ARJ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

ARJ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

[2017] FCA 263

File number: NSD 223 of 2017
Judge: RARES J
Date of judgment: 17 March 2017
Catchwords:

HIGH COURT AND FEDERAL COURT – challenge to jurisdiction – whether Federal Court has original jurisdiction to hear challenge to non-privative clause decision as defined in s 474(6) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) where decision alleged to involve jurisdictional error – whether such decision is “migration decision” in original jurisdiction of Federal Circuit Court under s 476(1) and excluded from Federal Court jurisdiction by s 476A(1) – original jurisdiction of Federal Court under s 39B(1) and (1A)(c) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) and s 19(1) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – whether s 476A of the Migration Act excludes Federal Court’s original jurisdiction in respect of matter seeking relief in relation to a “migration decision” alleged to involve jurisdictional error – whether jurisdictional fact must be capable of ascertainment before final hearing

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – meaning of “decision” within s 474 – whether textual construction of “decision” differs within s 474(2) as well as with s 474(4) – whether “decision” in s 474(4) means decision made under the Act as construed in Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476 – use of extrinsic materials in statutory construction

Legislation:

Constitution ss 75, 76

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) s 5, Sch 1

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) Pt IVA, ss 19, 32AB

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Div 13A Pt 2, Pts 5, 7, Div 1 Pt 8, Div 2 Pt 8, Pt 8A, ss 5, 5E, 252, 261A, 261F, 261K, 273, 338, 411, 474, 474A, 475, 476, 476A, 476B, 477, 477A, 478, 479, 480, 484, 486A, 486AA

Migration Legislation Amendment (Judicial Review) Act 2001 (Cth)

Migration Litigation Reform Bill 2005 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v DB Management Pty Ltd (2000) 199 CLR 321

Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR 464

Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters v Cross (2012) 248 CLR 378

Clyne v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 150 CLR 1

Collector of Customs (NSW) v Brian Lawlor Automotive Pty Ltd (1979) 24 ALR 307

Commissioner of Taxation v Australian Building Systems Pty Ltd (2015) 326 ALR 590

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd (2012) 250 CLR 503

Federated Engine-Drivers and Firemen’s Association of Australasia v Broken Hill Proprietary Company  Limited (1911) 12 CLR 398

Griffith University v Tang (2005) 221 CLR 99

Kirk v Industrial Court of New South Wales (2010) 239 CLR 531

Kline v Official Secretary to the Governor-General (2013) 249 CLR 645

Mayor &c of London v Cox (1867) LR 2 HL 239

McGraw-Hinds (Aust) Pty Ltd v Smith (1979) 144 CLR 633

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSSJ (2016) 90 ALJR…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 263
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of ARJ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection before the Federal Court involved a dispute over the jurisdiction of the Court to hear a challenge to a decision alleged to involve a jurisdictional error. The legal issues centred on whether the Federal Court had original jurisdiction to hear challenges to non-privative clause decisions under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), particularly when such decisions were alleged to involve jurisdictional errors. The court was required to determine whether the exclusion of certain migration decisions from the Federal Court's jurisdiction, as per sections 476(1) and 476A(1) of the Migration Act, applied to cases seeking relief in relation to non-privative clause decisions alleged to involve jurisdictional errors. Furthermore, the court needed to consider whether a jurisdictional fact must be ascertainable before the final hearing.

The court, in its reasoning, held that a non-privative clause decision, as defined in section 474(4) and (6) of the Migration Act, did not fall within the term "migration decision" as defined in section 5 of the Act. Consequently, the exclusion of certain migration decisions from the Federal Court's jurisdiction did not apply to non-privative clause decisions alleged to involve jurisdictional errors. The court also concluded that the jurisdictional fact needed to establish the Court's jurisdiction could be ascertained before the final hearing, as it was a matter that could be determined on the balance of probabilities based on the evidence presented.

The court found that it had original jurisdiction to grant final relief to the applicant, as the decision in question involved a non-privative clause decision alleged to contain a jurisdictional error. The respondents were granted leave to appeal the decision on the jurisdictional question. This outcome was reached by interpreting the statutory provisions in a manner that aligned with the legislative intent and the principles of jurisdictional fact ascertainment as established in previous case law.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The question reserved for determination on 2 March 2017 be answered as follows:

Question: Does the Court have jurisdiction to grant final relief to the applicant in these proceedings?

