WHITE and COMMISSIONER OF POLICE - [2025] WASAT 84

JURISDICTION     :   STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
ACT: FIREARMS ACT 2024 (WA)
CITATION:   WHITE and COMMISSIONER OF POLICE [2025] WASAT 84
MEMBER:   MR J O'SULLIVAN, SENIOR MEMBER
MR E CADE, MEMBER

HEARD: 26 JUNE 2025
FURTHER SUBMISSIONS FILED 16 AND 28 JULY 2025

DELIVERED          :   25 AUGUST 2025
FILE NO/S:   CC 682 of 2024
BETWEEN:   BEN EDWARD WHITE
Applicant
AND
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
Respondent

Catchwords:

Firearms Act 2024 (WA) - Whether Firearms Act 2024 has retrospective effect - Presumption of legality - Presumption against retrospective effect - Review of decision to revoke firearm authority - Preliminary issue whether person bound by conduct agreement order with exemption to possess a firearm authority made before commencement of Firearms Act 2024 is subject to a disqualifying order

Legislation:

Firearms Act 1973 (WA), s 11, s 11(1), s 11(2), s 11(1)(c), s 11(3), s 11(3)(a), s 11(3)(a)(i), s 11(3)(a)(ii), s 11(3)(a)(iii), s 11(3)(a)(iv), s 11(5)
Firearms Act 2024 (WA), s 4(1), s 4(2), s 5, s 9, s 9(1), s 9(1)(a), s 9(1)(b), s 140, s 192, s 192(1)(c), s 192(2), s 198(1), s 198(2), s 403, s 427, Pt 1, Pt 16
Firearms Regulations 2024 (WA), reg 6
Magistrates Court Act 2004 (WA), s 32
Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA), s 3(1), s 5A, s 10D, s 10H, s 10H(3), s 14(1), s 14(5), s 14(6), s 26, s 31, s 32(1), s 32(2), s 33(1), s 33(2)(d), s 35A, s 36(1), s 36(2)(f), s 36(2)(fa), s 36(3)(c), s 36(3)(d)
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 29

Result:

A conduct agreement order that includes in its terms 'the person bound being permitted to possess a firearms authorisation and necessary licences without further condition' is a disqualifying order for the purposes of the Firearms Act 2024 (WA)
The application is dismissed

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant	:	Mr C Porter & Mr M Ryan
Respondent	:	Ms J Kasbergen

Solicitors:

Applicant	:	Mortlock Ryan & Co
Respondent	:	State Solicitor's Office

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562
Blenkinsop v Wilson [2019] WASC 77
Brayson Motors Pty Ltd v Federal Commission of Taxation (1985) 156 CLR 651
Fazzolari Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council 2009 254 ALR 1
Gifford v Strang Patrick Stevedoring Pty Ltd (2003) 214 CLR 269; [2003] HCA 33
Harris v De Robillard [2017] FCCA 2451
Heywood v Sharpe [2014] FCCA 2999
Kassam v Hazzard [2021] NSWCA 299
Low v Performance Finance Ltd [2004] WASC 80
Malika Holdings Pty Ltd v Stretton (2001) 204 CLR 290
Mine Subsidence Board v Wambo Coal Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 137
Mohammadi v Bethune [2018] WASCA 98
Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 241 CLR 252; [2010] HCA 23
Worrall v Commercial Banking Co of Sydney Ltd (1917) 24 CLR 28

REASONS FOR DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL:

Introduction

Mr White is a gun dealer who seeks a review of the decision on behalf of the respondent revoking his firearm licences. The primary issue in the proceedings concerns whether Mr White as a person bound by a conduct agreement order (CAO) under the Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA) (ROAct) which by its terms permits him to possess a firearms authorisation, is subject to a 'disqualifying order' pursuant to the Firearms Act 2024 (WA) (2024 Act) and therefore prohibited from holding a firearm authority.[1]
[1] The RO Act uses the term 'firearms authorisation' whereas the 2024 Act uses the term 'firearm authority'. For the purposes of consistency, we have used the term 'firearm authority'.
To resolve this issue, the matter was set down for the determination of the following preliminary question:
Whether a CAO that includes in its terms: '[t]he Person Bound is permitted to possess a firearms item or firearms authorisation and the necessary licenses without further condition' renders the person bound subject to a disqualifying order under the 2024 Act?

Ultimately, the answer to the preliminary question is a matter of statutory construction.

The documents

In addition to providing oral submissions, the parties filed the following documents:
(1)Firearm Licence Revocation letter, 23 August 2024;
(2)Applicant's Bundle of Documents, 23 October 2024;
(3)Respondent's Bundle of Documents, 14 March 2025;
(4)Respondent's Submissions, 14 March 2025;
(5)Applicant's Submissions, 13 June 2025;
(6)Applicant's Submissions, 16 June 2025;
(7)Respondent's Submissions in Reply, 18 June 2025;
(8)Applicant's Supplementary Submissions, 16 July 2025;
(9)Respondent's Further Submissions in Reply, 28 July 2025.

Principles of statutory construction

The principles of statutory construction are well settled and have been so for some time.
In Mohammadi v Bethune[2] the Court of Appeal observed:
[2] Mohammadi v Bethune [2018] WASCA 98 [31] - [36].
31… Statutory construction requires attention to the text, context and purpose of the Act.   While the task of construction begins and ends with the statutory text, throughout the process the text is construed in its context.   Statutory construction, like any process of construction of an instrument, has regard to context. As Kiefel CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ recently explained in SZTAL:
The starting point for the ascertainment of the meaning of a statutory provision is the text of the statute whilst, at the same time, regard is had to its context and purpose. Context should be regarded at this first stage and not at some later stage and it should be regarded in its widest sense. This is not to deny the importance of the natural and ordinary meaning of a word, namely how it is ordinarily understood in discourse, to the process of construction. Considerations of context and purpose simply recognise that, understood in its statutory, historical or other context, some other meaning of a word may be suggested, and so too, if its ordinary meaning is not consistent with the statutory purpose, that meaning must be rejected.
32The primary object of statutory construction is to construe the relevant provision so that it is consistent with the language and purpose of all the provisions of the statute.
33The objective discernment of the statutory purpose is integral to contextual construction. The statutory purpose may be discerned from an express statement of purpose in the statute, inference from its text and structure and, where appropriate, reference to extrinsic materials.   The purpose must be discerned from what the legislation says, as distinct from any assumptions about the desired or desirable reach or operation of relevant provisions.
34Discernment of statutory purpose is particularly significant in cases, commonly encountered, where the constructional choice presented is from 'a range of potential meanings, some of which may be less immediately obvious or more awkward than others, but none of which is wholly ungrammatical or unnatural'.   In such a case, the choice 'turns less on linguistic fit than on evaluation of the relevant coherence of the alternatives with identified statutory objects or policies' …
35Thus, the material provisions of the Act must be understood, if possible, as parts of a coherent whole.
36Statutory texts enacted by the same legislature are to be construed, so far as possible, to operate in harmony and not in conflict.   Where two or more statutory enactments comprise the overlapping legislative scheme, the enactments should be construed accordingly, and the court should endeavour to produce a rational, sensible, efficient and just operation in preference to an inefficient, conflicting or unjust operation.
(Citations omitted)

