Rollins v City of Playford Council - [2025] SASC 181

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Appeal to a Single Judge)
ROLLINS v CITY OF PLAYFORD COUNCIL
[2025] SASC 181
Judgment of the Honourable Justice Gray (ex tempore)
23 October 2025
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS - SOUTH AUSTRALIAN CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
ANIMALS - LIABILITY OF OWNERS AND KEEPERS IN RESPECT OF INJURIES BY ANIMALS - STATUTORY PROVISIONS - SOUTH AUSTRALIA
COURTS AND JUDGES - JUDGES - POWERS AND DUTIES IN RESPECT OF UNREPRESENTED LITIGANTS
This matter concerns an application for leave to appeal against a decision of a senior member of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’) which affirmed a decision of the respondent, the City of Playford Council, to issue a destruction order in respect of a French Mastiff cross American Bulldog named ‘Hulk’, pursuant to ss 50(1)(a) of the Dog and Cat Management Act 1995 (SA).
The applicant’s contention on appeal was that targeted assistance was not provided to her as a self-represented litigant before the Tribunal and that she was denied procedural fairness.
The respondent submitted that the level of assistance provided by the Tribunal to the self-represented litigant was sufficient to satisfy the duties of the Tribunal with respect to self-represented litigants and that procedural fairness was not denied.
This appeal was filed a few days out of time.
After the appeal had been filed in this Court but prior to the notice of appeal being served on the respondent the dog was euthanised.
Held, refusing leave to appeal:
1.The applicant’s case on appeal, namely that procedural fairness was denied, is reasonably arguable. It is however not in the interests of justice to grant leave to appeal as there is no utility in the appeal as the dog has been euthanised: at [53]-[56].

Dog and Cat Management Act 1995 (SA) s 43, s 44, s 50, s 51 and s 59A; South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA) s 37 and s 71, referred to.
Wilson v City of Onkaparinga , applied.
Aldridge v Registrar of Firearms (SA) [2022] SASC 5; Fletcher v Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency [2023] SASCA 36; Gassy v The King [2023] SASCA 90; House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499; Jackson v Lepp Investments Pty Ltd [2016] SASC 62; (2016) 125 SASR 1; Kemp v Health and Community Services Complaints Commissioner [2025] SASC 56; Pix v South Australian Housing Trust [2016] SASCFC 57; (2016) 125 SASR 10; Varricchio v Wentzel [2016] SASC 86; (2016) 125 SASR 191, considered.

ROLLINS v CITY OF PLAYFORD COUNCIL
[2025] SASC 181
Civil: Single Judge Appeal
GRAY J (ex tempore):
Introduction

This matter concerns an application by Ms Rollins, the applicant, for leave to appeal against a decision of a senior member of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (‘SACAT’ or ‘the Tribunal’) made on 26 June 2025 (‘the Tribunal decision’). The applicant also seeks an extension of time to bring the appeal.
The decision against which the appeal is sought concerns a review by a senior member of SACAT of a decision dated 28 February 2025 (‘the Council decision’) of the respondent, the City of Playford Council (‘the Council’). The Council decision concerned the making of a Destruction Order (‘the destruction order’), pursuant to ss 50(1)(a) and (2) of the Dog and Cat Management Act 1995 (SA) (‘the Act’), in respect of a French Mastiff cross American Bulldog named ‘Hulk’ (‘the dog’ or ‘Hulk’).[1]
[1] The destruction order of 28 February 2025 identifies the order being made pursuant to section 50(2) of the Act. Notice of the intention to make that order had been given on 7 February 2025 to the then owner of Hulk: see Appeal Book (FDN 7) at 196 (Statement of Reasons dated 12 June 2025 at 4, [23]) (‘AB’).
