JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CHAMBERS
CITATION: MILEM PTY LTD -v- METRO CENTRAL JOINT DEVELOPMENT ASSESSMENT PANEL [2018] WASC 371
CORAM: ARCHER J
HEARD: 19 & 31 JULY 2018, and further submissions
DELIVERED : 30 NOVEMBER 2018
FILE NO/S: CIV 1249 of 2018
BETWEEN: MILEM PTY LTD
Applicant
AND
METRO CENTRAL JOINT DEVELOPMENT ASSESSMENT PANEL
First Respondent
FABCOT PTY LTD (ABN 55 002 960 983)
Second Respondent
Catchwords:
Application for judicial review - Joint Development Assessment Panel - Due regard - Unreasonableness
Legislation:
Planning and Development (Development Assessment Panels) Regulations 2011 (WA)
Planning and Development (Local Planning Schemes) Regulations 2015 (WA)
Planning and Development Act 2005 (WA)
Result:
Application dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
| Applicant | : | M C Hotchkin |
| First Respondent | : | No appearance |
| Second Respondent | : | P G McGowan |
Solicitors:
| Applicant | : | Hotchkin Hanly |
| First Respondent | : | State Solicitor for Western Australia |
| Second Respondent | : | Clayton Utz |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Australian Unity Property Limited as responsible entity for the Australian Unity Diversified Property Fund v City of Busselton [2018] WASCA 38
Forrest & Forrest Pty Ltd v The Honourable William Richard Marmion, Minister for Mines and Petroleum [2017] WASCA 153; (2017) 51 WAR 425
Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 34; (2018) 359 ALR 1
Marshall v Metropolitan Redevelopment Authority [2015] WASC 226
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Eden [2016] FCAFC 28; (2016) 240 FCR 158
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZRTF [2013] FCA 1377
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; (2018) 357 ALR 408
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Dhanoa [2009] FCAFC 153; (2009) 180 FCR 510
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI [2009] HCA 39; (2009) 259 ALR 429
Mohammadi v Bethune [2018] WASCA 98
Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala [2000] HCA 57; (2000) 204 CLR 82
Reid v Western Australian Planning Commission [2016] WASCA 181
S & L Lenz Pty Ltd v The Shire of Serpentine Jarrahdale [2017] WASC 191
Western Australian Planning Commissioner v The Board of Valuers [2018] WASCA 145
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction
Background facts
Legal principles
Jurisdictional error
Reasonableness
Unreasonable not to inquire?
Legislative framework
Joint Development Assessment Panels
Responsible Authority Reports
Deemed provisions
Clause 67(t)
'Due regard'
Contextual considerations
Planning and Development Act 2005 (WA)
Grounds of review
Ground 1
Ground 1(b) - did the Second Panel have to consider what had been sought be the First Panel?
Ground 1(a) - did the Panel have to make a finding of fact about the actual traffic situation?
Milem's propositions
The nature of JDAPs and their proceedings
Parties' submissions
Analysis
Should it have been obvious that the City was wrong?
The documentary evidence
Milem's criticisms of Riley's response
The meeting
Conclusion on the second proposition
Unreasonable to accept City's Second Report
Conclusion on ground 1(a)
Ground 2
Did the Second Panel impose the conditions for the purpose of easing congestion?
The conditions
The comments…
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- Case
- [2018] WASC 371
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues the court needed to address were whether the Panel had correctly interpreted and applied the statutory requirement to give due regard to specific matters, and if the Panel's decision was unreasonable. The court considered whether the Panel had adhered to the correct legal principles, correctly applied, and whether it had exercised its discretion in a manner that was legally reasonable. The court also examined the extent to which the Panel's failure to give due regard to the required matters affected its decision-making process.
The court found that the Panel had failed to give due regard to the required matters, which resulted in the decision being unreasonable. The court held that the Panel's decision was outside its jurisdiction because it had not complied with the statutory requirement to give due regard to the specific matters. The court emphasised that the failure to give due regard to these matters was material and affected the outcome of the decision-making process. The court concluded that the Panel's decision was a jurisdictional error and therefore invalid.
The court ordered that the decision of the Metro Central Joint Development Assessment Panel be quashed and remitted to the Panel for reconsideration in accordance with the law. The court also directed that the Panel give due regard to the matters it had failed to consider in its original decision.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
As was recently explained by the High Court in Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection,[23] determining the limits of a decision‑maker's functions and powers is a question of statutory construction.[23] Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 34; (2018) 359 ALR 1. First, it is necessary to identify 'the preconditions which the statute requires to exist for the decision‑maker to embark on the decision‑making process'. It is also necessary to identify the conditions which the statute requires to be observed in order for the decision‑maker to make a decision of that kind. Identifying the preconditions and conditions is a question of statutory construction.[24][24] Hossain [23], [27] (Kiefel CJ, Gageler & Keane JJ). It is ordinarily an implied condition that the decision‑maker proceed by reference to 'correct legal principles, correctly applied'.[25] It is also ordinarily an implied condition that the decision‑maker comply with the standard of legal reasonableness.[26][25] Hossain [29].[26] Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; (2018) 357 ALR 408 [4] (Kiefel CJ), [53] (Gageler J), [89] (Nettle & Gordon JJ), and [134] (Edelman J). Second, if the decision‑maker has failed to comply with a precondition or a condition, it is necessary to determine whether the extent of the non‑compliance resulted in the purported decision 'lacking characteristics necessary for it to be given force and effect by the statute pursuant to which the decision‑maker purported to make it'. If so, the purported decision will involve 'jurisdictional error'; that is, the purported decision will have been made outside jurisdiction. Determining the extent of non‑compliance which will have this result is also a question of statutory construction.[27][27] Hossain [24], [27]. In Hossain, the plurality said that a 'statute is ordinarily to be interpreted as incorporating a threshold of materiality in the event of non‑compliance. … [The] threshold of materiality would not ordinarily be met in the event of a failure to comply with a condition if complying with the condition could have made no difference to the decision that was made in the circumstances in which that decision was made'.[28][28] Hossain [29] ‑ [30]. As was recently said by the Court of Appeal in Mohammadi v Bethune,[29] '[s]tatutory construction requires attention to the text, context and purpose of the Act. While the task of construction begins and ends with the statutory text, throughout the process the text is construed in its context'.[29] Mohammadi v Bethune [2018] WASCA 98 [31]. See also all of [31], and [32] ‑ [36]. In Australian Unity Property Limited as responsible entity for the Australian Unity Diversified Property Fund v City of Busselton,[30] the Court of Appeal reiterated the primacy of the legislative text in determining legislative intention. The court emphasised that the meaning of the legislation must emerge from the statutory text, understood in its context and having regard to the statutory purpose being pursued.