Australian Unity Property Ltd v City of Busselton

[2018] WASCA 38

[2018] WASCA 38

JURISDICTION

SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT      THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION

CORAM

AUSTRALIAN UNITY PROPERTY LIMITED as

responsible entity for the AUSTRALIAN UNITY

DIVERSIFIED PROPERTY FUND -v- CITY OF

BUSSELTON [2018] WASCA 38

BUSS P

MURPHY JA

MITCHELL JA

HEARD

25 JANUARY 2018

23 MARCH 2018

CACV 91 of 2017

DELIVERED

FILE NO/S

BETWEEN

AUSTRALIAN UNITY PROPERTY LIMITED as

responsible entity for the AUSTRALIAN UNITY
DIVERSIFIED PROPERTY FUND
First Appellant

THE TRUST COMPANY (AUSTRALIA) LTD

Second Appellant

AND

CITY OF BUSSELTON

First Respondent

REALVIEW HOLDINGS PTY LTD

Second Respondent

KMART AUSTRALIA LIMITED

Third Respondent

ALDI FOODS PTY LIMITED

Fourth Respondent

Page 1

[2018] WASCA 38

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction

Coram

:   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

:   LE MIERE J

Citation

:   AUSTRALIAN UNITY PROPERTY LTD As

Responsible Entity for the Australian Unity Diversified
Property Fund -v- CITY OF BUSSELTON
[2017] WASC 236

File Number

:   CIV 2298 of 2016

Catchwords:

Planning law - Appeal against refusal of judicial review of development

approvals - Whether first respondent had or exceeded jurisdiction to determine

development applications - Construction to be given to legislation, delegated

legislation and extrinsic materials

Legislation:

City of Busselton Local Planning Scheme No 21

Planning and Development (Development Assessment Panels) Regulations 2011

(WA), reg 5(c)

Planning and Development Act 2005  (WA), s 171A(2)(a)

Result:

Appeal dismissed

Category:    A

Representation:

Counsel:

First Appellant

Second Appellant

:   Mr M D Cuerden SC & Ms M M J Tannock

:   Mr M C Cuerden SC & Ms M M J Tannock

Page 2

[2018] WASCA 38

First Respondent

Second Respondent   :   Mr C G Colvin SC & Mr B C Gauntlett

Third Respondent     :   No appearance

:   Mr L A Tsaknis

Fourth Respondent    :   No appearance

Solicitors:

First Appellant

Second Appellant

First Respondent

:   Squire Patton Boggs

:   Squire Patton Boggs

:   LSV Borrello Lawyers

Second Respondent   :   Hotchkin Hanly Lawyers

Third Respondent     :   No appearance

Fourth Respondent    :   No appearance

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Alcan  (NT)  Alumina  Pty  Ltd  v  Commissioner  of Territory  Revenue  [2009]

HCA 41; (2009) 239 CLR 27

Alphapharm Pty Ltd v H Lundbeck A/S [2014] HCA 42; (2014) 254 CLR 247

Australian Education Union v Department of Education [2012] HCA 3; (2012)

248 CLR 1

Australian  Unity Property  Ltd  as Responsible  Entity  for the  Australian Unity

Diversified Property Fund v City of Busselton [2017] WASC 236

Certain Lloyd's Underwriters v Cross [2012] HCA 56; (2012) 248 CLR 378

Cooper  Brookes (Wollongong)  Pty  Ltd  v  Federal Commissioner  of  Taxation

(1981) 147 CLR 297

Corporate Affairs Commission of NSW v Yuill (1991) 172 CLR 319

Epic Energy (Pilbara Pipeline) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue [2011]

WASCA 228; (2011) 43 WAR 186

Inco Europe Ltd v First Choice Distribution [2000] 1 WLR 586, 592; [2000] 2

All ER 109

Lacey v Attorney General (Qld) [2011] HCA 10; (2011) 242 CLR 573

Minister for Immigration v SZJGV [2009] HCA 40; (2009) 238 CLR 642

Queensland v Congoo [2015] HCA 17; (2015) 256 CLR 239

Re Shire of Mundaring; ex parte Solomon [2007] WASCA 132

SZTAL v Minister for Immigration [2017] HCA 34; (2017) 91 ALJR 936

Taylor v The Owners - Strata Plan 11564 [2014] HCA 9; (2014) 253 CLR 531

Thiess v Collector of Customs [2014] HCA 12; (2014) 250 CLR 664

Wentworth Securities v Jones [1980] AC 74

Zheng v Cai [2009] HCA 52; (2009) 239 CLR 446

Page 3

[2018] WASCA 38

Table of contents

Factual background.....................................................................................................................5

Issues for determination..............................................................................................................6

Issue 1: jurisdiction of the City to determine the development applications..............................7

Statutory context .....................................................................................................................7
Primary judge's approach........................................................................................................9
Appellants' submissions........................................................................................................12
Disposition ............................................................................................................................13

Issue 2: permitted uses under cl 4.4.2 of LPS 21......................................................................18

Provisions of the Act.............................................................................................................18
Provisions of LPS 21 ............................................................................................................19
Primary judge's approach......................................................................................................23
Appellants' submissions........................................................................................................24
General principles .................................................................................................................27

Importance of the legislative text......................................................................................27
Identifying legislative purpose..........................................................................................29
Correction of drafting errors .............................................................................................30

Disposition ............................................................................................................................32

Appellants' submission as to the meaning of 'Shop' in the Zoning Table.........................32
Type, class or genus of activity.........................................................................................34
Alleged drafting error .......................................................................................................35
Conclusion as to Issue 2....................................................................................................39

Issue 3: Special provision area..................................................................................................39

Orders........................................................................................................................................40

Page 4

[2018] WASCA 38

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

Factual background

1

The second  respondent (Realview)  is the  registered proprietor  of land

on West  Street, West  Busselton (Lot 17).   Lot  17 is zoned  'Restricted

Business'  by  City of  Busselton  Local  Planning  Scheme No. 21  (LPS

21).  The Zoning  Table to LPS 21 identifies  the uses of land which  are

permitted, permissible  and not permitted  in that  and other zones.   The

Scheme map also designates a  portion of Lot 17 (the A64 Area)  for the

additional use of 'Discount Department Store'.  Lot 17, and an adjoining

Lot 16, are within the Special Provision Area designated by LPS 21.

2

On 16  October 2015,  Realview caused  to be  submitted, on  its behalf,

three   development  applications   under  LPS   21.     The   applications

respectively sought approval of the following development:

(1)

Site  works to  prepare  Lot  17  for subsequent  subdivision  and

development,  with   an   estimated  development   cost  of   $2.5

million plus GST (Site Works Application).

(2)

A  discount  department  store,  of   which  the  third  respondent

(KMart) is  the  proposed tenant,  and four  showrooms,  with an

estimated  development  cost  of  $9  million  plus  GST  (KMart

Application).

(3)

A showroom  and supermarket,  of which  the fourth  respondent

(ALDI) is  the proposed  tenant, with an  estimated development

cost of $2 million plus GST (ALDI Application).

3

Car  parking,   drainage,  landscaping  and   site  works  were   expressly

excluded from the scope of the KMart Application.    The area on which

1

the proposed  discount  department store  was located  extended  beyond

the A64 Area.

4

5

Subsequent   to   the    lodgement   of   the    development   applications,

Realview revised  its estimates  of the  development costs  (exclusive of

GST) to $2,691,500, $8 million and $3,268,750 respectively.

The   First    Respondent   (City)    approved   Realview's   development

applications   on    29   January,   18    February   and   14    April   2016

respectively.  The approval of the KMart Application was subject to  the

condition that the approved  development and associated work must  not

1

Green AB 327.

Page 5

[2018] WASCA 38

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

commence until the  completion of site works  approved pursuant to  the

Site Works Application.

2

6

The appellants own and operate the Busselton Central Shopping Centre,

with which the proposed  development on Lot 17 will compete.   In July

2016, the  appellants lodged  an application  for judicial  review seeking

certiorari  to quash  the  City's development  approvals,  and declaratory

relief.  No issue  as to their standing to seek  that relief was raised in the

primary proceedings.  On 18 August 2017, the  primary judge dismissed

that application  for judicial review.   The appellants now  appeal to this

court against that decision.

Issues for determination

7

The appellants'  grounds of  appeal raise three  questions for  this court's

determination:

(1)

Was the  KMart Application  a development application  'for the

approval  of  development  that  has   an  estimated  cost  of  $10

million or more', within the meaning of reg 5(c)  of the  Planning

and

Development

(Development

Assessment

Panels)

Regulations 2011 (WA)  (Regulations)?   The  City did not have

3

jurisdiction  to  deal   with  an  application  for  the   approval  of

development  with  an estimated  cost  of  $10  million  or more,

which could only be  determined by a Development Assessment

Panel (DAP).

4

(2)

(3)

Can  the use  of  Lot  17  as a  'Discount  Department  Store'  and

'Supermarket' be permitted under cl 4.4.2 of LPS 21 on the basis

that  those  uses are  'not  specifically  mentioned  in the  Zoning

Table and cannot reasonably be determined as  falling within the

type, class or genus of activity of any other use category'?

If the  answer to  (2) is  'no', does  cl 6.3.1 of  LPS 21,  read with

item  SP26  of  Sch  3  to  LPS  21  and  the  adopted  Land   Use

Concept  Plan   approved  for  Lot   17,  nonetheless  permit   the

development  of a  'Discount Department  Store'  on that  part  of

Lot 17 proposed by the KMart Application?

2

3

Green AB 558.

References to the Regulations are to the Regulations as at the date of the approval of the development

applications.  The Regulations have been subsequently amended.

Regulations, reg 8(1)(a).

4

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[2018] WASCA 38

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

8

For the  reasons which follow,  the answer  to question 1  is 'no'  and the

answer to question 2  is 'yes'.  It follows that the  third question does not

arise and the  appeal must be dismissed.   If it were necessary  to answer

the third question, the answer to that question would be 'yes'.

Issue   1:    jurisdiction   of   the    City   to   determine    the   development

applications

Statutory context

9

Part 11A of the Planning  and   Development  Act  2005  (WA) (Act)

makes provision for DAPs. Under s 171A(2)(a):

5

(2)

The Governor may make regulations:

(a)

providing that,  despite any  other provision  of this  Act

or a planning  instrument, a development  application of

a  class  or   kind  prescribed  for  the   purposes  of  this

paragraph -

(i)

must be  determined by  a DAP  as  if the  DAP

were   the   responsible    authority   under   the

relevant planning  instrument in relation  to the

development; and

(ii)

cannot be determined by a local government or

the Commission.

10

11

Division 2 of pt 11A provides for the establishment of Local

Development  Assessment   Panels  (LDAPs)  for   a  local   government

district and  Joint Development Assessment  Panels (JDAPs) for  two or

more districts.

Under  reg  5(c)  of  the   Regulations,  subject  to  presently  immaterial

exceptions:

6

a development application that:

…

5

Section 171A(1)(ba) makes similar provision for regulations allowing an applicant for development

approval to elect to have a development of prescribed classes determined by a DAP.

