D M C v Public Trustee - [2025] SASC 136

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Appeal to a Single Judge)
D M C v PUBLIC TRUSTEE
[2025] SASC 136
Judgment of the Honourable Justice Gray (ex tempore)
15 August 2025
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS - STATUTORY APPEALS FROM ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES TO COURTS
HEALTH LAW - GUARDIANSHIP, MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF PROPERTY OF PERSONS WITH IMPAIRED CAPACITY - ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT - REVIEW, REVOCATION, ETC
This is an appeal against orders of a senior member of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (‘SACAT’) refusing permission to the appellant to internally review a decision of a member of SACAT in the original jurisdiction to affirm, but vary, an administration order.
The appellant seeks leave to appeal on the basis that he has a right to self-determination of his finances, and that he has the capacity to manage his finances.
Public Trustee, as the respondent, submitted that an appeal to the Supreme Court requires leave and that leave should be refused. The matters raised by the appellant are matters to be considered afresh in the original jurisdiction of SACAT.
Held, refusing leave to appeal:
1. There is no merit in the grounds of appeal raised by the appellant, and there is no matter of substance which is reasonably arguable to justify a grant of leave to appeal: [38].

Guardianship and Administration Act 1993 (SA) s 5; South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA) s 71, referred to.
Aldridge v Registrar of Firearms [2022] SASC 5; Draoui v Le [2021] SASCA 33; Jackson v Lepp Investments Pty Ltd (2016) 125 SASR 1; Pix v SA Housing Trust (2016) 125 SASR 10; Varricchio v Wentzal (2016) 125 SASR 198, considered.

D M C v PUBLIC TRUSTEE
[2025] SASC 136
Civil: Single Judge Appeal
GRAY J (ex tempore):
Introduction

This matter concerns an appeal against the orders of a senior member of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (‘SACAT’). The Senior Member dismissed an application brought by Mr DMC (‘the applicant’ or ‘protected person’) for an internal review of a decision of a member in the original jurisdiction of SACAT to affirm, but vary, an administration order.
The applicant, who is self-represented on this appeal, seeks to appeal on the basis that he has a right to self-determination of his finances, and on the grounds that he has provided sufficient evidence of his capacity for self-determination of his finances. He sought modification of the orders granting Public Trustee certain powers to administer his financial affairs.
Public Trustee (‘the respondent’) contends that leave to appeal is required, and that leave should be refused. The respondent further contends that if leave is granted, the appeal should be dismissed.
Background
The applicant was legally represented on the internal review. It was submitted on the internal review that he is a 30-year-old man with a diagnosis of intellectual disability (‘ID’), attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (‘ADHD’), attachment disorder, anxiety disorder and a well-established attachment and anxiety disorder relating to…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading D M C v Public Trustee

Details

AGLC: D M C v Public Trustee [2025] SASC 136
Case: [2025] SASC 136
Decision Date: 15 August 2025

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of D M C v Public Trustee involved an application for leave to appeal against a decision made by the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (SACAT) regarding the administration order for the applicant, a man with intellectual disability and other conditions. The applicant sought to have the administration order, which was varied to allow him to manage his estate and income, revoked in its entirety. The Public Trustee opposed the appeal, arguing that leave should be refused and that the appeal should be dismissed if leave was granted. The Supreme Court of South Australia was tasked with determining whether the applicant's grounds for appeal were sufficiently arguable to warrant granting leave and, if so, whether the appeal should succeed.

The court considered the merits of the applicant's grounds for appeal, which primarily concerned the decision to maintain a limited administration order rather than revoking it completely. The court evaluated whether the internal review decision by SACAT contained any errors of law or was otherwise unreasonable. The court concluded that the internal review decision did not exhibit any error of law, as the Senior Member had correctly applied the relevant legal tests and had carefully assessed the evidence presented. The court also noted that the Senior Member had identified that the variation to the administration order was the correct decision to protect the applicant's finances and prevent exploitation.

Ultimately, the court found no merit in the grounds of appeal raised by the applicant. The court determined that there was no matter of substance which was reasonably arguable to justify a grant of leave to appeal and that the interests of justice would not be served by allowing the appeal to proceed. The court refused the application for leave to appeal and, in the event that leave was deemed necessary, it would have dismissed the appeal on the merits.

The court emphasised that an appeal to the Supreme Court is not a review of the merits of the decision made by SACAT. The court highlighted that the applicant's arguments largely pertained to the merits of the decision, which are not generally subject to appellate review. The court also noted that the refusal of leave would impact the applicant's ability to manage his finances but considered this against the broader interests of justice and the need for finality in litigation. The court concluded that the internal review decision was sound and that there was no basis for allowing the appeal to proceed.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