The Magistrates Court proceedings

The circumstances giving rise to the CAO the subject of these proceedings are not in dispute.
Mr White and his wife (A) separated on or about 29 May 2023. On 7 June 2023, A applied under the RO Act for a family violence restraining order (FVRO) in relation to Mr White. A alleged in her application that Mr White:
(a)made emotionally abusive comments to her;
(b)engaged in coercive controlling behaviour;
(c)installed cameras around the house, which she alleged was for blackmail and/or intimidation purposes, which affected her mental health; and
(d)engaged in jealous behaviour.
The interim FVRO application proceeded to an ex parte hearing (in the absence of Mr White) before the Perth Magistrates Court on the same day the application was lodged. The court granted an interim FVRO for a period of 2 years.
The interim FVRO, pursuant to s 14(1) of the RO Act, would ordinarily have included a prohibition on the person bound possessing a firearm authority. However, on this occasion the Magistrate invoked the exception in s 14(5) of the RO Act as it then was, to which we will return later in these reasons.
The transcript of the interim hearing reveals that the Magistrate questioned A as to whether Mr White had ever threatened her directly or indirectly with a firearm. A replied that he had not.
The Magistrate then canvassed with A the prospect of excluding a restraint in the FVRO on Mr White possessing a firearm on the basis he is a gun dealer and if prohibited from possessing firearms, he would be unable to carry on his usual occupation. A having acceded to the proposal, the Magistrate included as a term of the interim FVRO that Mr White was to retain his firearms licences.
Upon the interim FVRO being served on Mr White, he lodged an objection. On 11 August 2023, in the course of a shuttle mediation conference in the Magistrates Court, Mr White and A consented to the making of a CAO for a period of 10 months commencing on 10 August 2023. The CAO expired on 11 June 2024.
The CAO contained the following clause which reflected the terms of the interim FVRO:
The Person Bound is permitted to possess a firearms item or firearms authorisation and the necessary licenses without further condition.
The CAO is signed by A, Mr White and a Magistrates Court Registrar.

The firearms revocation letter

By letter dated 23 August 2024 the respondent informed Mr White that his firearms licence, dealers' licence, corporate licence and warehouseman endorsement were revoked.
The letter provides two reasons for the revocation of Mr White's licences:
(1)he is not a fit and proper person in accordance with s 11(1)(c) of the Firearms Act 1973 (WA) (1973 Act) on the basis that a violence restraining order (VRO)[3] was made against him in the last 5 years; and
(2)he has been identified as a 'disqualified person' pursuant to s 9(1)(a) and s 9(1)(b) of the 2024 Act as he is the subject of a 'disqualifying order'; namely a FVRO/CAO made under the RO Act and he will be subject to a disqualifying period to be prescribed by regulations (to be published).
[3] In fact, it was an interim FVRO that was made ex parte.
The letter goes on to say that it appears that Mr White's licences are of a nature that will be directly impacted by the mandatory cancellation provisions of the 2024 Act, once commenced (upon proclamation).
The letter says further:
[U]nder the provisions of both the 1973 and the 2024 Act, I consider it is not appropriate for you to possess a Firearm Licence at this time.
Mr White is then informed he has three months from the receipt of the letter to lawfully dispose of his 'firearms and ammunition'.
With respect to the 2024 Act, the letter says that it received Royal Assent on 27 June 2024 and Pt 1 and Pt 16 have now come into operation. It then says the remainder of the provisions will come into operation on a day (or days) fixed by proclamation, and the associated regulations are to be published in due course.[4]
[4] Respondent's letter dated 23 August 2024, page 2.

The Tribunal proceedings

On 24 September 2024, Mr White lodged an application with this Tribunal seeking a review of the respondent's decision to revoke his firearms licences.
In dealing with a matter upon review, the Tribunal's functions and discretions correspond with those exercisable by the decision-maker in making the reviewable decision.[5]
[5] See s 29, State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA).
For present purposes if the CAO the subject of this application is correctly characterised as a 'disqualifying order' for the purposes of the 2024 Act, the Tribunal under s 140 and s 427 of the 2024 Act would have no discretion to set aside the decision.

The 1973 Act

As the preliminary question is to be determined by the Tribunal after 31 March 2025, which is the 'commencement day' as defined in s 403 of the 2024 Act, the provisions of the 1973 Act no longer apply.
However, it is permissible to look at repealed provisions dealing with the same subject matter in order to interpret the current iteration of the legislation.[6]
[6] D Pearce, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (9^th edition, LexisNexis Australia, 2019) at page 113.
As Pearce observed in Statutory Interpretation in Australia:[7]
The good sense of this approach is obvious. If one views the whole scheme of the legislation, it may be possible to see the way in which the legislature is dealing with the subject matter: whether it is extending or contracting benefits, whether it is increasing penalties and so on. Such information is likely to be of use to a court in its endeavour to understand the legislature's wishes.
[7] D Pearce, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (9^th edition, LexisNexis Australia, 2019) at page 114. See also Low v Performance Finance Ltd [2004] WASC 80.
The long title to the 1973 Act says:
An Act to make provision for the control and regulation of firearms and ammunition, the licensing of persons possessing, using, dealing with, or manufacturing firearms and ammunition, the repeal of the Firearms and Guns Act 1931, and for incidental and other purposes.
Section 11(1) of the 1973 Act relevantly provides that the respondent cannot grant an approval or permit or issue a licence (firearm authority) to an applicant if the respondent is of the opinion that it is not desirable in the interests of public safety, or the person is not a fit and proper person to hold the firearm authority.
Section 11(2) of the 1973 Act says that where the respondent is satisfied that a person has a history of, or a tendency towards, violent behaviour, the respondent may take it into account in deciding whether that person is a fit and proper person to hold a firearm authority.
The respondent is said, pursuant to s 11(3)(a) of the 1973 Act, to have a sufficient ground for forming an opinion that a person is not a fit and proper person to hold a firearm authority if the respondent is satisfied that at any time within the period of 5 years before the person applies for a firearm authority:
(i)the person was convicted of an offence involving assault with a weapon; or
(ii)the person was convicted of an offence involving violence; or
(iii)the person was convicted of an offence against this Act; or
(iv)a violence restraining order (VRO) was made against the person,
whether in this State or in any other place.
(Emphasis added)
No express mention is made in s 11 of the 1973 Act of a CAO being a ground for forming an opinion that a person is not fit and proper to hold a firearm authority.
Section 11(5) of the 1973 Act provides that the respondent may form an opinion that a person is fit and proper even though the respondent has a sufficient ground under subsection (3) for forming a contrary opinion.
When sections 11(3) and (5) of the 1973 Act are read together it is clear the respondent retained a discretion to grant a firearm authority to a person even despite the matters set down in sections 11(3)(a)(i) - (iv), including that a person had a VRO made against them in the last 5 years.