Answer: The Court has original jurisdiction to grant final relief to the applicant on the claims to relief in the originating application.

2. The respondents have leave to appeal in respect of the question and answer in order 1.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The Commonwealth contended that the need to identify the provision in an Act on which a decision maker acted or is alleged to have acted, in order to determine which Court had jurisdiction, would be simplified by its broad construction, because only matters falling within s 476A(2) would be in the original jurisdiction of this Court and all other matters referred to in s 474 would be allocated to the Federal Circuit Court. It submitted that its approach to the broad construction of Pts 8 and 8A of the Act and the expression “a non-privative clause decision” in s 474 was supported by the extra judicial remark of Lord Diplock (Diplock K, “The Courts as Legislators” in B Harvey (ed), The Lawyer and Justice (Sweet & Maxwell, 1978) at 274), that “if … the Courts can identify the target of Parliamentary legislation their proper function is to see that it is hit: not merely to record that it has been missed”.Consideration – jurisdictional facts If a court’s jurisdiction depends on the existence of particular facts or a particular state of affairs, a challenge to that jurisdiction “can only be resisted by establishing the facts on which it depends”, as Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ held in Shin Kobe Maru 181 CLR at 426. They said that the jurisdictional facts had to “be established on the balance of probabilities in the light of all the evidence advanced in the proceedings held to determine whether there is jurisdiction”. If this Court, as a superior court of record, holds that it has no jurisdiction because of the absence of jurisdictional fact, such a decision, while unreversed, “is conclusive as to all relevant matters thereby decided, [whereas] the judgment of an inferior Court, involving a question of jurisdiction, is not final”: Mayor &c of London v Cox (1867) LR 2 HL 239 at 262 per Willes J, giving the unanimous advice of Blackburn J, Pigott B, Shee and Smith JJ that Lords Cranworth and Westbury (constituting the House) adopted. The corollary is that an order made by a superior court of record, including this Court, which the court had no jurisdiction to make, is not a nullity, but rather it is valid and binding until set aside on appeal or under s 75(v) of the Constitution: Re Macks; Ex parte Saint (2000) 204 CLR 158 at 177-178 [22]-[23] per Gleeson CJ, 185-186 [52]-[53] per Gaudron J, 215‑216 [151]-[152] per McHugh J, 235-236 [216] per Gummow J, 248-249 [255]-[257] per Kirby J, 279 [343]-[344] per Hayne and Callinan JJ. And, if this Court held that it had no jurisdiction in relation to a non-privative clause decision because that was a valid decision (were it otherwise to have jurisdiction in relation to a non-privative clause decision involving jurisdictional error), that finding would create an issue estoppel. That is because it would be a finding of a jurisdictional fact that was necessarily decided as the essential foundation or groundwork of the order: Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR 464 at 532-533 per Dixon J.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

