Tucci v The Chief Executive Officer of the Department of Transport and Major Infrastructure

[2025] WADC 80

JURISDICTION     :   DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CIVIL

LOCATION:   PERTH

CITATION:   TUCCI -v- THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT AND MAJOR INFRASTRUCTURE [2025] WADC 80

CORAM:   JEYAMOHAN DCJ

HEARD:   12 SEPTEMBER 2025 & SUBMISSIONS PROVIDED 17 & 22 SEPTEMBER 2025

DELIVERED          :   10 NOVEMBER 2025

FILE NO/S:   CIVO 116 of 2025

BETWEEN:   VINCENZO TUCCI

Applicant

AND

THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT AND MAJOR INFRASTRUCTURE

Respondent

Catchwords:

Application for extraordinary licence - Road Traffic (Authorisation to Drive) Act 2008 (WA) - Whether principal means of obtaining income encompasses alternative employment - Turns on own facts

Legislation:

Road Traffic (Authorisation to Drive) Act 2008 (WA), s 27, s 28, s 30, s 32

Result:

Application allowed

Chief Executive Officer ordered to grant the applicant an extraordinary licence for a period of 12 months subject to appropriate conditions

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant	:	Mr M Tennent-Brown
Respondent	:	Mr A Hornigold

Solicitors:

Applicant	:	Austral Legal Pty Ltd
Respondent	:	Department of Transport - Legal & Legislative Services

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue [2009] HCA 41; (2009) 239 CLR 27

Australian Unity Property Ltd v City of Busselton [2018] WASCA 38

Certain Lloyd's Underwriters Subscribing to Contract No IH00AAQS v Cross [2012] HCA 56; (2012) 248 CLR 378

CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd [1997] HCA 2; (1997) 187 CLR 384

Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd [2012] HCA 55; (2012) 250 CLR 503

Director General of Department of Transport v McKenzie [2016] WASCA 147

Inco Europe Ltd v First Choice Distribution (a firm) [2000] 1 WLR 586; [2000] 2 All ER 109

Italiano v The Director General of Transport [1999] WASCA 40; (1999) 29 MVR 249

Lenegan v Director General of the Department of Transport [2012] WADC 102

McGree v The Chief Executive Officer of the Department of Transport [2024] WADC 96

Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations v Gribbles Radiology Pty Ltd [2005] HCA 9; (2005) 222 CLR 194

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJGV [2009] HCA 40; (2009) 238 CLR 642

Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28; (1998) 194 CLR 355

Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] HCA 23; (2010) 241 CLR 252

Taylor v The Owners - Strata Plan 11564 [2014] HCA 9; (2014) 253 CLR 531

Thiess v Collector of Customs [2014] HCA 12; (2014) 250 CLR 664

Wentworth Securities Ltd v Jones [1980] AC 74

JEYAMOHAN DCJ:

Introduction

1. On 10 February 2025, the applicant, Mr Vincenzo Tucci, was disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for a period of three years as a result of having been convicted for failing to stop and assist in circumstances of grievous bodily harm, contrary to s 54(1), s 54(2) and s 54(3)(b) of the Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA) (RTA).

1. Mr Tucci pleaded guilty to the offence and was sentenced to 16 months' imprisonment, of which four months were served immediately (from 10 February to 10 June 2025) and 12 months suspended until 10 June 2026.  This is Mr Tucci's first criminal conviction.

2. Mr Tucci was working at the time of the commission of the offence on 15 March 2023 as operations manager for Shepheard Pty Ltd (Shepheard).

3. The offence occurred in circumstances where Mr Tucci inadvertently ran over a person (Mr Jones) who was 'sleeping rough' on a hardstand area beside the Water Corporation wastewater pumping station situated at Lot 282 Bussell Highway, Margaret River whilst driving into the site in a Mitsubishi tanker truck.[1]  The incident occurred at approximately 5.10 am on 15 March 2023.

   [1] Affidavit of Vincenzo Tucci affirmed 2 July 2025 (Tucci Affidavit), page 8, Attachment C, Amended Statement of Material Facts, pars 1 - 5.

4. The offence did not involve speed, drugs or alcohol.

5. By application dated 7 July 2025 (as amended with leave) (Application), Mr Tucci has applied to this court under s 27 of the Road Traffic (Authorisation to Drive) Act 2008 (WA) (the Act) for an order directing the Chief Executive Officer of the Department of Transport (CEO) to grant him an extraordinary licence to enable him to resume work as operations manager at Shepheard.[2]  The Application is opposed by the CEO.

   [2] As the disqualification was imposed by this court, the Application was required to be made to this court: s 29(1).

6. The Application was heard on 12 September 2025. Following the hearing, orders were made permitting both parties to file further submissions regarding the timing of the Application and the operation of s 30(4)(b) of the Act. The parties filed their submissions on 17 September 2025 and 22 September 2025, respectively.

7. For the reasons that follow, I am satisfied that the refusal of the Application would:

   1.place an undue financial burden on Mr Tucci by depriving him of his principal means of obtaining income within the meaning of s 30(4)(b) of the Act; and

   2.deprive Mr Tucci of the only practicable means of travelling to and from the place at which he is employed within the meaning of s 30(4)(c) of the Act.

8. Further, having taken into account and considered each of the mandatory relevant considerations set out in s 30(2) of the Act, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to grant the Application, subject to appropriate conditions, and make an order directing the CEO to grant Mr Tucci an extraordinary licence for a period of 12 months pursuant to s 30(1)(a) of the Act.

Legislative framework

1. By s 27(1) of the Act, a person who is disqualified under the Act or any other written law from holding or obtaining a driver's licence may apply to a court for an order directing the CEO to grant to the person an extraordinary licence.

2. The power to grant an extraordinary licence is found in s 30 of the Act, in the following terms:

   30.Matters for consideration of court

   (1)A court may -

   (a)make an order directing the CEO, on payment of the prescribed fee, to grant to the applicant an extraordinary licence for a period not exceeding 12 months from the date on which it is granted as the court thinks fit; or

   (b)refuse the application.

   (2)In making a decision for the purposes of subsection (1), the court is to have regard to -

   (a)the safety of the public generally; and

   (b)the character of the applicant; and

   (c)the circumstances of the case; and

   (d)the nature of the offence or offences giving rise to the disqualification; and

   (e)the conduct of the applicant subsequent to the disqualification.

   [(3) deleted]

   (4)Despite subsections (1) and (2), the court must not make an order directing the grant of an extraordinary licence unless it is satisfied that the refusal of the application would -

   (a)deprive the applicant of the means of obtaining urgent medical treatment for an illness, disease or disability known to be suffered by the applicant or a person who is a member of his or her family; or

   (b)place an undue financial burden on the applicant or his or her family, by depriving the applicant of his or her principal means of obtaining income; or

   (c)deprive the applicant or a person who is a member of the applicant's family of the only practicable means of travelling to and from the place at which the applicant or that person, as the case may be, is employed.

1. The matters specified in s 30(2) of the Act are mandatory relevant considerations.[3]  In exercising its discretion the five mandatory relevant considerations referred to above must be taken into account.  They involve various potentially countervailing considerations that the court must weigh against each other in deciding whether to grant a licence or not.[4]

   [3] Director General of Department of Transport v McKenzie [2016] WASCA 147 [52] (Buss P, with whom Murphy JA & Beech J agreed) (McKenzie).

   [4] McKenzie [52].

2. The effect of s 30(4) of the Act is that the court is prohibited from making an order under s 30(1)(a), directing the CEO to grant to the applicant an extraordinary licence, unless the court is satisfied that the refusal of the application would have the consequence specified in par (a) or par (b) or par (c) of s 30(4).[5]

   [5] McKenzie [54].

1. The court may only grant an extraordinary licence for the purpose of overcoming or relieving one or more of the specified consequences which the applicant has established, by evidence, to the court's satisfaction.[6]

   [6] McKenzie [68] (Buss P, Murphy JA & Beech J agreeing).

2. While a mandatory precondition to granting an application specified in subsection (4) has been satisfied, it does not necessarily follow that the court must exercise its discretion to grant the application.[7]

   [7] McGree v The Chief Executive Officer of the Department of Transport [2024] WADC 96 [10] (McGree).

3. Under s 32(1)(b) of the Act the court may impose such conditions as it thinks proper subject to the observance of which the authority to drive under the licence may be exercised. The power is to be exercised consistently with the objects of the Act, which are primarily derived from s 30(2) and s 30(4).[8] Any conditions imposed must relate or be incidental to overcoming or relieving one of the consequences specified in subpars (a), (b) or (c) of s 30(4) and the discretionary power to impose conditions must be exercised consistently with s 30(2) and s 30(4).[9] The court may, in an appropriate case, reconcile countervailing considerations under s 30(2) by imposing conditions that would make the granting of an application appropriate.[10]

   [8] McKenzie [65] - [66], [69].

   [9] McKenzie [70].

   [10] McKenzie [68].

Circumstances of the offence

1. The circumstances of the offence can be summarised as follows.

2. Lot 282 Bussell Highway, Margaret River, is a Water Corporation wastewater pumping station (Site).  Access to the Site is not restricted and it is an access point for the public to access nature trails.  The Site has no lighting.[11]  The surface to the access track to the Site is unsealed.  There is an area beside the water pump station which has a sealed bitumen surface, referred to as a hardstand.[12]

   [11] Tucci Affidavit, page 8, Attachment C, Amended Statement of Material Facts, par 1.

   [12] Tucci Affidavit, page 8, Attachment C, Amended Statement of Material Facts, par 2.

3. On the night of 14/15 March 2023, Mr Jones was present at the Site.  Mr Jones was homeless at the time and was lying on his back on the hardstand, partially covered by a sleeping bag.[13]

   [13] Tucci Affidavit, page 8, Attachment C, Amended Statement of Material Facts, par 3.