The destruction order is made by reference to the grounds set out in s 51(a) of the Act, which in part provide as follows:
A council or the Board may make an order in relation to a dog under this Division if satisfied that—
(a) in the case of a Destruction Order—
(i) the dog is unduly dangerous; and
(ii)the dog has attacked, harassed or chased a person or an animal or bird owned by or in the charge of a person in circumstances that would constitute an offence against this Act…
The respondent issued reasons on 12 June 2025. The reasons record that the respondent was satisfied on the basis of two incidents that the destruction order was an appropriate and reasonable response. Other matters were also taken into account, including prior non-compliance with dog laws by the applicant. The applicant had at that stage of the proceedings been identified as someone with whom Hulk could be rehomed.
The learned Senior Member affirmed the decision under review as the correct and preferable decision.[2]
[2] South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA) s 37(1)(a).
The expiry of the time to appeal the Tribunal decision was 25 July 2025. The notice of appeal was filed in this Court on 28 July 2025. The respondent was served with the notice of appeal to this Court on 29 July 2025. The respondent states that prior to receiving the notice of appeal, the destruction order had been carried out, and the dog was euthanised.[3] The dog was euthanised on 29 July 2025, shortly before the notice of appeal was served on the respondent.[4]
[3] Respondent’s Written Submissions dated 13 October 2025 (FDN 4) at 1, [4] (‘RWS’).
[4] Appeal Transcript dated 20 October 2025 & 23 October 2025 at T5.18-24 (‘AT’); Affidavit of Paul St Leger Kelly sworn 23 October 2025 (FDN 12).
Background and nature of the appeal
This matter first came before SACAT on 2 May 2025. The matter was adjourned on that occasion as the applicant was not at that time the registered owner of the dog. The matter was then listed before the Tribunal on 9 May 2025 for further directions and by that time the applicant was the registered owner of the dog.
The owner of the dog at the time of the destruction order was, as I have indicated, not the applicant. On 7 May 2025, the applicant became the registered owner of Hulk. Prior to that, the registered owner of Hulk, as recorded by the Council, was Ms Michelle Crack (Davies). Another person, Ms Rebecca Majchrak, also identified herself to the Council as the owner of Hulk.[5] The Council issued the destruction order to both Ms Davies and Ms Majchrak.
[5] RWS at 2, [9]; AB at 193 (Statement of Reasons dated 12 June 2025 at 1, [3]).
A statement of reasons for the Council decision was issued following the appeal to SACAT, on 12 June 2025. Those reasons stated that the Council decision was made on the basis of two allegations concerning the dog as follows:[6]
a.On 8 August 2024, the dog was wandering at large, contrary to s 43(1) of the Act, along Stonehaven Street, Pennington. It is alleged that the dog approached two other dogs being walked on a lead when the dog attacked one of those dogs by grabbing them with his mouth. No injury resulted and no formal action was taken following investigation by the City of Charles Sturt; and,
b.On 30 January 2025 the dog, whilst residing at 28 Dolphin Street, Elizabeth, is alleged to have jumped the fence of the property and attacked a German Shepherd on the neighbouring property, where the dog had bitten at the throat of the German Shepherd. The German Shepherd required veterinary treatment, including surgery. This incident is alleged to have given rise to contraventions of ss 43(1) and 44(2) of the Act.
[6] AB at 194 (Statement of Reasons dated 12 June 2025 at 2, [12]-[15]).
The notice of the appeal does not identify in the usual way by reference to enumerated grounds the manner in which the decision is challenged. The applicant, being a self-represented litigant, did, however, in her notice of appeal rely upon the decision in Wilson v City of Onkaparinga (‘Wilson’).[7] The notice of appeal, inter alia, states: [8]
[T]he Member ought to have given Ms Rollins ‘targeted’ assistance by inviting her to obtain evidence to support her position.
[7] Wilson v City of Onkaparinga [2024] SASC 139 at [74]-[78] (B Doyle J).
[8] Notice of Appeal (FDN 1).
The notice then implies that a failure to provide such assistance meant that the applicant was denied procedural fairness. The notice also raises that the production of such evidence may have resulted in a different outcome.
