Aldridge v The Registrar of Firearms - [2022] SASC 5

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Appeal to a Single Judge)
ALDRIDGE v THE REGISTRAR OF FIREARMS
[2022] SASC 5
Judgment of the Honourable Justice Parker
20 January 2022
FIRE, EXPLOSIVES AND FIREARMS - EXPLOSIVES
FIRE, EXPLOSIVES AND FIREARMS - FIREARMS - LICENSING AND REGISTRATION - APPLICATION FOR LICENCE OR PERMIT - FIT AND PROPER PERSON
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS - SOUTH AUSTRALIAN CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
Application for an extension of time and permission to appeal a decision of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal.
On 12 June 2020, the applicant was notified by the delegate of the respondent that his firearms licence was cancelled on grounds that the respondent was not satisfied that he was a fit and proper person to hold a firearms licence. The cancellation followed a period of licence suspension while criminal charges arising from events occurring late in the evening on 1 January 2017 and into the early hours of 2 January 2017 were pending. Those charges were later withdrawn.
The applicant applied for review of the delegate's decision pursuant to s 34 of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA) (SACAT Act) and s 47 of the Firearms Act 2015 (SA). Prior to the hearing, the parties provided documentary evidence, video footage of the incidents occurring in January 2017 and written submissions. The review hearing was conducted across two days before the Tribunal during which the applicant and his wife gave oral evidence in support of the application. On 3 November 2020, publishing written reasons, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate's decision.
On 24 December 2020, the applicant filed a Notice of Appeal in the Supreme Court pursuant to s 71 (1)(b) of the SACAT Act advancing 8 lengthy grounds of appeal pleading that, inter alia, the Tribunal member erred in her exercise of discretion by committing various errors in process and outcome. Amongst the errors identified, the applicant pleads the Tribunal erred in considering further material not considered by the delegate and by failing to review the delegate's decision according to law. As the Notice of Appeal was filed 20 days out of time, the Applicant also applies for an extension of time in which to file the appeal on the basis that he was impacted by covid restrictions, amongst other matters.
Held, per Parker J, in granting permission to appeal:
1. The extension of time in which to file the appeal is granted.
2. The appeal is otherwise dismissed. The Tribunal member did not err in either process or outcome in her decision to affirm the decision of the delegate of the Registrar to cancel the applicant's firearms licence.
Firearms Act 2015 (SA) s 3(1)(a), 4(a), 7, 15(1)(b), 20(6); Serious and Organised Crime (Control) Act 2008 (SA); South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA) s 8(1)(f), 34, 35(2), 39(1)(b), 39(1)(c), 70, 71(2), 71(3b), 71(4); South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014 Rules 73 and 74; Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) 217.10, 218.17, referred to.
Jackson v Lepp Investments (2016) 125 SASR 1; Pix v South Australian Housing Trust (2016) 125 SASR 10; Re AKS [2016] SACAT 19, applied.
Banks v Transport Regulation Board (Vic) (1968) 119 CLR 222; Fox v Perry (2003) 214 CLR 118; Heatley v Tasmanian Racing and Gaming Commission (1977) 137 CLR 487; House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; Legal Professional Conduct Commissioner v Fowler [2020] SASCFC 65; Police v Losapio [2007] SASC 112; Police v Chilton (2014) 120 SASR 32; R v Gaming Board for Great Britain; Ex parte Benaim and Khaida [1970] 2 QB 417; R v Lutze (2014) 121 SASR 144; Registrar of Firearms v Gitsham (2002) 84 SASR 72; Schinckel v Registrar of Firearms [2020] SASC 236; Varricchio v Wentzel (2016) 125 SASR 191, considered.

ALDRIDGE v THE REGISTRAR OF FIREARMS
[2022] SASC 5
Miscellaneous Appeal: Civil

PARKER J: This is an application for permission to appeal under s 71 of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA) (the SACAT Act) against a decision by a member of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (SACAT) to affirm the decision by a delegate of the Registrar of Firearms (the Registrar) to cancel the applicant’s firearms licence pursuant to s 20(6) of the Firearms Act 2015 (SA).
Background
On 12 June 2020, the applicant was notified by the Registrar that his firearms licence was cancelled on the ground that he was not satisfied that the applicant was a fit and proper person to hold a licence. The cancellation followed a period of licence suspension while criminal charges arising from events on 1 January and 2 January 2017 were pending. Those charges were later withdrawn.
The events which gave rise to the suspension, and ultimately the cancellation of the applicant’s licence, relate to two incidents which occurred late in the evening of 1 January 2017 and in the early hours of 2 January 2017. The first incident occurred when the applicant confronted a group of people who were doing “burnouts” and setting off fireworks in the vicinity of his home at around 10 pm. The applicant, accompanied by a friend, Dave Cook, drove to a nearby intersection to confront the group. It was alleged that the applicant was armed with an extendable baton[1] and knife. However, he has denied carrying a knife.
[1] This item was referred to in evidence before SACAT as a “night stick”. The Macquarie Dictionary confirms my long-held understanding that a nightstick is the term used in the United States for “a heavy stick or long club carried by police”.
The second incident occurred at around 1:30 am on 2 January 2017 after a group began setting off fireworks in the driveway of the applicant’s home. The applicant again got in his car and drove towards the group. They drove off doing a “burnout” and the applicant pursued them. It is not disputed that following this incident the applicant was assaulted and his vehicle damaged by some of those present.
The applicant sought a review of the delegate’s decision in the review jurisdiction of SACAT. Prior to the hearing, the parties provided documentary evidence, video footage and written submissions. At the hearing, the applicant gave oral evidence, as did Ms Helen Hoare, who was at that time married to the applicant. The member published written reasons affirming the delegate’s decision.
Grounds of appeal
The applicant has sought permission to appeal on the following eight grounds:[2]
[2] There is no ground 8.
(1)The Tribunal allowed additional material not considered by the Registrar in consideration namely;
(a)     Additional video material that was not before the decision maker and in any event was not in the registrar of Firearms reasons for the original decision.
(b)     Unsubstantiated written statements, hearsay and assumptions;
(i)That the applicant carried a knife, and that history proves he has carried a knife.
(ii)That the applicant took the law into his own hands rather than request police attendance.
(iii)Filed documents and notes, from supposed witnesses unavailable for cross examination.
(iv)That the applicant when referring to a person named Bear, was referring to Robert Cameron.
(v)Various documents from an action against the applicant that was withdrawn.
(2)The proceedings miscarried as it was not review of the original decision by the original decision maker, namely the Registrar of Firearms.
(3)The Tribunal has erred in the decision by placing too much weight on;
(a)     Conversations made in private in frustration and fear by the applicant
(b)     Old criminal convictions and or polices notes, namely
(i)Alleged actions dating back to 1991
(ii)Unsubstantiated comments from an action dating back to 1997 (All were acceptable to the registrar when granting the applicant firearms licence every year up until 2017)
(4)The alleged association with a Motorcycle club member Bear.
(a)     There was insufficient evidence to show the person was a Gypsy joker at the time or that any formal association ever existed.
(5)Extensive Hearsay evidence was filed namely;
(a)     Audio Video which contained mere hearsay, from Channel 7 where people with blanked out faces made statements.
(b)     Video evidence filed and tendered which was incomplete and out of order, and incorrectly date stamped.
(c)     Old notes from unknown parties, supposedly police notes, from 30 years ago.
(d)     Various police allegations, that were withdrawn during an investigation into the applicant's treatment by SAPOL officers and the Firearms branch 5 years before the SACAT hearing by the Police ombudsman.
(e)     Details of charges withdrawn from 2017.
(f)     Witness statements relating to charges that were withdrawn and therefore hearsay
(6)The Tribunal failed to give sufficient weight to;
(a)     the Psychological report of Dr. Jack White dated 30th July 2020 and his opinion based on the information before the registrar, that the respondent was a fit and proper person to hold a Firearms Licence.