4. At about 5.10 am on Wednesday, 15 March 2023, Mr Tucci drove into the Site in a Mitsubishi tanker truck.  Mr Tucci entered the Site for the purpose of turning his truck around in order to drive in the opposite direction he had come from on Bussell Highway.[14]  Mr Tucci turned into the hardstand before stopping his truck and reversed back out again in order to turn around.[15]  One of the truck's wheels drove over Mr Jones' pelvic area.  Mr Jones screamed in pain.  Mr Jones saw the vehicle (had) stopped and started reversing, he saw the reverse lights.[16]

   [14] Tucci Affidavit, page 8, Attachment C, Amended Statement of Material Facts, par 8.

   [15] Tucci Affidavit, page 9, Attachment C, Amended Statement of Material Facts, par 6.

   [16] Tucci Affidavit, page 9, Attachment C, Amended Statement of Material Facts, par 7.

5. Mr Tucci stopped the truck, got out of the truck, and approached Mr Jones, at which point Mr Jones shouted at him 'you ran over me'.  Mr Jones says that Mr Tucci said nothing (to him).[17]  Mr Tucci says that he asked the person (Mr Jones) if he 'was okay'.

   [17] Tucci Affidavit, page 9, Attachment C, Amended Statement of Material Facts, par 8.

6. Mr Tucci then got back into the truck and left the area.[18]

   [18] Tucci Affidavit, page 9, Attachment C, Amended Statement of Material Facts, par 8.

7. Mr Jones was assisted by Mr Matwiejew, himself a homeless man who happened to be sleeping at the Site some distance from Mr Jones, who having heard the truck's engine and Mr Jones' screams, ran to a nearby service station, called 000 for an ambulance and directed the ambulance on arrival to Mr Jones.[19]

   [19] Tucci Affidavit, page 9, Attachment C, Amended Statement of Material Facts, pars 4, 10 and 12.

8. Another witness, Mr Hughes, who was staying at the Margaret Forest Holiday Apartment, heard a very loud scream that he thought was a male voice somewhere to the north of his room which was located adjacent to the bush/forest area.[20]

   [20] Tucci Affidavit, page 10, Attachment C, Amended Statement of Material Facts, par 11.

9. Mr Jones sustained multiple pelvic fractures, 6% body burns, and required surgery and skin grafts.[21]

   [21] Tucci Affidavit, page 9, Attachment C, Amended Statement of Material Facts, par 13.

10. On Thursday, 16 March 2023, Mr Tucci identified himself to the Western Australia Police Force (WA Police) as a result of a media broadcast regarding the incident.[22]  Until this time, Mr Tucci had not reported the incident to the WA Police.[23]

    [22] Tucci Affidavit, page 10, Attachment C, Amended Statement of Material Facts, par 16.

    [23] Tucci Affidavit, page 9, Attachment C, Amended Statement of Material Facts, par 17.

11. Mr Tucci participated in an audio-visual record of interview with WA Police regarding the incident, and admitted that:[24]

    1.He drove his truck into the parking lot.

    2.When he was reversing he noticed a person in a blanket and got scared.

    3.He immediately got out of the truck and had a feeling he had hurt somebody.

    4.He asked the person 'what are you [d]oing there? Are you okay' and the person replied 'I'm okay'.

    5.He was relieved, got back into his truck and carried on with his day.

    6.In the later afternoon, he had seen police in the area and he checked the news because he worked (out) that it may have been a stranger connected to what happened in the morning.

    7.This was around 5.30 am.

    [24] Tucci Affidavit, page 10, Attachment C, Amended Statement of Material Facts, par 18.

12. Mr Tucci pleaded guilty to the offence and was sentenced to 16 months' imprisonment, of which four months were served immediately (from 10 February to 10 June 2025) and 12 months suspended until 10 June 2026.

13. Mr Tucci received a three-year licence disqualification imposed by this court on 10 February 2025 following his conviction for failing to stop and assist in circumstances of grievous bodily harm, contrary to s 54(1), s 54(2) and s 54(3)(b) of the RTA.  Mr Tucci's licence disqualification commenced upon his release from prison.

The application

1. By application dated 7 July 2025 Mr Tucci seeks an order directing the CEO to grant him an extraordinary licence that allows Mr Tucci to drive:

   Vehicles of class:                    MC, HC, HR, MR, LR, C, CA

   in these localities:                   Within a 500km from Busselton Courthouse

   on these days at these times:     Monday - Sunday, 24 hours per day.

   for these purposes:                  To drive to and from home to place of employment and to drive in the course of employment.

   for the purposes of work as operations manager at Shepheard.

Supporting evidence

1. Mr Tucci in his affidavit in support of the Application affirmed 2 July 2025 (Tucci Affidavit) deposes that:[25]

   [25] Being Exhibit 1 admitted into evidence at the hearing of the Application.

   1.He resides in Margaret River and is the operations manager with Shepheard.

   2.He is currently serving a three-year licence disqualification imposed by this court on 10 February 2025 for the offence committed on 15 March 2023.[26]

   [26] Tucci Affidavit, page 1, par 10.

   3.The offence was failing to stop to assist in circumstances of grievous bodily harm.[27]

   [27] Tucci Affidavit, page 1, par 11.

   4.The circumstances were that he had inadvertently run over a person (Mr Jones) who was 'sleeping rough' on a hardstand area when he turned his truck around in the dark.[28]

   [28] Tucci Affidavit, pages 1 - 2, par 12.

   5.He had not seen Mr Jones as his truck headlights had not illuminated Mr Jones' location as his truck swung around in the course of turning.[29]

   [29] Tucci Affidavit, page 2, par 13.

   6.It was not suggested that he was driving in a careless or dangerous manner, but rather, that he failed to stop for long enough to ensure that Mr Jones was ok.[30]

   [30] Tucci Affidavit, page 2, par 14.

   7.He pleaded guilty to the offence in accordance with the Statement of Material Facts, a copy of which is attached to the Tucci Affidavit.[31]

   [31] Tucci Affidavit, page 2, par 15.

   8.In addition to his licence disqualification, that this court sentenced him to a period of imprisonment of 16 months, of which he served four months immediately and the remaining 12 months of which is suspended (which Mr Tucci is still subject to at present).[32]

   [32] Tucci Affidavit, page 2, par 16.

   9.By extension, his period of licence disqualification did not commence until he was released from his period of immediate imprisonment on 10 June 2025.[33]

   [33] Tucci Affidavit, page 2, par 17.

   10.As evidenced by the WA Police document entitled 'Traffic Infringements dated 27 June 2025',[34] he has three traffic infringements and up until the conviction leading to his current disqualification, he otherwise had a 'clean' record.[35]

   [34] Tucci Affidavit, Attachment B, page 7.

   [35] Tucci Affidavit, page 2, par 18.

   11.His offence did not involve drugs or alcohol.[36]

   [36] Tucci Affidavit, page 2, par 19.

   12.He has nevertheless obtained a recent set of blood tests (including for liver function) through his general practitioner, Dr Roocke.[37]

   [37] Tucci Affidavit, Attachment E, pages 12 - 15.

   13.He is also subject to random drug and alcohol testing both through his employment, and also at some of the sites which he goes onto in the course of his work with Shepheard.[38]

   [38] Tucci Affidavit, page 2, par 20.

   14.He does not drink alcohol and has not done so for many years.

   15.He does not use non-prescription drugs.[39]

   [39] Tucci Affidavit, page 2, par 21.

   16.Since being released from prison, he is back living at his home with his partner, Ms Girometti.[40]

   [40] Tucci Affidavit, page 2, par 22.

   17.There is no public transport in or around the area which he would use to get to and from work.[41]

   [41] Tucci Affidavit, page 2, par 23.

   18.Margaret River only has a limited taxi service and can offer no assurance of being available at the times he may need it to be able to get to and from work.[42]

   [42] Tucci Affidavit, page 3, par 24.

   19.The roads he has to travel on are not suitable for riding a bike (bicycle) to and from work safely at the times he needs to travel (which are often in the dark) due to being frequented by heavy vehicles and having limited shoulder space for cyclists.[43]

   [43] Tucci Affidavit, page 3, par 25.

   20.His current net weekly base income is approximately $1,250 (more if Mr Tucci works overtime) and his weekly expenses are approximately $1,100.  He does not earn enough to a pay a driver to get him to and from work.[44]

   [44] Tucci Affidavit, page 3, par 26.

   21.As such, driving is the only practical means of transport available to him to get to and from work.[45]

   [45] Tucci Affidavit, page 3, par 27.

   22.Since being released from prison, his employer has kept him employed, giving him tasks other than driving until such time as this Application is determined.[46]

   [46] Tucci Affidavit, page 3, par 28.

   23.His employment with Shepheard is his means of obtaining income.[47]

   [47] Tucci Affidavit, page 3, par 29.

   24.Shepheard has made it clear that if the Application is unsuccessful, that his employment will come to an end given the length of Mr Tucci's licence disqualification still to run.[48]

   [48] Tucci Affidavit, page 3, par 30.

   25.Since being released from prison, he has relied on Ms Girometti and others to drive from his home to the work depot and then drive a truck to the site of the call-out.  On those occasions, he would be able to provide written confirmation of the call-out locations and details if required to by WA Police as a condition of an extraordinary licence.[49]

   26.Shepheard has requested that he be permitted to drive within a 500 km radius of the work depot.[50]

   27.In his Application, he has proposed a radius of 500 km from Busselton Courthouse.[51]

   28.He regrets the actions which led to his conviction, imprisonment and licence disqualification.[52]

   29.Having been imprisoned and disqualified, that he now fully appreciates the gravity of his actions and that he is sorry for the harm caused to Mr Jones.[53]

   30.He let Mr Jones, himself, his family and Shepheard down.[54]

   31.Since being released from prison, he has completed a Traffic Offender Intervention Program[55] which provided him with further insight into, amongst other things, the seriousness of road trauma and the impact on other people who have to deal with it.[56]

   32.He remains subject to a period of suspended imprisonment through until 10 June 2026.[57]

   33.He is fortunate to have the ongoing support of his partner, employer and friends.[58]

   34.If granted an extraordinary licence, he would take every precaution to ensure that he complies with any conditions imposed upon it, and understands that even a minor breach of traffic rules can result in an extraordinary licence being cancelled.[59]

   [49] Tucci Affidavit, page 3, par 31.

