Coffey LPM Pty Ltd v The Contaminated Sites Committee [No 2]

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CIVIL

CITATION:   COFFEY LPM PTY LTD -v- THE CONTAMINATED SITES COMMITTEE [No 2] [2013] WASC 98

CORAM:   HALL J

HEARD:   13 NOVEMBER 2012

DELIVERED          :   22 MARCH 2013

FILE NO/S:   CIV 1979 of 2012

BETWEEN:   COFFEY LPM PTY LTD

Applicant

AND

THE CONTAMINATED SITES COMMITTEE
First Respondent

WESFARMERS KLEENHEAT GAS PTY LTD
Second Respondent

WA SEAFOOD EXPORTERS PTY LTD
Third Respondent

MINISTER FOR THE ENVIRONMENT & HERITAGE
First-named Intervenor

ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Second-named Intervenor

Catchwords:

Prerogative writs - Judicial review - Contaminated Sites Act 2003 (WA) - Notice of provisional findings - Whether procedural fairness requirements met - Whether oral hearing required - Whether notice deficient in informing of the case to be met - Whether the notice should have contained statement of reasons - Whether the notice should have dealt with arguments raised by applicant and resolved conflicting evidence - Whether reasonable suspicion of contraventions could be held without excluding statutory defences

Legislation:

Contaminated Sites Act 2003 (WA), s 37, s 38

Result:

Order nisi discharged
Limited declaration made

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant:     Dr J T Schoombee & Ms S C Errey

First Respondent     :     No appearance

Second Respondent     :     No appearance

Third Respondent     :     No appearance

First-named Intervenor     :     Mr R M Mitchell SC & Mr F Sunderland

Second-named Intervenor    :     Mr R M Mitchell SC & Mr F Sunderland

Solicitors:

Applicant:     SRB Legal

First Respondent     :     No appearance

Second Respondent     :     No appearance

Third Respondent     :     No appearance

First-named Intervenor     :     State Solicitor for Western Australia

Second-named Intervenor    :     State Solicitor for Western Australia

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Alphacell Ltd v Woodward [1972] AC 824; [1972] 2 All ER 475

Apache Northwest Pty Ltd v Agostini [No 2] [2009] WASCA 231

BP Australia Pty Ltd v Contaminated Sites Committee [2012] WASC 221

BP Australia v Contaminated Sites Committee [2012] WASC 211

DeKuyper v Crafter [1942] SASR 238

Environmental Agency (formerly National Rivers Authority) v Empress Car Co (Abertillery) Ltd [1998] 1 All ER 481; [1999] 2 AC 22

George v Rockett [1990] HCA 26; (1990) 170 CLR 104

Grays Haulage Co v Arnold [1966] 1 All ER 896

Gribbles Pathology v Cassidy [2002] FCR 856; (2002) 122 FCR 78

Heatley v The Tasmanian Racing and Gaming Commission [1977] HCA 39; (1977) 137 CLR 487

Hot Holdings Pty Ltd v Creasy [1996] HCA 44; (1996) 185 CLR 149

Kingham v Cole [2002] FCA 45; (2002) 118 FCR 289

Majury v Sunbeam Co Ltd [1974] 1 NSWLR 659

Masha Nominees Pty Ltd v Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd [2006] VSC 15; (2008) Aust Contract R 90‑237

MH6 v Mental Health Review Board [2009] VSCA 184; (2009) 25 VR 382

NAHF v The Minister for Immigration (2003) 128 FCR 351

NCSC v News Corp [1984] HCA 29; (1984) 156 CLR 296

Pallos Verdes Estates Pty Ltd v Carbon (1991) 6 WAR 223

Plaintiff M61/2010E v The Commonwealth…

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Details
Case
[2013] WASC 98
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Coffey LPM Pty Ltd v The Contaminated Sites Committee [No 2] involved the applicant, Coffey LPM Pty Ltd, challenging the validity of a notice of provisional findings issued by the Contaminated Sites Committee (the Committee). The applicant argued that the notice did not comply with procedural fairness requirements as outlined in the Contaminated Sites Act 2003 (WA). The case was heard in the Supreme Court of Western Australia. The central legal issues revolved around whether the notice of provisional findings issued by the Committee was deficient and whether it failed to meet the requirements of procedural fairness. Specifically, the court had to determine whether the notice was adequate in informing the applicant of the case to be met, if it should have contained a statement of reasons, if it should have addressed the arguments raised by the applicant and resolved conflicting evidence, and if a reasonable suspicion of contraventions could be held without excluding statutory defences.

The court examined the nature of the notice of provisional findings under section 37 of the Act and its role in the process of determining responsibility for remediation. The court noted that a notice of provisional findings is a procedural mechanism designed to ensure procedural fairness to those who may be held responsible for remediation. The court held that the notice did not affect the applicant's rights or interests and was merely a step in the process by which the Committee reached a decision. The court rejected the applicant's argument that it was entitled to procedural fairness in a particular manner before the requirements of section 37 were met. The court found that the notice was sufficient in informing the applicant of the case to be met and did not need to contain a statement of reasons or address all arguments and conflicting evidence at that stage. The court also held that a reasonable suspicion of contraventions could be held without excluding statutory defences.