(b)     The evidence of the applicant and his wife
(c)     The appellants right to call witnesses
(7)The Tribunal denied the applicant natural justice by;
(a)     Allowing the respondent to introduce evidence/hearsay that was not part of the information considered by the original decision maker, namely the Registrar of Firearms.
(b)     Viewing documentation that was filed, but not tendered due to admissions it was hearsay.
(c)     Allowing the respondent to file further evidence at hearing without notice to the applicant.
(d)     Denying the applicant sufficient time to call witnesses, to address this new evidence.
(9)The Tribunal erred in finding the application was not a fit and proper person to hold a Firearms licence.
The Member’s reasons
In relation to the events that occurred on 1 and 2 January 2017, the member made the following findings of fact:
(1)There were two incidents that occurred on the night. The first being at around 10 pm and the second around 1:30 am on 2 January 2017.
(2)In the lead up to the first incident, the applicant made the following comments which were ascertained from the footage obtained from the applicant’s dash cam:
(a)Applicant to his wife (over the phone): “They’re here, I’m going to go down there alright”;
(b)    Applicant’s wife to applicant: “Shall I call the police?”;
(c)     Applicant to his wife: “Yep, bloody oath, there’s about 50 of them…”;
(d)Applicant to his friend (in the car): “I’ve got a knife in there and a steel bar in my pocket just in case it gets out of hand”;
(e)Applicant to third party: “Wives are all saying call the cops” … “don’t want cops coming and you guys getting slammed” … “as it is we’re carrying weapons so we’d better be careful too”;
(f) Applicant to his wife (over the phone): “That’s not them, it’s a different group, we warned them they better get out of here, the Commodore guys … yeah, tell them it was a different lot … We were willing to go ‘em’ … but it wasn’t them” … “not guys who made threats…”;
(g)Applicant’s wife to applicant (over the phone): “…do I need to call them back again? I just cancelled the report”;
(h)    Applicant to his wife: “No that’s alright, not yet”;
(i)Applicant to third party: “we’ve made sure the cops fucken aren’t coming, alright, because they had been called” … “I didn’t want cops coming, ‘cos if the guys turns up, I don’t want cops seeing anything…”.
(3) The following comments were made by the people from the “Commodore group” to the applicant during the first incident:
(a)     “You don’t even know me”;
(b)    “You’re the one bringing weapons”.
(4)Following the first incident, the dash cam footage then shows the applicant driving up his driveway to drop a knife near a fence post, at which point the following comments were made:
(a) Applicant’s friend to the applicant: “you can’t ring what’s his name from the gypsys?”;
(b)    Applicant to his friend: “nah … too many of them”;
(c)     Applicant to his friend: “let’s get films of these shitters”;
(d)    Applicant to his friend: “I probably did drop my fucken knife cover”
(e)     Applicant to his friend: “I only got this as a weapon”;
(f) Applicant to his friend: “I wish I has a fucken gun, I’d just shoot them all”.
(5) The applicant then made a phone call to police to seek their assistance. He made the following comments to his friend while in the car:
(a)“I’d just like to fucken get a gun and shoot a couple of those really mouthy ones…”;
(b) “Don’t mention to Helen I pulled a knife will you please … I shouldn’t have, you know, it was stupid”;
(c) “If I had Bear still living in Adelaide I fucken could have sort these people out”;
(d)“Do you know what I’d like to do? Just go and get the fucken self loading and fucken knock a few of the cunts off”.
The member also had regard to the applicant’s offender history, namely a 1998 conviction for threatening to cause harm and 1992 charges for two counts of common assault.
The member found the applicant’s evidence not to be credible and reliable. The member also found that the applicant had misrepresented the true circumstances surrounding his offender history.
The member did not accept the applicant’s evidence in relation to the identity of Mr Cameron (known as Bear). The member did not accept the applicant’s explanation that “Bear” was a man who resided interstate who might set up authorised motor sport as a way to “sort these people out”.
Further, the member did not accept the applicant’s evidence that he had returned the knife to his driveway prior to the first incident on 1 January 2017. The member was satisfied that the dash cam footage had been recorded sequentially and that the applicant had removed the knife from his vehicle after, and not before, the first incident.
Although the events on 1 January 2017 were exceptional and the applicant ultimately suffered physical harm following the second incident, the member noted that the applicant chose to respond to the events in a confrontational and violent manner, rather than by having police intervene.
The member was satisfied that the applicant threatened the “Commodore group” with a knife, constituting a threat of violence. Together with the applicant’s own admission that he was carrying a night stick, the member found that the circumstances reflected adversely on his fitness and propriety. The member further observed that the applicant’s repeated indirect threats to use a firearm to harm others as noted at [7](4)(f) and [7](5)(a) and (d), indicated that there was a risk that he may cause harm to another by threatened use of a firearm. She considered this to be another factor that reflected adversely on his fitness and propriety.
The member held that although she did not consider the applicant’s offender history to be relevant to his current fitness and propriety, in conjunction with the events of 1 January 2017, it showed a pattern of confrontational behaviour. The member rejected the applicant’s contention that the comments made to his friend and the third party had been made to sound tough. Rather, the member held that the comments showed that the applicant had planned to confront the “Commodore group” while being aware that the attendance of the police patrol had been cancelled.
In light of these findings, the member formed the view that the applicant was not a fit and proper person for the purposes of the Firearms Act. Having made that finding, the member went on to consider whether the applicant’s firearms licence should be cancelled pursuant to the discretion in s 20(6) of the Firearms Act.
The member considered that the Firearms Act makes it clear that the use and possession of firearms is a privilege that is conditional on the overriding need to ensure public safety. For that reason, the member upheld the delegate’s decision to cancel the applicant’s licence and held that the decision was and remains the correct and preferable decision.
The applicant’s submissions
Extension of time
The applicant’s notice of appeal was filed 20 days out of time. The applicant submits that this occurred due to Covid restrictions, filing issues and his limited access to the internet as he was moving to a new house.
Leave to appeal
The applicant submits that the appeal is reasonably arguable and the subject matter of the appeal is of sufficient substance to justify consideration by the Court.
Substantive appeal
The applicant submits that the member erred by accepting evidence of his prior offending. He says the evidence relied on at the SACAT hearing was restricted to hearsay witness notes which were not referred to in the delegate’s reasons for refusing the renewal of his firearms licence. He also submits that he was not afforded the opportunity to call witnesses in response to additional material filed by the respondent prior to the first SACAT hearing.
The applicant contends that the member erred by rejecting his contention that the “Bear” he referred to on 1 January 2017 was not Robert Cameron but rather was a friend with an involvement in motorsport who had moved to Queensland. The applicant submits that he had no association with Robert Cameron or the Gypsy Joker Outlaw Motorcycle Club beyond attending and speaking at public rallies opposing the anti-association laws. The applicant further submits that other than media reports, the respondent did not tender any evidence at the hearing to establish any connection with the Gypsy Jokers.
The applicant submits that the isolated events of 1 January 2017 do not establish that he is not a fit and proper person for the purposes of s 7 of the Firearms Act. Instead, the applicant submits that his decision to confront and attempt to negotiate with the members of the “Commodore group”, whom he alleges were making threats to his family and property, was poorly made. The applicant submits that the member erred in finding that he was not a fit and proper person on the basis of events that occurred on a single occasion under mitigating circumstances. He also referred to his community activities in support of his submissions as to his fitness and propriety.
The respondent’s submissions
Extension of time
The respondent opposes the grant of an extension of time on the basis that although a delay of 20 days may not be of sufficient significance in isolation, in the context of the absence of a reasonable excuse for the delay, the lack of an arguable case, and the respondent’s right to rely on the finality of judgment, the Court should refuse to grant the applicant an extension of time. The respondent observes that the Covid lockdown in November 2020 took place over three days and only affected one business day. The applicant was, at the relevant time, legally represented and there should not have been any difficulty with filing the notice of appeal through the Court’s online portal.