Reg 6 of the Regulations prescribes development applications for approval of developments outside the

6

district of the City of Perth that have an estimated cost of $2 million or more and less than $10 million under

s 171A(2)(ba) of the Act.

Page 7

[2018] WASCA 38

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

(c)

in the case of an application for development in a district outside

of  the  district  of  the  City  of  Perth  -   is  for  the  approval  of

development that has an estimated cost of $10 million or more,

is of a class prescribed under section 171A(2)(a) of the Act.

12

By reg 8(1) of the Regulations:

Despite any  other  provision of  the Act  or  a planning  instrument, any

DAP  application  for  approval   of  development  within  a  district   for

which a DAP is established:

(a)

must  be   determined  by  the   DAP  as   if  the  DAP   were  the

responsible authority  under the  relevant planning  instrument in

relation to the development; and

(b)

cannot be determined by  the local government for the  district or

the Commission.

13

The  Regulations go  on  to  make  specific provision  in  relation  to the

content  and determination  of  a 'DAP  application'.    The phrase  'DAP

application' is  defined to include  a development application  prescribed

under reg 5 of the Regulations.

7

The requirements include that:

(1)

The applicant  must,  when lodging  a DAP  application,  give to

the relevant local government a  completed notice in the form of

Form  1  in  Sch  3  and  pay  the  relevant  fee  in  Sch  1  to  the

Regulations.

8

The  form  requires   the  applicant  to  state   the

'[e]stimated  cost  of development'.    The  fees  are  specified by

reference to the 'estimated cost of the development'.

9

(2)

(3)

On  receipt of  a  DAP  application,  the local  government  must

consider the application and all accompanying material and may

require further specified information or documents.

10

Within  seven days  after the  date  on which  it  receives a  DAP

application,  the  local   government  must  give  a   copy  of  the

application  and   certain  other  material   to  the   administrative

officer of the relevant DAP.

11

7

8

9

Regulations, reg 3(1)

Regulations, reg 10.

Item 1 of Sch 1 to the Regulations.

10

11

Regulations, reg 11A.

Regulations, reg 11(1).

Page 8

[2018] WASCA 38

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

(4)

The local government  must give a  report on a DAP  application

to the  presiding member  of the relevant  DAP within  a defined

period.

12

(5)

Subject to presently immaterial exceptions, the provisions of the

Act and the planning instrument under which a DAP application

is made apply to  the making and notification of a determination

by the  relevant  DAP as  if it  were the  responsible authority  in

relation to the planning instrument.

13

14

The  term 'development'  is  relevantly  defined  in s 4(1)  of  the  Act  to

mean:

the development or use of any land, including:

(a)

any demolition,  erection, construction,  alteration of  or addition

to any building or structure on the land;

(b)

the carrying out on the land of any excavation or other works.

The phrase  'development application'  is relevantly defined  to mean  an

application under a planning scheme for approval of development.

Primary judge's approach

15

The primary judge initially identified  this branch of the appellants' case

as involving two alternative propositions:

(1)

The   City    had   no    jurisdiction   to    determine   the   KMart

Application    because   the    estimated    cost    of   the    KMart

development  in  truth  included  the  estimated  cost  of  the  site

works  necessary for  the development  and  was more  than  $10

million.

(2)

In substance the Site Works Application, the KMart Application

and the  ALDI Application  comprised  applications for  a single

development with  an estimated cost  of $13.5 million plus  GST

and therefore met the $10 million threshold.

14

16

The primary judge then identified the construction of reg 5 advanced by

the appellant as being:

15

12

13

14

Regulations, reg 12.

Regulations, reg 16(1).

Australian Unity Property Ltd as Responsible Entity for the Australian Unity Diversified Property Fund

v City of Busselton [2017] WASC 236 (primary decision) [6].

Primary decision [12].

15

Page 9

[2018] WASCA 38

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

that a  development application will  be prescribed  if the estimated  cost

of the  'development' is  $10 million  or more,  whether approval  for the

entire  works  comprising that  development  is  sought  in  one  or more

development applications.

17

The    primary   judge    concluded    that   the    correct    or    preferable

interpretation of  the Regulations  does not  require that  the Site  Works

Application and the  KMart Application (or  the KMart Application and

the  ALDI   Application)   be  considered   as  one   application   for  the

purposes  of  reg   5  of  the   Regulations.

16

His  Honour  held   that  a

'development application' in  its ordinary meaning and  in the context of

the Act  and the  Regulations is  a formal application  to the  responsible

authority for approval of  a specified development.  The  Regulations do

not  provide  for  separate  formal  applications  to  be  deemed  to  be  a

combined  or  composite  application for  the  purposes  of  reg  5.    The

primary judge said that there  is no foothold in the text of  the regulation

to construe it in that manner.

17

18

The primary judge also accepted that an applicant for development  may

determine what is to be the subject  matter of the application.     The Act

18

did  not  authorise  the  making of  regulations  as  to  what  may  be  the

subject   of    a    development   application    nor   what    constitutes    a

development application.  Those were  matters for the relevant planning

instrument.

19

The   Act  and   Regulations   did  not   require   a  local

government    to    combine   or    amalgamate    separate    development

applications  for   the  purposes  of  a   referral  to  a   DAP,  rather  than

considering each development application on its merits.

20

19

20

The  primary  judge  viewed various  provisions  of  the  Regulations  as

showing that the development application referred to and  considered by

a  DAP   will  be  a  single   development  application  that   reaches  the

statutory $10  million  threshold, unaffected  by any  other development

application.

21

The primary judge  rejected the appellants'  submission that the  purpose

of s 171A(2)(a) and reg 5 would be undermined if applications for

separate    developments    are     treated    as    separate     developments

notwithstanding that  they  are, or  may be,  sequential  developments of

the same  land or related  developments of adjoining  land.   His Honour

16

17

18

19

20

21

Primary decision [22].

Primary decision [24].

Primary decision [25].

Primary decision [26].

Primary decision [27].

Primary decision [28].

Page 10

[2018] WASCA 38

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

said   that,  if   each  application   is   capable  of   being   presented  and

considered as  a separate  development and  is the  subject of  a separate

formal  application,   then  the   local  government   may  consider   each

application   in  accordance   with  relevant   statutory   instruments  and

planning    principles.

22

He    concluded     that    the    Explanatory

Memorandum to  the Approval and Related  Reforms (No 4)  (Planning)

Act  2010 (WA),  which  introduced  the DAP  provisions  into  the Act,

does not disclose any purpose which requires the statutory provisions to

be construed in  the manner advocated by the  appellants.

23

His Honour

said:

24

The  object  of  the DAP  provisions  is  to  streamline  the  development

process,  not  to  constrain  the  applications  for   development  which  a

developer may make.   It is not contrary to the  purpose or objects of the

DAP model  to permit  a  developer to  apply to  a local  government for

approval of a development  on a site and then  subsequently apply to the

local  government  for  a  further  development  on the  site  where  each

development application considered separately  is not a mandatory DAP

application,   that    is   a   development    application   which   must    be

determined by a DAP.

21

The primary  judge  also considered  the construction  contended  for by

the appellants to be unworkable.  His Honour said:

25

It would  require the  local government to  assess whether  all aspects  of

the  'development application'  are  included  in each  application  that is

lodged.   What criteria are  to be  applied given that  the legislation  does

not  say  what  forms part  of  a  single  development  and  what  may be

separate  developments?   If  it is  to  be determined  objectively,  such a

requirement will  in effect mean  that landowners will be  confined as to

the  development   approvals  that   they  can  seek   by  some   unguided

assessment made by a  local authority of what the  application should be

for.   An  incorrect  assessment would  mean  that it  is  determined by  a

local authority  without jurisdiction  resulting  in invalidity.   What  is to

happen where applications in respect of the same land are lodged  weeks

or months later?  Are they then to be evaluated to see whether they form

part of the same  development?  What if  approval has been given of  the

earlier application in the meantime?

Appellants' submissions

22

The appellants  submit that  their preferred construction  flows from  the

ordinary   meaning    of   the   reference    to   the    'estimated   cost'   of

22

23

24

25

Primary decision [29]

Primary decision [30].

Primary decision [31].

Primary decision [32].

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[2018] WASCA 38

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

development for which  approval is sought.   The appellants submit  that

this reference  necessarily encompasses the  estimated cost  of all works

required   to   carry   out   the   physical   alterations   identified   in   the

development  application.

26

The  appellants   further  submit  that  the

'development' for which approval is sought includes the proposed use to

which the  land is  to be put.   They  say that  the estimated cost  of such

development necessarily includes the estimated  cost of all works which

the developer proposes  to carry out  in order to render  the land capable

of  being approved  for, and  put  to, the  proposed use.    The appellants

submit  that  this  is  so  even if  those  works  are  not  identified  in  the

development application.

The appellants say:

27  28

[T]o identify  the estimated cost  of 'development' for  which approval is

sought  necessarily requires  the  identification of  the  estimated cost  to

carry out all  works which the developer intends  to carry out in order  to

complete the proposed physical alterations to the land so as to be able to

put  the land  to  the  proposed use  for  which  development approval  is

sought.

23

24

The appellants submit  that their preferred  construction would advance,

and  the  construction  adopted  by  the primary  judge  undermines,  the

purpose of the legislation.   The purposive argument is  advanced at two

levels.

More broadly, it  is contended that the  purpose of requiring approval  to

be obtained is to  enable the entirety of the proposed  development, both

as  to  the  proposed  physical alterations  and  the  proposed  use,  to  be

assessed  against applicable  planning criteria.    It is  submitted that  the

legislative  scheme  does  not  contemplate the  approval  process  being

fragmented by discrete aspects  of the works necessary for the proposed

development   being    made   the    subject   of   separate    development

applications and approvals.

29

25

More narrowly, the appellants submit that the purpose of s 171A(2)(a)

of  the Act  is  to require  that  developments of  a  certain magnitude  or

significance  (measured   by  reference   to  the   estimated   cost  of   the

proposed  works)  be  determined  by a  DAP,  as  a  specialist  planning

body, rather  than by  the responsible  authority.  The  appellants submit

that  it may  properly be  inferred  that this  is, amongst  other  things, to

ensure consistency in planning decisions across  local governments with

26

27

28

29

Appellants' submissions par 30.

Appellants' submissions par 31.

Appellants' submissions par 32.

Appellants' submissions par 35.

Page 12

[2018] WASCA 38

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

respect to developments of sufficient  size.

30

The appellants submit that

the  primary  judge's  construction  would  enable   a  developer  to  split

proposed works having an estimated cost  of $10 million or more across

two   or   more   development   applications,   for   determination   on   a

piecemeal  basis   by   the  responsible   authority.     It  is   said  such   a

construction would undermine the legislative purpose of s 171A(2)(a)

and  reg 5,  and  should not  be  adopted unless  the  words of  reg  5 are

incapable of bearing a construction which gives effect to its purpose.