   [50] Tucci Affidavit, pages 3 - 4, par 34.

   [51] Tucci Affidavit, page 4, par 36.

   [52] Tucci Affidavit, page 4, par 37.

   [53] Tucci Affidavit, page 4, par 37.

   [54] Tucci Affidavit, page 4, par 37.

   [55] Tucci Affidavit, Attachment D, page 11.

   [56] Tucci Affidavit, page 4, par 37.

   [57] Tucci Affidavit, page 4, par 37.

   [58] Tucci Affidavit, page 4, par 37.

   [59] Tucci Affidavit, page 4, par 37.

1. Jack Thomas Shepheard in his affidavit affirmed 27 June 2025[60] (First Shepheard Affidavit) deposes that he is a director of Shepheard; Mr Tucci's employer and that he provides this affidavit in support of Mr Tucci's Application.  Attached to the First Shepheard Affidavit is a letter of support from Mr Shepheard dated 24 June 2025 which states that:[61]

   [60] Being Exhibit 3 admitted into evidence at the hearing of the Application.

   [61] First Shepheard Affidavit, Annexure A, page 3.

1.Shepheard operates a vacuum truck and transporting company servicing the southwest, Great Southern, greater Perth area and Wheatbelt regions of Western Australia.

2.Shepheard has employed Mr Tucci since its inception in October 2022.

3.Mr Shepheard is an integral part of Shepheard's team.

4.Mr Tucci is employed on a full-time basis, and through consistent commitment and performance, has progressed to his current role as operations manager.

5.Shepheard wishes to retain Mr Tucci as part of its workforce as he is a valuable and experienced employee.  Shepheard held Mr Tucci's position open during his recent period of imprisonment on that basis.

6.While Shepheard has been able to keep Mr Tucci employed on limited interim duties since his release from prison - such as yard work and second operator positions within Shepheard's trucks when required - these duties are not sustainable for Shepheard's business in the long term.

7.If Mr Tucci does not have the ability to perform his usual full duties (which requires that he holds a valid licence covering vehicle classes from C through to MC), Shepheard will be unable to continue employing him beyond the outcome of this Application and would need to hire a replacement.

8.The hiring of a replacement for Mr Tucci by Shepheard would not be straightforward due to the somewhat niche skill set which Shepheard employees require and the fact that many potential employees are unwilling to be on‑call outside of standard business hours due to other commitments.

9.Trying to hire a replacement employee would result in a significant financial and operational impact on Shepheard's business.

10.Mr Tucci's standard work hours are 5.00 am to 6.00 pm, Monday to Friday.  However, Shepheard operates 24 hours a day, seven days a week, providing essential services including emergency spill response, controlled waste transport, high‑pressure jetting and industrial cleaning.

11.Shepheard's clients include utility providers, mining operations, and local governments - many of whom require immediate response or work to be carried out outside normal business hours.

12.There is an operational need for Mr Tucci to have the flexibility to work the 24/7 nature of Shepheard's business.  That his role requires him to be on-call, attend emergency call‑outs, supervise after-hours operations, and step in to provide truck driving coverage at any time including nights, weekends and public holidays.

13.The greatest distance Mr Tucci may be required to drive from Shepheard's depot would be approximately 500 km.

14.As operations manager, Mr Tucci is responsible for coordinating and overseeing heavy vehicle logistics, site operations, staff and service delivery.

15.Mr Tucci's duties also require conducting on-site supervision and safety assessments; driving and operating multi‑combination (MC) vehicles in routing and emergency situations; providing contingency coverage for unavailable drivers; and personally ensuring compliance with environmental and safety regulations during transport of controlled waste and dangerous goods.

16.Both Shepheard and many of Shepheard's clients conduct random drug and alcohol testing as part of standard safety protocol.

17.Mr Tucci has never returned a positive result during the course of his employment and has consistently complied with all occupational health and safety requirements.  That Shepheard fully supports Mr Tucci's Application and is prepared to comply with any reasonable licence conditions imposed by this court.

1. Jack Thomas Shepheard in his supplementary affidavit affirmed 9 September 2025[62] (Second Shepheard Affidavit) relevantly deposes that he is Mr Tucci's employer; that he provides this supplementary affidavit in support of Mr Tucci's Application to be granted an extraordinary licence for work purposes; and that having re-read his affidavit dated 27 June 2025, which annexed Mr Shepheard's letter dated 24 June 2025, he can confirm that the contents of it remain true and accurate as at the date of this affidavit.

   [62] Being Exhibit 4 admitted into evidence at the hearing of the Application.

1. Lisa Girometti, in her affidavit affirmed 2 July 2025[63] (Girometti Affidavit) deposes that she is Mr Tucci's long-term de facto partner and that she provides this affidavit in support of Mr Tucci's Application which she supports fully.  Attached to the Girometti Affidavit is a letter of support from Ms Girometti.[64]  In the letter, Ms Girometti states that:

   [63] Being Exhibit 5 admitted into evidence at the hearing of the Application.

   [64] Girometti Affidavit, Annexure A, page 3.

   1.Over the past few months, the consequences of Mr Tucci's accident have had a profound impact on their household.

   2.Mr Tucci's inability to drive will cause considerable strain, not only on Mr Tucci's mental health, but on their financial stability.

   3.As she is employed on a casual basis, their household income is limited and inconsistent.

   4.Mr Tucci's continued employment is crucial to his ability to meet their basic living expenses.

   5.Mr Tucci has been under significant stress at the prospect of losing his employment and she has witnessed firsthand the toll this has taken on Mr Tucci's wellbeing.

   6.In the 20 plus years she has known Mr Tucci, he has consistently demonstrated himself to be an exemplary and responsible driver.

   7.The incident which led to the loss of Mr Tucci's licence was entirely out of character and Ms Girometti knows that he deeply regrets his actions.

   8.She believes that Mr Tucci is determined not to repeat the same mistake.

   9.She is concerned about Mr Tucci resorting to alternative means of travel, such as riding a pushbike to work in circumstances where the 10 km stretch along Bussell Highway Mr Tucci would need to travel is unsafe for cyclists.

   10.There are no viable public transport options available to Mr Tucci and the local taxi services in Margaret River are extremely limited and unreliable making them an impractical long-term solution for daily commuting.

   11.Granting Mr Tucci an extraordinary licence is essential for his continued employment, wellbeing and safety.

2. Gianluca Allegretti in his affidavit affirmed 2 July 2025[65] (Allegretti Affidavit) deposes that he is a long-term friend of Mr Tucci[66] and provides this affidavit in support of Mr Tucci's Application.  Attached to the Allegretti Affidavit is a letter of support from Mr Allegretti dated 26 June 2025 provided by way of a character reference.[67]  In the letter, Mr Allegretti states that:

   1.He has known Mr Tucci for over 20 years having first met him in Italy and that they remain close friends and fellow residents of the Margaret River area.

   2.He sees Mr Tucci almost daily.

   3.He knows Mr Tucci to be a reliable, responsible and trustworthy individual and a hardworking person with integrity.

   4.The extraordinary licence would enable Mr Tucci to continue meeting his work obligations and maintain his financial stability.

   5.He has been a passenger in vehicles driven by Mr Tucci many times over the years and has always found Mr Tucci to be a careful and safe driver.

   6.The news of Mr Tucci receiving a driving-related conviction was genuinely surprising as he had never regarded Mr Tucci's driving as careless or reckless.

   [65] Being Exhibit 6 admitted into evidence at the hearing of the Application.

   [66] Allegretti Affidavit, par 1.

   [67] Allegretti Affidavit, Annexure A, page 3.

Hearing of the Application

1. The Application proceeded to hearing on 12 September 2025.  Both parties were represented by counsel at the hearing of the Application.  Mr Tucci and his counsel appeared at the hearing remotely via video and audio-link.

2. The Application had initially been brought pursuant to the now repealed provision of s 76(1) of the RTA. At the hearing of the Application on 12 September 2025, counsel for Mr Tucci confirmed that the Application is brought pursuant to s 27 of the Act and I granted leave to amend the application to reflect this.

The applicant's position

1. Mr Tucci submits that his principal means of obtaining income is through his employment with Shepheard.

2. Further to the matters deposed to in his affidavit, Mr Tucci, having been affirmed, gave evidence at the hearing on 12 September 2025 in support of his Application.  Mr Tucci's evidence can be summarised as follows.

3. Mr Tucci said that he was reliant on lifts from colleagues or his partner, Ms Girometti, to get to and from work, from Margaret River to Cowaramup:[68]

   TUCCI MR:  Okay, usually I go from Margaret River to Cowaramup(?) at this stage with some of my colleague will pick me up and drop me off when we finish the shift.  When they are not available, usually Lisa if he's free give me a lift, or in other case I have to miss the day because I can't get to work.  Regarding them - my colleague - they are not always available because probably we have a different shift.  My boss, Jack(?), tried to put us in a same shift in this way I can always have the lift to work and come back.  That is the way.

   There is no other option, unfortunately, because to get from Margaret River to Cowaramup, you have to take the bus on highway, which doesn't have any footpath to anything you can even ride a bike, even it it's 10‑kilometre stretch.  But unfortunately it's the only option have a lift.

   [68] Transcript of hearing of Application on 12 September 2025 (ts), page 9.