Leave to appeal
The respondent submits that leave to appeal should not be granted. The applicant has not established that it is reasonably arguable that the member erred in the exercise of her discretion. The respondent submits that applicant must show either a process error, or outcome error. Even if the applicant can show there has been a process error, he must also demonstrate that there should have been a different outcome. The respondent submits that it is not reasonably arguable that the member erred in the exercise of her discretion.

The respondent also submits that the subject matter of the appeal is not of sufficient substance to justify consideration by the Court. The respondent emphasises that this is not a case where the applicant’s rights as a natural person are being infringed, nor is he seeking to recover compensation for financial losses, nor does he require a firearms licence for his livelihood. Rather, this is a case where a privilege afforded to the applicant has been rescinded.
Substantive appeal
The respondent submits that that s 34 of the SACAT Act allowed the member to receive further evidence that was not before the initial decision maker. The member was also not bound by the rules of evidence and was permitted to inform herself as she thought fit. However, the respondent had expressly informed SACAT that it did not rely on hearsay material. It is not reasonably arguable that any of the material considered by the member was irrelevant. The weight to be given to factual findings was a matter for the member.
The respondent also made submissions about various factual matters referred to by the applicant. I will consider those issues below.
The respondent submits that it was plainly open to the member, on the evidence before her, to conclude that the decision of the delegate that the applicant was not a fit and proper person to hold a firearms licence was the correct and preferable decision.
Consideration
Extension of time
While I do not consider the explanations for the delay advanced by the applicant to be particularly compelling, due to the relative shortness of the delay and the lack of prejudice to the respondent and because, by a fine margin, I consider the applicant’s case to be reasonably arguable, I have granted an extension of time.
Leave to appeal
This appeal may only proceed if leave is granted under s 71(2) of the SACAT Act. In Pix v South Australian Housing Trust[3] the Full Court adopted the principles that I had stated in Jackson v Lepp Investments concerning the principles to be applied when deciding whether to grant permission to appeal from SACAT to this Court. In that case I stated:[4]
I consider that the ordinary principles applied when the Court decides whether or not to grant permission for a civil appeal should be followed. The overriding principle is always the interests of justice. The ordinary approach is that permission will only be granted where an appeal is reasonably arguable and the subject matter is of sufficient substance to justify consideration. A failure of the first-instance decision-maker to give adequate reasons will require the grant of permission.
[Citations omitted].
[3] (2016) 125 SASR 10 at [3] (Kourakis CJ with Bampton and Doyle JJ agreeing).
[4] (2016) 125 SASR 1 at [19].
Soon after the decisions in Jackson and in Pix, Doyle J held in Varricchio v Wentzel that leave to appeal from SACAT should not be readily granted.[5]
[5] (2016) 125 SASR 191 at [37].
In this case, I decided that it was appropriate to hear the application for permission to appeal concurrently with the submissions on the appeal. Having heard and considered those submissions I have concluded that, by a fine margin, the appeal was reasonably arguable. For that reason, while recognising the principle stated by Doyle J in Varricchio v Wentzel, I have granted permission to appeal. However, for the reasons that follow, I have dismissed the appeal.
It is necessary for me to comment upon the contention by the respondent that the subject matter of the appeal is not of sufficient substance to justify consideration by the Court. in opposition to the grant of an extension of time. The basis for this submission was that a privilege afforded to the applicant has been rescinded rather than his livelihood or compensation or natural rights being in issue.
That submission fails to recognise properly the basis for the principle that leave to appeal should not be granted where the subject matter of the appeal is not of sufficient substance to warrant consideration by the Court. That principle is intended to screen out cases where the disputed question has little or no practical or legal significance and there is no issue of principle nor a potential miscarriage of justice.
While the holding of a firearms licence is a privilege,[6] and in this case, the holding of the licence does not affect the applicant’s livelihood[7], the exercise of the statutory power to cancel the licence on the grounds that he is not a fit and proper person is plainly damaging to the reputation of the applicant.[8] For that reason, the fact that the impugned decision is the cancellation of a firearms licence, does not, of itself, establish that the subject matter of the appeal lacks sufficient substance to warrant consideration by the Court. Furthermore, while I have ultimately rejected the various contentions advanced by the applicant, they did warrant scrutiny.
[6]     Police v Losapio [2007] SASC 112 at [21] (David J).
[7]     In contrast to cases such as Banks v Transport Regulation Board (Vic) (1968) 119 CLR 222 and R v Gaming Board for Great Britain; Ex parte Benaim and Khaida [1970] 2 QB 417.
[8]     Heatley v Tasmanian Racing and Gaming Commission (1977) 137 CLR 487.
The elements of the decision under review
The delegate of the Registrar stated in his decision of 12 June 2020 that “I do not think Mr Aldridge is a F & P person and his licence is to be cancelled”. That was an exercise of the power conferred upon the Registrar by s 20(6)(d) of the Firearms Act to cancel a firearms notice “on any ground on which the Registrar might refuse an application by the licensee for such a licence”.
Section 15(1)(b) of the Firearms Act provides that the Registrar may refuse an application for a firearms licence if he is not satisfied that the applicant is a fit and proper person to hold the licence. The term “fit and proper person” is defined in s 7. The relevant provisions of s 7 are as follows:
(2) A person who has a physical or mental illness, condition or disorder, or in relation to whom other circumstances exist, that would make it unsafe for him or her to possess a firearm or ammunition is not a fit and proper person for a purpose under this Act.
(3) A person may be taken not to be a fit and proper person for a purpose under this Act if the person—
(a)     has not complied with the requirements of this Act in relation to the safe handling, use, storage or transport of firearms; or
(b)     has been found guilty of an offence under this Act, the repealed Act or corresponding legislation of another State or Territory of the Commonwealth; or
(c)     has been found guilty of an offence involving actual or threatened violence in South Australia or any other State or Territory of the Commonwealth or in any other part of the world; or
(d)     has been found guilty of an offence as prescribed by the regulations; or
(e)     has been found guilty of fraud or deception for the purpose of obtaining a licence or permit under this Act or under corresponding legislation of another State or Territory of the Commonwealth; or
(f)      is the subject, or has in the past been the subject, of—
(i) an intervention order under the Intervention Orders (Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009 or any other order of a similar nature made by a court whether in this State or any other State or Territory of the Commonwealth; or
(ii) a foreign restraining order; or
(g)     has failed to comply with a requirement made under section 53.
(4) In deciding whether a person is a fit and proper person for a purpose under this Act—
(a)     regard may be had to the reputation, honesty and integrity of the person, close associates of the person and any people with whom the person associates; and
(b)     regard must be had to—
(i) any risk of the person using a firearm for an unlawful purpose; or
(ii) any risk of the person using a firearm to harm himself or herself; or (iii) any risk that the person will cause injury or harm to another by the use or threatened use of a firearm; or
(iv) any risk of the person failing to exercise continuous and responsible control over a firearm, and, in that connection, regard may be had to the person's past behaviour, instability, intemperate habits, way of living or domestic circumstances.
(5) A person may be taken not to be a fit and proper person for a purpose under this Act if the person has made a threat of violence, or stated the intention, or sought, to acquire or use a prescribed firearm or any firearm for an unauthorised purpose.
(7) This section does not limit the grounds on which a person may be taken not to be a fit and proper person for a purpose under this Act.
The SACAT review – s 34 of the SACAT Act
The applicant sought review of the decision to cancel his licence under s 34 of the SACAT Act. For present purposes, the relevant provisions of s 34 are as follows:
(3) Subject to subsections (4), (5) and (6), the Tribunal will, in exercising its review jurisdiction, examine the decision of the decision-maker by way of rehearing.
(4) On a rehearing, the Tribunal must reach the correct or preferable decision but in doing so must have regard to, and give appropriate weight to, the decision of the original decision-maker.
(5) A procedure on a rehearing will include—
(a) an examination of the evidence or material before the decision-maker (unless any such evidence or material is to be excluded under another provision of this Act or under any other law); and
(b) a consideration of any further evidence or material that the Tribunal decides, in the circumstances of the particular case, to admit for the purposes of rehearing the matter.