Because the applicant is self-represented, and having regard to the obvious importance of this matter to her, I have considered for myself, having regard to the notice of appeal, whether although not precisely articulated or developed by the applicant, there are arguable grounds upon which to complain either about the process before the Tribunal or the essential steps in its reasoning and the outcome of the Tribunal process.[9]
[9] See Wilson v City of Onkaparinga [2024] SASC 139 at [80] (B Doyle J).
The respondent contends on appeal that the applicant was not denied procedural fairness and that the assistance that the Tribunal provided to the applicant in the course of the proceedings was consistent with the principles outlined by B Doyle J in Wilson.[10]
[10] RWS at 6, [31].
The respondent contends that to the extent that the applicant seeks to have the destruction order ‘downgraded, presumably to have Hulk (the dog the subject of the order) rehomed with her’, there is no utility in the appeal.[11]
[11] RWS at 2, [5].
The respondent initially submitted that ‘an appeal may still be appropriate in circumstances that the operation of the Act is such that whilst the order relates to the dog in most instances, the order is a relevant consideration in making a prohibition order pursuant to section 59A(3)(b)(ii) of the Act.’[12] The respondent goes on to state that ‘if the appellant is successful on appeal, the noting of a destruction order ‘on her record’ will be removed.’[13] However, that submission was withdrawn at the hearing of this appeal.[14]
[12] RWS at 6, [31].
[13] RWS at 6, [31].
[14] AT at T30.1-7.
On 10 0ctober 2025, orders were made indicating that the applicant should file written submissions as soon as practicable and in any event prior to the hearing of the appeal, noting that such submissions had not been filed within the timeframe provided for in the Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA).
The applicant being self-represented in this matter, the matter was called on for directions on 14 October 2025 to address matters that the applicant had raised in correspondence and to ascertain whether the applicant was in a position for the matter to proceed to hearing on 20 October 2025. The Court had not received any written submissions from the applicant and the applicant had not filed any evidentiary material. The applicant appeared via telephone on 14 October 2025 and was informed that should she wish to produce any evidence in support of her appeal, she should do so prior to the hearing of the appeal. The applicant was also informed that should she wish to obtain further legal advice she should so before the hearing.[15]
[15] Appeal Transcript dated 14 October 2025 at T4.2-11.
The respondent indicated at the directions hearing of this matter that, the applicant being self-represented, the respondent would file the appeal book.
At the hearing of this matter on 20 October 2025, the applicant did not appear. An explanation for the non-appearance was provided by email part way through the hearing. Whilst the respondent had initially contended that the matter should be dismissed for want of prosecution, ultimately the matter was adjourned for further hearing on 23 October 2025.
At the hearing of this matter on 23 October 2025, the respondent submitted that the Court should dismiss the matter for want of prosecution, without a determination of the application for leave to appeal on its merits. I determined, given that the Court was in a position to deal with the matter today, it was in the interests of finality to proceed with the hearing and determine the application for leave to appeal in the absence of the applicant.[16]
[16] See AT at T19.1-9.
I have summarised above the central contentions advanced by each party. I have, however, had regard to all of the submissions of the parties put forward, both in writing and orally, at the hearing of this appeal. I have also considered the documents contained in the appeal book, which I am informed constituted all of the substantive material before the Tribunal.[17]
[17] Book of Documents (as lodged before the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and provided to this Court pursuant to r 214.3(1) of the Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA)).
An extension of time
Appeals to this Court must be made within one month of the decision under review.[18] That requirement may be dispensed with where it is just and reasonable in the circumstances to do so.[19] In this case, there was no opposition to the extension of time being granted and an order granting the extension of time was made.[20]
[18] South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA) s 71(3).
[19] South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA) s 71(3).
[20] AT at T20.3-5.
Statutory basis of the appeal and relevant principles
An appeal under s 71 of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA) is by way of rehearing.[21]
[21] South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA) s 71(3a).
An appeal to this Court from a decision of a Senior Member requires leave.[22] This Court should only grant leave to appeal from a SACAT internal review decision where the appeal is reasonably arguable, and the subject matter is of sufficient substance to justify consideration.[23]
[22] South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA) s 71(2).