The 2024 Act

The 2024 Act was passed by Parliament and received Royal Assent on 27 June 2024. Part 1 came into effect on the day the 2024 Act received Royal Assent, and the transitional provisions contained in Pt 16 commenced on the following day. The remainder of the 2024 Act commenced on 'commencement day', 31 March 2025. The 1973 Act was repealed by the 2024 Act with effect from commencement day.
The principles of the 2024 Act are set out in s 4(1):
(a)there is an overriding need to ensure public safety in connection with the possession and use of firearms in the community;
(b)the possession and use of firearms is a privilege that is always conditional on the overriding need to ensure public safety;
(c)public safety can be ensured by strict controls to secure the safe and responsible possession and use of firearms in the community.
The objects of the 2024 Act are set out in s 4(2):
(a)to improve public safety by ensuring the safe and responsible possession and use of firearms;
(b)to specify the purposes for which a person can be authorised to possess or use a firearm;
(c)to minimise the risk of persons becoming victims of crimes that involve the use of firearms;
(d)to prevent persons from having access to firearms for criminal purposes;
(e)to prevent access to firearms by persons who pose a risk of violence, family violence or intimidating behaviour;
(f)to prevent access to firearms by persons who pose a risk of misuse of firearms;
(g)to minimise the risk of persons causing harm, including psychological harm, to themselves or others by the misuse of firearms;
(h)to reduce the number of firearms unlawfully possessed in the community;
(i)to facilitate a nationally consistent approach to the control of firearms.
Perhaps the most important difference between the 1973 Act and the 2024 Act for the purposes of the preliminary question concerns the limitations on the respondent's (and in turn the Tribunal's) discretion in relation to certain matters.
Under the 1973 Act the respondent could form an opinion that a person was a fit and proper person to hold a firearm authority where the person had been convicted of an offence involving violence or was the subject of a VRO notwithstanding that such a conviction or VRO was a sufficient ground for the respondent to form an opinion that the person was not a fit and proper person. Under the 2024 Act no such discretion exists where a person is a 'disqualified person'.
Relevantly, for present purposes, s 140 of the 2024 Act says:
The Commissioner must not grant a firearm authority to a person who is a disqualified person or prohibited person.
Section 9(1) of the 2024 Act relevantly says that a person is a 'disqualified person':
(a)when the person is the subject of a disqualifying order; or
(b)during the disqualifying period prescribed by the regulations as the disqualifying period for a disqualifying order[.]
A person is an 'interim disqualified person' if the person is a disqualified person solely as a result of being the subject of a disqualifying order that is of a temporary or interim nature only.
Pursuant to s 5 a 'disqualifying order' includes a VRO, FVRO or CAO.
Section 427 of the 2024 Act says that s 9 extends to a disqualifying order made before commencement day and a disqualifying period that started before commencement day.
Section 192(2) of the 2024 Act provides that the respondent is not required to cancel or refuse to renew a firearm authority as a result of the holder being a disqualified person if the holder is an interim disqualified person or a person who holds a relevant management position in the body corporate or partnership that holds the firearm authority is an interim disqualified person.
Section 198(1) of the 2024 Act imposes an obligation on the respondent to instead suspend a firearm authority if satisfied that the holder is a disqualified person as a result of the person being an interim disqualified person.
Section 198(2) of the 2024 Act requires the respondent to revoke the suspension if the firearms holder is no longer the subject of an interim disqualifying order.

It follows that if an 'interim disqualifying order' becomes a 'disqualifying order', the holder of the firearm authority will be revoked instead of suspended. In the event the interim disqualifying order is not made final, the suspension is lifted.

The RO Act

It is not in dispute in these proceedings that the applicant was the subject of an interim FVRO issued on 7 June 2023[8] or that the interim FVRO was resolved by the parties consenting to a CAO on 11 August 2023.[9]
[8] Magistrates Court transcript; 7 June 2023.
[9] Respondent's submissions, 14 March 2025, pages 2 - 4 and Applicant's submissions, 16 June 2025, page 2.
We will briefly describe the process which led to the making of the CAO.
In accordance with s 26 of the RO Act an application for a FVRO must indicate whether to have the first hearing of the application held in the absence of the respondent or to proceed directly to a defended hearing. In this case A elected to have the first hearing in the absence of Mr White.
At the first hearing the Magistrate made an interim FVRO. It follows that the Magistrate must have been satisfied in accordance with s 10D of the RO Act that either:
(a)Mr White had committed 'family violence' against A (a person seeking to be protected) and that Mr White is likely again to commit family violence against A in the future; or
(b)A (the person seeking to be protected) has reasonable grounds to apprehend that Mr White will commit family violence against her.
'Family violence' as it was defined in s 5A of the RO Act as at the time Mr White was the subject of an interim FVRO provided:
(1)…
(a)violence, or a threat of violence, by a person towards a family member of the person; or
(b)any other behaviour by the person that coerces or controls the family member or causes the member to be fearful.
(2)Examples of behaviour that may constitute family violence include (but are not limited to) the following —
(a)an assault against the family member;
(b)a sexual assault or other sexually abusive behaviour against the family member;
(c)stalking or cyber-stalking the family member;
(d)repeated derogatory remarks against the family member;
(e)damaging or destroying property of the family member;
(f)causing death or injury to an animal that is the property of the family member;
(g)unreasonably denying the family member the financial autonomy that the member would otherwise have had;
(h)unreasonably withholding financial support needed to meet the reasonable living expenses of the family member, or a child of the member, at a time when the member is entirely or predominantly dependent on the person for financial support;
(i)preventing the family member from making or keeping connections with the member's family, friends or culture;
(j)kidnapping, or depriving the liberty of, the family member, or any other person with whom the member has a family relationship;
(k)distributing an intimate image of the family member without the family member's consent, or threatening to distribute the image;
(l)causing any family member who is a child to be exposed to behaviour or a pattern of behaviour referred to in this section.
(3)For the purposes of this Act, a person who procures another person to commit family violence is taken to have also committed the family violence.
Section 14(1) of the RO Act requires that every FVRO (or VRO) includes a restraint prohibiting the respondent from being in possession of a firearm item or firearm authority.
The transcript of the interim FVRO hearing indicates that the Magistrate, with the consent of A, included in the orders permission for Mr White to hold a firearm authority. It follows that the Magistrate must have been satisfied as to the matters set out in s 14(5) of the RO Act, as it then was.
At the time the interim FVRO was granted, s 14(5) and s 14(6) of the RO Act said:
…
(5)When making a FVRO or VRO a court may permit the respondent to have possession of a firearm item, and , if necessary, a firearms authorisation relating to it, on such conditions as the court thinks fit, if the court is satisfied that—
(a)the respondent cannot carry on the respondent's usual occupation unless the respondent is permitted to have possession of a firearm item; and
(b)the behaviour in relation to which the order was sought did not involve the use, or threatened use, of a firearm item; and
(c)the safety of any person, or their perception of their safety, is not likely to be adversely affected by the respondent's possession of a firearm item.
(6)If, under subsection (5), a court permits a respondent to have possession of a firearm item, the court must make that possession subject to such conditions (in addition to any conditions imposed under that subsection) as the applicant or person seeking to be protected requests unless the court considers the requested conditions to be unreasonable.
The enactment of the 2024 Act saw the repeal of s 14(5) from the RO Act such that it is no longer open to a court to allow a person bound by a FVRO or VRO to continue to hold a firearm authority.
Notably, neither s 14(1) of the RO Act prior to the 2024 Act nor after it, makes any mention of a CAO precluding the person bound from possessing a firearm authority.
Upon the issuing of the interim FVRO, it is served on the respondent who is then required to choose between various options.
Within 21 days of being served with the interim FVRO the respondent must complete the respondent's endorsement copy of the order and return it to the Registrar of the Magistrates Court (see s 31).
If the respondent returns the respondent's endorsement copy of the interim order and does not object, the interim order becomes a final FVRO (see s 32(1)).
Similarly, if the respondent does not return the respondent's endorsement copy, the interim order becomes a final FVRO with the same term as the interim order (see s 32(2)).
If, as occurred in this case, the respondent returns the respondent's endorsement copy of the interim order and objects to the interim order becoming final, the Registrar is to fix a final order hearing date (s 33(1)).
If the interim order includes a restraint on the respondent that prohibits the respondent from being in possession of a firearms item that the respondent reasonably needs in order to carry on the respondent's usual occupation, the date fixed for the final order hearing is to be as soon as practicable (see s 33(2)(d)).
If the matter proceeds to a final hearing, the court will either grant a final order or dismiss the application, in so doing, the Magistrate will invariably make findings of fact about what did or did not occur.
In this case the matter did not proceed to a final hearing because the matter was resolved through mediation with the parties agreeing to a CAO.
Section 10H sets out the procedure in relation to a CAO:
(1)If, at any stage of proceedings under this Act relating to an FVRO, the respondent agrees (a conduct agreement) to the making of a final order imposing restraints of the kind referred to in section 10G (a conduct agreement order), the court may make the order without being satisfied there are grounds for making an FVRO in the same terms.
(2)A conduct agreement does not constitute an admission by the respondent of all or any of the matters alleged in the application for the relevant FVRO.
(3)A conduct agreement order is not an FVRO but is taken to be an FVRO for the purposes of this Act.
(4)The registrar must cause a conduct agreement order to be prepared and served on the respondent.
The evident purpose of a CAO is to encourage a respondent to consent to an order on the basis that there is no admission of all or any of the matters alleged in the application nor any findings made by the court. Importantly, by incentivising a respondent to consent to a CAO, the applicant is relieved of the obligation to give evidence and be subjected to cross-examination at a final hearing.
Section 10H was inserted into the RO Act in 2016. The Attorney‑General explained its purpose as follows when the Bill was read for a second time:[10]
… The bill also provides for a new type of conduct agreement that will allow a respondent to consent to a final order on a no-admissions basis. The proposed conduct agreement order is enforceable if it is breached, in the same way as an FVRO, but is aimed at encouraging more respondents to consent to the order in appropriate circumstances rather than contest the matter at a final order hearing.
[10] Second Reading, 14 September 2016, (Hon Michael Mischin, Attorney General).
Given a CAO made under the RO Act is a 'disqualifying order' for the purposes of the 2024 Act, there may no longer be any incentive for a person wishing to apply for or retain their firearm authority to consent to such an order.
As a consequence of the 2024 Act, a respondent who now wants a firearm authority has no choice other than to proceed to a final hearing.
As s 10H(3) makes clear a CAO has the same force as a FVRO in that a breach of a CAO has the same consequences as breaching a FVRO.
In this case not only did the CAO not include a prohibition on Mr White possessing a firearm authority, but consistent with the terms of the interim FVRO granted permission for Mr White to retain his firearm authority:
The Person Bound is permitted to possess a firearm item or firearms authorisation and the necessary licences without further condition.
The CAO is signed by the applicant, Mr White and a Registrar of the Magistrates Court.

