Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v ARJ17

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v ARJ17 [2017] FCAFC 125

Appeal from: ARJ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 263
File number: NSD 515 of 2017
Judges: KENNY, FLICK AND KERR JJ
Date of judgment: 17 August 2017
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – allocation of jurisdiction between Federal Court and Federal Circuit Court – jurisdiction of Federal Court to review decision retained

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – original jurisdiction of the Federal Court under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) to review purported non-privative clause decision not excluded by s 476A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – where purported non-privative clause decision a decision involving jurisdictional error or excess of jurisdiction – decision a nullity – jurisdiction to review not excluded

Legislation:

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Migration Legislation Amendment (Judicial Review) Act 2001 (Cth)

Migration Litigation Reform Act2005 (Cth)

Explanatory Memorandum, Migration Litigation Reform Bill 2005 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (Northern Territory) [2009] HCA 41; 239 CLR 27

ARJ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 263

Blurton v Minister for Aboriginal Affairs (1991) 29 FCR 442

Collector of Customs (NSW) v Brian Lawlor Automotive Pty Ltd (1979) 41 FLR 338

Commissioner of Stamps v Telegraph Investment Company Pty Ltd (1995) 184 CLR 453

Commissioner of Taxation v Australian Building Systems Pty Ltd (in liq) [2015] HCA 48; 257 CLR 544

Felton v Mulligan (1971) 124 CLR 367

Hooper v Kirella (1999) 96 FCR 1

Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW) [2010] HCA 1; 239 CLR 531

Kline v Official Secretary to the Governor General [2013] HCA 52; 249 CLR 645

Miller v Haweis (1907) 5 CLR 89

NAAV v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002) 123 FCR 228

Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth [2003] HCA 2; 211 CLR 476

Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355

PT Bayan Resources TBK v BCBC Singapore Pte Ltd [2015] HCA 36; 258 CLR 1

Rizeq v Western Australia [2017] HCA 23

Seventh Mingcourt Pty Ltd v Lawrence (1996) 64 FCR 367

SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] HCA 63, (2006) 228 CLR 152

Date of hearing: 20 June 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 179
Counsel for the Appellants: GR Kennett SC with P Herzfeld
Solicitor for the Appellants: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Respondent: D Hume with M Seymour
Solicitor for the Respondent: The National Justice Project
Table of Corrections
22 August 2017 In paragraph 78, the references to paragraphs [5], [6] and [7] have been replaced with [75], [76] and [77].
22 August 2017 In paragraph 137, the reference…
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Details
Case
[2017] FCAFC 125
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v ARJ17 involved the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and an individual, ARJ17, who was a non-citizen. The dispute centred on the classification and judicial review of a decision allegedly made under section 252 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). Specifically, the issue was whether a decision that was purportedly made under this section but was vitiated by jurisdictional error or excess of jurisdiction could be regarded as a non-privative clause decision for the purposes of judicial review. The Federal Court of Australia was tasked with determining this matter.

The court had to decide whether a decision that was purportedly made under section 252 but was not actually made due to jurisdictional error or excess of jurisdiction could be classified as a non-privative clause decision. This distinction was crucial because if such a decision was considered a non-privative clause decision, the court’s jurisdiction under section 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) would not be diminished by section 476A(1) of the Migration Act. The court considered the definitions provided in the Migration Act and the legislative intent behind these definitions. It also examined the broader legal principle that a decision involving jurisdictional error is regarded as no decision at all.

The court reasoned that a purported non-privative clause decision, which was never actually made due to jurisdictional error or excess of jurisdiction, should be distinguished from a genuine non-privative clause decision. The court noted that the Migration Act specifically defines "migration decision" and includes "purported privative clause decisions" but does not include purported non-privative clause decisions. The court concluded that Parliament intended for these two types of decisions to be treated differently, thus impacting the court’s jurisdiction. This interpretation was supported by the legislative context and the principle that decisions involving jurisdictional error are void.

The court held that a decision purportedly made under section 252 of the Migration Act but vitiated by jurisdictional error or excess of jurisdiction is not a non-privative clause decision for the purposes of judicial review. Consequently, such a decision could still be subject to judicial review under section 39B of the Judiciary Act, even if it was not explicitly included in the definition of "migration decision" under the Migration Act.