1. Mr Tucci said that in his view, it was not safe to ride a bike on Bussell Highway.[69]  Mr Tucci confirmed that he does not drink alcohol or use illicit drugs and is in very good health.[70]

   [69] ts 9.

   [70] ts 9.

2. Mr Tucci informed the court that time spent in prison following his conviction, whilst not easy, allowed him to think about the best he could do for the situation.  Mr Tucci said:[71]

   TUCCI MR:  That was a really impact, and definite is not easy to spend that time in prison, but allowed me to think about all the situation and the fact that at least I tried to do the best I could for the situation.  I'm really sorry for the person, well his injury was never my intention to injure anyone or to leave the scene without actually checking the other person, and it's something I will always carry with me because I reckon never's going to go away.  But at this stage I just try to move on and try to do the right thing.  Hopefully never happen to anyone, the circumstance where you can't really realise what's going on and just freak out or just panic for.

   [71] ts 10.

3. Mr Tucci informed the court that since his release from prison he had been working with Shepheard and that his employment is to be terminated if the Application is not granted.[72]  Mr Tucci was cross‑examined by counsel for the CEO and said that he has not sought out other work at all, other than the truck driving work with Shepheard.[73]

   [72] ts 10.

   [73] ts 17.

4. Mr Tucci further informed the court that he worked as a chef in a restaurant in Margaret River for five years in the past but terminated that job because it was stressful for him:[74]

   TUCCI MR:  I terminated that job because was really stressful for - for me.  I couldn't take any more of that kind of stressful kind of the environment.  So I decide to move on and do something different.  Yes?---And I - I choose to move in this kind of the role.  And also because the - now is the day, the cost of living raising up that much, doing hospitality kind of the job is struggle you to keep up with the expensive, so I had also to change for that reason.

   [74] ts 17.

5. As to the nature of his role as operations manager at Shepheard, Mr Tucci explained that his work involved the following:[75]

   TUCCI MR:  Okay.  In my job basically, I take all the - the calls from a customer, organise the shift for the crew.  Also work along with the crew with some help.  And I going around the - the sites to check for - for the jobs, or for if the crew has some problem during the job, try to help them out.  And - and also when we don't - we are short on - - -

Also to - to, like, provide service, like, advice on the - kind of the different issue can apply when the job is required.  Also, my job required some after-hour callout, basically, to (indistinct).  We had usually run during the normal hour, but because we go a bit overtime sometimes, we need - me and my boss, we need to go out overtime to do some 24/7 kind of service.  So that basically is my position in - in the job.

[75] ts 18 and ts 20.

1. Mr Tucci confirmed that he did not have any specific qualifications for the role of operations manager:[76]

   TUCCI MR:  Not really, because what happened was, I start in this job, it escalated my knowledge regarding - - - during the experience, so allowed me to do a lot of hours, cos - - - my colleague can't do it, so for that reason, my boss offered me the position as manager - - - in the business.

   [76] ts 20.

2. As to the after-hours nature of the work being performed by Mr Tucci for Shepheard:[77]

   TENNENT-BROWN, MR:  Thank you, your Honour.  If I may just, perhaps, direct one further question to Mr Tucci, just in terms of the after-hours work.  Mr Tucci, if you can explain for the benefit of the court whether the after-hours work is regular, whether it's seasonal and so on?

   TUCCI, MR:  So yeah, there are - there are callout.  There is more kind of the seasonal situation come up, and also season, but can - the more, sort of, time is over winter when the raining filling up the septic tanks or filling up the sewerage system, the (indistinct) sewerage system.  So up and - quite often can - we have to go and do the job, do it in night-time and in that seasonal particular job.  So just to clarify, it's fair to say that the after-hours work isn't all the time, it's at certain times of year---Yeah, it is more at certain time of the year.

   [77] ts 20.

1. Mr Tucci submits that determining what constitutes an applicant's principal means of obtaining income requires an assessment of the evidence put before the court.  No evidence was put to the court, including by way of cross-examination, as to what specific alternative employment opportunities may be available.

1. Mr Tucci submits that where an applicant has a particular skill set acquired through training, experience or a combination of both, it would seem unorthodox for a court to refuse an application solely on the basis that the applicant may be able to obtain employment in a different field of work with an alternative employer which does not require driving in circumstances where they otherwise satisfy the criteria for a grant with their existing employer.

2. Mr Tucci submits that the court may, in an appropriate case, reconcile countervailing considerations under s 30(2) of the Act by imposing conditions that would make the granting of an application appropriate: McGree.

3. Mr Tucci provided a copy of his Western Australia criminal and traffic record.[78]  Other than the offence, the record shows Mr Tucci having the following three traffic infringements: 5 June 2018 - Exceed speed limit in a speed zone by 10 km per hour but not more than 19 km per hour; 12 September 2017 - Exceed speed limit in a speed zone by not more than 9 km per hour; 21 December 2016 - Exceed speed limit in a speed zone by 10 km per hour but not more than 19 km per hour.  Mr Tucci deposes that he otherwise has a clean record.[79]

   [78] Tucci Affidavit, par 18; Attachment A, pages 6 - 7.

   [79] Tucci Affidavit, par 18.

The CEO's position

1. Counsel for the CEO opposed the grant of an extraordinary licence on the following grounds.

2. First, that in relation to s 30(4)(b) of the Act, Mr Tucci must satisfy the court with evidence that he will not only be deprived of his principal means of obtaining an income, but also that it will place an undue financial burden on him.

3. The CEO submits that the question of whether Mr Tucci's failure to actively seek alternative employment from the time he became aware of the likely disqualification undermines his claim of undue financial burden under s 30(4)(b) of the Act. This includes consideration of whether Mr Tucci could have reasonably anticipated the impact of disqualification and taken steps to mitigate it as well as his ability to find alternative employment in the event of him being disqualified.

4. The CEO accepts that Mr Tucci will lose his current role with Shepheard who continued to employ him, knowing that he did not have a driver's licence after his release from prison.  However, the CEO submits that even if Mr Tucci were to lose his current employment with Shepheard, in circumstances where:

   (a)Mr Tucci concedes that there is a critical shortage of chefs in the Margaret River area and that he is qualified to do that work;

   (b)Mr Tucci's has alternative means of obtaining an income at his disposal, namely to work as a chef; and

   (c)there is no evidence that Mr Tucci will suffer an undue financial burden if he loses his current employment,

   it is more probable than not that Mr Tucci will not suffer an undue financial burden if he is not granted an extraordinary licence.

5. The CEO submits that Mr Tucci's application for an extraordinary licence under s 30(4)(b) of the Act should be refused for the reasons of lack of evidence that loss of work as a truck driver/operations manager would cause an undue financial burden and for reasons referred to in Italiano v The Director General of Transport.[80]

   [80] Italiano v The Director General of Transport [1999] WASCA 40; (1999) 29 MVR 249 (Italiano).

6. The CEO further submits that if the application under s 30(4)(b) of the Act fails, then the application pursuant to the provisions of s 30(4)(c) of the Act must fail since Mr Tucci would not need to drive to Shepheard's base any longer.

7. Secondly, counsel for the CEO submits that the breadth of the extraordinary licence sought by Mr Tucci, if granted, would greatly minimise the punitive aspects of the disqualification.  The CEO relies on the principles set out in Italiano (as repeated in McKenzie) in support of the proposition that a motor vehicle driver's licence is not a right, it is a privilege, the continued maintenance of which depends on avoidance of traffic offences, and the punitive aspects of the disqualification are ordinarily considered under the nature of the offence giving rise to the disqualification criteria. Counsel for Mr Tucci submits that the court may, in an appropriate case, reconcile countervailing considerations under s 30(2) of the Act by imposing conditions that would make the granting of an application appropriate: McGree.

8. Thirdly, counsel for the CEO submits that whilst Mr Tucci was entitled to make the Application at the time that he did, the consequence of making an application at the minimum period, meant that, effectively, he precluded court's considerations, namely, the conduct of the applicant subsequent to the disqualification, such that this court is not able to attribute any weight to that particular ground.

9. At the conclusion of the hearing, I made orders for the filing of further submissions by both parties in respect of the timing of the making of the Application and addressing s 30(4)(b) of the Act, with submissions being filed on 17 September 2025 and 22 September 2025 by the parties respectively. Both parties filed submissions in addition to the earlier submissions filed on behalf of Mr Tucci dated 11 September 2025.

Issues for determination

1. The following issues arise for determination:

   1.The proper construction of the words 'principal means of obtaining income' within the meaning of s 30(4)(b) of the Act.

   2.Would the refusal of the Application place an undue financial burden on Mr Tucci by depriving him of his principal means of obtaining income within the meaning of s 30(4)(b) of the Act?

   3.Would the refusal of the Application deprive Mr Tucci of the only practicable means of travelling to and from the place he is employed within the meaning of s 30(4)(c) of the Act?

   4.Has Mr Tucci satisfied the mandatory statutory criteria set out in s 30(2) of the Act?

Issue 1: Proper construction of the words 'principal means of obtaining income': s 30(4)(b) of the Act

1. The CEO submits that the question of whether Mr Tucci's failure to actively seek alternative employment from the time he became aware of the likely disqualification undermines his claim of undue financial burden under s 30(4)(b) of the Act. This includes consideration of whether Mr Tucci could have reasonably anticipated the impact of disqualification and taken steps to mitigate it as well as his ability to find alternative employment in the event of him being disqualified.

Disposition

1. It is convenient here to construe s 30(4)(b) of the Act.

2. Section 30(4)(b) of the Act relevantly provides that the court must not make an order directing the grant of an extraordinary licence unless it is satisfied that the refusal of the application would:

   (b)place an undue financial burden on the applicant or his or her family, by depriving the applicant of his or her principal means of obtaining income; …

3. Section 8 of the Interpretation Act 1984 (WA) (Interpretation Act) provides that:

   A written law shall be considered as always speaking and whenever a matter or thing is expressed in the present tense, it shall be applied to the circumstances as they arise, so that effect may be given to every part of the law according to its true sprit, intent and meaning.