Public Trustee (‘the respondent’) contends that leave to appeal is required, and that leave should be refused. The respondent further contends that if leave is granted, the appeal should be dismissed.Background The applicant was legally represented on the internal review. It was submitted on the internal review that he is a 30-year-old man with a diagnosis of intellectual disability (‘ID’), attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (‘ADHD’), attachment disorder, anxiety disorder and a well-established attachment and anxiety disorder relating to an extensive trauma history. As a child, the applicant experienced ongoing abuse and abandonment. He was placed in foster care in 2007, when he was around 13 years of age. He lived from that time in a series of residential care placements, and as an adult, he has lived in various forms of accommodation including with friends, in motels, and in supported accommodation. The Public Advocate is appointed as the applicant’s guardian. The applicant did not challenge that order in the proceedings before SACAT. An administration order (full) was made in respect of the applicant by the Guardianship Board of South Australia on 9 August 2012. It appears from the decision on internal review that a guardianship order in some form has, for the most part, been in place since that time. The applicant has made numerous applications, including in 2015, 2016 and 2018 to revoke the guardianship order. These applications were all unsuccessful. On 6 March 2025, an application was brought by the applicant for an internal review of a decision of a member of SACAT of 6 August 2024, in the original jurisdiction pursuant to which an order was made affirming but varying the administration order (‘the 6 August 2024 decision’). The 6 August 2024 decision of SACAT varied the administration order from a full administration order to a limited administration order. The respondent remained as the administrator. The administration was limited to managing the whole of the protected person’s estate and any income (such as his Centrelink entitlements), apart from any income received by the applicant from any employment he may obtain. The applicant seeks that that order be revoked on this appeal. On the internal review, the applicant, whilst expressing a preference for variation to the guardianship order made, submitted that he can manage his finances with only informal supports, and that, as a consequence, the administration order should be set aside in its entirety. It was submitted on the internal review that the applicant currently resides in a house alone in Elizabeth Downs in supported independent living accommodation. He also receives support from NDIS support workers. At the internal review hearing, the applicant acknowledged that he had a cognitive impairment, but he did not agree that he continued to have a mental incapacity as defined in the Guardianship and Administration Act 1993 (SA). It was submitted on the internal review that, although the applicant has some decision-making incapacity concerning his finances, a guardianship order, even in the limited form, was not required because there are informal supports in place; he has accommodation and support with activities of daily life pursuant to his NDIS plan.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

GRAY J

There is a public interest in the finality of litigation,[19] and the issue before this court today concerns the application for leave to appeal in respect of the decision of the Senior Member on the internal review.[19] Draoui v Le [2021] SASCA 33 at [112] (S Doyle JA, with Lovell and Livesey JJA agreeing).Conclusion I have considered the merits of the grounds of appeal raised by the applicant in relation to the decision of the Senior Member. I find no merit in those grounds. It follows that there is no matter of substance which is reasonably arguable to justify a grant of leave to appeal. In my view, the interests of justice would not be served by a grant of leave in this matter.[20] I refuse leave to appeal. If necessary, in any event as I find no merit in the grounds raised, I would have dismissed the appeal.[20] Jackson v Lepp Investments Pty Ltd [2016] SASC 62; (2016) 125 SASR 1 at 5, [19] (Parker J); Pix v SA Housing Trust [2016] SASCFC 57; (2016) 125 SASR 10 at 11, [3] (Kourakis CJ, with Bampton and S Doyle JJ agreeing).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GRAY J

The overarching consideration is the interests of justice.[12][12] Jackson v Lepp Investments Pty Ltd [2016] SASC 62; (2016) 125 SASR 1 at 5, [19] (Parker J); Pix v South Australian Housing Trust [2016] SASCFC 57; (2016) 125 SASR 10 at 11, [3] (Kourakis CJ, with Bampton and S Doyle JJ agreeing).Consideration As the applicant was advised during this hearing, an appeal to this court is not a review of the merits.[13] Many of the matters raised by the applicant in oral submissions made at this hearing concern the merits of the decision made by SACAT. The applicant repeated many of the submissions that were raised before the Senior Member on the internal review.[13] Aldridge v Registrar of Firearms (SA) [2022] SASC 5 at [54] (Parker J). I have had regard to the principles in s 5 of the Guardianship and Administration Act 1993 (SA) in considering this matter. I accept that the refusal of leave will have an impact upon the applicant’s ability to manage his own monies and that such an order is restrictive of his rights and personal autonomy. I have also had regard to the wishes expressed by the applicant to manage his own finances and to all of the matters that the applicant has raised. In my view, the internal review decision does not exhibit any error of law. The Senior Member stated and applied the correct test in considering the question of permission to seek an internal review.[14] [14] AB at 33, [35]-[36]. The decision on review is not unreasonable, illogical or irrational.[15] The Senior Member carefully analysed and considered the submissions advanced by the applicant. The Senior Member also carefully assessed and weighed the evidence presented by the respondent on the internal review. The weight to be given to particular evidence received by SACAT on the internal review is a matter for SACAT to assess and, absent the form of error identified above in the assessment of this evidence, it is not a matter which is generally susceptible to appellate review.[16][15] House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; Aldridge v Registrar of Firearms (SA) [2022] SASC 5 at [33] (Parker J).[16] Aldridge v Registrar of Firearms (SA) [2022] SASC 5 at [75] (Parker J). It follows that I have not identified appellable error in the decision of the Senior Member. There is no process error such as an error in the reasoning process, nor is there an error in the outcome that is identified. The Senior Member identified that she considered that the variation to the order to permit the applicant to manage his wages was the correct and preferable decision.[17] The Senior Member followed a correct process in reaching the view that the evidence supports an administration order remaining in place to protect the applicant’s finances and to protect him from being preyed upon by other persons for his assets and cash.[18][17] AB at 33, [33].[18] AB at 33, [33]. In respect of the matters that the applicant raised about his difficulties accessing funds from Public Trustee to obtain legal representation to address other legal proceedings in which the applicant is involved, I have given consideration to these matters and it would be a concern if funds were not being provided to the applicant to obtain legal representation. Public Trustee submitted that it was not correct that funds were not provided to the applicant to obtain legal representation, including in relation to this appeal.