Several important principles emerge from s 34. The first is that s 34(3) required SACAT to examine the decision under review by way of rehearing. Such a review is one of both law and fact. It required the SACAT member to independently examine the decision.
Section 34(4)
Section 34(4) required SACAT to reach the correct or preferable decision. In doing so, the member was required to have regard to, and give appropriate weight to, the decision of the original decision maker. In my former capacity as President of SACAT, I considered those two obligations in Re AKS. [9] While my decision in Re AKS was concerned with an internal review under s 70 of the SACAT Act, the obligation to reach the correct or preferable decision and to have regard to, and give appropriate weight to, the decision of the original decision maker applies under both s 34 and s 70. Thus, the observations I made in Re AKS also apply to the interpretation of s 34.
[9] [2016] SACAT 19.
I held in Re AKS that it necessarily follows from the requirement to arrive at the correct or preferable decision, after having given appropriate weight to the decision under review, that the principles set out by the High Court in House v The King[10] concerning appeals from the exercise of a discretion do not apply when SACAT reviews a discretionary decision. Thus, if SACAT considers that the correct or preferable decision was not made, it may set aside the exercise of a discretion without having identified either a process error or an outcome error in the decision under review.[11] I also held in Re AKS that this requirement makes clear that SACAT is to conduct a review on the merits.[12]
[10] (1936) 55 CLR 499.
[11] Re AKS at [32].
[12] Ibid at [31].
I further observed in Re AKS that the use of the word “appropriate” to qualify the weight to be given to the decision under review requires that SACAT must have regard to all relevant circumstances surrounding the making of the decision.[13] Those circumstances may include the qualifications and experience of the decision maker, the nature of the decision under review and whether the decision turned upon the assessment of oral evidence where the primary decision maker may have had a particular advantage when assessing the credit of a witness.[14] In this case, the decision was of an administrative nature and the assessment of the credibility of oral evidence given by witnesses before the delegate did not arise, i.e. there were no such witnesses.
[13] Ibid at [33].
[14] Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118.
Where a matter has been decided in a specialist jurisdiction, and especially where the decision maker has particular expertise in the relevant field, it may be appropriate to give significant weight to their decision.[15] I made essentially the same point in Jackson in the context of an appeal to this Court from SACAT exercising its residential tenancies jurisdiction.[16] The Full Court adopted the same approach in Pix.[17]
[15] Re AKS at [33].
[16] (2016) 125 SASR 1 at [20].
[17] (2016) 125 SASR 10 at [6] (Kourakis CJ with Bampton and Doyle JJ agreeing).
Bleby J considered in Schinckel v Registrar of Firearms the question of the weight to be given to the decision under review.[18] His Honour noted my reasons in Jackson, and the endorsement of my reasons by the Full Court in Pix. More importantly for present purposes, Bleby J noted that the Full Court had stated in Pix in relation to a complaint about the weight given to specified circumstances that:[19]
[18] [2020] SASC 236.
[19] (2016) 125 SASR 10 at [6] (Kourakis CJ , Bampton and Doyle JJ agreeing).
This Court cannot substitute its evaluation of the relevant considerations for that of the Tribunal unless, having regard to the Tribunal’s specialist knowledge and experience, this Court finds that the order made is manifestly unreasonable.
Bleby J observed that although SACAT did not have the length and degree of specialist experience in the firearms jurisdiction as it does in residential tenancies matters (being the subject of the proceedings in Jackson and in Pix) and in guardianship matters, the fact was that SACAT did have a specialist role in relation to firearms which it had been exercising for several years. For that reason, Bleby J held that the Court should not interfere with a discretionary decision unless the SACAT decision was manifestly unreasonable.
I consider that in some instances, the circumstances may dictate that little weight should be given to the decision under review. Thus, it was significant in this case that the delegate had taken into account damaging information about the applicant’s suspected association with a member of the Gypsy Jokers without affording the applicant any opportunity to respond. That fundamental breach of procedural fairness much diminished the weight that could be attached to his decision. However, despite that defect in the decision-making process, it was appropriate to recognise the knowledge and experience of the delegate as a senior police officer in matters relating to ownership of firearms and community safety.
Section 34(5)
Section 34(5)(a) of the SACAT Act provides that the rehearing on review will include the evidence or material before the decision maker unless that material is otherwise excluded by law. Additionally, and most importantly given ground 1 of this appeal, s 34(5)(b) permits SACAT to decide, that in the circumstances of a particular case, it should consider further evidence or material that it decides to admit for the purposes of the rehearing.
I considered in Re AKS the exercise of the discretion by SACAT to receive further evidence when conducting a review.[20] Subject to the observations that follow, I adhere to the views that I expressed in Re AKS.
[20] Re AKS at [26]-[28].
I noted in Re AKS that the general principle is that further evidence may not be admissible on an appeal if it would have been reasonably available had diligent enquiries been pursued in the first instance. However, I noted that this consideration will generally carry much less weight in SACAT proceedings than before an appellate court. I held that view for several reasons. First, SACAT is a tribunal visited with administrative power and not a court exercising judicial power. Secondly, s 39(1)(b) of the SACAT Act provides that the rules of evidence do not apply to proceedings in SACAT. A third reason was that proceedings, particularly at first instance, tended to be conducted on a relatively informal basis in accordance with s 8(1)(f) of the SACAT Act. That observation was directed at hearings conducted in the internal review jurisdiction where SACAT conducts reviews of decisions that have been made within SACAT as the original decision maker. The fourth reason I advanced was that the great majority of parties in SACAT are not legally represented and, in my experience, often had little understanding of how to best go about advancing or proving their case. The final and most important reason was that the requirement for SACAT to arrive at the correct and preferable decision should not be frustrated by overly strict compliance with the principles applied by appellate courts to the addition of fresh evidence.
In a case such as the present matter where SACAT is reviewing a decision made by a public sector official (or the like) an applicant may have had a limited opportunity to present their case before the decision was made. In some instances, as with the present matter, adverse information may have been taken into account without the affected person being afforded procedural fairness. Considerations of this type provide a further reason why SACAT should generally be willing to admit further evidence when conducting a review under s 34, subject always to the observations that follow.
I went on to observe in Re AKS that the requirements applied by the courts that the new evidence be credible and relevant (i.e. it may have affected the outcome of proceedings) remain appropriate when SACAT exercises its discretion to admit further evidence. If those principles are not applied, in some cases SACAT could find itself overwhelmed with a plethora of irrelevant material with no evidentiary value.
It is also of fundamental importance that the decision to admit further evidence on the appeal does not operate so as to deny the other party a reasonable opportunity to respond to that material.
The powers and functions of the Supreme Court
The appeal to this Court is made under s 71 of the SACAT Act. As previously noted, the applicant requires leave under s 71(2). Section 71(3a) provides that the appeal is to be by way of rehearing. Section 71(3b) provides that the Court in conducting an appeal may draw inferences of fact from evidence or material before SACAT and may, as it thinks fit, allow further evidence or material to be presented to it. Section 71(4) empowers the Court to affirm, vary or set aside the decision appealed against and, if it thinks fit, to return the matter to SACAT for reconsideration in accordance with any directions considered appropriate.
The effect of s 71 is that an appeal from SACAT operates in the same manner as a civil appeal to a single judge (see UCR 217.10) or to the Court of Appeal (see UCR 218.17) as the case may be. However, it is important to recognise that an appeal to this Court from SACAT is materially different from the review conducted by SACAT of the decision made the delegate. Whereas the ultimate task of SACAT was to determine whether the correct and preferable decision was made, the role of this Court is to determine whether the SACAT member erred in the exercise of her quasi-judicial discretion by dismissing the review application. In deciding whether the member erred in the exercise of her discretion, it is necessary to determine in accordance with House v The King whether the decision was affected by a process error or an outcome error.[21]
[21] (1936) 55 CLR 499.