The interaction between the 2024 Act and the RO Act

The FVRO process began with the granting of an interim order made in the absence of Mr White. Accordingly, as is invariably the case in an ex parte hearing, the evidence presented to the court is untested.
An interim FVRO under the RO Act is an interim disqualifying order under the 2024 Act. It follows that upon resolution of the interim FVRO, the person bound by the order is either no longer the subject of an interim disqualifying order and therefore no longer suspended from holding a firearms authority (see s 198(2) of the 2024 Act) or the interim FVRO is made a final FVRO or a CAO, both of which are 'disqualifying orders' prohibiting the person from holding a firearm authority.
In this case the interim FVRO:
(a)was granted ex parte and therefore without Mr White being afforded the opportunity to challenge the evidence;
(b)was the subject of a permission pursuant to s 14(5) of the RO Act granted by the Magistrate after seeking the views of the protected person, who expressed no concern about Mr White retaining his firearms; and
(c)was resolved by the person protected and Mr White consenting to a CAO which involved no admission by Mr White of any or all of the allegations the subject of the interim FVRO and the court making the order without being satisfied there are grounds for making a FVRO in the same terms; and
(d)included an exemption in the same terms as that referred to in the interim FVRO (see paragraph (b) above).
Upon the commencement of the 2024 Act, s 14(5) of the RO Act was repealed and a CAO became a 'disqualifying order', which prohibited Mr White from possessing a firearm authority for 5 years from the date the CAO expired.
Throughout the transition from an interim FVRO to a CAO under the RO Act and then its characterisation as a 'disqualifying order' under the 2024 Act the evidence against Mr White never gets any higher than untested allegations, none of which involve any concern on behalf of the person protected about him holding a firearm authority.
Any suggestion that Mr White by not taking the interim FVRO to a final hearing implicitly accepted that the allegations are true is expressly contradicted by the terms of s 10H of the RO Act. Moreover, as the CAO was made before the 2024 Act became operational, he could not have known there was any need to do so. So far as Mr White was aware the Magistrate pursuant to s 14(5) of the RO Act had permitted him to retain his firearms licences when the interim FVRO was granted and both he and A had consented to a CAO in the same terms as the interim FVRO, without any admission of liability on his part.
Mr White cannot be criticised for organising his affairs based on the legislative regime that existed at the time.
With the 2024 Act came some significant changes to the regulation of firearms:
(a)Although s 14(1) of the RO Act makes no mention of a CAO prohibiting the person bound from holding a firearms licence, a CAO is nonetheless a 'disqualifying order' under the 2024 Act.
(b)Any discretion that existed under s 14(5) of the RO Act that permitted a person bound by a FVRO or VRO to hold a firearms licence has been repealed.
(c)Where a person is subject to a 'disqualifying order' under the 2024 Act, neither the respondent nor the Tribunal is invested with a discretion permitting the person to hold a firearms licence.