31

26

The appellants  submit that  the 'unworkable'32  consequences which  the

primary  judge  identified  can  only  arise  in  a  very  narrow  subset  of

applications, namely  where the  developer wishes to  split development

with  an estimated  cost of  $10  million or  more  across more  than one

development  application.

33

They  submit   that  the   primary  judge's

construction   itself   has   the   potential   for   practical   difficulties    in

operation,  for example  where  a developer  increases  the scope  of  the

proposed   works   before   the   responsible   authority   determines   the

application.

34

Disposition

27

The  statutory  criterion  for determining  the  respective  jurisdiction  of

local governments and DAPs to determine a development  application is

the  estimated cost  of  the development  for  which  approval is  sought.

The  structure  of  the   Regulations,  in  particular  the  requirement   for

action  to be  taken when  an  application is  lodged,

35

indicates  that the

character of  a development application  as a 'DAP  application' must be

ascertainable at the point in time at which it is lodged.

28

The reference  to an  'estimated cost'  is to  the outcome  of a  process of

estimation  which must  have  been  undertaken  by someone.    At  least

ordinarily, at the point when the development application is lodged, that

process  will  have  been   undertaken  by  or  on  behalf   of  the  person

seeking to undertake the development and who is  applying for approval

to do  so.   Irrespective  of who  undertakes that  estimation process,  the

character  of  a   development  application  as  a   DAP  application  will

depend on the outcome of  a process of estimating cost undertaken at  or

prior to the time at which the development application is lodged.

30

31

32

33

34

35

Appellants' submissions par 39.

Appellants' submissions par 40.

Primary decision [32].

Appellants' submissions pars 42 - 43.

Appellants' submissions par 47.

Regulations, reg 11A - 12.

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[2018] WASCA 38

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

29

The  difficulty  of  estimating  construction   costs  is  illustrated  by  the

notorious frequency with which significant construction works run  over

budget.  A variety of  approaches to estimating cost may be  undertaken,

from the application of a  notional cost per square metre of  constructing

certain  kinds of  building  to  an  analysis by  a  quantity  surveyor  of a

detailed construction plan.   Different allowances for contingencies may

be  made.    Development  costs  may  be  significantly  affected  by  the

conditions imposed on  a development approval.   A genuine  estimation

of  development  costs   may  be  regarded  as   wildly  inaccurate  when

compared with the actual costs ultimately incurred.

30

It  may be  accepted  that  the reference  to  'estimated  costs' is  to  costs

which have  been genuinely estimated; ie  to an estimation  which is not

colourable.     The  appellants   say  that  the   estimation  must   also  be

reasonable.    We  doubt  whether  that  is  the  case,  but  if  there  is  an

implicit requirement of reasonableness then such a requirement  will not

necessarily  be  transgressed   merely  because  the  person   making  the

estimation has  not accounted  for a  cost which  will be involved  in the

development.

31

In the  present case,  the only evidence  of an  estimation of the  costs of

the   development   for   which  approval   was   sought   in   the   KMart

Application,  at the  time  that application  was  made, is  the  $9 million

indicated  in  the  application  itself.    As  noted  above,  the  appellants'

submission is  that  the reference  in reg  5 to  'cost'  is to  the cost  of all

works which  the developer proposes  to carry  out in order  to complete

the proposed physical  alterations to the land  so as to be  able to put the

land to  the proposed use.   Even if  that submission  is accepted, it  does

not deny the $9 million estimation the character of the estimated  cost of

the   development   for   which  approval   was   sought   in   the   KMart

Application.  If the appellants'  submission is accepted, the consequence

would be  that the  estimated cost  of $9 million  would fail  to take  into

account  the cost  of  some of  the  physical  alterations required  for  the

relevant part  of  Lot 17  to be  put to  the  proposed use.   However,  the

estimate would remain an estimation  of the cost of the development for

which approval was sought by the KMart Application.

32

The appellants submit that the estimated  cost of development for which

approval  was  sought   in  the  KMart  Application   is  the  sum  of  the

development  costs  estimated  in  the KMart  Application  and  the  Site

Works   Application.

36

We   do  not   accept  that   submission.

The

36

Appeal ts 55.

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JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

development   for  which   approval   was   sought  in   the   Site  Works

Application was  that which  was required  to subdivide  Lot  17 into  10

new  lots.    The  development for  which  approval  was  sought  by  the

KMart Application was  located on only one of  those lots (proposed lot

10).

37

The  development  for which  approval  was  sought  in  the Site

Works Application  was clearly not  confined to  works on proposed  lot

10 and other works required for  putting proposed lot 10 to the uses of a

discount department store and showrooms.

33

Even  if  the  appellants'  construction   of  the  Regulations  were  to  be

accepted,  there  was  no  evidence  before  the  primary  judge  that  the

estimated cost of the development for which approval was sought in the

KMart Application exceeded $10 million.  The failure  by the appellants

to demonstrate the  existence of such an  estimate at the time  the KMart

Application  was made  means  that  they have  not  established that  the

KMart  Application  was  a  'DAP  application'  which  the   City  lacked

jurisdiction to determine.

34

In  any event,  as  a matter  of  construction, the  reference  to 'estimated

cost' in reg 5(b)  is confined to the cost  of undertaking the development

for  which  approval  is  sought  in  the  development  application.    The

reference does not  extend to work  for which approval is  not sought by

the  development  application,  even   where  that  work  is  a   necessary

precursor to the development  proposed in the development  application.

In the present  case, the works  on the site and  other works identified in

the Site  Works Application were  specifically excluded  from the scope

of the  KMart Application.

38

The cost  of undertaking development  for

which approval was not sought in, and  which was specifically excluded

from, the Kmart Application cannot properly form  part of the estimated

cost of undertaking the development for  which approval was sought for

the purposes of reg 5(b) of the Regulations.

35

The  construction  we  have  adopted  reflects  the  natural and  ordinary

meaning of the language used in the Regulations, considered as a whole

and understood in the context of the Act.  It is consistent  with the stated

purpose  of the  Act to  provide  for an  efficient  and effective  land  use

planning system in the State.

39

The appellants' construction would tend

to  defeat  that   object  by  making   it  more  difficult   to  ascertain  the

jurisdiction of  local governments and DAPs  to determine development

applications in marginal cases.  Recognising that the Regulations define

37

38

39

See Green AB 276.  The subsequently approved subdivision plan is at Green AB 486.

Green AB 327.

Section 3(1)(b) of the Act.

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DAP  applications   by  reference   to  the  estimated   cost  of   only  the

development  for   which  approval   is  sought   reduces  the   scope  for

jurisdictional  disputes  which  are   apt  to  delay  the  determination  of

applications and create doubts about the validity of approvals which  are

granted.

36

37

38

The appellants' submissions are largely driven by a concern to prevent a

developer   fragmenting   the   approval  process   by   making   separate

development   applications    in    respect   of    discrete   aspects    of    a

development, and  thereby avoid mandatory determination  by a DAP.

40

There is no  express anti-avoidance provision in the  Act, and we see no

warrant for implying  such a statutory purpose.   Neither the Act nor the

Regulations create any  obvious incentive for a developer  to adopt such

an approach.    The quantum  of the  estimated cost  of  development for

which approval  is  sought does  not affect  the planning  legislation and

policies which  are  to be  applied in  determining  the application.   The

only  change caused  by a  lower  estimated cost  of  development is  the

identity of  the public  authority which  will determine  the development

application.

Further,  as the  primary  judge  correctly recognised,41

s 171A(2)(a) of

the  Act authorises  the  making of  regulations  identifying  the class  or

kind of development  application which must be  determined by a DAP.

It  does  not authorise  the  making  of  regulations  which  constrain  the

scope of  a development application  which an applicant  may choose to

make.

Any   limits   on    the   permissible   scope   of    development

applications will depend  on the terms of  the relevant planning scheme.

Absent  such  a  provision  in   the  relevant  planning  scheme,  there  is

nothing in the Act or Regulations to limit the choices which a developer

may make as to  the scope of a development application  or the different

stages  at   which  approval  may   be  sought.     There  is  no   basis  for

identifying    a    legislative    policy    against    the    fragmentation    of

development applications.

It should  also be noted  that the appellants'  construction would  involve

the differential treatment  of development applications  which are of the

same substantive  effect from  a planning perspective.   For  example, in

the present  case, on  the  appellants' construction,  the City  would have

jurisdiction to  determine the KMart Application  if that application  had

been made after the development  authorised by the approval of the Site

Works Application had been  completed.  On this construction, the  City

40

41

Appellants' Submissions par 35.

Primary decision [26].

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JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

would also  have jurisdiction  to determine  the KMart  Application if  it

had been  conducted by a  developer other than  Realview (for example,

by KMart pursuant to the  terms of a development lease or following  an

agreement for the  sale of proposed lot  10 to KMart).   From a planning

policy  perspective,  it  is  difficult  to  see the  justification  for  treating

applications for what  will ultimately result in  an identical development

differently by reason of such differences.

39

We do not  accept the appellants' submission that  there is to be inferred

from the  terms of  the legislation a  purpose of  ensuring consistency  in

planning    decisions    across   local    governments    with    respect    to

developments  of   sufficient  size.     Developments   in  different   local

government   districts  are   regulated   by  the   different   provisions  of

planning schemes applicable in  each district, and the different planning

policies   made   under   those   schemes.     Further,   the   DAP   which

determines  a  development  application   may  be  an  LDAP,  which  is

created for a  single local government district,  or a JDAP in  the case of

two or  more government districts.   There  is no reason  to suppose  that

the variance  in  approach between  different LDAPs  or JDAPs  dealing

with  development   applications   made  under   a  variety   of   different

planning   schemes    is   any    greater   than   that    of   different    local

governments.

40

41

We also agree with the conclusion  of the primary judge, for the reasons

his  Honour gave,

42

that  the Regulations  did  not require  that  the  Site

Works  Application  and  the   KMart  Application  be  considered  as  a

single application for the purposes of reg 5 of the Regulations.

For  these  reasons,   the  KMart  Application   was  not  a  development

application for the  approval of 'development that  has an estimated cost

of  $10   million   or  more',   within  the   meaning   of  reg 5(c)   of  the

Regulations.    Ground  of  appeal  1,  which  in  effect  alleges  that  the

primary   judge   erred   in   reaching   a   contrary   conclusion,   is    not

established.

Issue 2: permitted uses under cl 4.4.2 of LPS 21

Provisions of the Act

42

Section  69  of   the  Act  provides   for  the  making  of   local  planning

schemes  with  respect   to  land,  with  the  general   objects  of  making

42

Primary decision [22] - [32], summarised above.

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JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

suitable provision for the improvement, development and  use of land in

the  scheme  area.    A  planning  scheme  may  also  make  provision  in

relation  to  matters  referred  to  in  Sch 7  to  the  Act.    Those  matters

include the zoning of the scheme  area for appropriate purposes, and the

designation  of  uses   in  zones  as   permitted,  prohibited  or  requiring

approval.

