JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL
CITATION: COFFEY LPM PTY LTD -v- THE CONTAMINATED SITES COMMITTEE [No 2] [2013] WASC 98
CORAM: HALL J
HEARD: 13 NOVEMBER 2012
DELIVERED : 22 MARCH 2013
FILE NO/S: CIV 1979 of 2012
BETWEEN: COFFEY LPM PTY LTD
Applicant
AND
THE CONTAMINATED SITES COMMITTEE
First RespondentWESFARMERS KLEENHEAT GAS PTY LTD
Second RespondentWA SEAFOOD EXPORTERS PTY LTD
Third RespondentMINISTER FOR THE ENVIRONMENT & HERITAGE
First-named IntervenorATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Second-named Intervenor
Catchwords:
Prerogative writs - Judicial review - Contaminated Sites Act 2003 (WA) - Notice of provisional findings - Whether procedural fairness requirements met - Whether oral hearing required - Whether notice deficient in informing of the case to be met - Whether the notice should have contained statement of reasons - Whether the notice should have dealt with arguments raised by applicant and resolved conflicting evidence - Whether reasonable suspicion of contraventions could be held without excluding statutory defences
Legislation:
Contaminated Sites Act 2003 (WA), s 37, s 38
Result:
Order nisi discharged
Limited declaration made
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Applicant: Dr J T Schoombee & Ms S C Errey
First Respondent : No appearance
Second Respondent : No appearance
Third Respondent : No appearance
First-named Intervenor : Mr R M Mitchell SC & Mr F Sunderland
Second-named Intervenor : Mr R M Mitchell SC & Mr F Sunderland
Solicitors:
Applicant: SRB Legal
First Respondent : No appearance
Second Respondent : No appearance
Third Respondent : No appearance
First-named Intervenor : State Solicitor for Western Australia
Second-named Intervenor : State Solicitor for Western Australia
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Alphacell Ltd v Woodward [1972] AC 824; [1972] 2 All ER 475
Apache Northwest Pty Ltd v Agostini [No 2] [2009] WASCA 231
BP Australia Pty Ltd v Contaminated Sites Committee [2012] WASC 221
BP Australia v Contaminated Sites Committee [2012] WASC 211
DeKuyper v Crafter [1942] SASR 238
Environmental Agency (formerly National Rivers Authority) v Empress Car Co (Abertillery) Ltd [1998] 1 All ER 481; [1999] 2 AC 22
George v Rockett [1990] HCA 26; (1990) 170 CLR 104
Grays Haulage Co v Arnold [1966] 1 All ER 896
Gribbles Pathology v Cassidy [2002] FCR 856; (2002) 122 FCR 78
Heatley v The Tasmanian Racing and Gaming Commission [1977] HCA 39; (1977) 137 CLR 487
Hot Holdings Pty Ltd v Creasy [1996] HCA 44; (1996) 185 CLR 149
Kingham v Cole [2002] FCA 45; (2002) 118 FCR 289
Majury v Sunbeam Co Ltd [1974] 1 NSWLR 659
Masha Nominees Pty Ltd v Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd [2006] VSC 15; (2008) Aust Contract R 90‑237
MH6 v Mental Health Review Board [2009] VSCA 184; (2009) 25 VR 382
NAHF v The Minister for Immigration (2003) 128 FCR 351
NCSC v News Corp [1984] HCA 29; (1984) 156 CLR 296
Pallos Verdes Estates Pty Ltd v Carbon (1991) 6 WAR 223
Plaintiff M61/2010E v The Commonwealth…
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- Case
- [2013] WASC 98
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the nature of the notice of provisional findings under section 37 of the Act and its role in the process of determining responsibility for remediation. The court noted that a notice of provisional findings is a procedural mechanism designed to ensure procedural fairness to those who may be held responsible for remediation. The court held that the notice did not affect the applicant's rights or interests and was merely a step in the process by which the Committee reached a decision. The court rejected the applicant's argument that it was entitled to procedural fairness in a particular manner before the requirements of section 37 were met. The court found that the notice was sufficient in informing the applicant of the case to be met and did not need to contain a statement of reasons or address all arguments and conflicting evidence at that stage. The court also held that a reasonable suspicion of contraventions could be held without excluding statutory defences.
The Supreme Court of Western Australia found that the notice of provisional findings issued by the Committee was valid and did not breach the requirements of procedural fairness. The applicant's challenge to the notice was dismissed. The court's decision underscored the importance of procedural fairness in the context of environmental regulation and the balance between ensuring fairness and maintaining practical and efficient decision-making processes.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
However, no decision as to responsibility for remediation has yet been made. The question in the present case concerns the validity of the s 37 notice rather than the validity of a decision as to responsibility for remediation. The question is whether the Act implicity conditions the power to issue a notice under s 37 by imposing a requirement that the identified elements of procedural fairness be rendered prior to that notice issuing. A condition that a power conferred by statute upon the executive will be exercised with procedural fairness to those whose interest may be adversely effected by the exercise of that power is usually implied: Plaintiff S10/2011 v Minister for Immigration [2012] HCA 31; (2012) 86 ALJR 1019 [97] (Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ). See also Re Refugee Tribunal; Ex parte Aala [2000] HCA 57; (2000) 204 CLR 82. Crucially, as I have earlier noted, a notice under s 37 does not affect the rights or interests of the applicant; it is one step in the process by which the committee reaches a decision. The decision to issue a s 37 notice is not one that would be expected to attract obligations of procedural fairness. The proper characterisation of a s 37 notice is that it is one of the mechanisms by which procedural fairness is accorded to a person who may ultimately be held responsible for remediation of a site. The requirement to issue a s 37 notice is a modification of the common law requirements of procedural fairness, imposing on the committee a stricter obligation than might otherwise apply: BP Australia Pty Ltd v Contaminated Sites Committee [2012] WASC 221 [110] (Martin CJ). In essence, the applicant's contention is that it is entitled to be accorded procedural fairness in a particular manner before the procedural fairness requirements provided for in s 37 have been accorded to the applicant. To construe the Act in this manner would be to treat a s 37 notice as having greater significance and effect than is provided for in the Act. Furthermore, it would be to impose prescriptive obligations as to the way in which, and timing of, aspects of procedural fairness are to be delivered. This is likely to impose a process which is more concerned with formalities than s 34 implies. Procedural fairness is concerned with substance, not form. It is concerned with the substance of the entirety of the process, not part of it: See South Australia v O'Shea [1987] HCA 39; (1987) 163 CLR 378. The applicant placed reliance on the process here being what was described as 'two‑tier decision‑making'. That is to say that the process involves an investigation and a preliminary decision before a final decision is made. Reference was made to Hot Holdings Pty Ltd v Creasy [1996] HCA 44; (1996) 185 CLR 149 and Gribbles Pathology v Cassidy [2002] FCR 856; (2002) 122 FCR 78. But the use of general categorisations like 'two‑tier decision‑making' is apt to obscure the importance of the particular circumstances. Hot Holdings involved a preliminary decision by someone other than the final decision‑maker that the final decision‑maker was then required to take into account. That is materially different to the present case. In any event, whether and to what extent procedural fairness requirements apply to a preliminary stage in proceedings must always depend on the particular statutory framework within which the decision is made.