Decision

Reasons for decision

A dilemma arises, however, in classifying a decision that is purportedly made under the Migration Act, where that decision would be a non-privative clause decision if made, but, on account of a failure to exercise jurisdiction or an excess of jurisdiction, was not made. Specifically, how is a decision purportedly made under s 252 of the Migration Act but vitiated on account of jurisdictional error to be regarded in this particular legislative scheme? If there is a relevant difference between a decision made under s 252 (a non-privative clause decision) and a decision purportedly made under s 252 but not made because it is vitiated by jurisdictional error or excess of jurisdiction (purported non-privative clause decision), then this Court’s jurisdiction under s 39B of the Judiciary Act in a matter arising under s 252 of the Migration Act is not diminished by s 476A(1) in respect of a purported non-privative clause decision. This is because a purported non-privative clause decision is neither a “migration decision” (as defined) nor a decision “in relation to a migration decision”. It cannot be construed as “in relation to” a migration decision because no migration decision was ever made. Further, the fact that the Parliament has chosen only to extend the meaning of the expression “migration decision” to embrace a “purported privative clause decision” indicates that it did not intend that expression to extend to a purported non-privative clause decision. As explained below, it seems to me that, properly construed, this legislative scheme operates on the assumption that a non-privative clause decision and a purported non-privative clause decision are relevantly different and that the definition of “migration decision” in s 5(1) of the Migration Act is not intended to include a purported non-privative clause decision. In construing any legislation, the primary focus is the language used in the text of the provisions, acknowledging that the meaning of the text may, and often will, require consideration of the context, including the purpose and policy of a provision: see Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (Northern Territory) [2009] HCA 41; 239 CLR 27 at [47]. The ascertainment of purpose and policy may sometimes be assisted by reference to the history of a provision and relevant extrinsic materials. In this particular statutory context, the Parliament recognised the significance of the distinction between a decision made in exercise of statutory power and a decision only purporting to be made in exercise of statutory power. This much is evident from the definitions of a “privative clause decision” in ss 5(1) and 474(2) and a “purported privative clause decision” in s 5E(1) of the Migration Act, as well as the use of these expressions in defining a “migration decision” for the purposes of the Migration Act: see s 5(1). Parliamentary recognition of the importance of the distinction between a decision actually made in exercise of a statutory power and a decision purporting to be, though not, made in exercise of the power conforms with the general principle, affirmed by the plurality in Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth [2003] HCA 2; 211 CLR 476 (Plaintiff S157) at [76], that “ an administrative decision which involves jurisdictional error is ‘regarded, in law, as no decision at all’”, citing Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj [2002] HCA 11; 209 CLR 597 at [51], [63] and [152]. The principle is well-established and has general application, with the consequence that the High Court has applied the principle in construing the provisions of State legislation governing the jurisdiction of a State decision-making body: see Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW) [2010] HCA 1; 239 CLR 531 at [104]-[105].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Section 5(1), being an interpretation section, provides in part as follows: In this Act, unless the contrary intention appears: AAT Act migration decision: see section 474A.…migration decision means: (a) a privative clause decision; or (b) a purported privative clause decision; or (c) a non-privative clause decision; or (d) an AAT Act migration decision. …non-privative clause decision has the meaning given by subsection 474(6).…privative clause decision has the meaning given by subsection 474(2). Section 5E provides as follows:Meaning of purported privative clause decision (1)In this Act, purported privative clause decision means a decision purportedly made, proposed to be made, or required to be made, under this Act or under a regulation or other instrument made under this Act (whether in purported exercise of a discretion or not), that would be a privative clause decision if there were not: (a) a failure to exercise jurisdiction; or (b) an excess of jurisdiction; in the making of the decision. (2) In this section, decision includes anything listed in subsection 474(3). Part 8 Division 1 of the Migration Act contains within it one section, s 474. It provides as follows:Part 8—Judicial reviewDivision 1—Privative clause474 Decisions under Act are final (1) A privative clause decision: (a) is final and conclusive; and (b)must not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called in question in any court; and (c) is not subject to prohibition, mandamus, injunction, declaration or certiorari in any court on any account. (2) In this section: privative clause decision means a decision of an administrative character made, proposed to be made, or required to be made, as the case may be, under this Act or under a regulation or other instrument made under this Act (whether in the exercise of a discretion or not), other than a decision referred to in subsection (4) or (5). (3)A reference in this section to a decision includes a reference to the following: (a)granting, making, varying, suspending, cancelling, revoking or refusing to make an order or determination; (b)granting, giving, suspending, cancelling, revoking or refusing to give a certificate, direction, approval, consent or permission (including a visa); (c)granting, issuing, suspending, cancelling, revoking or refusing to issue an authority or other instrument; (d) imposing, or refusing to remove, a condition or restriction; (e)making or revoking, or refusing to make or revoke, a declaration, demand or requirement; (f) retaining, or refusing to deliver up, an article; (g) doing or refusing to do any other act or thing; (h)conduct preparatory to the making of a decision, including the taking of evidence or the holding of an inquiry or investigation; (i)a decision on review of a decision, irrespective of whether the decision on review is taken under this Act or a regulation or other instrument under this Act, or under another Act; (j) a failure or refusal to make a decision. (4)For the purposes of subsection (2), a decision under a provision, or under a regulation or other instrument made under a provision, set out in the following table is not a privative clause decision:(5)The regulations may specify that a decision, or a decision included in a class of decisions, under this Act, or under regulations or another instrument under this Act, is not a privative clause decision. (6)A decision mentioned in subsection 474(4), or specified (whether by reference to a particular decision or a class of decisions) in regulations made under subsection 474(5), is a non-privative clause decision. (7)To avoid doubt, the following decisions are privative clause decisions within the meaning of subsection 474(2): (a)a decision of the Minister not to exercise, or not to consider the exercise, of the Minister’s power under subsection 37A(2) or (3), section 48B, paragraph 72(1)(c), section 91F, 91L, 91Q, 195A, 197AB, 197AD, 198AE, 351 or 417 or subsection 503A(3); (d)a decision of the Minister under Division 13A of Part 2 to order that a thing is not to be condemned as forfeited.