4. The importance of statutory text to the exercise of statutory construction is well established.  The principles were summarised by the Court of Appeal in McKenzie,[81] and that summary is repeated here for ease of reference.

   [81] McKenzie [45] - [48].

5. In Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd,[82] French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Bell and Gageler JJ observed:

   This Court has stated on many occasions that the task of statutory construction must begin with a consideration of the [statutory] text' (Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (2009) 239 CLR 27 at 46 [47]). So must the task of statutory construction end. The statutory text must be considered in its context. That context includes legislative history and extrinsic materials. Understanding context has utility if, and in so far as, it assists in fixing the meaning of the statutory text. Legislative history and extrinsic materials cannot displace the meaning of the statutory text. Nor is their examination an end in itself.

   [82] Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd [2012] HCA 55; (2012) 250 CLR 503 [39]. See also Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] HCA 23; (2010) 241 CLR 252 [31] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan & Kiefel JJ); Thiess v Collector of Customs [2014] HCA 12; (2014) 250 CLR 664 [22] (French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel, Gageler & Keane JJ).

6. The primary object of statutory construction is to construe the relevant provision so that it is consistent with the language and purpose of all the provisions of the statute.  The statutory text is the surest guide to Parliament's intention.  The meaning of the text may require consideration of the context, which includes the general purpose and policy of the provision, in particular the mischief it is seeking to remedy.[83]

   [83] See Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28; (1998) 194 CLR 355 [69] (McHugh, Gummow, Kirby & Hayne JJ); Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue [2009] HCA 41; (2009) 239 CLR 27 [47] (Hayne, Heydon, Crennan & Kiefel JJ).

7. The context includes the existing state of the law, the history of the legislative scheme and the mischief to which the statute is directed.[84]  The purpose of legislation must be derived from the statutory text and not from any assumption about the desired or desirable reach or operation of the relevant provisions.[85]  The intended reach of a legislative provision is to be discerned from the words of the provision and not by making an a priori assumption about its purpose.[86]

   [84] See CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd [1997] HCA 2; (1997) 187 CLR 384, 408 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey & Gummow JJ).

   [85] See Certain Lloyd's Underwriters Subscribing to Contract No IH00AAQS v Cross [2012] HCA 56; (2012) 248 CLR 378 [26] (French CJ & Hayne J).

   [86] See Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations v Gribbles Radiology Pty Ltd [2005] HCA 9; (2005) 222 CLR 194 [21] (Gleeson CJ, Hayne, Callinan & Heydon JJ).

8. The general principles concerning the circumstances in which words may be read into legislation were summarised by this court in Australian Unity Property Ltd v City of Busselton.[87]Those general principles are repeated as follows.

   [87] Australian Unity Property Ltd v City of Busselton [2018] WASCA 38 [87] - [91].

9. In Taylor v The Owners - Strata Plan 11564,[88] the High Court recognised that there are some circumstances in which purposive construction may allow for the reading of a provision as if it contained additional words (or omitted words) with the effect of expanding its field of operation.  French CJ, Crennan and Bell JJ observed:[89]

   The question whether the court is justified in reading a statutory provision as if it contained additional words or omitted words involves a judgment of matters of degree.  That judgment is readily answered in favour of addition or omission in the case of simple, grammatical, drafting errors which if uncorrected would defeat the object of the provision.  It is answered against a construction that fills 'gaps disclosed in legislation' or makes an insertion which is 'too big, or too much at variance with the language in fact used by the legislature'.

   (citations omitted)

   [88] Taylor v The Owners - Strata Plan 11564 [2014] HCA 9; (2014) 253 CLR 531 (Taylor).

   [89] Taylor [38].

10. Their Honours referred to three conditions identified by Lord Diplock in Wentworth Securities Ltd v Jones,[90] as modified by Lord Nicholls in Inco Europe Ltd v First Choice Distribution (a firm).[91]  Those conditions were summarised by French CJ and Bell J in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJGV as follows:[92]

    Three matters of which the court must be sure before interpreting a statute in this way were the intended purpose of the statute, the failure of the draftsman and parliament by inadvertence to give effect to that purpose, and the substance of the provision parliament would have made.  The third of these conditions was described as being of 'crucial importance'.  Otherwise any attempt to determine the meaning of the enactment would cross the boundary between construction and legislation.

    [90] Wentworth Securities Ltd v Jones [1980] AC 74, 105.

    [91] Inco Europe Ltd v First Choice Distribution (a firm) [2000] 1 WLR 586; [2000] 2 All ER 109, 115.

    [92] Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJGV [2009] HCA 40; (2009) 238 CLR 642 [9].

11. In Taylor, French CJ, Crennan and Bell JJ went on to note:[93]

    … However, it is unnecessary to decide whether Lord Diplock's three conditions are always, or even usually, necessary and sufficient.  This is because the task remains the construction of the words the legislature has enacted.  In this respect it may not be sufficient that 'the modified construction is reasonably open having regard to the statutory scheme' because any modified meaning must be consistent with the language in fact used by the legislature.  Lord Diplock never suggested otherwise.  Sometimes, as McHugh J observed in Newcastle City Council v GIO General Ltd [(1997) 191 CLR 85 at 113], the language of a provision will not admit of a remedial construction. Relevant for present purposes was his Honour's further observation, '[i]f the legislature uses language which covers only one state of affairs, a court cannot legitimately construe the words of the section in a tortured and unrealistic manner to cover another set of circumstances.'

    Lord Diplock's speech in Wentworth Securities laid emphasis on the task as construction and not judicial legislation.  In Inco Europe Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead observed that even when Lord Diplock's conditions are met, the court may be inhibited from interpreting a provision in accordance with what it is satisfied was the underlying intention of Parliament: the alteration to the language of the provision in such a case may be 'too far-reaching'. In Australian law the inhibition on the adoption of a purposive construction that departs too far from the statutory text has an added dimension because too great a departure may violate the separation of powers in the Constitution.

    (some citations omitted)

    [93] Taylor [39] - [40].

12. The term 'principal' is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary to mean:

    First or highest in rank; most important; foremost; greatest.

13. The words 'principal means of obtaining income' arises from the text of s 30(4)(b) of the Act itself, and are expressed in the present tense. They refer to a state of affairs that is extant at the time of that application. Nothing in the words used in the subsection contemplate looking beyond the state of affairs that is extant at the time of the application.

14. It is worth observing that this approach is consistent with that of court in Lenegan v Director General of the Department of Transport.[94]  Although Leneganwas in respect of the now repealed s 76 of the RTA, the decision considered the proper construction to be placed on (relevantly) s 76(3b)(b) of the act as it then was and is substantially in similar terms to s 30(4)(b) of the Act. As was observed by Staude DCJ in Lenegan:[95]

    What is in issue in this appeal is the proper construction to be placed on pars (b) and (c).  Looking firstly at par (b), an undue financial burden is one which is 'beyond what is warranted, excessive or disproportionate' (see the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary).  The meaning of the expression, 'depriving him of his principal means of obtaining income', in the present context, is to prevent that person from doing his or her usual work. 

    This subsection therefore requires the court, if it thinks that the grant of a licence is proper upon consideration of the factors set out in s 76(3), not to make an order unless it is satisfied that refusal of the application would have the effect of, in terms of par (b), imposing a disproportionate financial burden on the applicant by preventing him from doing his normal work. 

    Whether the refusal will have that effect in any case is a question of fact and degree to be determined, having regard to all the circumstances of the case.  The court must consider and decide whether the applicant is deprived of his or her means of obtaining income without an extraordinary licence. 

    If it is satisfied that the applicant would be so deprived, the court must look at whether the effect of that is an undue financial burden.  A person who can use public transport, or hire a driver, or whose work is such that arrangements can be made to enable them to continue to work without a licence to drive, will not be deprived of their principal means of obtaining income or, in those circumstances, may not otherwise suffer an undue financial burden.

    [94] Lenegan v Director General of the Department of Transport [2012] WADC 102 (Lenegan).

    [95] Lenegan [25] - [28].

15. In this case, the CEO does not contend that Mr Tucci is not employed by Shepheard.  Nor does the CEO contend that Mr Tucci is employed by any other employer other than Shepheard.  Further, the CEO accepts that Mr Tucci will lose his current role with Shepheard if he is not granted an extraordinary licence. 

16. Whilst the CEO contends that Mr Tucci has an alternative means of obtaining an income at his disposal because he has worked as a chef in the past, there is no suggestion by the CEO that Mr Tucci is employed as a chef at present and that this is Mr Tucci's usual work.

17. In my view, the legislative text of s 30(4)(b) of the Act cannot accommodate the CEO's contention that the question of whether an applicant's 'principal means of obtaining income' includes a consideration of whether the applicant has actively sought alternative employment. 

18. It would seem on an ordinary reading of s 30 of the Act, the court hearing an application for an extraordinary licence holds a jurisdiction to either make an order directing the CEO to grant the applicant an extraordinary licence or to refuse the application. It is established that the effect of s 30(4) of the Act is that the court is prohibited from making an order under s 30(1)(a) directing the CEO to grant to the applicant an extraordinary licence unless the court is satisfied that the refusal of the application would have the consequence specified in s 30(4)(a), s 30(4)(b) or s 30(4)(c).[96]

    [96] McKenzie [54].

19. Where an application is made pursuant to s 30(4)(b) of the Act, it is for the applicant to satisfy the court that refusal of the application would place an undue financial burden on the applicant or his or her family, by depriving the applicant of his or her principal means of obtaining income. This subsection requires the court to consider the question in the present context and having regard to the applicant's usual means of obtaining income.