A process error will have occurred if the member acted on a wrong principle, if her decision was affected by extraneous or irrelevant matters, if she mistook the facts or did not take into account some material consideration. If a process error is not apparent, but if the result is manifestly unreasonable, this Court may infer that there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion held by SACAT.
The applicant’s community work

The applicant referred in his oral submissions to SACAT and in his written and oral submissions to the Court to his involvement in animal rescue. This may require the humane destruction of animals that have been seriously injured by bushfires or motor vehicles. He wishes to continue this activity and believes that if he were to be granted a firearms licence endorsed with the appropriate category his ability to humanely euthanise distressed animals would be greatly enhanced.
The applicant made various assertions from the bar table about his use of firearms to deal with distressed animals. There was no evidence to support these assertions, which went beyond the unchallenged statement in his affidavit that the loss of his licence had resulted in pain and suffering for animals injured by the Kangaroo Island and Cudlee Creek bushfires.
In response to that submission, counsel for the respondent drew the attention of the Court to the affidavit of Matthew Boisseau filed on behalf of the respondent. At page 52 of that affidavit Mr Boisseau, deposed that the applicant had been licensed to use his Class A and Class B firearms for the purposes specified in categories 1 (shooting club), 2 (target shooting), 3 (hunting) and 5 (primary production) and his Class H firearm for category 1 (shooting club) purposes. Counsel submitted that category 5 would have permitted the applicant to euthanise animals on his own property but not otherwise.[22]
[22] If in fact the animal shelter he and his former wife conducted constituted “primary production”.
While I have referred to this issue to avoid any suggestion that I have not addressed the appellant’s various contentions, I do not consider his reasons for wanting to retain his licence to be relevant to this appeal. The relevant question is whether the member erred by concluding that the delegate had made the correct and preferable decision in finding that he was not a fit and proper person to hold a licence.
Against that background, I turn to the grounds of appeal.
Ground 1
The applicant complains in ground 1 that SACAT allowed additional material into evidence on the hearing of the review that had not been considered by the delegate in making the impugned decision. The particulars provided in support of this ground are extensive.
As I have previously noted, s 34(5)(b) of the SACAT Act empowered the member to receive further evidence in conducting the review. The applicant has not complained about the admission of all further evidence but only that led by the respondent. He has not complained about the decision of the member to allow him, and his former wife, to give oral evidence in support of his application for review. He has also not complained about the admission into evidence of the report he had obtained from the psychologist, Dr Jack White, nor the report of the investigation made by the Police Ombudsman some years ago into his complaints about the SA Police Firearms Branch.
In considering the appeal against the exercise by the member of her discretion under s 34(5)(b) of the SACAT Act to admit further evidence for the purposes of the review, in addition to the general principles I have discussed at [47] to [52], I consider there to be three relevant considerations. First, was the further evidence relevant in that it would assist the member to determine whether the delegate had made the correct and preferable decision by cancelling the applicant’s licence. Secondly, and inextricably linked to the first point, did the further evidence have some probative value. Thirdly, having decided to admit the further evidence, did the member ensure that the applicant was accorded procedural fairness by giving him sufficient opportunity to respond.
On 14 July 2020, the Crown Solicitor’s Office (CSO) acting on behalf of the respondent, filed with SACAT an electronic book of documents as required by s 35(2) of the SACAT Act. That book was then served upon the applicant. It contained the delegate’s decision, all materials considered by the delegate when he made the decision and also all material in the possession or control of the Registrar relevant to the review by SACAT.
On 7 August 2020 the applicant advised the CSO that he proposed to call seven witnesses. The CSO contended that the evidence of most of those witnesses was not relevant and applied for a directions hearing. That hearing was conducted on 25 August 2020. Prior to the directions hearing, the CSO filed an outline of argument which set out in some detail the evidence that the respondent proposed to rely upon at the review hearing.
Amongst other matters, an outcome of the directions hearing was that the CSO was directed to provide a copy of any audio-visual material that it intended to rely upon to the applicant by 1 September 2020. A complete copy of the audio-visual material extracted by the police from the applicant’s dash camera did not become available to the CSO until 10 September 2020 and was provided to the applicant that day.
At the outset of the review hearing, and also on several occasions during the hearing, the member explained that she had a discretion to receive further evidence. After the first day of hearing on 11 September 2020, the matter was adjourned for further hearing on 20 October 2020. Arrangements for the viewing of the full version of the audio-visual material were discussed prior to the adjournment.
On 16 September 2020, the SACAT Registry sent an email to the applicant that expressly referred to the power of SACAT to receive further evidence and included the full text of the relevant provisions of the SACAT Act. The email noted that the question of witnesses had been discussed at two directions hearings prior to the first day of the review hearing. The email informed the applicant that the member was not proposing to issue a further direction but requested that he advise whom he proposed to call as witnesses and their relevance by 18 September. The email also suggested that he seek legal advice. I infer from its contents that this email was very probably sent on the instructions of the member.
I am satisfied that the applicant was informed well prior to the first review hearing of the further evidence that the respondent proposed to rely upon. With the exception of the full copy of the audio-visual recording extracted by the police from his dash camera, he been provided with all material some two months before the first hearing, including the edited version of the audio-visual recording. In addition, the respondent’s proposed argument was made clear in the submissions provided prior to the directions hearing on 25 August 2020. While the full version of the audio-visual recording did not become available until 10 September 2020, the lengthy adjournment of almost six weeks gave him ample opportunity to consider his response to that material.
In the circumstances to which I have referred, the receipt of further evidence did not deny the applicant procedural fairness. I am also satisfied that the additional material was relevant to the decision that the SACAT member was called upon to make, i.e. was the decision to cancel the applicant’s firearms licence the correct and preferable decision? I am also satisfied that the member did not act contrary to the general principles I have identified concerning the receipt of further evidence. I will refer to the issue of probative value at a later point in this judgment. It suffices to say at this point that I am satisfied that the material was of sufficient probative value to warrant being received on the review.
For these reasons, I do not consider that ground 1 gives rise to an appealable error.
Ground 2
The applicant complains in ground 2 that the proceedings miscarried as the review conducted in SACAT was not a review of the original decision made by the delegate of the Registrar. The applicant did not explain in either his written or oral submissions what was the intended meaning of this ground. I infer that the substance of the complaint is that as a result of the member taking into account further evidence, she effectively made a fresh decision rather than merely reviewed the decision made at first instance.
As I have previously indicated, s 34(5)(b) of the SACAT Act empowered the member to receive further evidence when conducting the review by way of re‑hearing. I have already found that the member did not err in the exercise of that discretion. I do not consider that ground 2 gives rise to an appealable error.
Ground 3
The applicant complains in ground 3 that the member erred by placing too much weight on particular matters. The matters to which he has referred are the conversations that he held with his friend, Dave Cook, which occurred at a time when he was frustrated and in fear. He also refers to reliance allegedly placed upon his past criminal convictions and police notes relating to offences in 1991 and 1997. He points out that these matters were known to the Registrar when his licence had been first granted and then renewed each year prior to 2017.
A complaint that a judicial or quasi-judicial decision maker erred by attaching too much, or too little, weight to a particular consideration when exercising their discretion is not, of itself, a valid ground of appeal.[23] To put the matter another way, a complaint about the weight given by the decision maker to a particular matter cannot establish a process error. I will consider in response to ground 9 whether the decision by the member to dismiss the application gave rise to an outcome error, i.e. was the decision manifestly unreasonable or unjust.
[23] Police v Chilton (2014) 120 SASR 32 at [18] (Kourakis CJ); R v Lutze (2014) 121 SASR 144 at [40] (Vanstone and Parker JJ); Legal Professional Conduct Commissioner v Fowler [2020] SASCFC 65 at [62] (Kourakis CJ, Parker and Bleby JJ agreeing).