[23] See, as to being reasonably arguable: Jackson v Lepp Investments Pty Ltd [2016] SASC 62; (2016) 125 SASR 1 at 5-6, [19]-[20] (Parker J); Pix v South Australian Housing Trust [2016] SASCFC 57; (2016) 125 SASR 10 at 11, [3] (Kourakis CJ, with Bampton and S Doyle JJ agreeing). See, as to substance: Aldridge v Registrar of Firearms (SA) [2022] SASC 5 at [33] (Parker J).
It is important that leave is not granted as a matter of routine. SACAT is a specialist tribunal, and the granting of leave too readily would undermine the legislative intention to establish SACAT as a specialist tribunal.[24] It is also relevant to consider the Court’s function on appeal if leave is granted noting that this is an appeal by way of rehearing.[25]
[24] Varricchio v Wentzel [2016] SASC 86; (2016) 125 SASR 191 at 198, [37] (S Doyle J).
[25] RWS at 5, [27].
The overarching consideration is the interests of justice.[26]
Consideration in respect of ground of appeal
[26] Jackson v Lepp Investments Pty Ltd [2016] SASC 62; (2016) 125 SASR 1 at 5, [19] (Parker J); Pix v South Australian Housing Trust [2016] SASCFC 57; (2016) 125 SASR 10 at 11, [3] (Kourakis CJ, with Bampton and S Doyle JJ agreeing).
The Tribunal decision
The Tribunal found that the statutory preconditions to the making of a Destruction Order were established. The Tribunal held:[27]
A Destruction Order can be made on the grounds set out in section 51(a) of the Dog and Cat Management Act 1995, namely (i) the dog is unduly dangerous; and (ii) the dog has attacked, harassed or chased a person or an animal or bird owned by or in the charge of a person in circumstances that would constitute an offence against the Dog and Cat Management Act.
‘Unduly dangerous’ is not defined in the Dog and Cat Management Act. The usual authority on the meaning of ‘unduly dangerous’ as that term is used in that Act is to be found in the District Court decision of Clare & Gilbert Valleys Council v Crawford [2005] SADC 135. At [77] Millsteed J found that an unduly dangerous dog exposes “the public, or other animals, to an appreciable risk of serious harm”. It is also necessary to consider the context in which that risk of harm arises, for example if the dog is being mistreated, provoked or used in the reasonable defence of a person or property: Crawford at [69].
In this matter Hulk attacked the other dog when he escaped from the property where he was being housed. No more than that is reliably known about the incident. There is no evidence that Hulk was provoked or being used to defend anyone or anything, and I find that he was not. Ms Rollins submitted that Hulk had not been fed for 2 days but I am not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that that is correct, nor that hunger would justify the attack that Hulk launched on the other dog’s throat.
I bear in mind that Hulk had previously been involved in an incident on 8 August 2024 where he escaped from another property and by his behaviour caused a passerby to believe that he was about to attack her dog. Hulk did not inflict injury although he grabbed the other dog with his mouth. No action was taken by the council in whose area this incident occurred.
[27] AB at 9 (Order of the Tribunal dated 26 June 2025 at 2, [5]-[8]).
The learned Senior Member went on to find:[28]
I have had regard to the material that was before the City of Playford Council and to the additional written and oral evidence put before the Tribunal on review. I am satisfied that Hulk is an unduly dangerous dog with a history of escaping from properties where he has been housed, and behaving aggressively towards other dogs. The injuries he inflicted on another dog on 30 January 2025 were extremely serious. I am satisfied that Hulk has attacked or harassed other dogs in circumstances that could constitute an offence against the Dog and Cat Management Act in both August 2024 and January 2025. I am not satisfied that Ms Rollins is able to manage Hulk effectively to reduce the risk he presents if he were to escape once again. Although Ms Rollins submitted that she had spoken to 2 persons with apparent expertise in canine behaviour about the possibility of Hulk undergoing training to alleviate anxiety, she did not provide the Tribunal with any written evidence from those persons who had not in any event assessed Hulk.
