Ilic v City of Adelaide

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Land and Valuation Division: Application for Judicial Review)

ILIC v THE CITY OF ADELAIDE & ANOR

[2010] SASC 139

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Kourakis

12 May 2010

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - JUDICIAL REVIEW - GROUNDS OF REVIEW - UNREASONABLENESS

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - JUDICIAL REVIEW - GROUNDS OF REVIEW - JURISDICTIONAL MATTERS

ENVIRONMENT AND PLANNING - HERITAGE CONSERVATION - JUDICIAL REVIEW OF HERITAGE DECISIONS - GENERALLY

ENVIRONMENT AND PLANNING - BUILDING CONTROL - COUNCIL CONSENT AND APPROVAL - MATTERS FOR CONSIDERATION BY COUNCIL - HERITAGE PROTECTION

Plaintiff purchased residence in 2003 – plaintiff notified of proposal to designate residence local heritage place in 2006 – proposal resulted from heritage survey – plaintiff took no steps to lodge written objection – residence then designated local heritage place – between 2007 and 2009 plaintiff applied several times for demolition of residence and consent for new development – first defendant refused development approval – plaintiff obtained two opinions and first defendant obtained a further opinion all concluding that residence did not warrant listing as local heritage place – first defendant and plaintiff each requested heritage designation of residence be removed by second defendant, who refused both requests – plaintiff sought judicial review of first defendant’s refusal of development approval.

Whether lawfulness of designation of place as local heritage place turns on court’s finding that place satisfies one or more of criteria specified in Development Act 1993, s 23(4) or whether it turns on Minister’s opinion that place satisfied one or more of those criteria – held: power to designate a place as a local heritage place is administrative not legislative – lawful designation of a place as local heritage place turns on Minister’s opinion that one or more of the criteria specified in Development Act 1993, s 23(4) are satisfied – unnecessary in this case to go on to consider the grounds on which the opinion of the Minister may be reviewed.

Whether designation of residence as local heritage place ineffective because of erroneous description in Development Plan – held: description of residence in Development Plan sufficiently clear and certain for designation as local heritage place to be effective.

Whether first defendant’s refusal of development approval invalid because of Wednesbury unreasonableness and failure to have regard to the requests to remove heritage designation of residence – held: although residence of insignificant heritage value, first defendant’s decision to proceed on the basis that residence correctly designated as heritage place notwithstanding opinions to the contrary not perverse or unreasonable – first defendant’s refusal of development approval valid.

Development Act 1993 s 3, s 4, s 23, s 24, s 25, s 29, s 33, s 35; Development Regulations 2008 cll 1(4) and 12(1) of Sch 1A, cl 2 of Sch 2, cl 4(1) of Sch 3, Sch 4, referred to.
Timbarra Protection Coalition Inc v Ross Mining NL (1999) 46 NSWLR 55; Woolworths Ltd v Pallas Newco Pty Ltd (2004) 61 NSWLR 707; Australian Heritage Commission v Mount Isa…

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Details
Case
[2010] SASC 139
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Ilic v City of Adelaide, the plaintiff sought judicial review of a decision by the City of Adelaide to refuse development approval for the demolition of a residence and construction of a new building on the site. The dispute centred on the designation of the residence as a local heritage place, a decision made by the City of Adelaide in 2006. The plaintiff argued that the designation was flawed and that the council's refusal of development approval was unreasonable and invalid. The legal issues before the court were whether the lawfulness of the heritage designation was determined by the court or the Minister, whether the designation was ineffective due to an erroneous description in the Development Plan, and whether the council's decision was unreasonable and failed to consider requests to remove the heritage designation.

The court held that the designation of a place as a local heritage place was an administrative decision, not legislative, and hinged on the Minister's opinion that the criteria in the Development Act were satisfied. The court found the description of the residence in the Development Plan sufficiently clear and certain to render the designation effective. Regarding the council's decision, the court concluded that despite the residence's insignificant heritage value, the council's decision to proceed on the basis that the residence was correctly designated as a heritage place was not unreasonable. The council's refusal of development approval was therefore valid.