The respondent's submissions

The respondent contends that the words of the 2024 Act leave no room for doubt, a disqualifying order is expressly defined in the 2024 Act to comprehend a CAO made under the RO Act. The respondent says further that the 2024 Act does not moderate that definition by reference to the specific nature or content of a CAO in a particular case.[11]
[11] Respondent's Submissions, 14 March 2025, page 2.
According to the respondent any submission that the clear words of the 2024 Act should give way to some unexpressed policy intent is an attempt to impermissibly read words into the legislation in a way that fundamentally subverts Parliament's intention as expressed.[12]
[12] Respondent's Submissions, 14 March 2025, page 2.
The respondent observes that s 14(1) of the RO Act, both as presently in force and as in force at the time the interim FVRO and CAO were made restraining Mr White, includes a restraint prohibiting the person bound by a FVRO and VRO from having possession of firearms or obtaining a firearm authority.
The respondent says that a CAO is taken to be a FVRO for these purposes.[13] Presumably this is a reference to s 10H(3) of the RO Act which provides:
(3)A conduct agreement order is not an FVRO but is taken to be an FVRO for the purposes of this Act.
[13] Respondent's Submissions, 14 March 2025, page 2.
We note that s 14(1) of the RO Act refers only to FVROs and VROs. No mention is made of CAOs. While it is not in dispute that a CAO is binding on the person bound as if it were a FVRO, the imposition of a CAO and an FVRO are achieved by different procedures. As we have already pointed out a CAO involves no admission by the person bound of any or all of the matters alleged in the application for a FVRO. Also, the court may make the order without being satisfied that there are grounds for making an FVRO in the same terms.
The respondent then points to the fact that subdivision 16 of Pt 17 of the 2024 Act amends the RO Act as of commencement day by deleting s 14(5). According to the respondent, from 31 March 2025 (commencement day), a court issuing a CAO no longer has discretion to make a CAO permitting the person bound to hold a firearm authority. The respondent says that a CAO must, without exception, prohibit the person bound from having possession of a firearm or obtaining a firearm authority.[14]
[14] Respondent's Submissions, 14 March 2025, pages 5 - 6.
The respondent also relies on the principles and objects of the 2024 Act which direct particular attention to ensuring public safety and preventing access to firearms by persons who pose a risk of violence, family violence or intimidating behaviour.[15]
[15] Respondent's Submissions, 14 March 2025, page 8.
With respect to the particular circumstances of this case, whereby the Magistrate invoked the operation of s 14(5) of the RO Act to permit Mr White to retain his firearm authority, the respondent contends that an order of a court cannot override the effect of legislation enacted by Parliament. According to the respondent, if a CAO is a 'disqualifying order' in accordance with the 2024 Act, Mr White will be a disqualified person regardless of the terms of the CAO.[16]
[16] Respondent's Submissions, 14 March 2025, page 12.
The respondent contends that to find a CAO containing particular permissions relating to firearms is not a 'disqualifying order' within the meaning of the 2024 Act would involve altering the ordinary and natural meaning of the words in paragraph (a) of the definition of 'disqualifying order', or reading in additional words such as 'other than a CAO which by its terms permits the person to be in possession of firearms'. The respondent says there is no basis to adulterate the plain words of the legislation in this way. The respondent also points to the fact that had Parliament intended to create an exemption for persons where a CAO specifically permitted them to retain firearms licences, then it was open for Parliament to have done so.[17]
[17] Respondent's Submissions, 14 March 2025, pages 9 - 10.
The respondent observes that Parliament did turn its mind to dispensations in relation to interim or temporary VROs in that they suspend the person bound from firearms licences until the interim VRO is resolved. Similarly, a misconduct restraining order (MRO), under the Firearms Regulations 2024 (WA) (the Regulations), only prohibits the person bound from holding a firearm authority if the MRO expressly imposes a restraint of that kind.[18]
[18] Respondent's Submissions, 14 March 2025, pages 11 - 12.
The respondent observes that the purpose or at least the outcome of the 'disqualification' regime under the 2024 Act is quite evidently to remove the wide-ranging discretion that was permitted of a decision‑maker under the 1973 Act, as is borne out by the secondary materials. The respondent says, '[t]he applicant might consider that harsh but it is the regime that Parliament has imposed'.[19]
[19] Respondent's Submissions, 14 March 2025, para 63.

The applicant's submissions

The applicant does not contend that words need to be read into the definition of 'disqualifying order' in the 2024 Act. Rather, the applicant argues that the words 'disqualifying order' means an order that is a CAO made under the RO Act, by their natural and ordinary meaning and in contemplation of what a court order is, required the decision-maker to consider the terms or content of a CAO not just the fact of its existence.[20]
[20] Applicant's Submissions, 16 June 2025, page 2.
The applicant acknowledges that the previous s 14(5) of the RO Act which invested a court with a discretion to permit a person bound by a FVRO under the RO Act (and so a CAO under the RO Act) to in effect possess a firearm has been repealed. The applicant notes, however, that as a matter of practice and for some time, there exists two types of CAOs:[21]
(a)those made under the RO Act before the repeal of s 14(5); and
(b)those made under the RO Act after the repeal of s 14(5).
[21] Applicant's Submissions, 16 June 2025, page 3.
While the applicant accepts that there is an application of the 2024 Act to disqualifying orders made before (and a disqualifying period started before) the commencement day, the applicant says that nothing in the 2024 Act has a retrospective effect of a type that would recast or change the content in terms of a disqualifying order made before the commencement day. Nor is there anything that would have the retrospective effect of cancelling or making a nullity of a disqualifying order made before the commencement day which is otherwise still in effect.[22]
[22] Applicant's Submissions, 16 June 2025, page 3.
The applicant does not dispute that the principles and objects of the 2024 Act are set out in s 4(1) and s 4(2). The applicant does, however, take issue with the respondent's reference to the objects as including 'to prevent access to firearms by persons who pose a risk of violence, family violence or intimidating behaviour' if it be suggested the applicant poses a risk of these things. The applicant asserts that if there is evidence he poses a risk as described above, that should expressly have been put. Otherwise, there is nothing before the Tribunal which establishes a risk of these things relevant to the interpretative issues arising on the preliminary question or at all.[23]
[23] Applicant's Submissions, 16 June 2025, page 4.