[28] AB at 9 (Order of the Tribunal dated 26 June 2025 at 2, [12]).
As I have indicated above, the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the Council as being the correct and preferable decision.[29]
[29] AB at 10 (Order of the Tribunal dated 26 June 2025 at 3, ‘Order of the Tribunal’).
Consideration
The matters raised by the applicant are clearly of significance to her, and it is clear from the materials that the applicant held a genuine and deep affection for Hulk. The applicant was also, based on the papers, concerned to see that what she perceived as the right thing was done, notwithstanding that the destruction order had been carried out prior to the hearing of the application for leave to appeal.
As I have indicated above, this Court should only grant leave to appeal from a SACAT internal review decision where the appeal is reasonably arguable, and the subject matter is of sufficient substance to justify consideration.[30] The overarching consideration is the interests of justice.[31]
[30] See, as to being reasonably arguable: Jackson v Lepp Investments Pty Ltd [2016] SASC 62; (2016) 125 SASR 1 at 5-6, [19]-[20] (Parker J); Pix v South Australian Housing Trust [2016] SASCFC 57; (2016) 125 SASR 10 at 11, [3] (Kourakis CJ, with Bampton and S Doyle JJ agreeing). See, as to substance: Aldridge v Registrar of Firearms (SA) [2022] SASC 5 at [33] (Parker J).
[31] Jackson v Lepp Investments Pty Ltd [2016] SASC 62; (2016) 125 SASR 1 at 5, [19] (Parker J); Pix v South Australian Housing Trust [2016] SASCFC 57; (2016) 125 SASR 10 at 11, [3] (Kourakis CJ, with Bampton and S Doyle JJ agreeing).

In the case of the making of a Destruction Order, such an order cannot be made unless the statutory criteria in s 51(a) are made out. B Doyle J held in Wilson,[32] in the context of s 59A(3) of the Act, that the question of whether mandatory statutory criteria are made out on appeal raises the correctness standard, whereas his Honour held in respect of the making of a decision about whether and in what form orders should be made, the deferential standard applies on appeal.I accept the reasoning in Wilson and I find that it applies in respect of a decision made pursuant to s 51(a) of the Act.
[32] Wilson v City of Onkaparinga [2024] SASC 139 at [73]-[74] (B Doyle J).
The question of whether or not a Destruction Order should be made following a finding that the statutory criteria to enliven the discretion are made out is a question in relation to which the principles in House v The King[33] apply. It follows that the applicant needs to demonstrate a miscarriage in the exercise of the discretion, either in the manner in which, or reasoning by which, it was exercised (a process error) or in the outcome of its exercise (an outcome error).[34]
[33] House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499.
[34] Wilson v City of Onkaparinga [2024] SASC 139 at [69] (B Doyle J).
I do have some significant concerns about the hearing that occurred in SACAT.
The relevant principles that are applicable in dealing with self-represented litigants were referred to in Wilson.[35]In that case, as B Doyle J held:[36]
Dealing with self-represented litigants can require the striking of a difficult balance. A court or tribunal should ensure that the litigant’s lack of legal representation does not compromise the fairness of the hearing by providing appropriate assistance where necessary – particularly in order to ensure that the proceeding is kept free from error or misunderstanding. However, the court or tribunal ought not conduct the case for the litigant, advise them, or otherwise detract from the neutrality of the court or tribunal so as to create a legitimate sense of grievance on the part of the other party.
Considering the proceeding in the Tribunal as a whole, I consider that the applicant was given appropriate, albeit general, assistance in encouraging and facilitating the presentation by him of his arguments. To conclude that the Tribunal was required in effect to identify and guide the applicant as to the specific matters he should address, in order to best advance the broader contentions he was making, would impose an unrealistic burden on a busy Tribunal and risk detracting from the neutrality of the Tribunal’s role. It may also carry some risks. A court or tribunal will usually be unaware of the complete evidential and forensic landscape that might inform the choices litigants, including unrepresented litigants, make, and it should therefore be careful about being overly prescriptive in the identification of relevant matters about which evidence or submissions should be made. Fundamentally, as was said in Gassy v The King, it remains for the parties to define the issues and to select the evidence and arguments on which they rely.