They also include:

43  44

Approval, refusal  or approval subject  to conditions of  any use or  class

or kind  of development  by a consideration  of any  matter to which  the

Act relates including the public interest.

43

A  local  planning   scheme  may  be  prepared   or  adopted  by  a   local

government under  s 72 of the Act.   After advertising  and consultation,

and  subject to  environmental  assessment, a  local  planning scheme  is

submitted to the Minister for his or her approval under s 87(1) of the

Act.   The Minister may approve  the scheme, require  the relevant local

government to modify  and resubmit the scheme  for approval, or refuse

to   approve   the   scheme.

45

A   similar   process   is   prescribed  for

By s 87(4) of the Act:

amendments to a local planning scheme.

46

A  local planning  scheme  or  amendment to  a  local  planning scheme,

when approved  by the  Minister and  published in  the Gazette,  has full

force and effect as if it were enacted by this Act.

44

Section 68  of  the Act  provides that,  on the  day on  which the  section

comes  into  operation   (which  was  9  April  2006),   a  town  planning

scheme  in  force under  the  former  Town  Planning  and  Development

Act 1928 (WA) continued in force as a local  planning scheme under the

Act.  By  this means,  Busselton Shire  Council District  Town  Planning

Scheme  No. 20  (TPS  20),  to  which reference  is  made  later  in these

reasons, continued as a local planning scheme after 9 April 2006.

Provisions of LPS 21

45

46

LPS 21 is a local planning scheme made under the Act which came into

force on 15 October 2014.

Clause 4.1  of LPS 21  classifies the  Scheme area into  zones shown  on

the  Scheme  map,  including  the  'Business'  and   'Restricted  Business'

zones.

43

44

45

46

Item 6 of Sch 7 to the Act.

Item 9 in Sch 7 to the Act.

Planning and Development Act s 87(2).

Planning and Development Act s 75, s 87.

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47

Clause 4.2.2  provides for  the objectives  and policies for  the 'Business

Zone'.  The objectives of that zone are:

(a)

To provide for  conveniently-located shopping and  other service

associated   commercial    activities   to   service   each    centre’s

catchment   area,   as    determined   by   the   relevant    planning

framework.

(b)

To maintain  and reinforce  the  viability of  existing commercial

centres, including those supporting adjoining agricultural areas.

48

Clause  4.2.3  identifies  the  following  objectives  and  policies  of   the

'Restricted Business Zone':

Objective

To   make    adequate   provision   for    other   commercial   needs    and

opportunities not  ideally located  in the  town centres  of Busselton  and

Dunsborough whilst having regard to  the strategic importance and need

to maintain the commercial primacy of the town centres.

Policies

(a)

To

provide

for

development

having

relatively

low

traffic-generating  characteristics,  but  not  high  turnover  shops

and offices that  might more properly  be located in the  Business

zone.

(b)

To  provide  for relatively  low  intensity  commercial  and  retail

uses  with  extensive   floor  space  requirements  which,  by   the

nature  of  the  activity conducted,  require  relatively  direct  and

easy access to motor vehicle parking areas for loading purposes.

(c)

(d)

To   provide   for   development   which   will   not   result   in   a

detrimental  impact  on  surrounding  commercial  centres  or  an

overall adverse impact on commercial centres.

To restrict  development which  is likely  to contribute  to ribbon

development,   the    spread   of    town   centres,    or   otherwise

detrimentally impact the efficiency of main or arterial roads.

49

50

Clause  4.3  provides  that  the  Zoning  Table  indicates,  subject  to  the

provisions of the  Scheme, the uses permitted in  the Scheme area in the

various zones.

Under cl 4.3.2, a 'P'  designation in the Zoning Table means that the  use

is  permitted   by  the  Scheme   providing  the   use  complies  with   the

relevant  development standards  and  the requirements  of  the Scheme.

'X' means a use that is not permitted by the Scheme.

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51

'Showroom' is a  'P' use in the  Restricted Business Zone.   'Shop' is a  'P'

use  only in  the  Business Zone,  and  an  'X' use  (not  permitted) in  all

other  zones.    'Discount  Department  Store'  and  'Supermarket',  while

defined in Sch 1 to LPS 21, are not referred to in the Zoning Table.

52

Clause 4.4 provides:

4.4.1.   Where  a specific  use  is  mentioned in  the  Zoning  Table,  it is

deemed to  be excluded from the  general terms used  to describe
any other use.

4.4.2.   If a  person  proposes  to carry  out  on  land any  use  that is  not

specifically   mentioned    in   the   Zoning    Table   and   cannot
reasonably  be  determined  as falling  within  the  type,  class  or
genus of activity of any other  use category the local government
may:

(a)

determine that  the use is  consistent with the  objectives

of the particular zone and is therefore permitted; or

(b)

determine  that   the  use  may   be  consistent  with   the

objectives   and  policies   of  the   particular   zone  and

thereafter  follow the  advertising  procedures  of clause

10.4   in    considering   an    application   for    planning

approval; or

(c)

determine   that  the   use   is   not  consistent   with   the

objectives  of  the particular  zone  and  is  therefore not

permitted.

53

54

Under   cl 4.5.1,  notwithstanding   the  provisions   of   clause  4.3   and

'Table 1',  the  City  may  approve  any  development  consistent  with  a

Development  Guide Plan  adopted  pursuant to  Part  7  of the  Scheme.

There is no  evidence that a Development  Guide Plan has been adopted

by the City with which the development is consistent.

Clause 4.7 provides:

Notwithstanding  anything  contained   in  the  Zoning   Table,  the  land

specified in Schedule 2 may be used  for the specific use or uses that are

listed in  addition to  any uses  permissible in the  zone in  which land  is

situated subject  to the conditions  set out  in Schedule 2  with respect to

that land.

55

Item   A64  of   Sch   2   and  the   Scheme   map   identify  a   'Discount

Department  Store' as  an additional  specified  use the  A64 Area.    The

'Conditions' column of item A64 contains the following provisions:

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1.

2.

The additional use  specified shall be  deemed to be a  'D' use for

the purpose of Part 4 of the Scheme.

Development shall  be in  accordance with  a Land  Use Concept

Plan adopted by Council.

The   additional    use   specified   shall    comprise   a   single    discount

department  store  with  a   gross  leasable  floor  area  of   not  less  than

5,000m² and not more than 8,000m².

Under cl 4.3.2, a 'D' use is a use that is not permitted unless the City has

exercised its discretion by granting planning approval.

56

Part   6   makes    provision   in   relation   to   Special    Control   Areas.

Clause 6.1.1 provides for a  number of different kinds of special  control

areas, including 'Special Provision' areas.  Clause 6.1.2 provides:

In  respect  of   a  special  control  area   shown  on  a  Scheme   map,  or

otherwise set  out in the Scheme,  the provisions applying  to the special

control  area   apply  in   addition  to   the   provisions  applying   to  any

underlying zone or reserve and any general provisions of the Scheme.

57

Clause  6.3.1  makes  the  following  provisions   in  relation  to  Special

Provision areas:

Notwithstanding   any   other   provisions    of   the   Scheme,   use   and

development  of land  identified  on  the Scheme  map  within  a Special

Provision  area and  specified  in Schedule  3,  shall be  subject  to  those

provisions listed  within  Schedule 3  specific to  the land  in addition  to

any provisions which  are generally more  applicable to such land  under

the Scheme.

58

59

Item SP26  of Sch  3 identifies  Lot 17  and the  adjacent Lot  16 for  the

purposes of  this provision.   That item provides  that development  shall

be in  accordance with  a Land  Use Concept  Plan adopted  by Council.

Item SP26   also   contains   a   number   of   specific   requirements   for

development on Lots 16 and 17.

Clause 9.1 provides that, subject to cl 9.2:

[A]ll  development   on  land  zoned   and  reserved  under   the  Scheme

requires the prior approval of  the local government.  A person must  not

commence or  carry  out any  development without  first having  applied

for and  obtained the  planning approval  of the  local government under

Part 10.

Clause   9.2   identifies    'permitted   development'   which,   except    as

otherwise  provided   in  the  Scheme,   does  not   require  the  planning

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JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

approval of the City.  Clearly, none of the development that is  proposed

on Lot 17 is identified as permitted development by cl 9.2 of LPS 21.

60

Part 10  deals  with the  requirements of  an application  for approval  of

development.  Clause 11.2 identifies the matters  to which the City must

have  due regard  in  considering an  application  for planning  approval,

including the  aims and  provisions of  LPS 21.   Clause 11.3  empowers

the City  to  grant its  approval with  or  without conditions  or refuse  to

grant its approval.  By cl 11.7:

Planning approval may be granted:

(a)

(b)

for the use or development for which the approval is sought;

for that use or development, except  for a specified part or aspect

of that use or development; or

(c)

for a specified part or aspect of that use or development.

61

Sch 1 to LPS 21 contains the following relevant definitions:

"Discount Department Store"  means a premises wherein a  substantial

range of  consumer goods are  kept in  a substantial number  of different

departments and offered for sale by a single retailer but does not include

a supermarket nor a supermarket component.

"Shop" means any building wherein  goods are kept, exposed or offered

for  sale  by retail,  or  within  which  services  of a  personal  nature  are

provided  (including a  hairdresser,  beauty therapist  or  manicurist)  but

does  not include  a showroom,  fast  food outlet  or  any other  premises

specifically defined elsewhere in this part.

"Showroom" means any building or  part of a building used or intended

for use for the purpose of displaying or offering for sale by wholesale or

retail,   automotive  spare   parts,  carpets,   large   electrical  appliances,

furniture,  hardware or  bulky  goods  but  does not  include  the  sale by

retail  of foodstuffs,  liquor or  beverages, items  of  clothing or  apparel,

magazines,  newspapers, books  or paper  products,  china, glassware  or

domestic hardware, or items of personal adornment.

"Supermarket"  means  premises   used  to  sell  a   range  of  food  and

household convenience  goods by retail but  does not include  a discount

department store, showroom or takeaway food outlet.

Primary judge's approach

62

The  definition of  'Shop'  excludes from  its  scope  'any other  premises

specifically   defined  elsewhere   in'   pt   13   of  LPS   21.

'Discount

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Department  Store'  and  'Supermarket'   are  both  premises  specifically

defined elsewhere in pt  13 of LPS 21.   The primary judge held that the

latter premises were expressly excluded from the scope of the definition

of 'Shop'.   As 'Discount  Department Store' and  'Supermarket' were not

referred  to   in  the  Zoning  Table   of  LPS  21,   those  uses  could   be

permitted under cl 4.4.2 of LPS 21.

63

The primary judge gave three reasons for this conclusion:

(1)

The construction of  'Shop' as including a  'Discount Department

Store' and  a 'Supermarket' was  not reasonably open  on the text

of cl 4.4.2, the Zoning Table and the definition of 'Shop' in pt 13

of  LPS  21.   The  meaning  that  a  'Shop'  includes a  'Discount

Department Store' and  a 'Supermarket' can only  be achieved by

rewriting cl 4.4.2, the relevant  definitions or the relevant entries

in the Zoning Table or some combination of those provisions.