The court's reasoning was based on a detailed analysis of the criteria for heritage designation, the descriptions provided in the Development Plan and heritage reports, and the council's consideration of the heritage value of the residence. The court found that the council's decision was not Wednesbury unreasonable and did not fail to consider the plaintiff's requests to remove the heritage designation. The plaintiff's application for judicial review was dismissed.

The final orders of the court were that the plaintiff's application for judicial review be dismissed, and that the costs of the application be paid by the plaintiff.

Background

Background to the litigation

In 2003, the plaintiff purchased a residence located in North Adelaide. In 2006, the plaintiff was notified that the residence was proposed to be designated as a local heritage place. This proposal arose from a heritage survey conducted by McDougall and Vine, which described the residence as an important example of the Inter-War Old English revival style, reflecting the design, details, and building materials commonly in use at that time. The plaintiff did not take any steps to lodge a written objection to this proposal. Subsequently, the residence was designated as a local heritage place under the Development Act 1993.

Between 2007 and 2009, the plaintiff applied several times for the demolition of the residence and for consent for new development. The City of Adelaide, the first defendant, refused the development approval. To challenge the heritage designation, the plaintiff obtained two independent opinions, both concluding that the residence did not warrant listing as a local heritage place. The City of Adelaide obtained a further opinion, which also concluded that the residence should not be listed. Both the plaintiff and the City of Adelaide requested the second defendant, the Minister, to remove the heritage designation of the residence, but the Minister refused both requests. The plaintiff then sought judicial review of the City of Adelaide's refusal of the development approval.

The key facts revolve around the heritage designation of the residence, the differing opinions on its heritage value, and the subsequent refusal of the development approval by the City of Adelaide. The plaintiff's applications for demolition and new development were denied, leading to the judicial review proceedings where the validity of the designation and the council's decision were central issues.

The matter before the court is an application for judicial review of a decision by the City of Adelaide (the "First Defendant") to refuse the plaintiff's application for development approval. The plaintiff, who purchased a residence in 2003, was notified in 2006 of a proposal to designate the residence as a local heritage place. The proposal resulted from a heritage survey, but the plaintiff did not lodge any written objection. The residence was subsequently designated as a local heritage place, and between 2007 and 2009, the plaintiff applied several times for demolition of the residence and consent for new development. The First Defendant refused the development approval, and the plaintiff obtained two opinions that the residence did not warrant listing as a local heritage place, while the First Defendant obtained a further opinion to the contrary. Both the plaintiff and the First Defendant requested the second defendant, the Minister, to remove the heritage designation of the residence, but the Minister refused both requests. The plaintiff then sought judicial review of the First Defendant's refusal of development approval.

Key procedural steps in the matter include the plaintiff's application for judicial review, the filing of written submissions by both parties, and the making of interlocutory orders by the court. The court heard arguments on several grounds of review, including whether the designation of the residence as a local heritage place was lawful, whether the designation was ineffective due to an erroneous description in the Development Plan, and whether the First Defendant's refusal of development approval was invalid due to Wednesbury unreasonableness and failure to have regard to the requests to remove the heritage designation. The court ultimately found that the First Defendant's decision to proceed on the basis that the residence was correctly designated as a heritage place was not perverse or unreasonable, and that the refusal of development approval was valid.