(citations omitted)
[35] Wilson v City of Onkaparinga [2024] SASC 139 at [88]-[89] (B Doyle J).
[36] Wilson v City of Onkaparinga [2024] SASC 139 at [88]-[89] (B Doyle J).
Further, in Gassy v The King it was held that: [37]
A litigant has a fundamental right to self-representation. Despite the prevalence of unrepresented litigants, it remains for the parties to define the issues and to select the evidence and arguments on which they rely.
(citations omitted)
[37] Gassy v The King [2023] SASCA 90 at [33] (Livesey P, David JA and Stein AJA).
I have concerns about the findings that are expressed in paragraph [10] of SACAT’s decision in which the learned Senior Member states:
On 17 September 2024, 2 of her dogs escaped from her property and one of them attacked and bit another dog. This incident is relevant to the Tribunal’s decision in 2 ways. Firstly, it detracts from Ms Rollins’ submission that it would not be possible for Hulk to escape from her property due to the height of the fence and that fact that she is ‘always there’ except for ‘2 hours per week’. Secondly, it detracts from Ms Rollins’ submission that she is able to manage dogs, and that Hulk would be calm and not aggressive if put into her care.
The respondent’s evidence before the Tribunal consisted of evidence from Ms Cheryl Doudle, a Senior Community Inspector with the Council, that:[38]
We do have concerns. In terms of housing, I understand that Ms Rollins already has three large dogs that she is the owner of. During conversations she has advised that if she were to take Hulk, she would re-home her three dogs. I question whether that would be the case. If that wasn’t the case, I would be concerned given the behaviour displayed by Hulk is highly dog-aggressive, I’m concerned that he would be housed at a property with four other dogs. Also concerned that Ms Rollins has talked about how secure her property is. But, on 17 September 2024, two of her dogs escaped her property and were involved in a dog attack, resulting in a single bite wound to the victim dog.
[38] AB at 37 (Transcript of Proceedings, Rollins v City of Playford Council (South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, D’Arcy SM, 20 June 2025) at 14 (‘SACAT Transcript’)).
The evidence before the Tribunal concerning that incident from the applicant was as follows:[39]
Also, can I add that when my two dogs did get out, there was no brutal attack or anything like that. As a matter of fact, I went and saw the Council, my Council Marion, it was just a report made. It was an accident and it wasn’t my fault. My dogs never get out of my yard. The fellow that was repairing my fence came with me and owned up to the fact that he didn’t shut the gate properly while he was welding up the bars there to allow for a padlock. I could have strangled him, but, yeah. Because my dogs just never get out. And, he just had not shut the gate properly. Lucky I was in the front yard. One of the dogs jumped on the gate and bang, open she come. But, yeah, it was really a nothing occurrence. But still, two of them did get out. But, I was on top of it pretty well straight away. Yeah, it doesn’t happen. It never, ever, ever happens. I keep my gates padlocked at all times.
[39] AB at 40 (SACAT Transcript at 17).
On further questioning by the learned Senior Member, the following evidence was given:[40]
Yeah, they did, yeah. But, of course, yes she panicked and so did I. You know, you don’t know what dogs are going to do. But, my dogs are not vicious at all. I’m grateful that they didn’t actually attack. One of them was just jumping around like a lunatic and the other one was just wagging its tail. It was a non-event, but they shouldn’t have got out and I take full ownership of that.
[40] AB at 40 (SACAT Transcript at 17).
The respondent on appeal accepted that the difficulty in terms of the findings of the Tribunal is that the learned Senior Member does not identify the basis for preferring the evidence of the respondent on this topic over the evidence of the applicant.[41]
[41] AT at T22.34-8-23.1-6.
The learned Senior Member also makes no mention in the reasons for decision of the applicant’s unchallenged evidence that Hulk had resided with her for a couple of years, there were no reported incidents in that time, and that he had been fine with other dogs.[42]
[42] AB at 41 (SACAT Transcript at 18).