(2)

(3)

The construction  advanced by the  respondents is  not absurd or

unreasonable.

A    'Discount    Department    Store'    and    a

'Supermarket' are  'D' uses in both  the 'Business' and  'Restricted

Business'   zones.      In   each   case    the   City   can    make   a

determination in accordance  with cl 4.4.2 as  to whether the use

is permitted.

The  appellants  did  not  state  how  the  City  and  the  Minister

would have  changed the text  of cl 4.4.2,  the Zoning  Table and

the definitions in pt 13 so as to give effect to the intention which

the applicants attribute to the City  and the Minister.  Even if the

court  considers  that the  natural  and  ordinary  meaning  of  the

relevant statutory provisions produces a result that is unintended

or the  result of  a  drafting mistake  or oversight,  the court  may

only  overcome the  error  or oversight  if  it is  possible  to  state

with certainty what words would have  been adopted by the City

and approved by  the Minister had their  attention been drawn to

the  problem.     This   principle  constitutes  an   insurmountable

hurdle for the appellants.

Appellants' submissions

64

On appeal,  the appellants  advance three  bases for  contending that  the

use of  Lot 17 as  a 'Discount Department  Store' or 'Supermarket'  could

not be permitted under cl 4.4.2 of LPS 21.

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[2018] WASCA 38

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65

First, the appellants  submit that the term  'Shop' in the Zoning  Table is

not used  in  the same  sense in  which that  term is  defined in  Sch 1  to

LPS 21.  This is on  the basis that the concluding exclusionary words  of

the  definition  of 'Shop'  in  Sch  1  were  not intended  to  be  imported.

Clause 4.4.1 of  LPS  21 deals  with the  question of  overlap,  providing

that:

Where a specific  use is mentioned in  the Zoning Table, it is  deemed to

be excluded from the general terms used to describe any other use.

66

67

The appellants submit that  cl 4.4.1 renders the concluding words  of the

definition of 'Shop', underlined in the following quote, unnecessary:

"Shop"  means any  building  wherein goods  are  kept  … but  does  not

include a showroom,  fast food outlet or any  other premises specifically

defined elsewhere in this part.

The appellants say  that, not only  is the adoption of  the underlined part

of the  definition unnecessary, but  adoption of it  into the Zoning  Table

would have  a radically different  effect to  that of avoiding  overlapping

use descriptions.   It  would exclude  some uses  from the  Zoning Table

altogether.   The appellants  therefore submit  that the underlined  words

do not apply where  the term 'Shop' is used in  the Zoning Table.  If that

underlined  part of  the  definition  is not  applied  to  the Zoning  Table,

both a  'Discount Department  Store' and  'Supermarket' are  a 'Shop'  for

the purposes of the Zoning Table.

68

Second, the appellants submit that use as a 'Discount Department  Store'

and 'Supermarket'  fall within  the 'type,  class or genus  of activity  of' a

'Shop' for the  purposes of cl 4.4.2 of LPS  21.  That is  so even if 'Shop'

is  employed in  the  Zoning  Table in  the  sense  in which  that  term  is

defined by Sch  1.  Therefore,  even if a 'Discount  Department Store' or

'Supermarket' is  not a 'Shop', as  that term is  used in the  Zoning Table,

neither of those two uses can be permitted under cl 4.4.2 of LPS 21.

69

70

However, the  appellants do not  contend that,  if cl 4.4.2 was  otherwise

applicable,  it  was  not  open  to  the  City   to  determine  that  the  uses

of 'Discount Department  Store'   and  'Supermarket'   were  or   may  be

consistent  with   the   objectives,  or   objectives  and   policies,   of  the

Restricted Business Zone.

47

The   third   basis   for   the   appellants'   contention   depends   on   the

acceptance of its  submissions as to the purpose  of making Amendment

47

Appeal ts 20.

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No. 72 to TPS 20 (Amendment 72).  The  appellants submit that LPS 21

substantively adopted the  relevant provisions of  TPS 20 as affected  by

Amendment 72.

71

72

Prior  to the  making  of  Amendment 72,  Lots  16  and  17 were  zoned

'Residential' under TPS  20.  'Shop' was defined  in the same terms as  in

LPS  21.   'Shop'  was   a  permitted  use   in  the   'Business'  Zone,  and

prohibited in  all other zones unless  specifically permitted elsewhere  in

the Scheme.

Amendment 72 made the following amendments to TPS 20:48

(1)

Lots   16   and   17   were   rezoned   'Restricted   Business'   and

'Recreation', as depicted on the Scheme amendment map;

(2)

There  was  a  realignment   of  the  boundary  of  a  wetland   on

Lots 16  and  17 and  nearby  land,  as  depicted  on  the Scheme

amendment map;

(3)

(4)

(5)

Lots  16 and  17  were included  in the  'Special  Provision Area'

under the  equivalent  to cl  6.3.1 of  LPS 21  in terms  reflecting

those noted at [57] above;

'Additional Use'  provisions were added  allowing the use  of the

A64   Area   as    a   'Discount   Department   Store'    subject   to

conditions;

Definitions  of 'Discount  Department  Store' and  'Supermarket',

reflecting the current definitions in LPS 21, were added into Sch

1.

73

74

The  appellants  submit   that  the  purpose  of  Amendment   72  was  to

re-zone Lots  16 and  17 as  Restricted  Business and  to provide  for the

future  commercial  development   of  a  defined   part  of  Lot  17   as  a

'Discount Department Store'.

The  appellants submit  that  the  legislative purpose  of  introducing the

definition of  'Discount Department Store'  was to make  clear what  was

to  be   permitted   on  the   A64  Area.     The  definition   of  'Discount

Department Store' expressly excluded  a 'Supermarket'.  Amendment 72

introduced  the definition  of  'Supermarket'  at  the same  time  to  make

clear  the  extent  of  that  exclusion.     The  appellants  submit  that  the

introduction of those two definitions was not intended to have the effect

48

Government Gazette 22 June 2007 p 2896 - 97 (Green AB 576 - 577).

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[2018] WASCA 38

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

of  either  permitting   use  of  land  as   a  'Discount  Department  Store'

outside the A64 Area, nor of permitting  the use of any part of Lot 17 as

a 'Supermarket'.

75

The appellants  submit that  the definition  of 'Shop' in  Sch 1  should be

read  into  the substantive  provision  (the  Zoning  Table)  and  then  the

Zoning Table construed  in its context  and having regard  to its purpose

or object.   The  structure and  general policy  of LPS  21 is  inconsistent

with  an  intention  that  use of  an  area  of  land  as  a  'Supermarket'  or

'Discount  Department Store'  would  be left  unallocated  in the  Zoning

Table, to be governed exclusively by cl 4.4.2.   The appellants say that a

literal reading of  the provisions does not conform  to the relevant intent

as  ascertained  from  the  provisions  of  the  instrument,  including  the

policy which  may be  discerned from  those provisions.   They  say that

there  is no  uncertainty as  to  how the  text of  the  definition would  be

changed to give  effect to its true intent.   The appellants submit that  the

relevant context requires  that, when it  is used in  the Zoning Table, the

term 'Shop' bears  a modified meaning which  does not exclude use  as a

'Discount Department Store' or 'Supermarket'.

76

This submission requires  that words either be  added to or deleted from

the   text  of   LPS  21.     One  mechanism   which  could   achieve   the

substantive effect for which the appellants contend would be to read the

following underlined words into the definition:

49

'Shop' means  any building wherein goods  are kept, exposed  or offered

for sale by retail … but does not include a showroom, fast food outlet or

any other premises specifically defined elsewhere  in this part other than

a 'Discount Department Store' or 'Supermarket'.

Another mechanism raised during the course of oral argument would be

to read the following underlined words into the definition:

50

'Shop' means  any building  including a  'Discount Department Store'  or

'Supermarket' wherein  goods  are kept,  exposed or  offered  for sale  by

retail … but does  not include a showroom, fast food outlet  or any other

premises specifically defined elsewhere in this part.

General principles

77

The  submissions in  this case  were  directed to  establishing  legislative

intention.   The relevant intention  which is identified  by the  process of

49

50

Appeal ts 5.

Appeal ts 8.

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[2018] WASCA 38

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

statutory construction is  not the subjective understanding or  motives of

persons  exercising  delegated  legislative  power.   Much  less  is  it  the

subjective  understanding  or motivation  of  the  officials  charged  with

drafting  the legislative  text.   Rather,  the construction  of  LPS 21  is a

process of  determining the objective  meaning of  the legislation by  the

application of  recognised rules  of interpretation  to the legislative  text,

understood as a  whole and in  its context.  As  the High Court observed

in Zheng v Cai:

51

It has been said that to attribute an intention to the legislature is to apply

something  of  a  fiction.  However,  what  is   involved  here  is  not  the

attribution of  a collective  mental  state to  legislators. That  would be  a

misleading use  of  metaphor. Rather,  judicial findings  as to  legislative

intention  are an  expression  of the  constitutional  relationship  between

the arms  of government with  respect to  the making, interpretation  and

application  of laws  …  the preferred  construction  by  the court  of  the

statute   in   question    is   reached   by   the    application   of   rules   of

interpretation  accepted  by  all  arms  of  government  in  the  system  of

representative democracy. (citations omitted)

78

Three  aspects of  that  constitutional relationship  between  the  arms of

government are of particular significance in the present case.

Importance of the legislative text

79

The first aspect is the imperative to give primacy  to the language which

the  legislating body  has chosen  to  use.   As  the plurality  observed  in

Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue:

52

This  Court  has  stated  on  many  occasions  that  the  task  of  statutory

construction   must   begin  with   a   consideration   of   the   text   itself.

Historical considerations  and extrinsic materials  cannot be relied  on to

displace the clear meaning of the text.  The language which  has actually

been employed in the text of legislation  is the surest guide to legislative

intention.   The  meaning  of the  text  may require  consideration  of the

context, which  includes the general  purpose and policy  of a  provision,

in particular the mischief it is seeking to remedy. (citations omitted)

80

This focus on  the statutory text may be  seen as an aspect of  the rule of

law.    It  recognises  and  preserves  the  role  of  the  legislature,  acting

within   constitutional   constraints,  in   identifying   the   policy   which

51

Zheng v Cai [2009] HCA 52; (2009) 239 CLR 446 [28], in an observation adopted and applied in Lacey v

Attorney General (Qld) [2011] HCA 10; (2011) 242 CLR 573 [43]; Queensland v Congoo [2015] HCA 17;

(2015) 256 CLR 239; Alphapharm Pty Ltd v H Lundbeck A/S [2014] HCA 42; (2014) 254 CLR 247.

52

Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue [2009] HCA 41; (2009) 239 CLR 27

[47]. To similar effect, see Thiess v Collector of Customs [2014] HCA 12; (2014) 250 CLR 664 [22] - [23];

SZTAL v Minister for Immigration [2017] HCA 34; (2017) 91 ALJR 936 [14], [38].

