Flying Fighters Pty Ltd v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Flying Fighters Pty Ltd v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2019] QSC 120

PARTIES:

FLYING FIGHTERS PTY LTD (ACN 067 895 005) (RECEIVERS AND MANAGERS APPOINTED) AS TRUSTEE FOR THE FLYING FIGHTERS DISCRETIONARY TRUST

(Applicant)

v
OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY

(First Respondent)

AND

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
(Second Respondent)

AND

NIGEL MARKEY
(Third Respondent)

AND

ANN FORDYCE
(Fourth Respondent)

BS No 4275 of 2018

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Trial

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

10 May 2019

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

15 June 2018; Further submissions received 9 July 2018 and 13 August 2018

JUDGE:

Brown J

ORDER:

The order of the Court is that:

1. The appointment of the third and fourth respondents as receivers pursuant to the Merrell charge was invalid pursuant to s 418A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).

2.   I will hear the parties as to costs and as to any further relief, particularly given Flying Fighters only raised the argument upon which it was successful on the day of hearing.

3.   Such submissions should be made within 14 days of the Order made.

CATCHWORDS:

PROPERTY – CHARGE – MERGER AND EXTINGUISHMENT – whether merger of interests as result of forfeiture of aircraft and charge to Commonwealth under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth)

ESTOPPEL – ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT – ISSUE ESTOPPEL – GENERAL PRINCIPLES – whether issue estoppel arising out of earlier proceedings

ESTOPPEL – ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT – ANSHUN ESTOPPEL – GENERALLY – whether Anshun estoppel arising out of earlier proceedings

MORTGAGE-DEBENTURE – RECEIVERS – APPOINTMENT – where the third and fourth respondents were appointed as receivers at the instigation of the Official Trustee in Bankruptcy in respect of aircraft under a charge over the aircraft which had alongside the legal estate in the aircraft been forfeited to the Commonwealth under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth) – whether appointment of receivers valid

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS – LIMITATION OF PARTICULAR ACTIONS – MORTGAGES AND CHARGES – whether appointment of receivers under the charge statute-barred

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 418A
Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld), s 26(1)
Proceeds of Crime Act2002 (Cth) s 92, s 96, s 99, s 100, s 102, s 104, s 141, s 338
Property Law Act 1974 (Qld), s 17

AD v Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police (2018) 97 NSWLR 588, cited
Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Douglas Morris Investments Pty Ltd [1992] 1 Qd R 478, followed
Australian Energy Ltd v Lennard Oil NL (No 2) [1988] 2 Qd R 230, cited
Batistatos vRoads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales (2006) 226 CLR 256, cited
Bofinger v Kingsway Group Ltd (2009) 239 CLR 269, considered
CDPP v Hart & Ors; Yak 3 Investments P/L as t/tee for Yak 3 Discretionary Trust & Ors v Commonwealth of Australia [2013] QDC 60, considered
Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Hart; Commonwealth of Australia v Yak 3 Investments Pty…

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Details
Case
[2019] QSC 120
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Flying Fighters Pty Ltd sought to challenge the appointment of receivers by the Official Trustee in Bankruptcy, who exercised powers under a charge that had been forfeited to the Commonwealth under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth). The Federal Court of Australia was required to decide whether the merger of interests occurred as a result of the forfeiture of the aircraft and the charge to the Commonwealth. The Court was also required to determine whether issue estoppel or Anshun estoppel arose out of earlier proceedings and whether the appointment of receivers was valid and not statute-barred.

The Court held that the appointment of receivers was invalid pursuant to s 418A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The Court found that the doctrine of merger did not apply as the interests vested in the Commonwealth absolutely upon forfeiture, extinguishing the security interest under the charge. The Court also held that neither issue estoppel nor Anshun estoppel arose out of earlier proceedings. The Court further held that the appointment of receivers was not statute-barred.

The order of the Court was that the appointment of the third and fourth respondents as receivers was invalid pursuant to s 418A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The Court will hear the parties as to costs and any further relief, with submissions to be made within 14 days of the Order made.

Orders

Orders of the court

The order of the Court is that:

1. The appointment of the third and fourth respondents as receivers pursuant to the Merrell charge was invalid pursuant to s 418A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).

2. I will hear the parties as to costs and as to any further relief, particularly given Flying Fighters only raised the argument upon which it was successful on the day of hearing.

