HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
GLEESON CJ,
GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE AND CRENNAN JJDIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
FOR VICTORIA APPELLANTAND
PHAN THI LE RESPONDENT
Director of Public Prosecutions for Victoria v Le [2007] HCA 52
14 November 2007
M65/2007ORDER
1.Appeal allowed in respect of grounds (1)-(3) and dismissed in relation to grounds (4)-(7).
2.Set aside Order 1 of the orders made by the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria on 15 February 2007 and, in its place, order that:
(a)the appeal be allowed;
(b)Order 1 of the orders made by Judge Campbell on 31 March 2006 be varied as follows:
(i)Order that the interest as joint proprietor of Phan Thi Le in the property situated at 10/28-30 Ridley Street, Sunshine and more particularly described in Certificate of Title Volume 9604 Folio 908 be excluded from the automatic forfeiture pursuant to s 52(1)(a) of the Confiscation Act 1997; and
(ii)Declare that the nature of the interest of Phan Thi Le in the property is that of tenant in common as to a one-half share.
3. The appellant to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal to this Court.
On appeal from the Supreme Court of Victoria
Representation
D F Jackson QC with N J O'Bryan SC for the appellant (instructed by Solicitor for Public Prosecutions)
D Grace QC with D C Hallowes and M K Moshinsky for the respondent (instructed by Melinda Walker & Co)
Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.
GLEESON CJ. I have had the advantage of reading in draft form the joint reasons for judgment of Kirby and Crennan JJ. I agree with the orders proposed in those reasons. As to the first and third issues with which they deal (the scope of orders excluding property from forfeiture, and the matter of reasonable suspicion), I agree with what their Honours have said and have nothing to add. As to the second issue (sufficient consideration), I would add the following, and make particular reference to the factual basis on which the primary judge and all three members of the Court of Appeal decided the question.
The relevant part of the evidence as to the motivation for the transfer, to the respondent, of an interest (as joint tenant) in the matrimonial home was laconic, and barely tested in cross-examination. The respondent was entirely dependent upon her husband. She said that she asked to be made a part owner of the matrimonial home because, if anything happened to her husband, she would have had nowhere to live and believed the property would pass to his children by a former marriage. The primary judge concluded:
"Whilst natural love and affection may not be sufficient to justify a commercial contract between people at arm[']s length, it is a common 'consideration' in respect to the alteration of property interests between husband and wife, as is the case here. In any event, it would seem…
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- Case
- [2007] HCA 52
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court was required to determine several legal issues. These included whether the whole of the property, or only the respondent's joint interest, could be excluded from forfeiture. The court also had to consider whether the respondent satisfied the condition in s 52(1)(a)(iii) of the Act, which requires that the circumstances of acquisition did not arouse a reasonable suspicion that the property was tainted. Furthermore, the court needed to decide whether the concept of "reasonable suspicion" should be tested wholly objectively and whether "natural love and affection" constituted "sufficient consideration" within the meaning of s 52(1)(a)(v) of the Act.
The High Court, in a joint judgment by Kirby and Crennan JJ, with Gleeson CJ providing additional reasons, allowed the appeal in part. The court held that "natural love and affection" did not constitute "sufficient consideration" for the purposes of the Act, as it was not "valuable consideration" in the eyes of equity. However, the court found that the respondent had satisfied the condition under s 52(1)(a)(iii) regarding reasonable suspicion, and that the test for reasonable suspicion was to be applied objectively. The court also determined that the respondent's interest as a joint proprietor could be excluded from forfeiture.
Consequently, the High Court set aside the orders of the Court of Appeal. It ordered that the respondent's interest as joint proprietor in the property be excluded from automatic forfeiture and declared that her interest was that of a tenant in common as to a one-half share. The DPP was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal to the High Court.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Appeal allowed in respect of grounds (1)-(3) and dismissed in relation to grounds (4)-(7).
