SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Appeals to a Single Judge: Permission to Appeal)
HU v DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
[2017] SASC 46
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Bampton
30 March 2017
CRIMINAL LAW - PROCEDURE - CONFISCATION OF PROCEEDS OF CRIME AND RELATED MATTERS - RESTRAINING OR FREEZING ORDER - WHAT PROPERTY
Mr and Ms Hu owned property at Toorak Gardens as joint tenants. Mrs Hu transferred her interest to Mr Hu in October 2015, for consideration expressed to be “Nil. Love and affection”. Mrs Hu is alleged to have committed serious drug offending in December 2015. On the application of the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Chief Judge made a restraining order pursuant to s 24 of the Criminal Assets Confiscation Act 2005 (SA) (the Act) ordering that Mr and Mrs Hu’s interests in the property and a Honda sedan must not be disposed of or otherwise dealt with by any person.
Mr Hu sought permission to appeal the Chief Judge’s order – whether the Court had the power to make the restraining order – whether the property was subject to the effective control of Mrs Hu pursuant to s 24(5)(a)(ii)(A) of the Act – whether Mr Hu’s interest should be excluded from the restraining order.
HELD:
1. Permission to appeal granted.
2. The Court was empowered to make the restraining order as the interest transferred to Mr Hu was still subject to the effective control of Mrs Hu pursuant to s 6(1)(d) of the Act.
3. Appeal allowed for the purposes of varying the order of the Chief Judge pursuant to s 40 of the Act to exclude Mr Hu’s interest in the property from the restraining order.
Criminal Assets Confiscation Act 2005 (SA) s 3, s 6, s 24, s 26, s 34, s 76, s 78; Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) r 288(1)(a)(ii); Controlled Substances Act 1984 (SA) s 32(3), referred to.
DPP v Le (2007) 15 VR 352; DPP (Vic) v Le (2007) 232 CLR 562, applied.
HU v DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
[2017] SASC 46Appeal to a single Judge
BAMPTON J: Dada Hu’s wife, Gian Hue Hu, is charged on a Magistrates Court Information dated 3 February 2016 with five counts of trafficking contrary to s 32(3) of the Controlled Substances Act 1984 (SA). Counts 1 and 2 are alleged to have been committed at Kilkenny on 10 December 2015 and counts 3, 4 and 5 are alleged to have been committed at Norwood on 11 December 2015.
The Hus married on 8 September 1990. On 30 September 1997, Mr and Mrs Hu purchased land described as the whole of the land comprised in Certificate of Title Register Book Volume 1189 Folio 27 (“the property”). By reference to the memorandum of transfer registered on 30 September 1997, Mr and Mrs Hu are recorded as the transferees holding the property as joint tenants.
On 22 October 2015, Mrs Hu transferred her interest in the property to Mr Hu with the consideration…
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- Case
- [2017] SASC 46
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues in this case revolved around the interpretation of the Criminal Assets Confiscation Act 2005 and the specific wording of the restraining order. Mr Hu argued that the restraining order should not apply to his interest in the property because he did not hold the same interest that Mrs Hu had before the transfer. He contended that the restraining order could only apply if the property in question was subject to Mrs Hu's effective control, which was not the case with his interest as a joint tenant. Furthermore, Mr Hu asserted that the restraining order should be limited to the interest that Mrs Hu held before the transfer, rather than his entire interest in the property.
The court found in favour of Mr Hu, concluding that the restraining order should only apply to the interest in the property arguably held on trust for Mrs Hu by virtue of the operation of section 6(1)(d) of the Act. The court held that Mr Hu's interest in the property was not the same as the interest held by Mrs Hu before the transfer, and therefore, the restraining order should be limited to the interest that Mrs Hu held. The court allowed the appeal and varied the order of the Chief Judge to exclude Mr Hu's interest in the property at 128 Kensington Road, Toorak Gardens, from the restraining order. The court also noted that further hearings would be required to determine if a declaration regarding the nature of Mr Hu's interest was necessary.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Section 3 of the Act defines sufficient consideration as follows:sufficient consideration, in relation to an acquisition or disposal of property, means consideration that is sufficient and that reflects the value of the property, having regard solely to commercial considerations; Mr Hu concedes that, in accordance with s 6(1)(d), Mrs Hu could be deemed to have effective control over the property as she initially owned the property and the property was disposed of to him for the insufficient consideration of “love and affection” within six years of the application being made. Mr Hu contends that an application:·relying on the deemed effective control of a suspect over property pursuant to s (6)(1)(d) of the Act, and ·identifying the specified property to be restrained as his interest in the land,could only be successful if the interest which he held at the time the application was made was the same interest that had been held by Mrs Hu before the transfer. Mr Hu explains that if Mrs Hu had owned the land as sole proprietor and then transferred it to him as sole proprietor, an order could have been made that his interest not be disposed of or otherwise dealt with, because his interest was the same as the interest which was transferred. In this matter, he argues that, as he and Mrs Hu had been joint tenants, what was transferred to him was in effect only a part interest in the property. Mr Hu submits that the Director specified the property in the application as Mr Hu’s interest as a sole proprietor gained after the transfer. He argues this is an interest which is not and never has been subject to the effective control of Mrs Hu, who only ever possessed an interest in the land as a joint tenant and never had ownership as a sole proprietor of the estate in fee simple. Mr Hu contends that the Court could not therefore be satisfied that there were “reasonable grounds” under s 24(5)(a)(ii)(A) of the Act to suspect that the specified property, being Mr Hu’s interest as a sole proprietor, was subject to Mrs Hu’s effective control. The effective control of Mrs Hu under s (6)(1)(d) of the Act is required to enliven the Court’s power to specify property and make a restraining order. Without reasonable grounds to suspect Mrs Hu’s effective control over Mr Hu’s interest in the property, a restraining order could not be made. At best, Mr Hu asserts, the deeming provision in s 6(1)(d) can deem Mrs Hu to have effective control over her previous interest as a joint tenant, but no more than that. Mr Hu argues that the Chief Judge was incorrect in finding that he did not need to determine if the whole of the defendant’s interest was capable of being restrained. The Chief Judge needed to be satisfied that the whole of the interest could be restrained before he could make an order in those terms, but, on Mr Hu’s argument, he could not be satisfied of that because Mrs Hu did not have effective control of the property. The specified property Mr Hu concedes that pursuant to the definition in s 3, “property” can mean both land and an interest in land for the purposes of s 24(1), s 24(2) and s 6(1)(d). He says, however, that whether it refers to the land itself or the interest in a restraining order depends on how it is defined in the application. The Director’s choice to identify the specified property in the application as an interest in the land means it must also be so defined in the context of s 6(1)(d). Mr Hu suggests that had the application specified the property as being the land itself as opposed to Mr Hu’s interest in the land, it is possible an order could have been sought effectively. However, by specifying the property as the defendants’ interest in the application, the order sought could not be validly made. The consequences of the order