SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Flying Fighters Pty Ltd v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2019] QSC 120
PARTIES:
FLYING FIGHTERS PTY LTD (ACN 067 895 005) (RECEIVERS AND MANAGERS APPOINTED) AS TRUSTEE FOR THE FLYING FIGHTERS DISCRETIONARY TRUST
(Applicant)
v
OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY(First Respondent)
AND
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
(Second Respondent)AND
NIGEL MARKEY
(Third Respondent)AND
ANN FORDYCE
(Fourth Respondent)BS No 4275 of 2018
DIVISION:
Trial Division
PROCEEDING:
Trial
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court at Brisbane
DELIVERED ON:
10 May 2019
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
15 June 2018; Further submissions received 9 July 2018 and 13 August 2018
JUDGE:
Brown J
ORDER:
The order of the Court is that:
1. The appointment of the third and fourth respondents as receivers pursuant to the Merrell charge was invalid pursuant to s 418A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).
2. I will hear the parties as to costs and as to any further relief, particularly given Flying Fighters only raised the argument upon which it was successful on the day of hearing.
3. Such submissions should be made within 14 days of the Order made.
CATCHWORDS:
PROPERTY – CHARGE – MERGER AND EXTINGUISHMENT – whether merger of interests as result of forfeiture of aircraft and charge to Commonwealth under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth)
ESTOPPEL – ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT – ISSUE ESTOPPEL – GENERAL PRINCIPLES – whether issue estoppel arising out of earlier proceedings
ESTOPPEL – ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT – ANSHUN ESTOPPEL – GENERALLY – whether Anshun estoppel arising out of earlier proceedings
MORTGAGE-DEBENTURE – RECEIVERS – APPOINTMENT – where the third and fourth respondents were appointed as receivers at the instigation of the Official Trustee in Bankruptcy in respect of aircraft under a charge over the aircraft which had alongside the legal estate in the aircraft been forfeited to the Commonwealth under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth) – whether appointment of receivers valid
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS – LIMITATION OF PARTICULAR ACTIONS – MORTGAGES AND CHARGES – whether appointment of receivers under the charge statute-barred
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 418A
Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld), s 26(1)
Proceeds of Crime Act2002 (Cth) s 92, s 96, s 99, s 100, s 102, s 104, s 141, s 338
Property Law Act 1974 (Qld), s 17AD v Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police (2018) 97 NSWLR 588, cited
Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Douglas Morris Investments Pty Ltd [1992] 1 Qd R 478, followed
Australian Energy Ltd v Lennard Oil NL (No 2) [1988] 2 Qd R 230, cited
Batistatos vRoads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales (2006) 226 CLR 256, cited
Bofinger v Kingsway Group Ltd (2009) 239 CLR 269, considered
CDPP v Hart & Ors; Yak 3 Investments P/L as t/tee for Yak 3 Discretionary Trust & Ors v Commonwealth of Australia [2013] QDC 60, considered
Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Hart; Commonwealth of Australia v Yak 3 Investments Pty…
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- Case
- [2019] QSC 120
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court held that the appointment of receivers was invalid pursuant to s 418A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The Court found that the doctrine of merger did not apply as the interests vested in the Commonwealth absolutely upon forfeiture, extinguishing the security interest under the charge. The Court also held that neither issue estoppel nor Anshun estoppel arose out of earlier proceedings. The Court further held that the appointment of receivers was not statute-barred.
The order of the Court was that the appointment of the third and fourth respondents as receivers was invalid pursuant to s 418A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The Court will hear the parties as to costs and any further relief, with submissions to be made within 14 days of the Order made.
Orders
Orders of the court
The order of the Court is that:
1. The appointment of the third and fourth respondents as receivers pursuant to the Merrell charge was invalid pursuant to s 418A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).
2. I will hear the parties as to costs and as to any further relief, particularly given Flying Fighters only raised the argument upon which it was successful on the day of hearing.
3. Such submissions should be made within 14 days of the Order made.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Flying Fighters further contends that as s 92 operates automatically the parties’ intentions as to the merger or otherwise of their legal or equitable interests upon forfeiture are irrelevant. It also contends that equity would not apply, given the forfeiture operated automatically. It therefore contends that the presumption at law that a merger has occurred would apply.Consideration Upon forfeiture there was a coincidence of interests that vested in the Commonwealth absolutely pursuant to s 96 of the POCA, such that the doctrine of merger could apply to extinguish the lesser interest, in this case, the security interest under the charge. A merger may occur when the two estates which are supposed to coalesce become vested in the same person at the same time and in the same right.[48] At common law merger occurred by operation of law and, according to Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity Doctrines and Remedies, where a person entitled to land acquires a charge over it, extinguishment is presumed irrespective of the parties’ intentions unless the party acquiring the property acquires them in different capacities.[49] [48] In this case, which involves interests such as charges which are collateral to an interest or estate in that they issue out of or depend on the relevant interest in the estate, the outcome is more aptly described as “extinguishment” than “merger”. Extinguishment concerns the sinking of an interest collateral to an interest or estate: JD Heydon, MJ Leeming and PG Turner, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity Doctrines and Remedies (2015) 5th Ed, LexisNexis Butterworths. For ease of reference and given the parties did not make such a distinction, the judgment will refer to merger.[49] JD Heydon, MJ Leeming and PG Turner, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity Doctrines and Remedies (2015) 5th Ed, LexisNexis Butterworths at 41-115. In equity, however, merger was a matter of the intentions of the parties such that it did not occur unless intended by the person who acquired the two estates.[50] If no intention is expressed the court considers what is most advantageous for the person acquiring the interest and orders accordingly.[51] The Court would presume that the security would be kept alive if it was for the benefit of the acquirer of the interest.[52] According to Bryson J in Sandhurst Trustees Ltd v 72 Seventh Street Nominees Pty Ltd (In Liq):[53]“Equity prevented accidental or unintended results from mergers by treating interests which merged at law as still subsisting.” [50] Capital and Counties Bank Ltd v Rhodes [1903] 1 Ch 631 at 652-653, per Cozens-Hardy LJ.[51] Thorne v Cann [1895] AC 11 at 19. Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity Doctrines and Remedies at 41-115.[52] Swinfen v Swinfen (No 3) (1860) 29 Beav 199.[53] (1998) 45 NSWLR 556 at 566. It has been held that that there is no reason or principle for adopting a different approach to the existence of basic rules of equity in the construction of statutes than that which is adopted in respect of basic principles of common law in that context.[54] A statute is to be read as operating harmoniously with those principles unless the statute makes it clear that Parliament intended to derogate from those principles.[54] Minister for Lands and Forests & Anor v McPherson & Anor (1991) 22 NSWLR 687 at 700 per Kirby P; See also Williams v Wreck Bay Aboriginal Community Council (2019) 93 ALJR 279 at [71]-[72] and [75].