A decision under s 252 is defined in s 474(4) and (6) of the Migration Act as a “non‑privative clause decision”. A privative clause decision is defined in s 474(2), in essence, as a decision of an administrative character that is “made … under this Act”, other than a decision referred to in s 474(4) and (5), and s 474(1) attributes to a privative clause decision characteristics of finality and protection from legal challenge. A purported privative clause decision is defined in s 5E as one that would be a privative clause decision if there were not a failure to exercise jurisdiction or an excess of jurisdiction. A migration decision is defined in s 5 of the Act, relevantly, as a privative clause decision, a purported privative clause decision, a non-privative clause decision or an AAT Act migration decision. The Act provides in s 476(1) that the Federal Circuit Court has the same original jurisdiction as the High Court does under s 75(v) of the Constitution “in relation to migration decisions”, with limited exceptions. And, s 476A(1) provides that despite any other law, including s 39B of the Judiciary Act, this Court “has original jurisdiction in relation to a migration decision if, and only if” it is a migration decision of a specified kind. There is no definition that expressly makes a purported non-privative clause decision (i.e. one that Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476 at 506 [76] would classify as a decision not “made … under this Act”, or made under a provision in the table in s 474(4)) a “migration decision” as defined that, first, the Federal Court cannot review under s 476A(1) or that, secondly, the Federal Circuit Court can review under s 476(1) (see Plaintiff S157 211 CLR at 511 [95]-[97]). The Commonwealth accepted for the purpose of the determination of the jurisdictional question that the source of any power to promulgate and then enforce the new policy was s 252 or another power, such as s 273, the exercise of which was, or would be, a non-privative clause decision as defined in s 474(4), (5) and (6). In particular, the Commonwealth referred to the Minister’s power under s 273, on its behalf, to cause detention centres to be established and maintained. By consent, on 2 March 2017, I ordered that the question, “Does the Court have jurisdiction to grant final relief to the applicant in these proceedings?”, be determined separately and before all other questions in the proceedings. If this Court lacks original jurisdiction to hear the subject matter of the application, the applicant seeks an order transferring the proceeding to the Federal Circuit Court under s 32AB(1) of the Federal Court Act. The Commonwealth wishes to contend that if the Court lacks original jurisdiction to hear the application, it also lacks jurisdiction under s 32AB(1) to transfer the application. That issue does not arise on the separate question. All parties agreed that I should order that, to the extent necessary, whoever is unsuccessful should have leave to appeal.The legislative scheme

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Section 5(1) of the Migration Act provides that, relevantly, the following definitions apply in the Act “unless the contrary intention appears”:AAT Act migration decision: see section 474Amigration decision means:(a) a privative clause decision; or(b) a purported privative clause decision; or(c) a non-privative clause decision; or(d) an AAT Act migration decision.non-privative clause decision has the meaning given by subsection 474(6).privative clause decision has the meaning given by subsection 474(2).purported privative clause decision has the meaning given by section 5E.Next, s 5E provides:5E Meaning of purported privative clause decision(1)In this Act, purported privative clause decision means a decision purportedly made, proposed to be made, or required to be made, under this Act or under a regulation or other instrument made under this Act (whether in purported exercise of a discretion or not), that would be a privative clause decision if there were not:(a) a failure to exercise jurisdiction; or(b) an excess of jurisdiction;in the making of the decision.(2)In this section, decision includes anything listed in subsection 474(3). As is apparent, each definition of the four classes of decision that are comprehended in the defined term “migration decision” is linked to a further definition in s 474 for the first three classes and in s 474A for the last class. Importantly, s 474 is the only section in Div 1 of Pt 8. It is headed “Privative clause”, and provides:Division 1 – Privative clause474 Decisions under Act are final(1) A privative clause decision:(a) is final and conclusive; and(b)must not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called in question in any court; and(c)is not subject to prohibition, mandamus, injunction, declaration or certiorari in any court on any account.(2) In this section:privative clause decision means a decision of an administrative character made, proposed to be made, or required to be made, as the case may be, under this Act or under a regulation or other instrument made under this Act (whether in the exercise of a discretion or not), other than a decision referred to in subsection (4) or (5).(3)A reference in this section to a decision includes a reference to the following:(a)granting, making, varying, suspending, cancelling, revoking or refusing to make an order or determination; (b)granting, giving, suspending, cancelling, revoking or refusing to give a certificate, direction, approval, consent or permission (including a visa);(c)granting, issuing, suspending, cancelling, revoking or refusing to issue an authority or other instrument;(d) imposing, or refusing to remove, a condition or restriction;(e)making or revoking, or refusing to make or revoke, a declaration, demand or requirement;(f) retaining, or refusing to deliver up, an article;(g) doing or refusing to do any other act or thing;(h)conduct preparatory to the making of a decision, including the taking of evidence or the holding of an inquiry or investigation;(i)a decision on review of a decision, irrespective of whether the decision on review is taken under this Act or a regulation or other instrument under this Act, or under another Act; (j) a failure or refusal to make a decision.(4)For the purposes of subsection (2), a decision under a provision, or under a regulation or other instrument made under a provision, set out in the following table is not a privative clause decision: