House v Forestry Tasmania - [1995] HCATrans 336

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Hobart No H2 of 1995

B e t w e e n -
GEOFFREY DAVID HOUSE
Applicant
and
FORESTRY TASMANIA and HER MAJESTY’S ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF TASMANIA

Respondents

Application for special leave to appeal

BRENNAN CJ
GAUDRON J
GUMMOW J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

FROM HOBART BY VIDEO LINK TO CANBERRA

ON THURSDAY, 23 NOVEMBER 1995, AT 9.56 AM

MR W.T. McMILLAN: Your Honours, I appear for the applicant. (instructed by McLean Phillips & Bartlett)

MR A.G. MELICK: Your Honours, I appear with my learned friend, MR J.R. McDONALD, for the respondents. (instructed by Gunson Pickard & Hann)

MR McMILLAN: Your Honours, if I could take you to page 48 of the application book where his Honour the Chief Justice deals with the issues giving rise to the first point of complaint of the applicant. It is to be recalled that what we had here was a factual base where the applicant was required, in the course of the pruning operation of the third level, to stand at various stages towards the top of the ladder and eventually on the top itself of a ladder which was not an inclined device but was vertically held against the pine tree he was pruning. He was some 4.17 metres when he was on the top rung from the ground.

BRENNAN CJ: Now, Mr McMillan, we are aware of the facts. You are aware, I take it, that the Court does not grant special leave simply to review findings of fact.

MR McMILLAN: Yes, I am aware of that, your Honour.

BRENNAN CJ: Or to determine whether or not there was a misapplication of established principle.

MR McMILLAN: Yes. I was merely providing the matrix that the applicant attacks the way in which the Full Court approached this first issue of responding to the risk and I was coming to the evidence that the Court had before it, namely from a Mr Viner, an engineer called by the respondents, and the evidence of a Mr Gilbert, called by the applicant, and the purport of that evidence is set out at page 48 in the judgment of the Chief Justice. Briefly, it indicated that there was the possibility of the use of a choker which could go round the operator and the tree itself and the court analyses that evidences toward the foot of page 48, and the court upheld the approach of the trial judge at about line 45:

The learned trial judge concluded that for reasons he gave, including the fact that Mr Gilbert’s evidence was primarily in situations which were different.....he should place greater reliance upon Mr Viner’s opinion.

Now, the applicant says that the Full Court has not applied those principles in such well-known authorities as Wyong v Shirt. There has not been that proper balancing and evaluation of the evidence which the principles set out in the…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading House v Forestry Tasmania

Details

AGLC: House v Forestry Tasmania [1995] HCATrans 336
Case: [1995] HCATrans 336
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia heard an appeal in *House v Forestry Tasmania*. The case concerned a dispute between Mr House, a landowner, and Forestry Tasmania, a state-owned corporation, regarding the impact of forestry operations on Mr House's property.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether Forestry Tasmania had breached a duty of care owed to Mr House by failing to take reasonable steps to prevent damage to his land, which was alleged to have been caused by the discharge of water and debris from forestry operations. Specifically, the Court had to consider the scope of the duty of care owed by a statutory authority in carrying out its functions and whether the actions or omissions of Forestry Tasmania fell below the standard of reasonable care.

The Court's reasoning focused on the principles of negligence. It was held that while Forestry Tasmania had a statutory duty to manage state forests, this did not absolve it from a common law duty of care to adjoining landowners. The Court examined the foreseeability of harm to Mr House's property and the reasonableness of the precautions that could have been taken by Forestry Tasmania to mitigate any potential damage. The Court ultimately found that Forestry Tasmania had failed to exercise reasonable care in its management of the forestry operations, leading to foreseeable damage to Mr House's land.

The High Court allowed the appeal, finding that Forestry Tasmania was liable for the damage caused to Mr House's property. The matter was remitted to the Supreme Court of Tasmania for determination of the quantum of damages.

Orders