20. It is for the court to form a view as to whether the applicant has satisfied s 30(4)(b) of the Act by having regard to the evidence before the court.

Issue 2: Undue financial burden on the applicant by depriving him of his principal means of obtaining income: s 30(4)(b) of the Act

1. The CEO contends that Mr Tucci would not suffer an undue financial burden even if he were to lose his current employment with Shepheard as he has an alternative means of obtaining an income at his disposal, namely to work as a chef.  In support of this, the CEO points to the critical shortage of chefs in the Margaret River area, and submits that Mr Tucci is qualified to do that work. 

2. The CEO opposes this ground of the Application on this basis.

3. No evidence is adduced as to the income Mr Tucci would be said to receive if he were able to secure such alternative employment; and whether there would be a need to travel to and from the place of hypothetical employment.

Disposition

1. As noted in my findings above, the legislative text of s 30(4)(b) of the Act itself cannot accommodate the CEO's contention that the question of whether an applicant's 'principal means of obtaining income' includes a consideration of whether the applicant has actively sought alternative employment.

2. In this case, to satisfy the requirements of s 30(4)(b) of the Act, it is necessary for Mr Tucci to satisfy the court on the basis of the evidence that:

   (a)Mr Tucci's employment with Shepheard is his principal means of obtaining income;

   (b)refusing the grant of an extraordinary licence would deprive Mr Tucci of his principal means of obtaining income; and

   (c)this would place an undue financial burden on Mr Tucci or his family.

3. The evidence before this court is as follows:

   1.That Mr Tucci is employed as operations manager for Shepheard.[97]

   2.That as operations manager Mr Tucci is required to drive a truck and is responsible for coordinating and overseeing heavy vehicle logistics, site operations, staff and service delivery for Shepheard.[98]

   3.That Mr Tucci's standard work hours are 5.00 am to 6.00 pm, Monday to Friday, but that there is an operational need for Mr Tucci to have the flexibility to work the 24/7 nature of Shepheard's work within a 500 km radius from Shepheard's depot.[99]

   4.That while Shepheard has been able to keep Mr Tucci employed on limited interim duties since his release from prison - such as yard work and second operator positions within Shepheard's trucks when required - these duties are not sustainable for Shepheard's business in the long term.[100]

   5.That if Mr Tucci does not have the ability to perform his usual full duties (which requires that he holds a valid licence covering vehicle classes from C through to MC), Shepheard will be unable to continue employing him beyond the outcome of the Application.[101]

   6.That Mr Tucci's current net weekly base income is approximately $1,250 and his weekly expenses are approximately $1,100.[102]

   7.That a refusal of the grant of an extraordinary licence would place an undue financial burden on Mr Tucci and his partner, Ms Girometti.[103]

   8.That as Ms Girometti is employed on a casual basis, their household income is limited and inconsistent.[104]

   9.That Mr Tucci's continued employment is crucial to his ability to meet their basic living expenses.[105]

   [97] Being Exhibit 1 admitted into evidence at the hearing of the Application.

   [98] First Shepheard Affidavit, Annexure A, page 3.

   [99] First Shepheard Affidavit, Annexure A, page 3.

   [100] First Shepheard Affidavit, Annexure A, page 3.

   [101] First Shepheard Affidavit, Annexure A, page 3.

   [102] Being Exhibit 1 admitted into evidence at the hearing of the Application.

   [103] Girometti Affidavit, Annexure A, page 3.

   [104] Girometti Affidavit, Annexure A, page 3.

   [105] Girometti Affidavit, Annexure A, page 3.

4. Mr Tucci set out in his affidavit his financial position.  Included into evidence as Exhibit 2 is an ANZ transaction report in the joint account of Mr Tucci and Ms Girometti for the period 6 May 2025 to 3 September 2025 which was the subject of cross-examination.  The evidence of Mr Tucci and Ms Girometti is that Mr Tucci will suffer an undue financial burden if he loses his current employment with Shepheard. 

5. It was not put to Mr Tucci in cross-examination that his evidence in respect of any of the matters the subject of the Application could not be relied on by the court or was otherwise objectionable. 

6. I accept Mr Tucci as a credible witness.  Further, I accept Mr Tucci's reasoning for his career change and his evidence in this regard. 

7. Similarly, the counsel for the CEO did not seek to cross‑examine any of the other witnesses about the matters deposed to in their respective affidavits and I accept the evidence of each of Ms Girometti, Mr Shepheard and Mr Allegretti.

8. Mr Tucci has been employed by Shepheard on a full‑time basis since its inception in October 2022 and through consistent commitment and performance, has progressed to his current role as operations manager and is an integral part of the Shepheard team despite not having any specific qualifications for the role.  The evidence before this court is that Mr Tucci's role as operations manager at Shepheard is his principal means of obtaining income and requires that he be able to drive in order to undertake his work.  As such, I do not accept the CEO's contention that loss of work as a truck driver/operations manager would not cause Mr Tucci an undue financial burden.

1. If the Application were granted, I am satisfied that Shepheard would employ Mr Tucci on a full-time basis with Mr Tucci's standard work hours being 5.00 am to 6.00 pm Monday to Friday and that the greatest distance Mr Tucci may be required to drive from Shepheard's depot would be approximately 500 km.[106]

   [106] First Shepheard Affidavit, Annexure A, page 3.

2. I accept that the nature of work undertaken by Shepheard means that Shepheard operates 24 hours a day, seven days a week, providing essential services including emergency spill response, controlled waste transport, high-pressure jetting and industrial cleaning.[107]  Whilst Mr Shepheard deposes in the First Shepheard Affidavit that there is an operational need for Mr Tucci to have the flexibility to work the 24/7 nature of Shepheard's business, in the context of the on-call aspect of the work, express reference is made by Mr Shepheard to Mr Tucci having to specifically provide truck driving coverage at any time including nights, weekends and public holidays.[108]

   [107] First Shepheard Affidavit, Annexure A, page 3.

   [108] First Shepheard Affidavit, Annexure A, page 3.

1. Further, having had regard to Mr Tucci's evidence at the hearing on 12 September 2025, it cannot be said that the after-hours nature of the work being performed by Mr Tucci is a constant and ongoing need given on Mr Tucci's own evidence this type of after‑hours work is seasonal in nature (ie winter months) and is not required to be undertaken all the time.[109]

   [109] ts 20.

2. I have also had regard to the evidence that there are other employees of Shepheard who are colleagues of Mr Tucci.[110]

   [110] ts 9.

3. Clearly, on the evidence before this court, it cannot be said that Mr Tucci is the only employee of Shepheard able to meet all of Shepheard's operational needs.  However, I balance this with the evidence of Mr Tucci that as operations manager, his role is such that it is necessary for him to take all the calls from a customer, organise the shift for the crew and work along with the crew with some help including going around the sites to check the jobs and assist crew as required which sometimes involves needing to go out overtime as a 24/7 service.[111]

   [111] ts 18 and ts 20.

4. In this case, there is no challenge to the evidence that the demands of Mr Tucci's job are such that he needs to be available on-call, attend emergency call‑outs, supervise after-hours operations, and step in to provide truck driving coverage (covering an approximately 500 km radius from Shepheard's depot in Margaret River) at any time including nights, weekends and public holidays with an operational need for Mr Tucci to have the flexibility to work the 24/7 nature of Shepheard's business.

1. On the basis of the evidence, I am satisfied that Mr Tucci's employment with Shepheard is his principal means of obtaining income such that refusing the grant of an extraordinary licence would deprive Mr Tucci of his principal means of obtaining income and would place an undue financial burden on Mr Tucci and his partner, Ms Girometti.

Issue 3: Only practicable means of travelling to and from the place at which the applicant is employed: s 30(4)(c) of the Act

1. The CEO opposes this ground of the Application and submits that if the application under s 30(4)(b) of the Act fails, then the application pursuant to the provisions of s 30(4)(c) of the Act must fail since Mr Tucci would not need to drive to Shepheard's base any longer.

2. No evidence was submitted by the CEO that Mr Tucci could make other arrangements to travel to and from Shepheard's depot by using taxis, public transport or other means of travel.

Disposition

1. It is for the court to satisfy itself that the refusal of the application would have the consequence specified in par (a) or par (b) or par (c) of s 30(4) of the Act.[112] As such, the CEO's assertion that s 30(4)(c) must fail on the assumption that s 30(4)(b) of the Act fails does not follow and in any event is not made out in light of my findings above.

   [112] McKenzie [54].

2. Having found that refusal of the Application would place an undue financial burden on Mr Tucci by depriving him of his principal means of obtaining income within the meaning of s 30(4)(b) of the Act, I have, for completeness, also considered the Application pursuant to s 30(4)(c) of the Act.

3. In McKenzie, the Court of Appeal held that the consequence specified in s 30(4)(c) will not be made out unless the court is satisfied that the refusal of the application (in other words, the refusal to authorise the applicant to drive a motor vehicle) would, relevantly, deprive the applicant of the 'only practicable means' of travelling to and from his or her place of employment and went on to observe as follows:[113]

   The meaning of the word 'practicable' depends, to a significant extent, on the context, but it ordinarily connotes that which is reasonably feasible or reasonably capable of being put into practice, done or accomplished.  See Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (6th ed, 2007) 2310; Macquarie Dictionary (5th ed, 2009) 1305.

   In s 30(4)(c), the word 'practicable', in the context of 'depriving the applicant … of the only practicable means' of travelling to and from the place at which the applicant is employed, contemplates factual differences between applicants according to each applicant's personal circumstances. It is necessary to address what is 'practicable' for the particular applicant and not what is 'practicable' for a hypothetical reasonable person.

   [113] McKenzie [55] - [57].