2. Set aside Order 1 of the orders made by the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria on 15 February 2007 and, in its place, order that:
(a) the appeal be allowed;
(b) Order 1 of the orders made by Judge Campbell on 31 March 2006 be varied as follows:
(i) Order that the interest as joint proprietor of Phan Thi Le in the property situated at 10/28-30 Ridley Street, Sunshine and more particularly described in Certificate of Title Volume 9604 Folio 908 be excluded from the automatic forfeiture pursuant to s 52(1)(a) of the Confiscation Act 1997 ; and
(ii) Declare that the nature of the interest of Phan Thi Le in the property is that of tenant in common as to a one-half share.
3. The appellant to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal to this Court. (per joint judgment of Kirby and Crennan JJ with Gleeson CJ giving additional reasons for the second issue and agreeing with the joint orders and joint reasons. Gummow and Hayne JJ allowed the appeal but differed as to their reasons and orders from the majority.)
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: GLEESON CJ,
Of those criteria, the requirement that there be "sufficient consideration" was most open to doubt on the facts of the present case. It is to that criterion which is the subject of grounds 4 and 5 in the Notice of Appeal, and to these we now turn."Sufficient consideration" Until the transfer in question, Mr Le was the sole registered proprietor of the property the continued ownership or enjoyment of which is at stake in these proceedings. On 29 August 2003 he transferred the property to himself and his wife as joint tenants. The consideration was expressed to be "natural love and affection". The critical question is whether, within the meaning of the Act, the transfer was made for "sufficient consideration". It is convenient to approach that question first by looking to the character given by the general law to a conveyance expressed to be made for a consideration being "natural love and affection". The various senses in which the term "consideration" is used and the adjectives attached to it have been detailed and discussed in this Court in Roxborough v Rothmans of Pall Mall Australia Ltd[12] and Commissioner of State Revenue (NSW) v Dick Smith Electronics Holdings Pty Ltd[13]. The following may be added in elaboration of what was said in those cases and with particular reference to conveyancing law and practice.[12](2001) 208 CLR 516 at 556‑557 [103].[13](2005) 221 CLR 496 at 504‑506 [22]‑[24]. Equity will not (subject to what appears below) assist what it regards as a volunteer to perfect an otherwise imperfect gift of property. In that regard, it would be insufficient to show "good consideration", being natural affection for family members or moral obligation[14]. However, "valuable consideration" will attract the intervention of equity. Equity regards this as not including a bare covenant under seal but as including not only money or money's worth but a settlement made before and in consideration of marriage or agreed before and executed after the marriage[15]. There was no marriage consideration in the present case and no "valuable consideration". Nor, given what has been said earlier in these reasons respecting National Provincial Bank[16], was the creation of the joint tenancy the discharge of any obligation imposed by law upon the husband to create a proprietary interest in the apartment in favour of his wife.[14]Underhill and Hayton, Law Relating to Trusts and Trustees, 17th ed (2007) at §9.75.[15]Underhill and Hayton, Law Relating to Trusts and Trustees, 17th ed (2007) at §9.76.[16][1965] AC 1175 at 1247‑1248. It should be added to what has been said respecting "good consideration" that it may play a part in the operation of limited and specific conveyancing principles, albeit with no reference to the situation in the present case. Of the expression "good consideration" it was said in Elphinstone's work, one of the classic conveyancing treatises[17]:"By 'good consideration' is meant merely the motive of natural affection towards relations. It has no validity against creditors or purchasers. The only effect of it is to raise the use in covenants to stand seised."Further, Leake wrote that[18]:"The motive then stood in place of a consideration, and it was said to be made upon a good consideration, as distinguished from a consideration of money or value, which formed the characteristic of a bargain and sale."[17]Elphinstone's Introduction to Conveyancing, 7th ed (1918) at 81. (footnote omitted)[18]An Elementary Digest of the Law of Property in Land (1874) at 110.