any removal to New Zealand. That emotional and psychological hardship can be dealt with, and the Applicant has previously adjusted to life in foreign places such as prison or immigration detention with little issue, but it should not be forgotten.
The Tribunal finds that the Applicant could likely re-establish himself and maintain basic living standards. Nevertheless, removal to New Zealand is a potentially devastating consequence for the Applicant which weighs in favour of revocation.
CONCLUSION
The Tribunal is required to bring together the relevant considerations in this matter and consider, as part of a single evaluation, their relative significance in terms of whether the Tribunal is ultimately satisfied that there is ‘another reason’ why the mandatory cancellation decision should be revoked.[145]
[145] See CRNL v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 138, [27]-[28]; VZWF v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 1160, [8].
Clause 7(2) of the Direction states that the primary consideration in cl 8.1 (protection of the Australian community) is ‘generally to be given greater weight than other primary considerations’, and that, otherwise, the relevant ‘primary considerations should generally be given greater weight than the [relevant] other considerations’. This guidance is consistent with the principle articulated at cl 5.2(2), that ‘the safety of the Australian community is the highest priority of the Australian government’. The Tribunal notes that this guidance does not mean that the other considerations are secondary to the primary considerations, or that they should always be given less weight.[146]
[146] See Suleiman v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 74 AAR 545.
The Tribunal has considered the relevant considerations in this matter and determined that there is not ‘another reason’ to revoke the cancellation. Those factors which weigh against revocation, particularly the consideration of the protection and expectations of the Australian community, outweighed those factors that are in favour of revocation, including his ties to Australia, the consequences of an adverse decision and the impediments to removal. The Applicant’s unacceptable risk of re-offending in a sexual way (coupled with the Minister’s articulation of community expectations) commanded that conclusion, notwithstanding the force of the other relevant factors which pointed to a contrary conclusion. The correct decision is therefore to affirm the decision under review.
DECISION
The Tribunal affirms the reviewable decision.
I certify that the preceding 135 (one hundred and thirty-five) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of General Member J Papalia
...................[SGD].....................................................
Associate
Dated: 26 May 2025
Date of hearing: 12, 15 May 2025 Applicant: Self-represented Counsel for the Respondent Ms C I Taggart Solicitors for the Respondent: Ms A Rezae, Sparke Helmore Lawyers ANNEXURE A - REASONS FOR ANONYMISATION
On 26 March 2025, the Tribunal, on its own initiative, made orders under s 70(1) of the ART Act requiring that the Applicant’s name be suppressed and replaced with a pseudonym for the purposes of the review. It did so having regard to:
(a)the principle that it is desirable that hearings of proceedings in the Tribunal are held in public;[147] and
[147] ART Act s 71(2)(a).
(b)the reasons in favour of making the order, namely that the conduct requiring consideration by the Tribunal included child sex offences committed in Queensland where the complainant was a family friend of the Applicant and where the facts of that conduct appeared to be in dispute based upon representations made to the delegate by the Applicant.
The Queensland Commissioner of Police and the Director of Public Prosecutions for Queensland each requested that the Tribunal consider the sensitive nature of the material that they produced under summons in this proceeding related to that conduct or to the possession of CEM.
Relevantly, both Queensland and Western Australian law generally prohibit the publication of any matter likely to lead members of the public to identify a complainant of a sexual offences.[148]
[148] Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1978 (Qld), s 6; Evidence Act 1906 (WA), s 36C.
It is common practice in both Queensland and Western Australia to suppress the names of sex offenders who seek to challenge consequential administrative decisions that are directly related to their underlying convictions or charges.[149] This is done to protect the privacy and welfare of the complainants.[150] It is not done in order to protect the privacy or welfare of the applicants. Each case will turn on its facts.
[149] See Re M and Chief Executive Officer of Department for Community Development [2009] WASAT 6, [8].
[150] See Hill v State of Western Australia (No 2) [2022] WASCA 149, [8].
Noting that the Tribunal made those orders on its own initiative and that it did not give reasons for making them, the Minister subsequently objected to them on the basis that there was not a proper basis for departing from the ‘norm’ established by s 71(2)(a) of the ART Act.[151]
[151] See ASIC v AAT (2009) 181 FCR 130, [74]-[76].
When challenged by the Tribunal regarding the basis for the orders, this evolved to a submission that ‘the available information does not reveal an obvious or clear connection between the identity of the Applicant and the identity of the complainant.’[152]
[152] RSFIC, [22].
That submission was poorly made in circumstances where the grooming offence was committed against a family friend in rural Queensland and where the Tribunal was required to consider the conduct and consequent risk profile in intricate detail. Accordingly, the Tribunal remained of the view that the confidentiality orders made were appropriate and necessary for the protection of the complainant.
I certify that the preceding 7 (seven) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of General Member J Papalia
...................[SGD].....................................................
Associate
Dated: 26 May 2025
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