3. Such submissions should be made within 14 days of the Order made.

Background

Background to the litigation

Flying Fighters Pty Ltd[1] seeks to challenge the appointment of receivers by the Official Trustee in Bankruptcy exercising powers under a charge which was forfeited to the Commonwealth. This application follows what has already been prolonged and hard fought litigation. To understand the application it is necessary to provide some background.[1] Throughout this judgment, the applicant will be referred to as ‘Flying Fighters’ in relation to the period both before and after the appointment of the receivers.Background Flying Fighters owned two aircraft, Aerovod L-39C with registration VH-SIC and Akrotech CAP 232 with registration VH-SHI. Merrell Associates Ltd (‘Merrell’) held a charge over the aircraft. Mr Steven Hart was charged with a number of offences under the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) and Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) as a result of operating a systematic tax fraud. In 2003, the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (“CDPP”) obtained orders under the Proceeds of Crime Act2002 (Cth) (“the POCA”) restraining a number of assets owned or leased by Mr Hart or the companies believed to be under the effective control of Mr Hart pursuant to s 17 of the POCA. The charge in favour of Merrell was also the subject of the Restraining Order. In May 2005, Mr Hart was convicted of nine counts of defrauding the Commonwealth. On 18 April 2006, the property which was the subject of the Restraining Order was automatically forfeited to the Commonwealth pursuant to s 92 of the POCA. The property forfeited included the aircraft and the Merrell charge to which they were subject. Under s 96 of the POCA, the forfeited property “vests absolutely in the Commonwealth”. Notwithstanding that, provision is made under s 104 of the POCA for a party to make an application for a declaration of the nature, value and extent of their interest and the transfer of that interest or its monetary equivalent under s 102 of the POCA, if the party can satisfy the Court of the statutory preconditions. On 17 October 2006, an application was made seeking orders under s 102 of the POCA by five companies (referred to as the Hart companies), including Flying Fighters, in respect of various property forfeited to the Commonwealth including the aircraft. Some of the property claimed by the other Hart companies was also the subject of Merrell charges.[2] In particular, one of the Hart companies, Nemesis Australia Ltd, owned real property at Merriwa St which was forfeited to the Commonwealth. Merriwa St was subject to a charge held by Merrell and a mortgage held by Countrywide Co-Operative Housing Ltd. It was sold by the Official Trustee on 8 January 2007. [2] It is uncontroversial that the charges held by Merrell in respect of the forfeited property were substantively in the same terms. On 30 November 2010, a pecuniary penalty order was made against Mr Hart in the total sum of $14,757,287. The Commonwealth made an application that pursuant to s 141 of the POCA, the property sought under s 102 of the POCA should be made available to satisfy a pecuniary penalty order made against Mr Hart on 19 November 2010. That application was determined at the same time as the application for orders under s 102 by the Hart Companies.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