The Supreme Court of Western Australia found that the notice of provisional findings issued by the Committee was valid and did not breach the requirements of procedural fairness. The applicant's challenge to the notice was dismissed. The court's decision underscored the importance of procedural fairness in the context of environmental regulation and the balance between ensuring fairness and maintaining practical and efficient decision-making processes.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The jurisdiction of the committee was enlivened by the application by WASE pursuant to s 36. That section provides as follows:Committee to make decisions as to responsibility for remediation(1)The committee is to make decisions as to -(a)who is responsible for remediation of a site;(b)the extent to which a person is, or persons are, responsible for remediation of a site.(2)The committee -(a)is to make a decision as to responsibility for remediation if it is requested to do so by an interested person; and(b)may make a decision as to responsibility for remediation on its own initiative.(3)In this section - interested person means a person who is prescribed as being an interested person for the purposes of this section. If the committee makes a determination that a person is responsible for remediation one of the consequences is that the CEO of the Department of Environment and Conservation (DEC) may issue various kinds of notices under pt 4 of the Act. These notices may require the investigation, cleanup or abatement of hazards arising from the contamination of a site: s 41 and s 49 to s 51. The Act provides that where a site is classified as 'contaminated - remediation required' a notice may be given to 'a person responsible for remediation of the site': s 42(1)(a). Where more than one person is responsible notice may be given to any or all of the persons responsible for remediation. A notice may also be given to an owner or occupier of the land: s 42(1)(c). Such notices are binding on the person to whom they are given: s 47A(a). In some circumstances a notice may also be binding on subsequent owners: s 48; or on an owner of other land: s 54. A person on whom a notice is binding must ensure that the requirements of the notice are complied with within such time as is specified in the notice: s 43. Failure to comply with a notice is an offence and may also result in the CEO taking action to ensure that the requirements of the notice are complied with: s 43(2) and s 53(1)(a). The CEO may also recover the costs of taking action to ensure compliance from the person on whom the notice is binding: s 55(1). Where a person carries out investigation or remediation in respect of a site (whether or not pursuant to a notice issued by the CEO) the person may, to the extent that the person is not a person responsible for the remediation of the site, recover certain costs from the person responsible for that remediation: s 56. The costs recoverable are the reasonable costs of carrying out the investigation or remediation and of complying with a notice issued by the CEO which is binding on the person incurring the cost. Such costs are recoverable by action in a court of competent jurisdiction. It can be seen from this that there are two significant consequences that flow from a decision as to responsibility for remediation of a site classified as 'contamination - remediation required'. First, it makes the person or persons responsible liable to be served with a notice by the CEO which they are under a legal obligation to comply with. Secondly, it makes responsible persons liable to an action for recovery of costs associated with investigation and remediation of the site.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

However, no decision as to responsibility for remediation has yet been made. The question in the present case concerns the validity of the s 37 notice rather than the validity of a decision as to responsibility for remediation. The question is whether the Act implicity conditions the power to issue a notice under s 37 by imposing a requirement that the identified elements of procedural fairness be rendered prior to that notice issuing. A condition that a power conferred by statute upon the executive will be exercised with procedural fairness to those whose interest may be adversely effected by the exercise of that power is usually implied: Plaintiff S10/2011 v Minister for Immigration [2012] HCA 31; (2012) 86 ALJR 1019 [97] (Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ). See also Re Refugee Tribunal; Ex parte Aala [2000] HCA 57; (2000) 204 CLR 82. Crucially, as I have earlier noted, a notice under s 37 does not affect the rights or interests of the applicant; it is one step in the process by which the committee reaches a decision. The decision to issue a s 37 notice is not one that would be expected to attract obligations of procedural fairness. The proper characterisation of a s 37 notice is that it is one of the mechanisms by which procedural fairness is accorded to a person who may ultimately be held responsible for remediation of a site. The requirement to issue a s 37 notice is a modification of the common law requirements of procedural fairness, imposing on the committee a stricter obligation than might otherwise apply: BP Australia Pty Ltd v Contaminated Sites Committee [2012] WASC 221 [110] (Martin CJ). In essence, the applicant's contention is that it is entitled to be accorded procedural fairness in a particular manner before the procedural fairness requirements provided for in s 37 have been accorded to the applicant. To construe the Act in this manner would be to treat a s 37 notice as having greater significance and effect than is provided for in the Act. Furthermore, it would be to impose prescriptive obligations as to the way in which, and timing of, aspects of procedural fairness are to be delivered. This is likely to impose a process which is more concerned with formalities than s 34 implies. Procedural fairness is concerned with substance, not form. It is concerned with the substance of the entirety of the process, not part of it: See South Australia v O'Shea [1987] HCA 39; (1987) 163 CLR 378. The applicant placed reliance on the process here being what was described as 'two‑tier decision‑making'. That is to say that the process involves an investigation and a preliminary decision before a final decision is made. Reference was made to Hot Holdings Pty Ltd v Creasy [1996] HCA 44; (1996) 185 CLR 149 and Gribbles Pathology v Cassidy [2002] FCR 856; (2002) 122 FCR 78. But the use of general categorisations like 'two‑tier decision‑making' is apt to obscure the importance of the particular circumstances. Hot Holdings involved a preliminary decision by someone other than the final decision‑maker that the final decision‑maker was then required to take into account. That is materially different to the present case. In any event, whether and to what extent procedural fairness requirements apply to a preliminary stage in proceedings must always depend on the particular statutory framework within which the decision is made.