The learned Senior Member made the following factual findings in respect of the 8 August 2024 incident:[43]
I bear in mind that Hulk had previously been involved in an incident on 8 August 2024 where he escaped from another property and by his behaviour caused a passerby to believe that he was about to attack her dog. Hulk did not inflict injury although he grabbed the other dog with his mouth. No action was taken by the council in whose area this incident occurred.
[43] AB at 9 (Order of the Tribunal dated 26 June 2025 at 2, [8]).
The evidence led from the respondent upon which the finding at paragraph [8], that a passerby believed that Hulk was about to attack her dog, was as follows:[44]
[44] AB at 37 (SACAT Transcript at 14).
So, it was notes that were written by Charles Sturt Council, have said that:
Hulk and his mate dog Prada were wandering about.
The allegation that was made was that:
Hulk rushed over and grabbed the victim dog with his mouth, but didn’t bite.
The notes were:
He was mouthy, no injuries, victims think the dog was just being playful or interested but not aggressive. Female dog was not involved.
The respondent accepted on appeal that there was a distinction between the evidence before the Tribunal and the finding concerning an attack.[45] I have some difficulty in accepting that the evidence supported a finding that Hulk by his behaviour on 8 August 2024 caused a passerby to believe that he was about to attack her dog.
[45] AT at T25.30.
The learned Senior Member also referred at paragraph [13] of the reasons to ‘Hulk’s history of attacks.’ It is difficult to characterise the 8 August 2024 incident as supportive of a finding that there was a history of attacks, although the respondent on this appeal characterised that reference as a reference by SACAT to both the 8 August 2024 incident together with the 30 January 2025 incident.
The learned Senior Member held: [46]
The respondent submitted that with Ms Rollins already owning 3 dogs, she would not be permitted a 4^th dog and that in order to have Hulk she would need to give up one of her other dogs. Ms Rollins agreed that her local council will not permit her to have 4 dogs. She said that she intends to surrender one of her dogs to her partner who lives in a different property. However that surrender has not yet occurred and no steps have been taken to transfer the registered ownership of any of Ms Rollins’ existing dogs. Ms Rollins submitted that she wanted to ‘wait and see’ what the outcome of this Tribunal proceeding is before undertaking the transfer process. However that ‘wait and see’ approach means that the Tribunal cannot be confident that Hulk could lawfully be put in Ms Rollins’ care even if the Destruction order were to be revoked.
[46] AB at 9 (Order of the Tribunal dated 26 June 2025 at 2, [11]).
The evidence before the Tribunal on that topic was as follows:[47]
SENIOR MEMBER D’ARCY: Is your partner is he now the registered owner of Bailey?
GAIL ROLLINS: No, not yet. We’re just waiting to see, I’m just waiting to see what happens here. Everything will be finalised. There is no point spending money to do all those things if I am not successful, you know. But, yes, it is going to happen, it can be done and there’s no problems there.
SENIOR MEMBER D’ARCY: Well, the difficulty with not having done it, Ms Rollins, is that it puts me in a position of needing to trust that it will happen.
GAIL ROLLINS: Okay, well, you can trust that. You can speak to my partner if you like, there’s no problems there too. I could make a phone call.
SENIOR MEMBER D’ARCY: Well, I don't know what evidence you expect me to take from him that would be relevant.
GAIL ROLLINS: Okay. Well, you know, I’m on my own here, I’ve been on my own the whole way through this. You know, I don't know what else to do. It is not something that I’m accustomed to, having to deal with this it has not been easy. And, but some things just I know that will have to be done if I’m successful, but it has just been something that I’m unaccustomed to, you know.
[47] AB at 42 (SACAT Transcript at 19).
It is difficult to ascertain how corroborative evidence from the applicant’s partner as to his willingness to accept the transfer of ownership of Bailey would not have been relevant to the finding the Tribunal ultimately made, namely that, the ‘Tribunal cannot be confident that Hulk could lawfully be put in Ms Rollins’ care even if the destruction order were to be revoked.’[48]
[48] AB at 9 (Order of the Tribunal dated 26 June 2025 at 2, [11]).