Decision

Reasons for decision

My reasons for so concluding follow.The validity of the council’s decision to refuse the applicationA Local Heritage Place? Schedule 2 to the Adelaide Development Plan contains a discussion of the various architectural styles which are reflected in Adelaide’s building heritage. The old English Revival style is said to describe homes exhibiting Elizabethan Tudor architectural details such as brick or white rendered walls, steeply pitched roof form and tall chimneys. The actual designation of the residence appears in a table headed Local Heritage Places at the foot of that part of the Adelaide Development Plan applicable to the Hill Street Policy Area: Section 23(4) of the Act is set out in [39] below. For now it suffices to observe that the criteria specified by s 23(4) of the Act which are referred to in the last column of the listing set out above are s 23(4)(a) “historical social and economic themes” and s 23(4)(d) “aesthetic merit, design characteristics or construction techniques”. The designation of the residence resulted from a heritage survey of North Adelaide buildings conducted by McDougall and Vine. The survey described the dwelling in these terms:STATEMENT OF HERITAGE VALUE:This house is an important example of the Inter-War Old English revival style of residences constructed in North Adelaide during the 1920s – 1930s, and reflects the design, details and building materials commonly in use at that time.The significant number of stone and brick residences, like this house, constructed in the Inter War period between 1920 and 1940 throughout this section of the city, are an important element of the distinctive historic residential character of North Adelaide. (emphasis in original) The plaintiff subsequently obtained two opinions on the heritage value of the residence. The first was a report from the architects Danvers Schulz Holland dated August 2006. The author, Mr Schulz, stated that:the subject building is not an ‘excellent’ or ‘important’ example of the inter-war Old English style, … and further does not represent important historical and social themes typical to the locality. Mr Schulz’s opinion was that the residence is:not a fine or exceptional example of inter-war Old English but is rather a mix of various styles of the day, including Spanish Mission. The subject building fails to display ‘typical’ characteristics of the inter-war Old English [style]. Mr Schulz concluded that the residence did not display sufficient aesthetic merit and design characteristics of significance to North Adelaide to warrant its listing as a Local Heritage Place. In 2006, before Mr Ilic obtained the second of his two heritage reports, the City of Adelaide requested a heritage report from Peter Bell. Mr Bell dismissed the basis for the listing given in the McDougall and Vine survey as being little more than the fact that the residence demonstrates that houses were being built in the inter-war period. Mr Bell described the residence as “eclectic, as much Spanish as Old English”. It was his view that the dwelling “is by no means an ‘excellent’ or ‘important’ example of the Old English style”. In Mr Bell’s opinion neither Elizabethan nor Tudor details were evident. He recommended that the residence be removed from the schedule of Local Heritage Places.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court's reasoning in Ilic v City of Adelaide involved several key issues, primarily concerning the administrative process of designating a local heritage place and the subsequent refusal of development approval. The first issue addressed was whether the lawfulness of the designation of the place as a local heritage place depended on the court's finding that the place satisfied one or more of the criteria specified in the Development Act 1993, s 23(4), or whether it depended on the Minister's opinion that the place satisfied one or more of those criteria. The court held that the power to designate a place as a local heritage place was administrative, not legislative. Therefore, the lawful designation of a place as a local heritage place hinged on the Minister's opinion that one or more of the criteria specified in s 23(4) of the Act were satisfied. The court found it unnecessary to delve into the grounds on which the Minister's opinion could be reviewed.

Next, the court examined whether the designation of the residence as a local heritage place was ineffective due to an erroneous description in the Development Plan. The court held that the description of the residence in the Development Plan was sufficiently clear and certain to render the designation as a local heritage place effective. The description, which referred to the Old English Revival style, aligned with the criteria outlined in s 23(4) of the Act, namely "historical social and economic themes" and "aesthetic merit, design characteristics or construction techniques".

The court then considered whether the first defendant's refusal of development approval was invalid due to Wednesbury unreasonableness and failure to have regard to the requests to remove the heritage designation of the residence. Despite the residence being of insignificant heritage value, according to opinions obtained by both parties, the court found that the first defendant's decision to proceed on the basis that the residence was correctly designated as a heritage place was not perverse or unreasonable. The court reasoned that the first defendant's decision to maintain the heritage designation, despite contrary opinions, was a valid exercise of their administrative discretion and did not constitute an unreasonable decision under the Wednesbury standard.

Lastly, the court addressed whether the first defendant's refusal of development approval was valid despite the residence being of insignificant heritage value. The court upheld the validity of the refusal, reinforcing that the administrative decision to maintain the heritage designation, even in the face of contrary expert opinions, was within the bounds of reasonableness and did not constitute an error of law.

The ratio decidendi of the case is that the administrative decision to designate a place as a local heritage place is grounded in the Minister's opinion on the satisfaction of specified criteria, and such designation's effectiveness does not hinge on judicial review. Additionally, the court's refusal of development approval, based on the maintenance of the heritage designation, was found to be a valid exercise of administrative discretion, even when contrary expert opinions exist. This decision underscores the deference given to administrative bodies in matters of heritage conservation and development approval, provided their decisions are not Wednesbury unreasonable.