The applicant draws attention to the distinction apparently drawn by the respondent between the category or type of an order on the one hand and the terms or content of an order on the other. The applicant argues that the respondent's submissions, while asserting a plain and natural meaning to the phrase 'disqualifying order', do not at any point engage in a meaningful way with the actual meaning of the word 'order' in the context of a definition plainly referring to orders of a court.[24]
[24] Applicant's Submissions, 16 June 2025, page 3.
The applicant contends that the respondent asserting a meaning of 'disqualifying order' which is strictly limited to the category of a court order fails to consider the serious problems that will arise in practice from such an approach including requiring the respondent to act in a way which overrides an order of the Magistrates Court, which presumably was not Parliament's intention.[25]
[25] Applicant's Submissions, 16 June 2025, page 12.
The applicant says that if the respondent was to be placed by Parliament in the very unusual situation where he was specifically being told by Parliament to ignore an order of the court, what might be expected is additional words in the definition of disqualifying order that reflect that intention. For example: disqualifying order means an order, that is, a VRO, a CAO, even if that order has a permissive element to it.[26]
[26] ts 8, 26 June 2025.
The applicant argues that this situation is something that the drafters have plainly not thought of and only arises for a period of time because eventually CAOs that have a similar permissive clause to that in Mr White's CAO will become extinct.[27]
[27] ts 8, 26 June 2025.
The applicant points to a Mareva Order as an example of how both the category and terms of a court order have consequences. Simply possessing information that an order of the category 'Mareva Order' exists, does not allow any person to know what that lawfully made order of a court permits or does not permit.[28]
[28] Applicant's Submissions, 16 June 2025, page 7.
In considering the meaning of the words rule, judgment and order in the context of the 'slip rule', the applicant refers to the following passages from Manousaridis J in Heywood v Sharpe:[29]
13.There are a number of matters to notice about this rule. First, the rule applies to a 'judgment or order'. The word 'judgment' is defined in the Dictionary to the FC Rules to have the meaning given to that word in s.4 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act). In that section, 'judgment' is defined to mean a 'judgment, decree or order, whether final or interlocutory', or a sentence, and includes a conviction. The word 'order' is defined in the Dictionary to the FC Rules to include 'a final order, an interlocutory order, a direction and a sentence of the Court'.
14.The word 'judgment', in its historical sense, refers to the formal decision of a common law court by which it finally determined the issues that were tendered by the parties to the court for its determination. It has been defined as:
the determination or sentence of the law, pronounced by a competent judge or court, as the result of an action or proceeding instituted in such court, affirming that, upon the matters submitted for its decision, a legal duty or liability does or does not exist.
15.Section 4 of the FCA Act makes it clear, however, that 'judgment' is not limited to its technical common law meaning. It includes a 'decree' which, although rarely used in modern times, is an order made by courts of equity that finally determines the rights between the parties. It also includes an 'order' which denotes any form of words by which a court pronounces its decisions in response to applications made to it. And, finally, because 'judgment' is defined to include an 'order', and 'order' is defined to include 'directions', 'judgment' also includes 'directions'. This may be taken to mean any order the Court makes for the taking of a step in a proceeding.
16.In short, the words 'judgment' and 'order' denote the words by which courts pronounce decisions they make …
[29] Heywood v Sharpe [2014] FCCA 2999 at [13] - [16].
The applicant also relies on Harris v De Robillard[30] which involved a claim that the form of judgment annexed to a bankruptcy notice did not accurately record the judgment that was entered in the local court's computer system. Manousaridis J held that the word 'order' is wide enough to include any form of words by which a court pronounces its decision in response to applications made to it. His Honour went on to observe that the expression 'judgment' and 'order' denote the words by which court's pronounce decisions they make that finally determine the controversy between the parties or otherwise determine finally the rights of the parties.[31]
[30] Harris v De Robillard [2017] FCCA 2451 at [24].
[31] Applicant's Submissions, 16 June 2025, pages 9 - 10.
Based on the authorities to which we have just referred, the applicant contends that the plain and ordinary meaning of the word 'order' in the context of a CAO and a 'disqualifying order' in s 5 of the 2024 Act must mean the words by which a court pronounces decisions it makes.
In further support of this proposition the applicant also relies on s 32 of the Magistrates Court Act 2004 (WA):
32.Effect of Court's summonses etc
(1)A summons or warrant or other order of the Court has effect according to its contents.
(2)A member of the Police Force must obey any warrant, order or direction that is duly issued by the Court and addressed to members of that Police Force.
(3)A member of the Police Force who contravenes subsection (2) is to be dealt with under the Police Act 1892 section 23.
The applicant relies in particular on the words:[32]
A summons or warrant or other order of the Court has effect according to its contents.
(Emphasis added)
[32] Applicant's Submissions, 16 June 2025, page 11.
The applicant also relies on the following observation from Corboy J in Blenkinsop v Wilson:[33] [34]
57… Section 34(1) further provides that it is presumed in any case dealt with by the Court that the Court was constituted according to law and had jurisdiction to deal with the case. Section 34(7) states that those presumptions apply in the absence of proof to the contrary.
[33] Blenkinsop v Wilson [2019] WASC 77 at [57].
[34] Applicant's Submissions, 16 June 2025, page 11.
The applicant argues that the respondent's submissions do not provide any authority for the meaning of the word 'order' in terms of a court order. The applicant says further that according to the respondent the face of the order is as far as the respondent must enquire into the relevant order to satisfy himself that pursuant to s 192(1)(c) and s 9(1)(a) or (b) the person is a disqualified person.[35]
[35] Applicant's Submissions, 16 June 2025, pages 11 - 12.
In response the applicant argues that given the established meaning of the word order as meaning 'the words by which courts pronounce decisions they make' - it is this interpretation that would actually require further words in the defining section or in s 192(1)(c) and s 9(1)(a) or (b) to make clear that what is being referred to as a disqualifying order is simply an order of a certain category.[36]
[36] Applicant's Submissions, 16 June 2025, page 12.
According to the applicant, the respondent's preferred interpretation has obvious problems in that if mere confirmation of the existence of an order in the category of a CAO were sufficient to constitute a disqualifying order and prompt a decision of the respondent under s 192 of the 2024 Act, this in practice would require the respondent to make a decision under s 192 which could be directly opposite to the terms of a lawfully made order of the Magistrates Court.[37]
[37] Applicant's Submissions, 16 June 2025, page 12.
The applicant submits that an administrative decision-maker cannot override the lawful order of a court absent an express and clear basis or authorisation, which is not the case here.[38]
[38] Applicant's Submissions, 16 June 2025, page 13.
Finally, the applicant takes issue with the respondent's submissions that the repeal of s 14(5) of the RO Act is indicative that Parliament must have intended that every CAO, no matter its terms, are disqualifying orders without exception.[39]
[39] Applicant's Submissions, 16 June 2025, page 13.
The applicant contends, on the other hand, that the fact of Parliament repealing s 14(5) of the RO Act means self-evidently that Parliament was aware that for some time there would be two possible types of CAOs in existence, (those that are permissive of firearm possession and those that are not).[40]
[40] Applicant's Submissions, 16 June 2025, page 13.
The applicant argues that given the contemplation by Parliament of some period of lawful CAOs constituting orders of a court permitting possession, it can be properly reasoned that Parliament cannot be taken to have intended administrative decision-makers override a court order without clear words in legislation expressly empowering them to do so.[41]
[41] Applicant's Submissions, 16 June 2025, page 13.