4. The Court of Appeal in McKenzie stated that ordinarily, the relevant facts and circumstances would include, for example:[114]

   (a)the circumstances of the applicant's employment including the nature of his or her place of employment;

   (b)the nature of the journey or journeys which the applicant must undertake in travelling to and from his or her place of employment;

   (c)the duration of the journey or journeys by the means of transport being considered;

   (d)the timing and frequency of the means of transport being considered;

   (e)the cost of undertaking the journey or journeys by the means of transport being considered; and

   (f)the applicant's financial capacity to pay for the cost of undertaking the journey or journeys by the means of transport being considered.

   [114] McKenzie [59].

5. The Court of Appeal went on to state that the above list was not an exhaustive statement of the facts and circumstances that ordinarily might be relevant to a particular case.  The Court of Appeal stated that:[115]

   The correct approach is for the court to evaluate separately each available transport option (if any), apart from driving a motor vehicle, in the context of the statutory scheme and all the relevant facts and circumstances, including the applicant's personal circumstances, and to make a judgment as to whether the transport option under consideration would be a 'practicable means' (that is, a reasonably feasible means), in the context of the statutory scheme and all the relevant facts and circumstances including the applicant's personal circumstances, for the applicant to travel to and from his or her place of employment.

   Section 30(4)(c) refers to 'travelling to … the place at which the applicant … is employed', but does not expressly identify the place where the journey begins. Similarly, s 30(4)(c) refers to 'travelling … from the place at which the applicant … is employed', but does not expressly identify the place where the journey ends.

   These express omissions reflect, no doubt, the reality that an applicant's point of departure, when travelling to the place at which he or she is employed, and an applicant's point of destination, when travelling from the place at which he or she is employed, will not necessarily be the applicant's usual residence.  An applicant may not have a single, fixed place of employment.  For example, an applicant may have two part‑time jobs each day at different locations.  It may be necessary for the applicant to travel directly from one location to the other.

   [115] McKenzie [61] - [63].

6. The evidence of Mr Tucci in this regard was to the effect that:

   1.The roads Mr Tucci has to travel on are not suitable for riding a bike (bicycle) to and from work safely at the times he needs to travel (which are often in the dark) due to being frequented by heavy vehicles and having limited shoulder space for cyclists.[116]

   2.Margaret River only has a limited taxi service and can offer no assurance of being available at the times Mr Tucci may need it to be able to get to and from work.[117]

   3.Mr Tucci does not earn enough to a pay a driver to get him to and from work.[118]

   4.Since being released from prison, Mr Tucci has relied on Ms Girometti and others to drive him from his home to the work depot and then drive a truck to the site of the call-out.[119]

   5.If Mr Tucci is unable to rely on Ms Girometti or colleagues to give him a lift, he has to miss the day because he is unable to travel to work.[120]

   [116] Being Exhibit 1 admitted into evidence at the hearing of the Application.

   [117] Being Exhibit 1 admitted into evidence at the hearing of the Application.

   [118] Being Exhibit 1 admitted into evidence at the hearing of the Application.

   [119] ts 9.

   [120] ts 9.

7. In my view, having had regard to the evidence available, I am satisfied that the refusal of the grant of an extraordinary licence would deprive Mr Tucci of the only practicable means of travelling to and from the place at which Mr Tucci is employed within the meaning of s 30(4)(c) of the Act.

Issue 4: Mandatory relevant considerations: s 30(2) of the Act

1. There are five mandatory factors to consider in s 30(2) of the Act, namely: (a) the safety of the public generally; (b) the character of Mr Tucci; (c) the circumstances of the case; (d) the nature of the offence or offences giving rise to the disqualification; and (e) the conduct of Mr Tucci subsequent to the disqualification.

2. Each of these is addressed below.

Safety of the public generally

1. A convenient starting point in assessing the safety of the public generally is to have regard to the circumstances of the offending, which I have set out in detail earlier in these reasons.

2. The offence occurred in circumstances where Mr Tucci inadvertently ran over Mr Jones who was 'sleeping rough' whilst driving into the Site in a Mitsubishi tanker truck.  The Site has no lighting[121] and the offence occurred in the early hours of the morning, at about 5.10 am.[122]  Mr Jones was lying on his back on the hardstand, partially covered by a sleeping bag[123] and Mr Tucci deposed he had not seen Mr Jones as his truck headlights had not illuminated Mr Jones' location as his truck swung around in the course of turning.[124]

   [121] Tucci Affidavit, page 8, Attachment C, Amended Statement of Material Facts, par 1.

   [122] Tucci Affidavit, page 8, Attachment C, Amended Statement of Material Facts, par 5.

   [123] Tucci Affidavit, page 8, Attachment C, Amended Statement of Material Facts, par 3.

   [124] Being Exhibit 1 admitted into evidence at the hearing of the Application.

3. It was a plainly dangerous act, affecting public safety.  However, Mr Tucci was not travelling at speed, having turned into the hardstand before stopping his truck and reversing back out again in order to turn around.[125]

   [125] Tucci Affidavit, page 9, Attachment C, Amended Statement of Material Facts, par 6.

4. It is also relevant that Mr Tucci has no prior convictions.  He has however received certain traffic infringements, none of which are of specific significance in the context of having any similarity to the nature of the driving that was the subject of the offence of which Mr Tucci was convicted.

5. Whilst Mr Tucci stopped the truck and got out, he ultimately did not assist Mr Jones and simply drove away.[126]  The injuries sustained by Mr Jones as a result of Mr Tucci's driving are significant - Mr Jones sustained multiple pelvic fractures, 6% body burns, and required surgery and skin grafts.[127]

   [126] Tucci Affidavit, page 9, Attachment C, Amended Statement of Material Facts, par 8.

   [127] Tucci Affidavit, page 9, Attachment C, Amended Statement of Material Facts, par 13.

6. Whilst Mr Tucci had not reported the incident to the WA Police,[128] he did, on the following day, identify himself to WA Police as a result of a media broadcast regarding the incident[129] and pleaded guilty to the offence.

   [128] Tucci Affidavit, page 9, Attachment C, Amended Statement of Material Facts, par 17.

   [129] Tucci Affidavit, page 10, Attachment C, Amended Statement of Material Facts, par 16.

7. As noted above, Mr Tucci deposed amongst other things, that:

   1.He had not seen Mr Jones as his truck headlights had not illuminated Mr Jones' location as his truck swung around in the course of turning.

   2.It was not suggested that he was driving in a careless or dangerous manner, but rather, that he failed to stop for long enough to ensure that Mr Jones was ok.

   3.He pleaded guilty to the offence.

   4.He had three traffic infringements and up until the conviction leading to his current disqualification, he otherwise had a 'clean' record.

   5.His offence did not involve drugs or alcohol.

   6.He does not drink alcohol and has not done so for many years.

   7.He does not use non-prescription drugs.

   8.Since being released from prison, he has completed a Traffic Offender Intervention Program[130] which provided him with further insight into, amongst other things, the seriousness of road trauma and the impact on other people who have to deal with it.

   9.If granted an extraordinary licence, he would take every precaution to ensure that he complies with any conditions imposed upon it, and understands that even a minor breach of traffic rules can result in an extraordinary licence being cancelled.

   10.Time spent in prison following his conviction, whilst not easy, allowed him to think about the best he could do for the situation and that it had a real impact (on him).

   [130] Tucci Affidavit, Attachment D, page 11.

8. I am mindful that Mr Tucci had only been employed by Shepheard for a relatively short period of time prior to the incident occurring on 15 March 2023.  However, I have also had regard to the evidence of Ms Girometti and Mr Allegretti, both of whom have known Mr Tucci for a period of some 20 years and depose to Mr Tucci being a responsible, careful and safe driver.  I have also had regard to the available evidence as to Mr Tucci's driving history as it appears from his Western Australia criminal and traffic record and Mr Tucci's own evidence.[131]

   [131] Tucci Affidavit, par 18; Attachment A, pages 6 - 7.

9. Having had regard to each of these matters, and the circumstances of the offence itself, which, without diminishing the seriousness of the offence, did not occur when Mr Tucci was driving at speed or under the influence of drugs or alcohol, on balance, I am satisfied that Mr Tucci presents a low risk to the safety of the public generally if he returns to driving trucks on the road in a work context.

The character of the applicant

1. Both Ms Girometti and Mr Allegretti provided evidence as to Mr Tucci's character in the context of having known Mr Tucci for a significant period of time.  Ms Girometti is Mr Tucci's long-term de facto partner who has known Mr Tucci for some 20 plus years and Mr Allegretti his long‑term friend of some 20 years.

2. Both speak well of Mr Tucci.  Mr Allegretti deposed in the Allegretti Affidavit that he knows Mr Tucci to be a reliable, responsible and trustworthy individual and a hardworking person with integrity; and that he has always found Mr Tucci to be a careful and safe driver such that the news of Mr Tucci receiving a driving-related conviction was genuinely surprising as he had never regarded Mr Tucci's driving as careless or reckless.[132]

   [132] Being Exhibit 6 admitted into evidence at the hearing of the Application.

3. Mr Allegretti deposed that he has himself been a passenger in vehicles driven by Mr Tucci many times over the years and has always found Mr Tucci to be a careful and safe driver.[133]

   [133] Being Exhibit 6 admitted into evidence at the hearing of the Application.

4. Mr Shepheard in the First Shepheard Affidavit deposed that Mr Tucci is a valuable and experienced employee.

5. I am mindful that following the incident, whilst Mr Tucci stopped the truck and got out, he ultimately did not assist Mr Jones and simply drove away.[134]  Mr Tucci and Mr Jones have a different recollection of the exchange that occurred at that point.  Importantly, there is the evidence of Mr Matwiejew and Mr Hughes as to hearing screams (coming from Mr Jones), and this in combination with the injuries sustained by Mr Jones as a result of Mr Tucci's driving suggest that it is unlikely that Mr Jones 'was okay' contrary to what Mr Tucci says.  I am equally mindful that Mr Tucci did ultimately, on the following day, identify himself to WA Police and pleaded guilty to the offence and was convicted for failing to stop and assist in circumstances of grievous bodily harm, contrary to s 54(1), s 54(2) and s 54(3)(b) of the RTA.