While I have rejected the complaint in ground 3 that too much weight was placed on particular matters as a ground of appeal in its own right, I will consider those matters for the purpose of determining whether they assist in establishing that the member’s decision was manifestly unreasonable or unjust (being the subject of ground 9).
The member did not rely on the applicant’s past conviction as supporting the conclusion that he was not a fit and proper person to hold a licence. However, the member did find that the fact that he had “misrepresented the true circumstances surrounding his offender history” reflected adversely on his fitness and propriety. The factual basis for that finding was as follows.
On 4 August 1992 the applicant was dealt with by the Magistrates Court at Holden Hill for two offences of common assault. A conviction was not recorded and a fine of $1,000 was imposed in respect of one count. The other count was dismissed without penalty. At the SACAT hearing on 11 September 2020 the applicant asserted that he was not the person charged but acknowledged that the court record referred to a person with the same first name, middle name and surname, the same date of birth and the same address.
At the hearing on 20 October 2020 SACAT was provided with a police report which provided the victim’s name and his version of these incidents. The allegation was that the applicant “produced a spring bladed knife, threatened to cause damage to the victim’s vehicle and had implied that physical harm would come to him”. The victim stated that he had held grave fears for his own personal safety. After hearing the name of the victim, the applicant admitted that he was the person involved in the 1992 offences but continued to deny that he had made any threats and that a knife was involved.
On 12 January 1998 the applicant was convicted after a trial in the Magistrates Court at Holden Hill for an offence of threatening to cause harm. He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment for three months that was suspended on a bond to be of good behaviour for three years in the sum of $1,000. The evidence given by the applicant in SACAT about the 1998 convictions was that he had presented a cheque which the bank had mistakenly dishonoured at a time when he had adequate funds in his account. He contacted the bank and stated to the bank manager “I hope the same happens to you”.
The version in the police apprehension report was that he had stated to the bank officer that “I’m going to find out where you live … I will pay someone to knock you off … I won’t be involved. I am threatening you. You can take this seriously… I will get you”. The applicant denied in his SACAT evidence that he had made these statements and denied that he had made any threats to cause harm.
The member found that it was unclear on what factual basis the applicant had been sentenced following the 1998 trial. However, she concluded that it was implausible that he would have been sentenced to three months imprisonment on his version of events. The member did not accept his evidence as to what had occurred. That was because he could not have been found guilty and convicted of the offence of “threatening to cause harm” if the elements of the offence had not been made out. The member was satisfied that he had made a threat to cause harm of sufficient seriousness to warrant imprisonment, albeit suspended.
The applicant maintained in his submissions on appeal that he had forgotten about the 1992 assault and adhered to his version of the facts relating to the threaten to cause harm conviction in 1998. Having heard those submissions, I am not persuaded that the member erred in concluding that the applicant had misrepresented the true circumstances surrounding his offender history. This is not a case where the conclusion reached by the member was “glaringly improbable” or “contrary to compelling inferences” and I must give appropriate recognition to the advantage of the member having seen and heard the applicant give oral evidence under affirmation and respond to cross-examination.[24]
[24] Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118.
Quite apart from the Fox v Percy requirement in relation to the member’s finding on credit, my own observations of the applicant’s submissions (which, in substantial part in relation to this point, were effectively unsworn evidence from the bar table) only reinforced my view that the member had clearly reached the correct conclusion about the unreliability of his evidence about his offender history.
I dismiss ground 3.
Ground 4
The applicant complains in ground 4 that there was insufficient evidence to show that the person referred to as “Bear” was a member of the Gypsy Jokers at the relevant time or that he had any formal association with that person.
The relevance of this issue arises from the passage in the dash camera recording where the applicant stated to his friend, Dave Cook, “If I had Bear still living in Adelaide I fucken could have sort these people out”. Dave Cook had at one point asked the applicant, “You can’t ring what’s his name from the Gypsies?”
The applicant gave evidence before SACAT that he had taken an active role in opposing the Serious and Organised Crime (Control) Act 2008 (SA) (the Control Act) and spoken at rallies in Adelaide, Brisbane and Canberra. At those rallies he had met Robert Cameron, whom he knew to be a member of the Gypsy Jokers. He had the contact details of Mr Cameron and could have called him if he wished. He acknowledged that the reference to “what’s his name from the Gypsies” was a reference to Robert Cameron. However, he stated under cross-examination that the reference to “Bear” was not to Mr Cameron but rather to another person who now lived in Queensland. This person had been actively involved in motorsport and knew the parents of some of the youths who were involved in “hoon” driving near his home. He believed that if Bear still lived in Adelaide he may have been able to reduce the level of hoon driving by encouraging these people to engage in authorised motorsport.
The respondent tendered in SACAT a copy of a newspaper article dated 4 July 2015 referring to the protest by bikies against the Control Act. The article referred to the applicant and Mr Cameron as having attended the protest and referred to Mr Cameron as “Bear”. The applicant’s former wife, Helen Hoare, gave evidence that both she and the applicant knew Mr Cameron as Bear.
The member rejected the applicant’s evidence regarding the identity of Mr Cameron. She stated that she was satisfied that the applicant was referring to Mr Cameron when he made the comment “If I had Bear still living in Adelaide (etc)”. She specifically rejected the applicant’s evidence that Bear was a person who might set up authorised motorsport.
The delegate had made the observation in his decision that “most concern is the comment that an associate makes to Mr Aldridge asking whether he can contact someone from the Gypsies (referencing to Gypsy Jokers OMCG)”. At a later point the delegate stated: “what relationship does he have with Gypsy Jokers OMCG – declared criminal organisation, the comments made are not addressed in his submissions and raise serious concerns re: associations”. The delegate expressly referred to the “reference to getting Gypsy Jokers” as one of the grounds for cancellation of the applicant’s licence. As I have previously observed, the applicant was not given the opportunity to respond to these issues before the delegate took them into account.
The member did not make any finding that the applicant had a connection with the Gypsy Jokers. On my reading of the member’s reasons, her rejection of the applicant’s evidence regarding the identity of Mr Cameron simply amounted to an adverse finding as to his credit. While it is not entirely clear, the member seems to have taken into account this adverse finding as reflecting adversely on his fitness and propriety.
The applicant’s complaint that there was insufficient evidence to show that Mr Cameron was a Gypsy Joker at the relevant time or that any formal association existed with him is beside the point. The relevant finding by the member did not concern these issues but rather the unreliability of the evidence given by the applicant with respect to Mr Cameron. Thus, the applicant has complained about a decision that the member did not make.
For that reason, I do not consider that ground 4 identifies an appealable error. I dismiss ground 4.
Ground 5
The applicant complains in ground 5 that extensive hearsay evidence was filed in the SACAT review proceedings. He refers to six items of evidence.
Before considering those individual items of evidence, I note that s 39(1)(b) of the SACAT Act provides that SACAT is not bound by the rules of evidence and that s 39(1)(c) requires SACAT to act according to equity, good conscience and the substantial merits of the case and without regard to legal technicalities and forms.
The first item referred to by the applicant is audio-visual material compiled by the Channel Seven television station.
The transcript of the SACAT hearing confirms that, prior to the Channel Seven video being shown to SACAT, counsel for the respondent made clear that he only intended to show recordings of statements made by the applicant and not hearsay comments made by third parties. The transcript records that the applicant agreed to that approach. While the copy of the video filed in the SACAT Registry apparently included hearsay material, the important point is that no hearsay material was shown to the member.
The applicant has complained that video evidence was tendered which was incomplete and out of order and incorrectly date stamped. This allegation appears to relate to the audio-visual material retrieved from the dash camera in the applicant’s car. As I have previously noted, a complete copy of the dash camera footage was provided to the applicant by the respondent the day prior to the first SACAT hearing. The member viewed the entire footage on the second day of the hearing. Having done so, she expressly rejected the applicant’s contention that the footage had been recorded out of order.

I also note that counsel for the respondent informed SACAT when the recording was tendered that the timestamp shown on the recording was about two and one half hours too early. The applicant did not dispute that information.