The parties further submissions

At the end of the hearing, we made orders permitting the parties to file further submissions. Both parties took advantage of that opportunity.
The applicant's supplementary submissions primarily focus on the application of the principle of legality which is a rule of statutory construction requiring that courts do not impute to the legislature an intention to abrogate or curtail certain rights or privileges unless such an intention is clearly manifested by unambiguous language.[42]
[42] Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 241 CLR 252; [2010] HCA 23 at [56] - [59] per French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ.
The applicant argues that the principle of legality applies to the extent that the Tribunal considers uncertainty accompanies the meaning and use of the words 'CAO' and 'disqualifying order' in s 5 of the 2024 Act.[43]
[43] Applicant's Supplementary Submissions, 15 July 2025, page 2.
According to the applicant uncertainty is said to accompany the question of whether a CAO renders the person bound by the order subject to a disqualifying order under the 2024 Act in circumstances where the CAO permits the person bound to possess a firearm authority without further condition.[44]
[44] Applicant's Supplementary Submissions, 15 July 2025, pages 6 - 7.
The applicant concedes that firearm ownership is not an entrenched right but says it does not need to be for the principle of legality to have a role in the interpretative process in the event the relevant statutory provisions are unclear.[45]
[45] Applicant's Supplementary Submissions, 15 July 2025, page 2.
The applicant argues that the courts have recognised a wide range of what are described as principles, rights and privileges that can only be abrogated by the clearest of indications by the legislature.[46]
[46] Applicant's Supplementary Submissions, 15 July 2025, pages 3 - 5.
The formulation of principles, right and privileges requiring a clear and unambiguous statutory intention to abrogate, are said by the applicant to be set out by Pearce in Statutory Interpretation in Australia.[47]
[47] D Pearce, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (9^th edition, LexisNexis Australia, 2019) at page 255.
The applicant aligns his interest in maintaining his firearm authority[48] with an interference with vested property rights as described in Fazzolari Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council:[49]
As a practical matter it means that, where a statute is capable of more than one construction, that construction will be chosen which interferes least with private property rights.
[48] Applicant's Supplementary Submissions, 15 July 2025, page 3.
[49] Fazzolari Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council 2009 254 ALR 1 at [43] - [44].
The applicant says that the ownership of a thing is self-evidently a property right. Further, whilst the type of property in question being firearms is subject to regulation pertaining to its ownership the applicant's right was vested in the sense that he already had the required regulatory approval and licensing to own the type of property in question.[50]
[50] Applicant's Supplementary Submissions, 15 July 2025, page 4.
The applicant's submissions also pick up the argument advanced by the respondent that a MRO is only prescribed to be a disqualifying order where that order imposes restraints on the person bound by the order possessing a firearms item or firearm authority.[51] It follows according to the respondent that this assists in the interpretative process in that the failure to make a similar concession with respect to CAOs is deliberate.
[51] Applicant's Supplementary Submissions, 15 July 2025, page 6.
The applicant contends that there is something to be made of the fact that an MRO is only a disqualifying order if it includes a prohibition on holding a firearm authority that was achieved by regulations. The applicant argues that the exercise of a power by regulation could be used to resolve the uncertainty in relation to CAOs. It is the existence of this power, according to the applicant, that tends against an interpretation that Parliament intended the result for which the respondent advocates.[52]
[52] Applicant's Supplementary Submissions, 15 July 2025, page 6.
The respondent's further submissions in reply deal firstly with the principle of legality. While not disputing the existence of such a principle, the respondent contends its application is limited and does not extend to a firearm authority.[53]
[53] Respondent's Further Submissions in Reply, 28 July 2025, page 2.
The respondent says further that in the absence of any ambiguity the principle of legality has no role to play.[54]
[54] Respondent's Further Submissions in Reply, 28 July 2025, page 2.
Next the respondent addresses the applicant's contention that the power to make regulations prescribing an order of a kind as a disqualifying order is evidence that Parliament did not intend that all CAOs by disqualifying orders.[55]
[55] Respondent's Further Submissions in Reply, 28 July 2025, pages 2 - 4.
The respondent points to the fact that a CAO is expressly included in the definition of 'disqualifying order' in s 5 of the 2024 Act. Thus, there is no room for the regulations to make any further prescription in relation to CAOs. This is said to be in contrast to other orders which are not expressly included in the definition of 'disqualifying order' in s 5 of the 2024 Act, including MROs.[56]
[56] Respondent's Further Submissions in Reply, 28 July 2025, pages 3 - 4.

Disposition

As the Court of Appeal observed in Mohammadi v Bethune the primary object of statutory construction is to construe the relevant provision so that it is consistent with the language and purpose of all the provisions of the statute.
It is apparent that the 2024 Act gave rise to significant changes from what previously existed in the 1973 Act.
On its face neither the respondent nor the Tribunal have a discretion to grant a firearm authority to a person bound by a FVRO, VRO or CAO. By contrast under the 1973 Act the respondent retained a discretion to issue a firearm authority even if the applicant had been bound by a FVRO or VRO in the 5 years preceding the application for a firearm authority.
This change in approach to FVROs, VROs and by association CAOs is consistent with the purpose and objects of the 2024 Act which is concerned with public safety and preventing access to firearms by persons who pose a risk of violence, family violence or intimidating behaviour.
The applicant's primary argument is that an order including a CAO is to be considered according to its terms not merely by reference to it as a category of orders. The applicant says that Parliament has placed the respondent in the unusual position of having to ignore an order of the Magistrates Court permitting the applicant to possess a firearm authority. According to the applicant, had Parliament intended the respondent to ignore a court order, it is reasonable to expect that the words used to define a disqualifying order would have made that clear.
The applicant contends that the failure of the 2024 Act to deal with the subset of persons bound by a CAO that were permitted by a court to retain their firearm authority demonstrates that it was something the drafters had not considered.
The applicant rightly points out that it is not for an administrative decision-maker such as the respondent or the Tribunal to interfere with or overturn an order of a court. That, however, is not the case here. Neither the respondent nor the Tribunal is invested with any discretion as to whether a person bound by a FVRO, VRO or CAO can possess a firearm authority.
Section 140 of the 2024 Act simply says:
The Commissioner must not grant a firearm authority to a person who is a disqualified person or prohibited person.
The Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill supports this construction:
The designation of an offence or an order as a disqualifying offence or disqualifying order is not to be taken as a decision by the Commissioner, since this designation was achieved by legislative means. Therefore, a person cannot challenge a disqualification arising from a disqualifying order or disqualifying offence to the State Administrative Tribunal.
Section 9(1) of the 2024 Act defines a disqualified person as a person subject to a disqualifying order. FVROs, VROs and CAOs are all defined as disqualifying orders pursuant to s 5.
The 2024 Act in defining a disqualifying order does not on its face contemplate that the terms of a FVRO, VRO or CAO may permit the person bound to hold a firearm authority.
As we have already explained the applicant contends that had Parliament intended the respondent to ignore a court order that should have been made clear and was something the drafters' failed to consider. Whereas the respondent says had Parliament intended CAOs permitting possession of a firearm authority to be excluded from the scope of the term 'disqualifying order', it would have expressly said so.
The respondent points to the way the legislation deals with MROs, interim FVROs and through the exceptions in reg 6(2) of the Regulations regarding the disqualification period for orders of a temporary or interim nature.
The definition of 'disqualifying order' in s 5 of the 2024 Act includes in para (c) 'an order of a kind that is prescribed by the regulations as a disqualifying order'.
Regulation 6(1) of the Regulations says that for the purposes of para (c) of the definition of 'disqualifying order' in s 5 of the 2024 Act the following is a disqualifying order:
(d)a misconduct restraining order as defined in the Restraining Orders Act 1997 section 3(1) that imposes restraints on the person bound by the order under section 36(2)(f) or (fa) or (3)(c) or (d) of that Act[.]
Sections 36(2)(f) and s 36(3)(c) of the RO Act vest in the court a discretion whether to impose a restraint on the person bound by a MRO from possessing or applying for a firearm item or firearm authority. The Regulations acknowledge the court's discretion in relation to the terms of an MRO hence there are MROs that are disqualifying orders and those that are not.
As a general rule delegated legislation made under an Act is not to be taken into account for the purposes of interpretation of the Act itself.[57] However, it is permissible to look at the regulations not to construe an overall scheme or to throw light on ambiguity in a statutory provision, but to ascertain what the scheme is.[58]
[57] Mine Subsidence Board v Wambo Coal Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 137 at [41].
[58] Brayson Motors Pty Ltd v Federal Commission of Taxation (1985) 156 CLR 651 at 652.
The 2024 Act and Regulations appear to draw a distinction between the way different types of orders are dealt with. Interim and temporary orders render the person bound an interim disqualified person. Once the interim order expires or is dismissed, the person is no longer prohibited from holding a firearm authority because of the interim or temporary order.