   [134] Tucci Affidavit, page 9, Attachment C, Amended Statement of Material Facts, par 8.

6. At the hearing of the Application, Mr Tucci said that 'Hopefully never happen to anyone, the circumstance where you can't really realise what's going on and just freak out or just panic for'.[135]

   [135] ts 10.

7. I take into account that Mr Tucci has no criminal record other than for the offence the subject of the incident.  As has already been observed, Mr Tucci had committed certain driving offences which had been the subject of infringements before the offence.  While these matters may in certain respects be seen to go to his character, I consider that against Mr Tucci's otherwise good driving record and his positive character and hard-working nature as supported by the matters deposed to by each of Ms Girometti, Mr Allegretti and Mr Shepheard.

8. Whilst the circumstances of the offence did not involve drugs or alcohol, I also take into account Mr Shepheard's evidence that both Shepheard and many of Shepheard's clients conduct random drug and alcohol testing as part of standard safety protocols and that Mr Tucci has never returned a positive result during the course of his employment and has consistently complied with all occupational health and safety requirements.

9. Mr Tucci also provided by way of evidence a recent set of blood tests (including for liver function) through his general practitioner, Dr Roocke,[136] and deposed that he does not drink alcohol and has not done so for many years and does not use non-prescription drugs.

   [136] Tucci Affidavit, Attachment E, pages 12 - 15.

10. Further, I take into account the fact that since his release from prison, Mr Tucci has completed a Traffic Offender Intervention Program[137] which provided him with further insight into, amongst other things, the seriousness of road trauma and the impact on other people who have to deal with it.

    [137] Tucci Affidavit, Attachment D, page 11.

11. I accept that Mr Tucci has learned from that, and shown remorse for his conduct and insight in relation to the commission of the offence and having regard for the law.  Mr Tucci gave evidence at the hearing that the time spent in prison following his conviction had a real impact on him and allowed him to think about the situation.  Mr Tucci expressed being sorry for Mr Jones as well as his injury and says that it is something that he will always carry with him because it is never going to go away.

12. Having regard to the above materials and the evidence in this matter, I am satisfied that Mr Tucci is a person of good character and has adequately addressed any character concerns arising from his driving offence and traffic infringements.  This factor weighs in favour of the grant of the Application.

Circumstances of the case

1. I have set out in detail above my findings in relation to the overall circumstances of the case, in particular, in relation to the current circumstances of Mr Tucci and the undue financial burden on him and Ms Girometti if the Application is refused by depriving Mr Tucci of his principal means of obtaining income and to travel to and from the place at which Mr Tucci is employed.

2. The CEO submits that the breadth of the extraordinary licence sought by Mr Tucci, if granted, would have greatly minimised the punitive aspects of the disqualification.  The CEO relies on the principles set out in Italiano (as repeated in McKenzie) in support of this.  These matters are relevant to the nature of the offence giving rise to the disqualification and I have addressed them below in relation to that consideration.  I accept that, to an extent, those considerations overlap with consideration of the overall circumstances of the case.  Taking those matters into account, I nevertheless consider that the overall circumstances still weigh strongly in favour of the Application being granted.

Nature of the offence giving rise to the disqualification

1. I have already set out my findings in relation to the nature and circumstances of the offence giving rise to the disqualification and its objective seriousness.  The offence occurred whilst Mr Tucci was driving the truck in a work-related context but did not occur whilst Mr Tucci was driving at speed or whilst he was under the influence of drugs or alcohol.  The circumstances of the offence were such that in driving into the hardstand area of the unlit Site, Mr Tucci reversed back out again and over Mr Jones who was 'sleeping rough' and partially covered by a sleeping bag.

2. I accept that the circumstances in which the offence occurred were inadvertent in that Mr Tucci did not intend to reverse his truck over Mr Jones.  However, as a result of failing to stop and assist Mr Jones, Mr Tucci was convicted of grievous bodily harm, contrary to s 54(1), s 54(2) and s 54(3)(b) of the RTA.

3. The CEO contends that, in effect, the Application has been brought too soon and if granted would undermine the punitive aspect of the disqualification.

4. As McKechnie J observed in Italiano, a licence is a not a right but a privilege, the continued maintenance of which depends on the avoidance of traffic offences.[138]  It may also be accepted that a period of disqualification may in part have punitive aspects[139] as well as protective aspects.

   [138] Italiano [19].

   [139] Italiano [19].

5. If an extraordinary licence is granted to an applicant, it may reduce the so called 'punitive aspects' of a disqualification.  As the Court of Appeal observed in McKenzie, these are not expressly referred to in s 30(2) of the Act, but they will ordinarily be an integral part of the 'nature of the offence or offence giving rise to the disqualification', within s 30(2)(d).[140]

   [140] McKenzie [82] - [83].

6. The nature, extent and significance of any potential resulting reduction in any punitive aspects will depend on the circumstances of the case.  Matters that may be relevant to that assessment include, but are not limited to, the length of the disqualification imposed, the period of the disqualification that has been served, the minimum period before which an application may be made, and the scope of any proposed extraordinary licence and conditions to which it may be subject.[141]

   [141] Taylor [68].

7. Further, that is only one consideration to be weighed against all other considerations in the overall exercise of the discretion.[142]

   [142] McGree [82].

8. That the reduction in any punitive aspects may have been considered of significance in the particular circumstances of one case, does not mean it will have the same significance in the circumstances of a different case.[143]  As was observed by Sefton DCJ in McGree:[144]

   In cases such as Taylor and De Pledge, similar periods of two-year disqualifications had been served by the applicant to the period served by Mr McGree in this case.  That was considered to be of particular significance in the circumstances of those cases.  It does not necessarily follow, as the CEO appeared to contend, that the same level of significance arises in this case.  It does not, in my view, follow that in a case where slightly over a quarter of the period of disqualification has been served it is necessarily a strong countervailing factor or that it necessitates a conclusion that an application should be refused.  It depends on weighing up all the circumstances.

   (footnotes omitted)

   [143] McGree [83].

   [144] McGree [84].

9. While I consider that if the Application is granted it will reduce the significance of any punitive aspects of the disqualification, that will be ameliorated by the scope of the licence and appropriate conditions that I identify below.  Further, Mr Tucci will still be significantly restricted in his ability to drive.  He has been, and will continue to be, affected by punitive aspects of the disqualification, even if the Application is granted.

10. While overall the nature of the offence and this related aspect are significant and weigh against the exercise of the discretion, in my view they are strongly outweighed by other considerations in this case.

Conduct of the applicant subsequent to the disqualification

1. As set out above, Mr Tucci was sentenced to 16 months' imprisonment, of which four months were served immediately (from 10 February to 10 June 2025) and 12 months suspended until 10 June 2026.  Mr Tucci was released on parole and made the Application on 7 July 2025.

2. The CEO does not contend that the Application was brought contrary to s 28 of the Act. Rather, the CEO submits that whilst Mr Tucci was entitled to make the Application at the time that he did, the consequence of making an application at the minimum period, meant that, effectively, he precluded court's considerations, namely, the conduct of the applicant subsequent to the disqualification, such that this court is not able to attribute any weight to that particular ground.

3. In the period since the disqualification took effect following Mr Tucci's release on parole, he has not driven or committed any offences.  That counts slightly in favour of the grant of the application but is overall a relatively neutral consideration.

Conclusion

1. I am satisfied that the refusal of the Application would:

   (a)place an undue financial burden on Mr Tucci by depriving him of his principal means of obtaining income within the meaning of s 30(4)(b) of the Act; and

   (b)deprive Mr Tucci of the only practicable means of travelling to and from the place at which he is employed within the meaning of s 30(4)(c) of the Act.

2. After weighing up the preceding considerations, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to exercise my discretion to grant the Application subject to appropriate conditions to the following effect:

   1.That Mr Tucci may not drive other than:

   (a)a vehicle of class MC, HC, HR, MR, LR, C, CA;

   (b)for the purpose of driving only in the course of his employment with Shepheard Pty Ltd and for the purpose of travelling from his residence to his place of employment at Shepheard Pty Ltd's depot, 19 Ryans Road, Margaret River;

   (c)seven days a week and 24 hours per day;

   (d)for a maximum driving period of 10 hours per day; and

   (e)within a 500 km radius of the Busselton Courthouse.

   2.That Mr Tucci is to carry the extraordinary licence at all times whilst in control of a motor vehicle and to produce it on demand by any police officer.

   3.That Mr Tucci is to display 'E' plates on both the front and rear of the vehicle, of the same type and dimensions and in the same manner as 'L' plates provided for in the Road Traffic (Authorisation to Drive) Regulations 2014 (WA).

   4.That Mr Tucci is to have in his possession evidence of a logbook, completed in advance of any journey, the shift roster or shift rostering with the date, time, vehicle, destination and purpose of that journey able to be produced on demand to a police officer or otherwise provide confirmation that the purpose of the driving is only employment related.

   5.That Mr Tucci is not to have a blood-alcohol content above 0.00 at any time while driving a motor vehicle.

   6.That Mr Tucci is to provide to the CEO a completed medical assessment certificate (A Fitness to Drive M107A) before any extraordinary licence is issued by the CEO.

1. In my view those conditions would also significantly ameliorate any countervailing considerations including those arising as a result of the nature of the offence and any impact on any punitive aspects of the resulting disqualification.

2. I will allow the Application and order that the CEO, on payment of the prescribed fee, grant to the applicant an extraordinary licence for a period of 12 months subject to conditions to the above effect.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the District Court of Western Australia.

MO

Associate

10 NOVEMBER 2025