His Honour dismissed the Commonwealth’s application under s 141 of the POCA. Court of Appeal decision Both the Commonwealth and the Hart companies, including Flying Fighters, appealed the decision at first instance. Ground 2A and 2B of Flying Fighters’ Further Amended Notice of Appeal[18] provided that:“2A The primary judge erred in finding that the value of the appellants’ interest in the assets the subject of the application was diminished by reason of the charges in favour of Merrell.2B The primary judge ought to have found that by reason of the forfeiture of the charges to the Commonwealth, such charges ceased to have effect.”[18] Further Amended Notice of Appeal, CA3908/13. The majority judgment was given by P Lyons J, with whom Douglas J concurred.[19] Morrison JA gave a dissenting judgment. Morrison JA did not consider the position of the charges post-forfeiture on the basis that the exercise required under s 102 of the POCA only required a consideration of the value of the applicant’s interest pre-forfeiture.[20] P Lyons J upheld the finding of the learned primary Judge that the interest of Flying Fighters in the aircraft L-39C and CAP 232 was not derived from unlawful activity.[21] P Lyons J stated that the proceedings before the Judge at first instance were conducted on “the basis that the assets forfeited on 18 April 2006 were (no doubt until forfeiture) subject to charges to Merrell; and that each charge provided security for the total amount of the debt owed to Merrell”.[22] [19] Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Hart; Flying Fighters Pty Ltd v Commonwealth; Commonwealth v YAK 3 Investments Pty Ltd (2016) 336 ALR 492.[20] Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Hart; Flying Fighters Pty Ltd v Commonwealth; Commonwealth v YAK 3 Investments Pty Ltd (2016) 336 ALR 492 at [236]-[237].[21] At [1056] and [1093].[22] At [1231]. A number of the findings made at first instance were not challenged upon appeal. P Lyons J stated at [1232] that: “The Merrell charges were also forfeited to the Commonwealth on 18 April 2006. The learned primary Judge concluded that Merrell’s rights as creditor and its rights as chargee were separate rights; and that its loss of a charge over an asset owned by one of the Hart companies did not result in the loss of its right to sue the company for payment of the debt secured by that charge. His Honour also concluded, in respect of the mortgage debenture granted by Fighters to Merrell, that its forfeiture did not invest the Commonwealth with Merrell’s rights against Fighters for the payment of money. His Honour also concluded that he did not accept that the Commonwealth “has received Merrell’s right to sue for the amount owed by the (Hart) ‘companies’ to Merrell”. Again, these findings are not in issue in the appeals.” (footnotes omitted) P Lyons J stated that since the property had been forfeited to the Commonwealth, s 102 of the POCA must require a declaration of the applicant’s interest immediately prior to forfeiture. His Honour stated in that regard that he could not clearly identify the purpose the learned primary Judge had in mind when dealing with the sum of $1.6 million.[23] His Honour stated that while each asset was the subject of a charge, he considered that did not affect the nature of the interest of the Hart companies in any relevant asset on the basis that, until the secured creditor exercises the rights under a charge, the rights of the owner of the asset are generally not affected.[24][23] At [1241].[24] At [1242]-[1243].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Flying Fighters further contends that as s 92 operates automatically the parties’ intentions as to the merger or otherwise of their legal or equitable interests upon forfeiture are irrelevant. It also contends that equity would not apply, given the forfeiture operated automatically. It therefore contends that the presumption at law that a merger has occurred would apply.Consideration Upon forfeiture there was a coincidence of interests that vested in the Commonwealth absolutely pursuant to s 96 of the POCA, such that the doctrine of merger could apply to extinguish the lesser interest, in this case, the security interest under the charge. A merger may occur when the two estates which are supposed to coalesce become vested in the same person at the same time and in the same right.[48] At common law merger occurred by operation of law and, according to Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity Doctrines and Remedies, where a person entitled to land acquires a charge over it, extinguishment is presumed irrespective of the parties’ intentions unless the party acquiring the property acquires them in different capacities.[49] [48] In this case, which involves interests such as charges which are collateral to an interest or estate in that they issue out of or depend on the relevant interest in the estate, the outcome is more aptly described as “extinguishment” than “merger”. Extinguishment concerns the sinking of an interest collateral to an interest or estate: JD Heydon, MJ Leeming and PG Turner, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity Doctrines and Remedies (2015) 5th Ed, LexisNexis Butterworths. For ease of reference and given the parties did not make such a distinction, the judgment will refer to merger.[49] JD Heydon, MJ Leeming and PG Turner, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity Doctrines and Remedies (2015) 5th Ed, LexisNexis Butterworths at 41-115. In equity, however, merger was a matter of the intentions of the parties such that it did not occur unless intended by the person who acquired the two estates.[50] If no intention is expressed the court considers what is most advantageous for the person acquiring the interest and orders accordingly.[51] The Court would presume that the security would be kept alive if it was for the benefit of the acquirer of the interest.[52] According to Bryson J in Sandhurst Trustees Ltd v 72 Seventh Street Nominees Pty Ltd (In Liq):[53]“Equity prevented accidental or unintended results from mergers by treating interests which merged at law as still subsisting.” [50] Capital and Counties Bank Ltd v Rhodes [1903] 1 Ch 631 at 652-653, per Cozens-Hardy LJ.[51] Thorne v Cann [1895] AC 11 at 19. Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity Doctrines and Remedies at 41-115.[52] Swinfen v Swinfen (No 3) (1860) 29 Beav 199.[53] (1998) 45 NSWLR 556 at 566. It has been held that that there is no reason or principle for adopting a different approach to the existence of basic rules of equity in the construction of statutes than that which is adopted in respect of basic principles of common law in that context.[54] A statute is to be read as operating harmoniously with those principles unless the statute makes it clear that Parliament intended to derogate from those principles.[54] Minister for Lands and Forests & Anor v McPherson & Anor (1991) 22 NSWLR 687 at 700 per Kirby P; See also Williams v Wreck Bay Aboriginal Community Council (2019) 93 ALJR 279 at [71]-[72] and [75].