The applicant also complains that “old notes from unknown parties, supposedly police notes, from 30 years ago were filed in SACAT”. This appears to be a reference to police reports relating to the 1992 and 1998 charges. I have already dealt with these issues and no further comment is required.
The applicant complains that SACAT erred in allowing hearsay evidence to be filed relating to various police allegations that had been withdrawn following the investigation by the Police Ombudsman into his treatment by the SAPOL Firearms Branch five years before the SACAT hearing. He also complains that the documents filed with SACAT included police reports related to criminal charges against him in 2017 that were ultimately withdrawn. Those charges arose from the events on the night of 1 and 2 January 2017.
The material relating to the criminal charges was filed with SACAT as part of the s 35 book of documents. Because those documents were before the delegate when he made the decision, the respondent was required to provide that material to SACAT in accordance with s 35(2)(b). SACAT was entitled to examine those documents in accordance with s 35(8) and draw any conclusions of fact that it considered appropriate. However, the member expressly recorded that the charges had been withdrawn and they did not come within the applicant’s offender history. Furthermore, counsel for the respondent had informed both the applicant and SACAT by email on 10 September 2020 that he did not rely on the hearsay in the police documents.
The fact that the respondent acted in accordance with its statutory duty under s 35 by providing the documents to SACAT does not provide a valid ground of appeal.
In any event, I also note that the applicant filed the Police Ombudsman Report in response to the adverse police material from 2013. He used that report to support his submission that the criticism made by the Ombudsman about his treatment by the Firearms Branch, and the requirement that he be given an apology by SAPOL, had resulted in leftover angst that had affected the decision made by the delegate in 2020. The member was not satisfied that the delegate had had any involvement in the issues in 2013 and 2014 and nor was she satisfied that he was biased against the applicant on account of that matter.
For the reasons stated at [104], I dismiss ground 5.
Ground 6
The applicant complains in ground 6 that SACAT failed to give sufficient weight to the opinion expressed by the psychologist, Dr Jack White, that he was a fit and proper person to hold a firearm’s licence. He also complains that sufficient weight was not given to his evidence and that of his wife and also that sufficient weight was not given to his right to call witnesses.
I have previously stated that a complaint about the weight given to particular evidence is not, of itself, a valid ground of appeal against the exercise of a discretionary power. Nevertheless, I will make some observations about the various matters of which the applicant complains as that is relevant to the consideration of ground 9.
The member accepted the findings of Dr White that the applicant does not suffer from any cognitive impairment or mental health conditions. However, she also noted that Dr White was not provided with the applicant’s offender history and made his assessment solely on the information provided by the applicant. For that reason, she placed little weight on his report.
The applicant deposed in the affidavit filed in support of his appeal that Dr White had been provided with all emails and documents relating to the decision of the delegate. Those documents included his offender history. He also deposed that when Dr White had asked him about his history of offences, he had explained the circumstances and stated that he had never been accused of physical violence, only verbal threats.
Dr White reported that the applicant had stated to him “that he had never been convicted of any previous criminal offences”. At a later point Dr White recorded that the applicant denied “that he had ever been convicted of any previous violent offences”. At the commencement of his report, in accordance with the usual practice in expert reports, Dr White set out the material that had been provided to him. Although he referred to the letter from the delegate dated 15 June 2020 (that being the decision to cancel the applicant’s licence), he did not mention the other documents referred to by the applicant.
There is a clear inconsistency between the affidavit of the applicant and the report of Dr White. Even if the applicant is correct and truthful in his evidence so that either Dr White failed to read all the material that was provided to him, or failed to record that material in his report, and also misunderstood or mis-recorded the answers given to him by the applicant, the fact remains that Dr White prepared his report based upon a misunderstanding about the applicant’s history. That error, regardless of its cause, must necessarily reduce the weight that could be given to Dr White’s report. Accordingly, I do not consider that the member erred in finding that little weight could be given to his report.
It should also be noted that the report of Dr White was obtained by the applicant after the delegate had made the decision to cancel his licence. The delegate had not relied on s 7(2) of the Firearms Act which provides that a person who has a mental illness, condition or disorder would make it unsafe for him to possess a firearm, is not a fit and proper person for the purposes of the section. I infer that the purpose of the applicant in obtaining the report from Dr White was to assist in advancing a contention under s 7(4) that there is no risk that he would use or threaten the use of a firearm to cause injury or harm to another and that he did not show signs of instability. However, because the delegate did not rely on a concern about mental illness or a personality disorder as a basis to cancel the licence, even if the question of weight referred to in the previous paragraph were to be disregarded, I do not consider that Dr White’s report is of any real assistance.
The complaint that the member failed to give sufficient weight to the evidence of the applicant and his wife is not a valid ground of appeal for the reasons I have already stated at [75]. Moreover, the plain fact is that the member did not accept the accuracy of significant parts of the applicant’s evidence. She came to that conclusion after having seen and heard him give evidence and having also considered the audio-visual material and the court records.
The applicant’s complaint that the member failed to give sufficient weight to his right to call witnesses is most obscure. The applicant has alleged in his affidavit that he was unable to obtain confirmation between the first and second hearings of his right to call witnesses.
At the commencement of the hearing on 11 September 2020 the applicant informed SACAT that he did not intend to call any witnesses. As previously noted, after the first day of hearing the matter was adjourned until 20 October 2020 to enable the applicant to review the full copy of the dashcam footage provided to him on 10 September 2020. I have already referred at [68] to the email sent to the applicant by the SACAT Registry on 16 September 2020 asking that he provide details of the witnesses he intended to call at the resumed hearing.
In response, the applicant advised SACAT on 24 September 2020 that he intended to call his former wife, Helen Hoare, and his friend, Dave Cook, when the hearing resumed. Ms Hoare gave evidence when the hearing resumed but the applicant was not aware of Mr Cook’s availability. There was some discussion about a further adjournment to enable Mr Cook to attend. However, after the footage was viewed at the SACAT hearing, the applicant advised that he no longer wished to call Mr Cook. The applicant did not seek to call any other witness.
I consider it to be quite clear that SACAT did not fail to accord the applicant procedural fairness in relation to his right to call witnesses. His assertion that he was unable to obtain confirmation between the first and second hearings of his right to call witnesses is plainly inconsistent with the email sent to him about that issue and his response.
For the foregoing reasons I dismiss ground 6.
Ground 7
The applicant complains in ground 7 that he was denied natural justice in several respects. Before dealing with the specific contentions advanced by the applicant in relation to ground 7, I will summarise the general submissions made by the respondent on the question of procedural fairness. The respondent submits that the correspondence exchanged between the parties and SACAT prior to the hearing and also the SACAT transcript establish that the applicant was throughout the proceedings given the opportunity to put his case, to call witnesses, to conduct cross‑examination on the respondent’s case and a reasonable opportunity to review and consider all evidentiary material and submissions presented by the respondent as required by rules 73 and 74 of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014. Having reviewed the material referred to by the respondent, and in light of the various matters discussed above, I consider those submissions to be plainly correct.
Against that background, I turn to the specific complaints made by the applicant. The first complaint in relation to the alleged denial of natural justice (or procedural fairness) is that the respondent was permitted to introduce “evidence/hearsay that was not part of the information considered by the original decision‑maker”. I have considered this issue at length at [61] to [71] and [95] to [103]. I have also referred at [62] to the fact that the applicant had also introduced further evidence at the SACAT hearing. The member clearly had power to receive further evidence and, in doing so, she accorded the applicant procedural fairness.
A further complaint by the applicant is that the member viewed documentation that was filed with SACAT but not tendered in evidence due to the acknowledgement by counsel that it was hearsay. This complaint appears to relate to the police reports that resulted in the criminal charges laid against the applicant in 1992 and 1998. As I noted at [103], counsel for the respondent made clear to SACAT that he did not rely upon the hearsay elements of this material. There is nothing in the member’s reasons to suggest that she relied upon hearsay evidence, even though she was entitled to do so with the only issue being the question of weight.