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[2018] WASCA 38

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

legislation is  to pursue  by requiring that  effect be  given to the  chosen

This   point   was   noted  by   Gibbs   CJ   in   Cooper   Brookes

(Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation:

text.

53

The  danger   that   lies  in   departing  from   the  ordinary   meaning   of

unambiguous  provisions  is   that  'it  may  degrade   into  mere  judicial

criticism of  the propriety of  the acts of  the Legislature'  … it may  lead

judges to  put their own  ideas of justice or  social policy in  place of the

words of the statute.

81

Additionally, focus  on the  statutory text  facilitates the  comprehension

of the meaning of legislation by persons whose conduct it regulates.  As

French CJ observed in Alcan:

54

The starting  point in consideration  of the  first question  is the ordinary

and grammatical  sense of  the statutory words  to be  interpreted having

regard  to their  context  and the  legislative  purpose.   That  proposition

accords with the approach to construction characterised by Gaudron J in

Corporate Affairs Commission (NSW) v  Yuill [(1991) 172 CLR 319 at

[340]  as: 'dictated  by elementary  considerations  of fairness,  for,  after

all, those who are subject to the law’s commands are entitled to  conduct

themselves on  the basis that those  commands have meaning  and effect

according  to ordinary  grammar  and usage.'    In so  saying,  it must  be

accepted  that context  and  legislative purpose  will cast  light  upon the

sense in which  the words of  the statute are to  be read.  Context  is here

used in a wide sense  referable, inter alia, to the existing state  of the law

and  the  mischief  which  the  statute  was  intended  to  remedy.  (some

citations omitted)

82

These   considerations   are  no   less   important   when  the   legislative

instrument  being   construed  is   a  planning  scheme.     The   terms  of

planning schemes are regularly  referred to, often without the assistance

of   professional   legal   advice,   by   planners,   government    officials,

landowners and prospective landowners to identify the permissible  uses

of  land  to   which  the  scheme   applies.    Placing  a   counter-intuitive

judicial gloss  on the  plain language of  a planning  scheme reduces  the

capacity of those persons to comprehend its meaning.

83

That is not  to say that  the statutory text is  to be read divorced  from its

context and  purpose.  Context  and purpose  may affect the  meaning of

the  language  that  Parliament  has  chosen  to  use.    When  the  text  is

considered in its  context, and having regard  to the statutory purpose,  it

may  be  apparent that  words  are  used  with other  than  their  ordinary

53

Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 147 CLR 297, 305.

See also, Corporate Affairs Commission of NSW v Yuill (1991) 172 CLR 319, 340.

Alcan [4].

54

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[2018] WASCA 38

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

meaning.

55

The task of construction is  not to make a fortress out of the

dictionary.

56

However,  the  meaning  of the  legislation  must  emerge

from the  statutory text,  understood in its  context and having  regard to

the statutory purpose being pursued.

84

In construing a planning scheme, it is also relevant to  note that schemes

are   not  usually   drafted   by   Parliamentary   counsel  and   are   often

expressed in  terms  which lack  the precision  of an  Act  of Parliament.

Planning schemes should  be construed broadly rather than  pedantically

and with a  sensible practical approach.

57

But the exercise  remains one

of  identifying   the  objective   meaning  from   a  consideration  of   the

legislative text, understood  as a whole  and in the context  in which and

purpose for which it was enacted.

Identifying legislative purpose

85

The   second   aspect  of   the   constitutional   relationship   is   that   the

legislative purpose which informs the  proper construction of legislation

is itself  ascertained by  a process  of statutory  construction, rather  than

the mere attribution to  the legislature of what the  court might regard as

a  desirable  policy   outcome.    That  is,   legislative  purpose  is  to   be

ascertained from  what the legislation  says, rather than  any assumption

about  the   desired  or   desirable  reach  or   operation  of   the  relevant

provisions.

58

Identifying  the legislative  purpose is  itself an  objective

exercise of  statutory construction, which  does not involve  a search for

what  those who  promoted  or passed  the legislation  may  have had  in

mind when  it was enacted.     Nor is it  for a court  to construct its  own

59

idea  of   a  desirable   policy,  impute  it   to  the   legislature,  and   then

characterise it as a  statutory purpose.     To do so would be inconsistent

60

with the  constitutional role  of the  courts and  their proper  relationship

with Australian parliaments.

Correction of drafting errors

86

The third aspect  of the constitutional relationship between  the different

arms  of  government  which  is of  particular  significance  in  this  case

concerns  the  circumstances  in   which  courts  may  address  what  are

alleged to be drafting errors.

55

56

57

58

59

60

SZTAL [14].

Thiess [23].

Re Shire of Mundaring; ex parte Solomon [2007] WASCA 132 [25].

Certain Lloyd's Underwriters v Cross [2012] HCA 56; (2012) 248 CLR 378 [26].

Certain Lloyd's Underwriters v Cross [25].

Australian Education Union v Department of Education [2012] HCA 3; (2012) 248 CLR 1 [26] - [28].

Page 29

[2018] WASCA 38

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

87

In  Taylor  v   The  Owners  –   Strata  Plan  11564,61

the  High  Court

recognised  that   there  are   some  circumstances   in  which  purposive

construction may allow  for the reading of a  provision as if it  contained

additional  words (or  omitted  words) with  the  effect of  expanding  its

field of operation.  French CJ, Crennan and Bell JJ observed:

62

The  question   whether  the  court   is  justified  in   reading  a  statutory

provision as if  it contained additional words  or omitted words involves

a judgment of matters  of degree.  That  judgment is readily answered in

favour  of  addition  or  omission  in  the  case  of  simple,  grammatical,

drafting  errors  which  if  uncorrected  would  defeat  the  object  of  the

provision.  It is answered against a construction that fills 'gaps disclosed

in legislation'  or makes  an insertion  which is  'too big,  or too  much at

variance  with  the  language  in fact  used  by  the  legislature'.(citations

omitted)

88

Their Honours  referred to  three conditions identified  by Lord  Diplock

in  Wentworth Securities  v  Jones,

Inco Europe Ltd v First Choice  Distribution.

summarised  by French  CJ  and Bell  J in  Minister  for Immigration  v

SZJGV as follows:

63

as  modified by  Lord  Nicholls in

64

Those conditions were

65

Three  matters of  which  the  court  must be  sure  before  interpreting  a

statute in  this way were the  intended purpose of  the statute, the  failure

of the  draftsman and  parliament by  inadvertence to  give effect  to that

purpose,  and  the  substance  of  the  provision  parliament  would  have

made.  The  third of these conditions was  described as being of "crucial

importance".  Otherwise any  attempt  to determine  the  meaning of  the

enactment   would   cross   the    boundary   between   construction   and

legislation.

89

In Taylor, French CJ, Crennan and Bell JJ went on to note:66

However,  it  is  unnecessary  to  decide  whether  Lord  Diplock’s  three

conditions are always, or  even usually, necessary and sufficient. This is

because the  task remains  the construction  of the  words the  legislature

has enacted.  In this  respect it  may not  be sufficient  that 'the  modified

construction is  reasonably open having  regard to  the statutory scheme'

because any modified  meaning must be consistent with  the language in

fact used  by the  legislature.  Lord  Diplock never  suggested otherwise.

Sometimes, as  McHugh J  observed in  Newcastle City  Council v  GIO

General Ltd  [(1997) 191 CLR 85 at 113], the language of a provision

61

62

63

64

65

66

Taylor v The Owners - Strata Plan 11564 [2014] HCA 9; (2014) 253 CLR 531.

Taylor [38].

Wentworth Securities v Jones [1980] AC 74, 105.

Inco Europe Ltd v First Choice Distribution [2000] 1 WLR 586, 592; [2000] 2 All ER 109, 115.

Minister for Immigration v SZJGV [2009] HCA 40; (2009) 238 CLR 642 [9].

Taylor [39] - [40].

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[2018] WASCA 38

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

will not admit of a remedial construction. Relevant  for present purposes

was his Honour’s further  observation, '[i]f the legislature uses language

which  covers  only  one  state  of   affairs,  a  court  cannot  legitimately

construe the words of the section in a  tortured and unrealistic manner to

cover another set of circumstances'.

Lord Diplock’s  speech  in Wentworth  Securities laid  emphasis on  the

task as  construction and  not judicial  legislation. In  Inco Europe   Lord

Nicholls   of  Birkenhead   observed  that   even   when  Lord   Diplock's

conditions  are  met,  the  court  may   be  inhibited  from  interpreting  a

provision  in  accordance with  what  it  is  satisfied was  the  underlying

intention of  Parliament: the  alteration to the  language of  the provision

in  such   a  case  may   be  'too  far-reaching'.     In  Australian   law  the

inhibition on  the adoption  of a purposive  construction that  departs too

far from  the statutory text  has an added dimension  because too great  a

departure may violate the separation of powers in the Constitution.

(some citations omitted)

90

Identification  of purpose  and  drafting  errors  is therefore  a  matter  of

statutory construction, giving effect to  the whole of the statutory text in

its context.  Where there is  an obvious drafting  error, the true  meaning

of  the  language  is apparent  from  the  statutory  text  understood  as  a

whole in its relevant  context, even though that meaning  is not literal or

grammatical.    The  objective  legislative  intention  is  revealed  by  the

statutory  text, even  if  the  manner in  which  the  intention  is revealed

involves an  ungrammatical  use of  language in  other than  its ordinary

sense.   The  objectively intended  meaning  must be  apparent  from the

perspective of the reader, as opposed to the author, of the statutory text.

91

This concept was explained by Gageler and Keane JJ in Taylor:67

Statutory construction involves attribution  of legal meaning to statutory

text, read in context.   'Ordinarily, that meaning (the legal meaning)  will

correspond with  the grammatical meaning  … But not always'.  Context

sometimes  favours an  ungrammatical legal  meaning.   Ungrammatical

legal meaning  sometimes involves  reading statutory text  as containing

implicit  words.    Implicit  words  are  sometimes  words  of  limitation.

They are sometimes  words of extension.  But  they are always words of

explanation. The constructional task remains throughout  to expound the

meaning  of  the  statutory  text,  not  to  divine  unexpressed  legislative

intention or to remedy perceived legislative inattention.   Construction is

not speculation, and it is not repair. (citations omitted)

While their Honours  were in dissent in  Taylor, nothing in the  majority

judgment was inconsistent with the above statement of principle.

67

Taylor [65].

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[2018] WASCA 38

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Disposition

Appellants' submission as to the meaning of 'Shop' in the Zoning Table

92

There is no merit in  the appellants' first submission that the  term 'Shop'

in  the  Zoning  Table is  not  used  in  the  sense  in which  that  term  is

defined in Sch 1 to LPS  21.  The structure of LPS 21 is to  identify uses

in the  Zoning Table by  single words or short  phrases, all of  which are

defined in Sch  1 to LPS 21.   There is no  other point at which  the term

'Shop' is defined,  and no textual basis for  concluding that only the  first

half of  the definition in  Sch 1  is applicable to  the Zoning  Table.  The

meaning  of the  definition  is plain  and  unambiguous; the  term  'Shop'

does not include premises specifically defined  elsewhere in pt 13 of the

Scheme.     'Discount  Department  Store'   and  'Supermarket'   are  both

specifically defined  elsewhere in  Sch 1,  which is  in pt  13 of  LPS 21.