In any event, as the respondent properly conceded on the appeal, orders could have been made by the Tribunal which made the revocation of the destruction order consequent upon the applicant transferring the ownership of her other dog, Bailey, to her partner.[49]
[49] AT at T26.12-23.
I am mindful that, as B Doyle J held in Wilson, an unrealistic burden should not be imposed upon a tribunal concerning the extent to which a tribunal should identify and guide the applicant as to the specific matters a self-represented litigant should address. However, the difficulty with the manner in which the Tribunal dealt with the evidence concerning the number of dogs to be owned by the applicant is that the comments made by the Tribunal on this topic may have dissuaded the applicant from calling additional supportive evidence on this topic. To the extent that the applicant seeks to raise a ground of procedural fairness, I consider this ground is reasonably arguable.
In addition, as I have identified above, it is reasonably arguable that the Tribunal’s reasoning at paragraphs [8] and [13] contain the making of factual findings which are arguably not supported by the evidence before the Tribunal. The factual findings, in paragraphs [8] and [13], concern adverse findings about a prior incident involving Hulk on 8 August 2024. This factual finding arguably formed an essential step in the Tribunal’s reasoning. The factual finding at paragraph [10] concerns an incident including two other dogs which occurred on 17 September 2024. It is difficult to ascertain whether that factual finding was made after assessment of the differing versions of the incident before the Tribunal.
Returning however to the question of leave to appeal, although, for the reasons I have outlined above, there are reasonably arguable grounds, in order for there to be a grant of leave, the subject matter of the appeal must be of sufficient substance to justify consideration,[50] and the overarching consideration is the interests of justice.[51] A matter which weighs heavily against the grant of leave being in the interests of justice in this case is the question of the utility of the appeal.[52]
[50] See, as to being reasonably arguable: Jackson v Lepp Investments Pty Ltd [2016] SASC 62; (2016) 125 SASR 1 at 5-6, [19]-[20] (Parker J); Pix v South Australian Housing Trust [2016] SASCFC 57; (2016) 125 SASR 10 at 11, [3] (Kourakis CJ, with Bampton and S Doyle JJ agreeing). See, as to substance: Aldridge v Registrar of Firearms (SA) [2022] SASC 5 at [33] (Parker J).
[51] Jackson v Lepp Investments Pty Ltd [2016] SASC 62; (2016) 125 SASR 1 at 5, [19] (Parker J); Pix v South Australian Housing Trust [2016] SASCFC 57; (2016) 125 SASR 10 at 11, [3] (Kourakis CJ, with Bampton and S Doyle JJ agreeing).
[52] See Kemp v Health and Community Services Complaints Commissioner [2025] SASC 56 at [81] (B Doyle J). See also Fletcher v Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency [2023] SASCA 36 (Livesey P and Lovell JA).
I am unable to identify any utility in the grant of leave in circumstances where the dog has been euthanised.
I do not accept the submission initially advanced by the respondent that there is utility in the appeal by the operation of s 59A. Section 59A(3) only has operation if the applicant had owned or was responsible for the control of Hulk in the circumstances described in that section. On the evidence, the applicant was not responsible for the control of Hulk when the incident leading to the issuing of the destruction order occurred. The applicant’s ownership did not occur until after Hulk had been detained at an animal holding facility.
I would refuse leave to appeal as there is no utility in the appeal. Whilst it may be of little comfort to the parties, it is important to consider that even if there had been utility in the appeal and a grant of leave to appeal, this would not necessarily have altered the outcome for Hulk. The severity of the attack which occurred on 30 January 2025 would have been a significant matter for consideration on any rehearing before this Court or should the matter have been remitted for rehearing before the Tribunal. As I have determined that it is not in the interests of justice to grant leave to appeal, I do not address that issue further.
Conclusion and orders
The order of this Court is that the application for leave to appeal is dismissed.