The member did not make any finding as to the correctness or otherwise of the allegations in the police reports relating to the 1992 charges of common assault where one count was dismissed without penalty while he was fined $1000 without a conviction being recorded on the other count. The member expressly stated that it was unclear on what basis the applicant was sentenced following the 1998 conviction. She observed that the version of events given by the applicant in his evidence to SACAT could not be reconciled with the finding of guilt after a trial. On his version, the elements of the offence could not have been established. In that respect, the member was clearly correct.
Most importantly, the member found that the applicant’s offender history was dated and as such could not be considered relevant to his current fitness and propriety to hold a firearms licence. However, his offender history in conjunction with the events that had occurred on 1 January 2017 showed a pattern of confrontational behaviour. That was one of the factors that she took into account in concluding that he was not a fit and proper person to hold a firearms licence. The member did not rely on the detail contained in the police reports from 1992 and 1998 but on the outcome of the Court proceedings. Thus, I reject the contention that the member relied on hearsay evidence. In any event, as I have said previously, the member was entitled to inform herself as she saw fit with it being a matter for her to decide what weight she should place upon hearsay evidence.
As the member did not rely on the contents of the police reports from 1992 and 1998, there is no merit in his complaint that the authors of the reports were not made available for cross-examination. In any event, this is simply another way of presenting the hearsay complaint.
A further complaint by the applicant is that the respondent was permitted to file further evidence at the hearing without notice having been given to him. This complaint appears to relate to the tendering of the full copy of the dashcam footage from the applicant’s car. As I have noted at [66] to [69], the SACAT hearing was adjourned for five weeks to enable the applicant a reasonable opportunity to view and consider that material which only became available the day before the first hearing. When the hearing was resumed, the full recording was played. The applicant had the opportunity to make submissions about its content. He also had the opportunity during the adjournment to show it to his proposed witness, Mr Cook, to refresh his memory. I reject the contention that there was any unfairness in relation to this issue.
The final complaint made under ground 7 is that the applicant was denied sufficient time to call witnesses to address the new evidence. I have addressed this issue at [67] to [70]. I reject the contention that the applicant was denied procedural fairness in respect of this issue.
I dismiss ground 7.
Ground 9
There is no ground 8. The applicant complains in ground 9 that SACAT erred in finding that he was not a fit and proper person to hold a firearms licence. Some aspects of the error alleged by the applicant involve the contention that the member was mistaken in findings of fact and in other respects the contention is that the member’s decision is vitiated by an outcome error or is manifestly unreasonable or unjust.
As I have previously indicated, the task of the member was to determine whether the decision to cancel the applicant’s firearms licence was the correct and preferable decision. In doing so, the member was required to have regard to and give appropriate weight to the decision made by the delegate on behalf of the Registrar.
To the extent that the member made findings of fact the question is whether they were open to the member on the evidence and were not “glaringly improbable” or “contrary to compelling inferences” in the Fox v Percy sense. For the reasons that follow, I consider that the various findings of fact discussed below do not reveal any error.
The member accepted that the events that occurred in the vicinity of the applicant’s home on 1 January 2017 were exceptional. She accepted that he had ongoing issues with hoon drivers and also accepted that he ultimately suffered physical harm following the second incident that night.
The member noted that under s 4(a) of the Firearms Act, in deciding whether a person is a fit and proper person, regard may be had to their reputation, honesty and integrity. She found that the applicant’s evidence was not credible. He had not been entirely honest in his evidence to SACAT. She found that he had misrepresented the true situation of the events of 1 January 2017. She also found that he had chosen to deal with the matter himself in a confrontational and violent manner rather than have the police handle it. That finding was based primarily on the audio-visual evidence and the applicant’s response to that material. I cannot identify any error.
The member also found that the applicant had misrepresented the true circumstances surrounding his offender history. That finding was made after hearing oral evidence from the applicant and was almost inevitable in view of the incongruity between his evidence and the outcome of the court proceedings. I also made observations about that issue at [84].
As I have previously noted, the member did not accept the applicant’s evidence concerning the identity of Mr Cameron. She also rejected his evidence that “Bear” was a man who lived interstate who might help to set up motor sport as a diversion for the people who were annoying him. Once again, I am satisfied that there was no error.
The member also did not accept the applicant’s evidence about the knife. She found that the dash cam footage had been sequentially recorded and rejected the applicant’s evidence that he had seen a knife in his car and had returned it to his driveway prior to the first incident. The member was satisfied that he had removed the knife from his car after the first incident. These findings were supported by the audio-visual evidence. I do not accept that there was any error.
Section 7(4)(b)(iii) of the Firearms Act requires a decision‑maker to have regard to any risk that a person will cause injury or harm to another by the use or threatened use of a firearm. Section 7(5) provides that a person may be taken not to be a fit and proper person for the purposes of the Firearms Act if they have made a threat of violence, or stated the intention, or sought, to acquire or use any firearm for an unauthorised purpose.
In this context, the member found that the applicant had armed himself with a night stick, (i.e. an extendable baton) and a knife when he met the group of people at about 10 pm. The member stated that she was satisfied that this had been his intention when he started. The member also referred to the multiple other references by the applicant to the carrying of weapons in the plural. She also referred to his comment “don’t mention to Helen I pulled a knife”. On this basis the member was satisfied that the applicant had threatened a group of “hoons” with a knife and that this amounted to a threat of violence. This fact, together with his own admission that he had been carrying a night stick, reflected adversely on his fitness and propriety.
The member also referred to the statements that the applicant made to his friend in the car on a few occasions about wanting to get a gun and shoot some of the people who were annoying him. He had also told a third party, whom he had not met before, that “we’re carrying weapons”. After noting the applicant’s evidence that the comments were made in private to a friend and he had no intention of acting upon them, the member found that there was a risk that the applicant may cause harm to another by the threatened use of a firearm. This reflected adversely on his fitness and propriety.
The member rejected the applicant’s evidence that the comments that he had made to his friend and the third party were made so that he sounded tough. The evidence clearly showed that he had planned to confront the first group while armed with weapons at a time when he was aware that the attendance of the police patrol had been cancelled. The member concluded these events, considered in conjunction with his offender history, showed a pattern of confrontational behaviour.
The member also found that his evidence before SACAT demonstrated “a current lack of insight and appreciation into the risk his conduct has posed to others. This raises serious concerns about public safety in the context of firearms”.
I am satisfied that there was no error in the findings of fact referred to in the preceding four paragraphs and the inferences drawn by the member from those findings.
For the preceding reasons, the member concluded that the applicant was not a fit and proper person under the Firearms Act. The member observed that the Act makes it clear that the use and possession of firearms is a privilege that is conditional on the overriding need to ensure public safety. Those observations reflected the underlying principles set out in s 3(1)(a) of the Firearms Act and were consistent with the decisions of this Court in cases such as Police v Losapio[25] and Registrar of Firearms v Gitsham[26]. The member concluded that the decision to cancel the licence was and remained the correct and preferable decision and the decision under review was affirmed.
[25] [2007] SASC 112 at [21] (David J).
[26] (2002) 84 SASR 72 at [72] (Mullighan J).

The member addressed the relevant provisions of the Firearms Act. The evidence that the member took into account was also relevant and admissible. This was not a case where her findings of fact and the inferences that she drew from those facts were “glaringly improbable” or “contrary to compelling inferences” in the sense referred to by the High Court in Fox v Percy. As I have said on more than one occasion, what weight the member gave to that evidence and those inferences was a matter for her. I am not persuaded that the member’s decision reveals an outcome error in the House v The King sense or was manifestly unreasonable.
I dismiss ground 9.
Conclusion
For these reasons, I do not consider that the Tribunal member erred by affirming the decision of the delegate of the Registrar to cancel the applicant’s firearms licence.
I grant an extension of time and permission to appeal but dismiss the appeal on all grounds. I will hear the parties as to costs.