They are not a 'Shop' as that term is used in the Zoning Table.

93

The  appellants rely  on  the fact  that  the phrase  'Discount Department

Store' is only used in  the schedules to LPS 21,    and does not appear  in

68

the Zoning Table.  However,  there are other instances in LPS  21 where

terms  defined   in  Sch   1  do   not  appear   in  the   Zoning  Table   but

nonetheless have significance for  the operation of the main body  of the

Scheme text,  including the Zoning  Table.  A  number of defined  terms

affect the  meaning of  other defined terms  used in  the Zoning  Table.

Other  defined terms  have  a more  general  operation,    or  are  used in

specific provisions of the scheme text.

69

70

71

94

The   terms  'Caretaker's   Residence'   and  'Manager's   Residence'   and

'Research  and Development  Facility' are  defined  in Sch  1 but  appear

only  in Sch 2  to  the  Scheme.   The  former  two definitions  may  also

operate to limit the meaning of  'Tourist Accommodation', the definition

of which also excludes places used  for a purpose elsewhere specifically

defined  in Sch 1,  but  that is  not their  only  function.   It  may also  be

68

The term is only used in item A64 of Sch 2 and special conditions 8(b) and 15 in item SP39 of Sch 3 to

LPS 21.  In the latter case "Discount Department Store' is given its own specific definition.

'Amusement Machine' (used in the definition of 'Amusement Parlour'), 'Bulky Goods' (used in the

69

definition of 'Showroom'), 'Dwelling' (which is used in a variety of definitions and elsewhere in LPS 21),

'Health Care Professional' (used in the definition of 'Professional Consulting Rooms'), 'Net Lettable Area'

(used in the definition of 'Convenience Store', 'Rural Tourist Accommodation' (used in various definitions).

70

'The Act', 'Advertisement', 'Applicant', 'Building', 'Canal Frontage', 'Commission', 'Council', 'Dam',

'Floodway', 'Gazettal Date', 'Incidental Development', 'Mean High Water Mark', 'Natural Ground Level',

'Owner', 'Place', 'Stabilised Canal Edge', 'Waterway Frontage', 'Vegetation'.

71

'Entry Statement' is used in cl 5.35.5.  'Prime Agricultural Land' is used in Policy (a) of cl 4.2.6.

Page 32

[2018] WASCA 38

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

noted that some terms  are defined but are not  evidently used elsewhere

in the Scheme.

72

95

96

97

The   term  'Shop'   appears   in   the  Zoning   Table,   in   cl 5.20.1,  the

definitions  of 'Corner  Shop'  and 'Hospital'  in  Sch  1, certain  items  in

73  74

Sch 2   and other schedules.

In our  view, there  is  nothing in  the use  of the  terms described  above

which suggests that 'Shop' is  used in the Zoning Table in other than  the

sense defined in Sch 1 to LPS 21.

We do  not  accept that  the words  'but does  not includes  a  showroom,

fast food outlet  or any other premises specifically  defined elsewhere in

this part' in  the definition of 'Shop' are  implicitly excluded on the basis

that they are made redundant  by cl 4.4.1 of LPS 21.   Clause 4.4.1 deals

with general  and specific uses  mentioned in  the Zoning Table.   Some,

but not all,  of the terms used  in the Zoning Table  are defined in a  way

that excludes  other buildings  or places  specifically defined in  Sch 1.

75

While  there   is   some  overlap   in  the   provisions,  their   function   is

different.   Clause 4.4.1 is concerned  with uses  specified in the  Zoning

Table   while   the  exclusionary   components   of   the   definitions   are

concerned  with  the  meaning  of  other  defined  terms  in  pt   13.    No

intention to  use defined terms  other than in  their defined  sense can be

inferred from the presence of cl 4.4.1 of LPS 21.

98

The operation  which is produced  by applying the  defined terms  to the

Zoning Table  is not irrational  or absurd.  The  result is that  the uses of

'Discount Department Store'  and 'Supermarket' are not regulated  by the

Zoning  Table.   The permissibility  of  those uses  in any  zone  is to  be

determined by  the City  under cl 4.4.2, by  reference to  the consistency

of  those  uses  with the  objectives,  or  objectives  and  policies,  of  the

particular  zone in  which those  uses  are proposed.    Regardless of  the

permissibility of the uses in a particular zone which is determined under

cl 4.4.2,  development  comprising   a  'Discount  Department  Store'   or

'Supermarket'   still  requires   development   approval,  which   may   be

granted or  refused having regard  to the  matters specified in  cl 11.2  of

72

'Dry Industry', 'Generating Works', 'Jetty and Mooring Envelope', 'Major Road Frontage', 'Retirement

Village', 'Stabilised Surface of a Lot'.  The term 'Communal and Cluster Farming' is also defined in Sch 1

without being used elsewhere, although Objective (i) of cl 4.2.6 identifies encouraging 'the development of

cluster or communal farming' as an Objective of the Agriculture Zone.

73

Items A31, A39, A46 A60, A73.  The term is also used in items A2 A14, and A21, but in a context that

clearly excludes a 'Discount Department Store' or 'Supermarket'.

74

75

Item SP39 in Sch 3 (conditions 8, 14 and 15) and item 15 in Sch 14.

'Club', 'Community Centre', 'Recreation Establishment' and 'Tourist Accommodation' have definitions with

exclusionary components similar to the definition of 'Shop'.

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[2018] WASCA 38

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

LPS 21.   There is nothing about that  planning outcome which suggests

that it could not have been intended.

99

This is not a case where the appellants  can succeed on the basis that the

statutory context or legislative  purpose shows that the words in  LPS 21

are invested  with a  meaning that  differs from  their ordinary  meaning.

Having  regard   to  the   structure  of   LPS 21,  the  statutory   language

employed, the  context and purposes  of LPS 21,  the objective meaning

of the  words is  clear.   The primary  judge was  correct to find  that the

only   meaning  reasonably   open   on   the   language  of   the   relevant

provisions  of LPS 21,  considered  in their  context,  was that  neither  a

'Discount  Department Store'  nor a  'Supermarket'  was a  'Shop' for  the

purposes of the Zoning Table.

Type, class or genus of activity

100

Nor  is  there  any  merit  in  the  appellants'  second  submission  that  a

'Discount Department Store'  and 'Supermarket' fall with the  'type, class

or genus of  activity of' a  'Shop' for the purposes  of cl 4.4.2 of LPS  21.

As   'Discount   Department   Store'  and   'Supermarket'   are   expressly

excluded from the definition of 'Shop', those uses cannot be  regarded as

falling in the same  type, class or genus of activity  as the use defined as

'Shop'.  In any event, merely excluding 'Discount Department Store' and

'Supermarket' from the scope of cl 4.4.2 in this  manner would not assist

the  appellants.    On  this  argument,  no  provision  would  be  made  in

relation  the permissibility  of the  uses  of 'Discount  Department  Store'

and  'Supermarket', either  in  the Zoning  Table  or cl 4.4.2  of  LPS  21.

The City's discretion to grant development approval for  works designed

to facilitate  such a use  would not be  affected by any  provision in LPS

21 as to the permissible use  of land.  There would therefore be no  basis

on which  to impugn the  grant of  development approval, under  cl 11.3

of LPS 21, for those uses on Lot 17.

Alleged drafting error

101

This leaves the third submission which the appellants advance, which is

based  on  the  alleged  obvious  drafting  error  made  in  the  course  of

adopting Amendment 72.

102

We cannot  be  satisfied that  it was  an intended  purpose of  LPS  21 to

provide  that   use  of  land   as  a  'Discount   Department  Store'  is   not

permitted outside the  Business Zone and the A64  Area, and that use of

land as a 'Supermarket' is not permitted  outside the Business Zone.  We

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[2018] WASCA 38

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

therefore cannot  be satisfied  that the draftsperson  of LPS  21, the  City

and  the  Minister  failed,  through inadvertence,  to  give  effect  to  that

purpose.

103

It   is   important  to   recognise   that   the   statutory   instrument  being

construed is LPS 21 and not Amendment 72 to TPS 20.  While  many of

the  provisions  of   TPS  20  are  reflected  in   LPS  21,  there  are  also

substantial differences.   LPS 21 was not merely  a re-enactment of TPS

20.    As  is   the  case  when  construing  any  piece   of  legislation,  the

legislative history preceding the making of LPS 21 is part of the context

in which  the current  statutory text may  be understood.   However, any

failure  of Amendment  72 to  give  effect to  its objectively  ascertained

purpose cannot  be simply imputed  to LPS 21.   There is nothing  in the

terms of LPS 21, or the circumstances existing when LPS 21 was made,

to indicate  that LPS 21  was made other  than for the  objective purpose

of giving effect to the plain  meaning of its text.  It cannot be  concluded

that LPS 21  was made for  the same purpose as  Amendment 72, which

was Gazetted over 7 years previously.

104

Further, focussing  on Amendment  72 does  not lead to  success for  the

appellants.  It is  clear from the text of  Amendment 72 that it was made

for  the   purpose   of  designating   'Discount  Department   Store'  as   a

'discretionary'   use  in   the  A64   Area.     There   is  no   question   that

Amendment   72   achieved  that   object.     It   is   far   less  clear   that

Amendment 72  was made for  the purpose of  maintaining the status  of

'Discount Department Store'  and 'Supermarket' as  uses which were  not

permitted on other land.  That purpose was not reflected in the language

actually  used  in  Amendment   72,  understood  in  the  context   of  the

provisions of  TPS 20 which  were in  force at that  time.  It  may be  the

case  that  the  form of  Amendment 72  produced  consequences  which

were  not  subjectively  anticipated  by  the  draftsperson  or  those  who

approved the  drafting.  However,  that is  not to say  that the  legislation

failed  to  give  effect  to  the  objectively  ascertained  purpose.    Much

legislation  produces   consequences  which   may  not   be  subjectively

anticipated by  those who draft  and enact it.   But  it is one  thing to say

that  legislation  produces   unanticipated  consequences.    It  is   a  very

different thing to say that  there was an inadvertent failure to give effect

to the objectively ascertained legislative purpose.

105

Further,  the  clear  meaning   of  the  text  of  TPS 20,   as  amended  by

Amendment 72, did  not produce a result  which is manifestly absurd  or

unreasonable.   The  outcome  reflects  that achieved  in  LPS  21, noted

above.   'Discount Department  Store' was identified  as a  'discretionary'

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JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

use in the A64 Area.

76

The City could determine 'Discount Department

Store'  and 'Supermarket'  to  be  a  permitted use  in  other  locations by

reference to the consistency of the  use with the objectives and purposes

of the  relevant zone.

irrational.