MROs only become 'disqualifying orders' in the event a court imposes the restraints provided in s 36(2)(f) or (3)(c) of the RO Act. This flexibility may be explained by the fact that MROs involve conduct of lesser seriousness than that the subject of a FVRO, VRO or CAO and can only be made if the parties are not in a family relationship with one another.
Section 36(1) of the RO Act provides:
In making an MRO a court may impose such restraints on the lawful activities and behaviour of the respondent as the court considers appropriate to prevent the respondent —
(a)behaving in a manner that could reasonably be expected to be intimidating or offensive to the person seeking to be protected and that would, in fact, intimidate or offend the person seeking to be protected; or
(b)causing damage to property owned by, or in the possession of, the person seeking to be protected; or
(c)behaving in a manner that is, or is likely to lead to, a breach of the peace; or
(d)committing an offence under The Criminal Code section 70A(2A).
FVROs, VROs and CAOs are final orders. A CAO can only be made as a means of resolving an interim FVRO.
There are two other contextual matters that further support the conclusion that the legislature's decision to not moderate the definition of a disqualifying order by reference to the specific nature or content of a CAO in a particular case was deliberate.
First, as a consequence of the 2024 Act, s 14(5) of the RO Act was repealed thereby removing any prospect that a person bound by a FVRO or VRO could hold or apply for a firearm authority. This is the surest indication that Parliament did not want a person, who among other things, poses a risk of violence, family violence or intimidating behaviour to hold a firearm authority.
Second, s 427 of the 2024 Act provides that s 9 (disqualified persons and interim disqualified persons) extends to:
…
(b)a disqualifying order made before commencement day; and
…
(d)a disqualifying period that started before commencement day.
A distinction is to be drawn between legislation having a prior effect on past events and legislation basing future action on past events.[59] The former is retrospective the latter is not.
[59] See generally, D Pearce, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (9^th edition, Lexis Nexis Australia, 2019) at page 360.
We note that the Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill says:[60]
Disqualifying offences and disqualifying orders are both retroactive, which means that a person who has committed a disqualifying offence or received a disqualifying order before commencement day will either lose their firearm authority or not be able to apply for one until the expiry of the disqualifying period, which will be dated backwards to match the date of conviction or the day the disqualifying order was received.
[60] Explanatory Memorandum, presented in the Legislative Assembly, page 5.
The distinction as to whether legislation is retrospective or bases future action on past events is not always easy to resolve.
While there is nothing to prevent Parliament from making laws having retrospective operation, the starting point is that statutes are presumed not to have retrospective operation.
The presumption against retrospectivity can be excluded by either a direct statement to the contrary in the statute or by 'necessary intendment' that the statute is to operate retrospectively.
In Worrall v Commercial Banking Co of Sydney Ltd, the High Court held:[61]
… Necessary intendment only means that the force of the language in its surroundings carries such strength of impression in one direction, that to entertain the opposite view appears wholly unreasonable.
[61] Worrall v Commercial Banking Co of Sydney Ltd (1917) 24 CLR 28 at 32 per Barton, Isaacs and Rich JJ.
In our view, even if the 2024 Act is characterised as retrospective it is clear that the legislature intended that it apply to a disqualifying order made before commencement day.
The fact that the 2024 Act:
(a)does not distinguish between FVROs, VROs and CAOs that permit the person bound to hold a firearm authority and those that do not;
(b)repealed s 14(5) of the RO Act; and
(c)applies to disqualifying orders made prior to commencement day,
is a clear indication that the legislature must have intended that FVROs, VROs and CAOs that permitted the person bound to hold a firearm authority were to be considered disqualifying orders.
As we have discussed earlier, had Parliament wanted to draw a distinction between those who had permission to hold a firearm authority in accordance with s 14(5) of the RO Act, it could have done so.
We turn now to consider the applicant's submissions in relation to the principle of legality.
The principle of legality is a rule of statutory construction that an intention to abrogate or curtail certain rights or freedoms is not implied to the legislature unless such an intention is clearly manifest by unambiguous language.[62]
[62] Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562 at [19] - [20].
No authority was produced by either party that confirmed the principle of legality applies to a firearm authority. We also note that principles of the 2024 Act include:
(b)the possession and use of firearms is a privilege that is always conditional on the overriding need to ensure public safety.
A further difficulty for the applicant lies in the fact that there does not appear to be any ambiguity as to whether a CAO is a disqualifying order for the purposes of the 2024 Act.
The applicant argues that the power to make regulations prescribing an order of a kind as a disqualifying order is evidence that Parliament did not intend all CAOs to be disqualifying orders.
Unlike a MRO, a CAO is expressly referred to in the definition of a 'disqualifying order' without reference to a CAO that is permissive. Had there been an intention to treat CAOs in the same ways as MROs, they could have been included in para (c) of the definition of 'disqualifying order'.
As Bell P observed in Kassam v Hazzard:[63]
The principle of legality's role may be thought of as an occasionally useful, context-dependent adjunct to the ultimate and central judicial task and responsibility of giving effect to legislative intention. As Basten JA (with whom Beazley P and Payne JA agreed) observed in Elliott v Minister administering Fisheries Management Act 1994 (2018) 97 NSWLR 1082; [2018] NSWCA 123 at [35] (Elliott):
"the general requirement that effect must be given to the text of the statute, read in context and having regard to its apparent purpose, remains the principal focus of statutory construction".
The usual process of statutory construction expressed above is not 'overridden' by the principle of legality: Elliott at [40].
[63] Kassam v Hazzard [2021] NSWCA 299 (Kassam v Hazzard) at [86].
In Gifford v Strang Patrick Stevedoring Pty Ltd[64] McHugh J discussed the relevance of the strength of the right in question:
The presumption of non-interference is strong when the right is a fundamental right of our legal system; it is weak when the right is merely one to take or not take a particular course of action. Courts should not cut down the natural and ordinary meaning of legislation evincing an intention to interfere with these lesser rights by relying on a presumption that the legislature did not intend to interfere with them. Given the frequency with which legislatures now abolish or amend 'ordinary' common law rights, the 'presumption' of non-interference with those rights is inconsistent with modern experience and borders on fiction. If the presumption still exists in such cases, its effect must be so negligible that it can only have weight when all other factors are evenly balanced.
[64] Gifford v Strang Patrick Stevedoring Pty Ltd (2003) 214 CLR 269; [2003] HCA 33 at [36]. See also Kassam v Hazzard at [90].
As McHugh J cautioned in Malika Holdings Pty Ltd v Stretton:[65]
[I]n Australia today, few principles or rights can claim to be so fundamental that it is unlikely that the legislature would want to change them.
[65] Malika Holdings Pty Ltd v Stretton (2001) 204 CLR 290 at [28].
Having regard to the text of the 2024 Act, read in context and having regards to its purpose, principles and objects, we are not satisfied there is a sufficient basis to invoke the principle of legality even were we satisfied it has application with respect to firearms.

Conclusion

The preliminary question is answered in the affirmative. A conduct agreement order that includes in its terms 'the Person Bound is permitted to possess a firearms item or firearms authorisation and the necessary licenses without further condition' is a disqualifying order for the purposes of the Firearms Act 2024 (WA).

Orders

The Tribunal orders:
1.The application is dismissed.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.
MR J O'Sullivan, SENIOR MEMBER
25 AUGUST 2025