77

This planning  outcome cannot  be regarded  as

106

The  appellants  sought to  rely  on  a  precis, evidently  prepared  by  an

officer of the City, which appeared in the Agenda for the meeting of the

Council  of  the City  in  which  Amendment  72  was adopted  for  final

approval.  In  the precis, the  relevant officer indicated that  the proposal

was to 'permit  a DDS only  on the site  via an additional use  provision',

and   that  the   then   proposed   amendment   would  'limit   any   future

endeavours to seek an "out-of-town" location for a similar retail centre'.

The appellants  seek to rely  on the  Agenda as extrinsic  material which

may  be used  under  s 19 of  the  Interpretation  Act 1984  (WA)  in the

78

interpretation of a provision of a written law.     In our view, the Agenda

79

is not admissible for this purpose for two reasons:

(1)

The  Agenda  is   not  capable  of  assisting   in  ascertaining  the

meaning of Amendment 72.  The Agenda is not one of the kinds

of  material   identified   in  s 19(2)   of  the   Interpretation  Act.

Further, at the  time that Amendment  72 was made,  the Act did

not require the  Agenda to be provided to  the Minister when the

amendment was  forwarded  to her  for approval.

80

There is  no

evidence that the Agenda was in fact placed before the Minister.

As   noted  above,   the   legislative   effect  of   Amendment   72

required action by  both the Minister and the  City.  In our  view,

a document  which has not been  proven to be  before one of  the

officers exercising delegated legislative power does not  assist in

ascertaining the meaning  of Amendment 72.   Nor does it  assist

in ascertaining the meaning of LPS 21, which  was made 7 years

later.

(2)

The proposed use of the  Agenda is not one of the uses provided

for   by   s 19(1)   of   the   Interpretation   Act,   which    enables

consideration to be given to material:

76

77

Clause 23 of, and item 64 of Sch 4 to, TPS 20.

Clause 22 of TPS 20 read with the definitions of 'Shop' and 'Discount Department Store' in Sch 1 to TPS

20.

78

79

80

Green AB 292.

Appeal ts 38 - 43.

The material to be forwarded to the Minister was identified by regs 13, 18 and 19 of the Town Planning

Regulations 1967 (WA), which were in force when Amendment 72 was made.

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[2018] WASCA 38

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

(a)

to  confirm   that  the  meaning  of   the  provision  is   the

ordinary meaning  conveyed by  the text of  the provision

taking into account  its context in the written  law and the

purpose or object underlying the written law; or

(b)

to determine the meaning of the provision when:

(i)

the provision is ambiguous or obscure; or

(ii)

the ordinary meaning  conveyed by the text of  the

provision  taking  into account  its  context  in  the

written law  and the purpose  or object underlying

the written law  leads to a result that  is manifestly

absurd or is unreasonable.

As explained  above, the provisions  of LPS 21  and Amendment 72  are

not ambiguous  or obscure, and  the ordinary  meaning conveyed by  the

relevant  text  does  not  lead  to  a  result  that  is  manifestly  absurd  or

unreasonable.    The  Agenda  is,   in  substance,  sought  to  be  used  to

reverse  the  ordinary  meaning  conveyed  by  the  text  of LPS  21  and

Amendment 72, rather than to confirm that meaning.

107

In addition,  even if  an 'obvious  drafting error'  were to  be established,

the words which would  need to be inserted to give  effect to the alleged

purpose are too much at variance  with the Scheme text of LPS 21.  The

added words  would not  merely supplement  or explain the  meaning of

the language  used in  the Scheme  text.  Rather,  they would  reverse its

meaning.   The plain  and unambiguous  meaning of the  Scheme text  is

that  neither  a  'Discount  Department  Store'  nor  a  'Supermarket'  is  a

'Shop',  and  therefore  a  use  which  may  be  permitted   under  cl 4.4.2

where consistent with the  objectives and policies of a  zone.  The effect

of the words which the  appellants seek to add is that those uses  involve

use as  a 'Shop', which is  not permitted outside  the Business Zone  and,

in the case of a 'Discount Department Store', the A64  Area.  Adding the

proposed words is not consistent with the judicial task of  construing the

legislation.

108

In   oral    submissions,    senior   counsel    for   the    appellant    placed

considerable  reliance  on  the  decision  of  the  High  Court  in  Cooper

Brookes.   That case  dealt with the  construction of  taxation legislation

which  was  not  comparable to  TPS  20  or  LPS  21.   There  are  three

significant distinguishing features between the present  case and  Cooper

Brookes:

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[2018] WASCA 38

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

(1)

In Cooper Brookes, the literal  meaning of a provision produced

a result which  was regarded by a majority  of the High Court  as

'incongruous',

81

'irrational'

82

and  'capricious   and  irrational'.

83

Such a result is not apparent in the present case.

(2)

The    history    of    amendments    to    the    legislation     under

consideration  in Cooper  Brookes  enabled  an identification  of

the    process   by    which    one   provision    had    become    an

'anachronism'.

84

In the  present case,  the amendment on  which

the  appellants   rely  was   not  made   to  the   legislation  being

construed,   but    rather   to    its   predecessor,   and    does   not

definitively reveal  any obvious  drafting error even  at the  point

in time when the amendment was made.

(3)

In Cooper Brookes, there  was no rewriting of the  unambiguous

meaning  of   the  text  of   the  provisions.    Rather   a  deeming

provision was held not to apply to one part of the Act.

109

The appellants submit that a different approach to statutory construction

may be  justified where  definitional provisions  are concerned.   We  do

not  accept  that  submission.   It  is  established  that  the  function  of  a

statutory  definition   is  to  provide  an   aid  in  construing   the  statute.

Generally, the  proper course is to  read the words  of the definition  into

the relevant  provision and then  construe the  latter.

85

Undertaking that

ordinary process  in the  present case,  having regard to  the context  and

purpose of  the  legislation, there  is no  ambiguity.   Whether  or not  an

'obvious drafting  error' has  occurred in  a  definitional or  a substantive

provision,  the   question  is  ultimately   whether  the  alleged   intended

meaning  emerges  with sufficient  clarity  from  an  examination  of the

legislation considered as a whole  in its context, and whether the invited

departure from the statutory text is too great.

81

82

83

Cooper Brookes (305) per Gibbs CJ.

Cooper Brookes (310) per Stephen J.

Cooper Brookes (321) per Mason and Wilson JJ.  At 318 - 319, their Honours also referred to judges in the

Federal Court referring to the result as 'capricious and unjust'.

84

Cooper Brookes (306 - 307), (311 - 312).  For Stephen J this was critical: see (310).

85

Epic Energy (Pilbara Pipeline) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue [2011] WASCA 228; (2011) 43

WAR 186 [42], [150], [218] and cases there cited.

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[2018] WASCA 38

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

Conclusion as to Issue 2

110

For the  above reasons, use  of Lot 17  as a 'Discount Department  Store'

and  'Supermarket' can  be  permitted  under cl 4.4.2  of  LPS  21 on  the

basis that those uses are not  specifically mentioned in the Zoning Table

and cannot reasonably be determined as falling  within the type, class or

genus of  activity of any  other use  category.  Appeal  grounds 2  and 3,

which raise this second issue, are not established.

Issue 3: Special provision area

111

Our rejection of grounds  2 and 3 makes it  unnecessary to deal with the

third  issue  identified above,  which  is  raised  by ground  of  appeal  4.

However, had  it been necessary to  do so, we  would also have  rejected

ground  4.   Even  if it  is  assumed that  the  use  of that  part  of Lot  17

standing outside the A64 Area as a 'Discount Department Store' was not

permitted under  the Zoning  Table, it  would nevertheless  be permitted

under cl 6.3.1 of LPS 21.

112

Clause  6.3.1  applies  '[n]otwithstanding   any  other  provisions  of  the

Scheme'.  These  opening words contemplate  that the provisions in  Sch

3 may be inconsistent  with other provisions of the Scheme  and provide

for the  terms  of Sch  3 to  prevail to  the extent  of  such inconsistency.

Clause 6.3.1 applies to both the 'use and development of land' identified

on  the Scheme  map within  a  Special Provision  area  and specified  in

Sch 3.   Under cl 6.3.1,  the use  and development  of that  land 'shall  be

subject to those provisions  listed within Schedule 3 specific  to the land

in  addition to  any provisions  which  are generally  more  applicable to

such land under the Scheme'.

113

Lot  17  lies  within   a  Special  Provision  area,  and  is  subject   to  the

provisions in item SP26 in Sch 3 to LPS  21.  Special provision 1 in that

item requires  that  '[d]evelopment shall  be in  accordance  with a  Land

Use Concept  Plan adopted  by Council'.    The Land  Use Concept  Plan

adopted  by Council  on  24 June  2015  shows a  'Discount  Department

Store'  in the  area proposed  in  the KMart  Application,  which extends

beyond  the  A64 Area  on  Lot  17.

86

There  was  no challenge  to  the

validity   of   the   adopted   Land   Use   Concept   Plan.     The   KMart

Application  meets the  requirement  that development  of  Lot 17  be  in

accordance with the Land Use Concept Plan.

86

Green AB 468.

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[2018] WASCA 38

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

114

The requirement that  development of Lot 17  be in accordance with the

Land   Use   Concept    Plan   is   necessarily   inconsistent   with    other

provisions of  the Scheme  to the extent  that they  provide that  use as  a

'Discount  Department  Store'  is not  permitted  outside  the  A64  Area.

The  adopted Land  Use  Concept  Plan shows  a  'Discount  Department

Store'  extending beyond  the A64  Area.   Development  of  a 'Discount

Department Store' which was confined to the A64 Area would  not be in

accordance  with   the  adopted  Land   Use  Concept  Plan.     However,

development of  a 'Discount  Department Store'  in accordance  with the

adopted Land Use Concept  Plan would extend beyond the A64  Area in

a manner prohibited by the other provisions.

115

The opening words of cl 6.3.1  resolve any such inconsistency in favour

of item SP26 in  Sch 3 and the Land Use  Concept Plan.  When the City

came  to  determine the  KMart  Application  having  due  regard  to  the

provisions of LPS 21, it would appropriately have applied  cl 6.3.1, item

SP26  in Sch  3 and  the  Land Use  Concept Plan.    The validity  of  the

development approval  cannot be impugned in  the manner proposed  by

ground 4.

Orders

116

Given  the  rejection  of  the   grounds  of  appeal,  it  is  unnecessary  to

determine  Realview's  application  in  an  appeal  to  adduce  additional

evidence to  support its  submission that relief  should be  refused in  the

exercise of the  court's discretion even if  one or more of  the grounds of

appeal were established.

117

As  none of  the  grounds of  appeal  is established,  the  appeal must  be

dismissed.

I certify that  the preceding paragraph(s)  comprise the reasons for  decision of

the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

ET

RESEARCH ASSOCIATE/ORDERLY TO MITCHELL JA

27 MARCH 2018

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